Transcripts
Return to the list of transcripts
Transcript
Hearing: 22nd September 2009, day 68
Click here to download the LiveNote version
- - - - - - - - - -
PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF
ROBERT HAMILL
- - - - - - - - - -
Held at:
Interpoint
20-24 York Street
Belfast
on Tuesday, 22nd September 2009
commencing at 10.00 am
Day 68
1 Tuesday, 22nd September 2009
2 (10.00 am)
3 MR COLIN JOHN MURRAY (cont.)
4 Questions from MR McGRORY
5 MR McGRORY: If I may, sir, my name is McGrory. I am asking
6 questions on behalf of the family of Robert Hamill.
7 Mr Murray, you have over 30 years' experience as
8 a policeman. Isn't that right?
9 A. Yes, I do, yes.
10 Q. Many of those years were at a senior level?
11 A. Yes, they were.
12 Q. During which you were responsible in a leadership role
13 for the conduct of quite a number of murder
14 investigations?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. So when it is suggested to you, or when you are asked,
17 "Look, are you in any sort of association of experts?"
18 I am going to say to you that that's not really what are
19 about. You are here to evaluate this situation because
20 of the on-the-job experience that you have?
21 A. That's correct. I am an accredited senior investigative
22 officer. I think, as you are aware, I trained senior
23 officers from across the UK into best practice in
24 relation to the investigation of murder, and it is my
25 experience and that expertise that I bring before this
1
1 hearing here.
2 Q. Yes. Indeed, when you finished your job as an actual
3 working investigator at superintendent level, you were
4 then asked to become engaged in the training of other
5 superintendents?
6 A. That's correct, and I also acted as mentor to senior
7 investigating officers, having retired from Kent police.
8 Q. Thank you. Can I just ask you about, in your
9 experience, the value as an investigator of having
10 someone who might be suspected in a murder inquiry of
11 assisting the offenders after the event investigated as
12 part of the murder investigation?
13 A. I think as far as possible it would be essential to try
14 to do so. I have had experience of similar situations
15 where we have arrested somebody during part of the
16 murder investigation, because that may bring substantial
17 evidence, and I only say may bring substantial evidence,
18 towards the murder investigation.
19 Q. Of course, if it is at all possible, there are
20 considerable advantages to having he who may have
21 assisted the offender tried alongside the offender?
22 A. Absolutely.
23 Q. If I may elaborate on that a little bit, for example, if
24 there is evidence that someone was involved in a murder,
25 obviously the tribunal hearing that case might be
2
1 influenced by the fact that that person needed
2 assistance?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. In other words, it bolsters the case against the
5 offender in as much as it is relevant to the person who
6 assisted the offender?
7 A. Yes, it does.
8 Q. So as an investigating strategy, that would be best
9 practice, if at all possible?
10 A. I believe that to be so, yes.
11 Q. What happened in this case, however, is that Reserve
12 Constable Atkinson was investigated separately as part
13 of the allegations of neglect against the police rather
14 than investigated alongside those accused of the murder.
15 A. Are you talking of the alleged neglect of ...?
16 Q. The Land Rover police. Sorry.
17 A. Yes, yes.
18 Q. How that happened is as follows: that Tracey Clarke came
19 forward and Timothy Jameson came forward in or about the
20 weekend of Friday, 9th, Saturday, 10th May, a short time
21 after Robert Hamill died and still a relatively short
22 time after the incident.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. In terms of how the information about Allister Hanvey
25 and those others who were named by those witnesses as
3
1 being part of the people who murdered Robert Hamill is
2 concerned, they were all immediately arrested?
3 A. They were.
4 Q. The allegations were put to them and they were charged,
5 but that didn't happen with Reserve Constable Atkinson,
6 about whom an allegation had been made that he assisted
7 one of those offenders.
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. In fact, he wasn't even spoken to about this until the
10 following September.
11 A. That's right.
12 Q. The context in which he was spoken to was in the context
13 of an interview about the neglect -- about allegations
14 of neglect of the Land Rover police in not getting out
15 of the Land Rover quick enough?
16 A. That's correct, yes.
17 Q. In terms of the fruits of any questions that he was
18 asked about the Tracey Clarke allegation of collusion
19 with Hanvey, if I may use the word, that was never fed
20 into the murder file at any time?
21 A. No, it wasn't.
22 Q. In fact, it was eventually included in a neglect file,
23 which was a separate file?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. There was talk at some point that there might -- there
4
1 would have been a third file, an assisting offender
2 file, a criminal file, specific to that allegation, but
3 there never was such a file, sure there wasn't?
4 A. No, there wasn't.
5 Q. But insofar as the neglect file is concerned, Mr Adair
6 asked you yesterday about the language used of
7 scepticism, but the reality is that what we have been
8 told by Inspector Irwin and what we hear from the tapes
9 of Superintendent McBurney is that they never actually
10 believed the alibi presented by Andrea McKee and her
11 husband Michael on behalf of Atkinson --
12 A. No, they didn't.
13 Q. -- and that nowhere in that file is it clear to the
14 reader that, in fact, the police simply didn't believe
15 it.
16 A. It was not in that file, and I have to say I am very
17 surprised that it wasn't. I do believe, as I said
18 yesterday, that that should have been disclosed.
19 Q. Yes, and, indeed, not just should it have been disclosed
20 that it was disbelieved, but the reasons for the
21 disbelief --
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. -- should have been disclosed --
24 A. Absolutely.
25 Q. -- so as the reader of the neglect file would understand
5
1 that this was not a closed situation --
2 A. That's right.
3 Q. -- this was an ongoing investigation.
4 A. Indeed.
5 Q. But that wasn't done?
6 A. It wasn't done.
7 Q. Now, can I move on just to the thorny question of
8 Superintendent McBurney's motivation for his conduct of
9 the murder inquiry insofar as he took decisions about
10 how to deal with allegations about Reserve Constable
11 Atkinson?
12 Your first impression on reading these papers was,
13 as you have said, that it was -- first of all, you had
14 no comprehension as to why he went about it the way he
15 did in terms of any strategy?
16 A. I didn't see a strategy.
17 Q. No. Insofar as any revision of your opinion has been
18 concerned, you have reconsidered it for a number of
19 reasons, but one of those reasons is that it has now
20 been apparent to you that Mr McBurney has said there was
21 a strategy, a wait-and-see, wait-in-the-long-grass-type
22 strategy?
23 A. Yes, and on listening to the evidence of Mr Irwin, who
24 reflected upon the strategy that Mr McBurney was
25 playing.
6
1 Q. But, of course, you haven't -- I mean, you still can't
2 comprehend the strategy?
3 A. I can't, no, I can't. I find it very difficult to
4 understand how an allegation as serious as that can be
5 made, and for me, in effect, no action taken for the
6 best part of three years.
7 Q. Yes. I mean, one of the other reasons you have put
8 forward for your revision of your first impression is
9 what has been said about Superintendent McBurney --
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. -- in terms of his dedication and commitment as
12 a policeman.
13 A. That's correct, yes.
14 Q. But has it occurred to you that the more skilled and the
15 more experienced a police officer is, the harder it is
16 to understand this strategy?
17 A. Yes, I agree.
18 Q. And, of course, while we have heard evidence of
19 Superintendent McBurney's commitment in catching
20 criminals of all types from both sides of the community
21 and terrorism, of course, we have heard nothing in terms
22 of any investigation into another policeman?
23 A. No, we haven't, no.
24 Q. Another one of the reasons that you put forward for
25 revising your view was the possible concern, inhibiting
7
1 concern, that those officers would have had for
2 Tracey Clarke's safety.
3 That's one of the reasons you put forward in the
4 document for revising your view on the criminal
5 negligence issue.
6 A. No, not in relation to Tracey Clarke. I alluded to that
7 in relation to the -- the safety of Tracey Clarke was of
8 paramount importance, and I think it has been suggested
9 during the hearing the question was raised: how could
10 we, or how could the RUC, advance the investigation of
11 attempting to pervert the course of justice without
12 endangering Tracey by divulging that?
13 So I was alluding really to the -- I would not have
14 been divulging that statement. That's why
15 I acknowledged the safety of Tracey Clarke, but then
16 wanted to talk about the tactics of the telephone
17 subscriber checks and calls.
18 Q. But, of course, in terms of the safety of Tracey Clarke,
19 there had to be a point in the conduct of the case at
20 which her identity became known to those against whom
21 she was originally going to give evidence.
22 A. From the reading of the material, I think her identity
23 became known quite early, but it would be wrong of the
24 police to openly disclose her identity in an interview.
25 Q. Indeed, there would have been ways to interview those
8
1 suspects, including Atkinson, about the telephone call
2 allegation, as you suggested yesterday, without
3 revealing her identity; for example, if they were all
4 interrogated about the issue of contact and asked for
5 telephone records?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Or if, indeed, telephone records had been sought in
8 relation to them all?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. That would have gone a considerable way to protecting
11 her identity?
12 A. Yes, her identity wouldn't have been revealed.
13 Q. No, because if, for example, Constable Neill was asked
14 about it or any of the others in the Land Rover, then
15 the appearance would have been given, "Well, we are all
16 being investigated about this"?
17 A. I think it could have been a sensible tactic to look at
18 what contact there was between the alleged suspects in
19 order to try to cover for the identity of Tracey Clarke,
20 and that in itself would have revealed the incoming
21 telephone call from the reserve constable's house.
22 Q. Of course, the other factor here is, Mr Murray, that
23 Tracey Clarke withdrew her evidence on 16th October. So
24 thereafter then she was no longer a prosecution witness
25 really.
9
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. And shortly after that Hanvey and others were released.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. So the issue of her safety then would have been less of
5 an issue from that point on.
6 A. Yes, possibly.
7 Q. Well, she continued to live in the community and there
8 is no evidence of any harm coming to her at that point.
9 A. No.
10 Q. Of course, in terms of the fake alibi which came in from
11 Andrea McKee, it didn't come in until after that.
12 A. 27th October.
13 Q. Indeed. So in terms of any risk to Tracey Clarke, from
14 an investigating point of view in terms of cracking the
15 fake alibi, that would be a factor that had been
16 significantly reduced by then?
17 A. I am not sure by then whether they would even have had
18 to use Tracey Clarke.
19 Q. Indeed.
20 A. Because on the 27th, as I have suggested, she could have
21 been challenged about the account she put forward at
22 that time.
23 Q. Or indeed a short time after the 27th.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. There is an issue about whether or not Inspector Irwin
10
1 should have taken that statement. I am not actually
2 going to suggest to you that he shouldn't have done, but
3 once he did, there was then a golden opportunity to
4 crack open the alibi to see what else might have
5 happened.
6 A. There was.
7 Q. Looking briefly in terms of the conduct of the murder
8 investigation, speaking hypothetically, had she
9 disclosed that, in fact, she had been induced to give
10 a false alibi on behalf of Atkinson by Atkinson and her
11 husband, that, then, would have given grounds for the
12 immediate arrest of Atkinson and interrogation about
13 that?
14 A. Yes, it would.
15 Q. Faced with an allegation of assisting an offender, one
16 really doesn't know how Atkinson might have reacted.
17 A. I couldn't say how he would react.
18 Q. No.
19 A. Obviously I think his reaction would depend on the
20 weight of evidence.
21 Q. But one possible reaction, as happens in criminal cases,
22 is that he may have decided to disclose what he knew
23 about what happened on the night?
24 A. Yes, possibly.
25 Q. Now, just finally, Mr Murray, in terms of the telephone
11
1 billing you mentioned in your document that we were
2 furnished with yesterday, one of the reasons why you
3 might be revising your view of McBurney is that you
4 hadn't been aware that there was a difficulty about the
5 telephone providers giving the information in such a way
6 that it could be used in interviews?
7 A. No. Well, if I gave that impression, I need to correct
8 that.
9 Q. Yes, please.
10 A. What I have picked up during the hearing is that, at
11 certain times, service providers here were reluctant to
12 put witnesses before the court because of possible
13 danger.
14 I could understand the logic and the argument that
15 followed, that you would not necessarily advance those
16 as evidence, but that doesn't mean that within -- what
17 you would have is an intelligence document that
18 I believe you could use in the interview of Reserve
19 Constable Atkinson and I think it should have been used.
20 Q. Yes. Did you hear the evidence as well of the chief
21 constable, and I think, indeed, Inspector Irwin, that
22 there was a mechanism by which such information could be
23 obtained through a court order --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. -- to, in fact, use it in an interview and subsequently
12
1 evidentially?
2 A. Oh, yes, and I have heard that point made and that's
3 valid. If they wanted records, they could have got
4 a court order and I think I heard it mentioned they
5 could on occasions use service providers from England --
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. -- to distance them from that.
8 Q. Indeed.
9 A. So, yes, I do believe the records could have been
10 evidence and I do believe they could have been used.
11 MR McGRORY: Yes. Thank you very much.
12 MR ADAIR: Sir, I wonder might I mention one matter while it
13 is fresh in your mind, if I may? It relates to -- and
14 I'm sure it wasn't deliberate -- the suggestion that
15 there has been no evidence of Mr McBurney's involvement
16 in the investigation of policemen.
17 You will recall, sir -- I can't remember the precise
18 document, but the ICPC approved Mr McBurney as the
19 investigating officer in the neglect allegation because
20 of their experience of him in previous investigations
21 with the ICPC.
22 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
23 MR ADAIR: I don't think I need bother the witness with the
24 question, but just to remind the Panel of that evidence.
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Murray, can I just ask you this about
13
1 seeking to destroy the alibi that the McKees had put
2 forward?
3 That would be of little value unless one or both of
4 the McKees could then be used as witnesses in
5 a prosecution of Atkinson. Is that right?
6 A. That's correct, yes.
7 THE CHAIRMAN: An accomplice witness starts, or may start,
8 at a disadvantage in the eyes of the court.
9 A. Yes, absolutely.
10 THE CHAIRMAN: Would it be important to seek to destroy the
11 alibi in a way in which the attempt didn't at the outset
12 simply produce a lot of denials and lies, which might
13 then be used to discredit the witness in
14 cross-examination?
15 A. Yes. That would be so.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: So how you do it is not an easy matter?
17 A. No, and I am not confident that it could ever have been
18 managed successfully, but it's my view that that should
19 have been attempted.
20 THE CHAIRMAN: Even though you think, if it had been, it
21 might never have been successful in the sense of leaving
22 a witness as intact as possible so far as her
23 credibility was concerned?
24 A. I don't think -- I mean, there are inherent difficulties
25 obviously in using anybody who would later go before
14
1 a court and admit that they perverted the course of
2 justice, and I fully understand that. There are
3 difficulties, but I do believe that Andrea McKee should
4 have been challenged on that statement.
5 THE CHAIRMAN: You see, what we do know is -- and I am
6 leaving aside the delay, which is something we shall
7 have to consider -- that when Andrea McKee was seen, she
8 was ready, if you like, to come clean without any
9 prevarication.
10 A. Yes.
11 THE CHAIRMAN: So her attitude, when approached, didn't
12 provide further material to discredit her as a witness.
13 A. No, and I accept and understand that.
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
15 Questions from MS DINSMORE
16 MS DINSMORE: Good morning, Mr Murray.
17 A. Good morning.
18 Q. My name is Margaret Ann Dinsmore. I appear on behalf of
19 both Eleanor and Robbie Atkinson. I have very little
20 for you, but there are just two things.
21 First of all, I wonder, could we have page [74400]
22 up, please? Now, Mr Murray, if we could just highlight
23 the first two lines of the final paragraph.
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you tell us what document this is we are
25 looking at?
15
1 MS DINSMORE: We are looking at Mr Murray's report itself,
2 page 10 of the transcript of his report. This is your
3 report. This was your thinking. Your report initially
4 was done -- and this is no criticism at all --
5 an incredible exercise that you undertook, a very
6 extensive exercise, but it was a paper exercise. Isn't
7 that right?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. This report reflects what you are thinking on certain
10 matters at that stage with what you have before you?
11 That's correct?
12 A. That's correct, absolutely.
13 Q. Can I just take you to the first sentence in that
14 paragraph 4.26? There you refer to Reserve Constable
15 Atkinson and you say:
16 "Reserve Constable Atkinson was perhaps the most
17 active officer initially at the scene."
18 Now, is there anything that you have heard during
19 the course of this Inquiry that changed your views on
20 that?
21 A. Nothing whatsoever.
22 Q. So you were satisfied then and you are satisfied now
23 exactly what is stated there?
24 A. Yes, and I fully believe that still. Reserve Constable
25 Atkinson was very active at that scene.
16
1 Q. Thank you very much. Then I have just one other thing
2 to ask of you. You have been very helpful in providing
3 a further note and coming along to tell us after your
4 consideration of what we have lived and breathed really
5 since 13th January this year.
6 Can you tell us a little about how you went about
7 that exercise? Were you in chamber every day of the
8 last 70 days or so that we are on now?
9 A. No. I was tasked to select those witnesses that
10 I wished to hear give live evidence. I was asked to
11 view initially transcripts of the evidence of certain
12 other witnesses, but because of the extent of that work,
13 that then came down to rely on the reading of
14 a number of statements.
15 I have to say there were some people, with respect,
16 that were almost irrelevant to my report. So those
17 people I took no notes of.
18 Q. Right. Just so I am clear, really you had almost
19 a hybrid exercise in relation to consideration of the
20 evidence which this Inquiry has heard? Some of it was
21 on paper. Some of it was on paper that was -- and
22 I don't mean this in any way derogatory at all, but
23 because of the remit and your terms of reference, some
24 of it on paper was cursory, because you would say, "That
25 wasn't relevant to what I was tasked to do". Is that
17
1 right?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Then we have another category of witnesses and that is
4 a perusal of, really, the transcript that came up in
5 relation to each day?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Then there is the third category which are those
8 witnesses that you thought you wanted to see and hear?
9 A. That's correct, yes.
10 Q. And to see and hear, then were you present in the
11 chamber, or did you do it by way of a link?
12 A. I did both. On occasions I would be in the chamber
13 here, but I have to say I found it more conducive to
14 being in the Inquiry room, where I could make easier
15 notes basically.
16 Q. Right. So even the exercise of observation was
17 a hybrid. You picked your witnesses --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- that you wanted to be in the presence of?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Physically in the presence of, auditory in the presence
22 of, and then there are those that you said, "Yes, I want
23 to see them, I want to hear them, but I don't need to be
24 in the presence of them"?
25 A. Yes, that is correct.
18
1 Q. Now, can I ask you, what witnesses did you choose to be
2 in the presence of?
3 A. Without going through all my notes, which I don't have
4 with me, I am not, off the top of my head, able to say
5 how many I was in for.
6 Q. Well, can I ask you, for example, were you in for
7 Tracey Hanvey?
8 A. I was in the chamber for Tracey, yes.
9 Q. You were in the chamber for Tracey?
10 A. Because she was by video link.
11 Q. So you saw her and heard her via the video link?
12 A. Yes, I did.
13 Q. What about Andrea McKee?
14 A. No, I wasn't here for Andrea McKee.
15 Q. So you neither saw nor heard orally Andrea McKee? You
16 read obviously I would think, unless it may well be --
17 THE CHAIRMAN: You have not given him a chance. He is
18 thinking about his answer.
19 MS DINSMORE: I apologise. I am very properly corrected by
20 the Chair.
21 A. I stand to be corrected, but I believe I listened to
22 Andrea McKee.
23 Q. From where?
24 A. From the Inquiry. I can't guarantee that. I would need
25 to do some research into that.
19
1 Q. I appreciate you wouldn't have all your notes here.
2 Would you have your diary here?
3 A. I don't carry a diary.
4 Q. So you wouldn't know whether you were in the province on
5 11th February of this year or not then?
6 A. Without doing some research, I don't know.
7 Q. What about my clients? Were you present for my clients?
8 A. Yes, I was.
9 Q. In the chamber?
10 A. Only for Reserve Constable Atkinson.
11 Q. Were you in the chamber here or ...?
12 A. I was here for both Reserve Constable Atkinson and his
13 wife, and there may -- I have a feeling there was
14 an amalgam of being in the chamber and listening again
15 in the Inquiry.
16 Q. So you --
17 A. I know I was definitely here at the Robert Hamill
18 Inquiry.
19 Q. You were present in the back. Right.
20 What about the -- you know there were very senior
21 prosecutors who have given evidence at this Inquiry,
22 very, very senior practitioners who have given evidence
23 about interviews that they carried out and views that
24 they formed in relation to Andrea McKee.
25 Were you present, for example, here -- and this you
20
1 won't need your diary for; it is very recent -- for
2 10th September or 3rd September
3 A. Can you tell me ...
4 Q. Christine Smith.
5 A. No, I have read her transcript.
6 Q. But you didn't see her?
7 A. No.
8 Q. What about Mr Gerald Simpson?
9 A. No, I didn't.
10 Q. Was the impression you got from the transcripts you read
11 such as led you to believe that these were very, very
12 senior people indeed who were highly experienced in
13 relation to the task of dealing with potential
14 witnesses?
15 A. Yes, indeed.
16 Q. Have any of your observations meant there was anything
17 further that you wished to add to your report in
18 relation to that category of evidence that we have
19 explored?
20 A. Not really. I am mindful of the views of the first
21 witness you mentioned of the lack of credibility that
22 she felt Andrea McKee had.
23 Q. Yes. Were you impressed by her evidence?
24 A. I mean, I have looked at her professionally and, you
25 know, that is her view obviously.
21
1 Q. Yes, but if you had been a policeman at an investigation
2 and you had prosecutors probably actually, you know, if
3 you were working amongst, you would have known, but was
4 there anything that was unimpressive or inconsistent in
5 relation to the evidence they gave in relation to the
6 conclusion that they formed?
7 A. As I understand it, their issues were in relation to the
8 doctors and the account that Andrea McKee had given in
9 Wrexham. My view is, and was, first of all,
10 Andrea McKee admitted to perverting the course of
11 justice. So her credibility and reliability as
12 a witness was already --
13 Q. Tarnished?
14 A. -- tarnished. I mean, it must be, because she would
15 have admitted to committing a criminal offence.
16 I didn't think the evidence of her at the surgery
17 actually was very significant, from my point of view,
18 because of that.
19 Q. Surely Miss Smith particularly went a little further
20 than that, did she not, when pressed particularly by
21 Inquiry counsel?
22 When pressed, she went further and gave what her
23 view was about this witness over and above just that one
24 individual aspect of the Pendine.
25 A. I am afraid you would have to refresh my memory with
22
1 exactly what she did say when she was pushed.
2 Q. I am being unfair to you.
3 THE CHAIRMAN: I don't think, in fact, Miss Smith gave us
4 any assessment about the evidence concerning the case.
5 I think her focus was on the effect on Mrs McKee's
6 credibility of what she was saying about Pendine.
7 Am I right, Mr Underwood?
8 MR UNDERWOOD: I am so sorry. I didn't hear. An urgent
9 e-mail.
10 MS DINSMORE: He never listens while I am on my feet.
11 I mean, there is, and in fact there has been from day
12 one, that everybody understands where he is coming from.
13 THE CHAIRMAN: I think the burden of Miss Smith's evidence
14 in criticising Andrea McKee's credibility focused on
15 Pendine.
16 MR UNDERWOOD: It did.
17 THE CHAIRMAN: Not on what she might be able to say about
18 the offence itself?
19 MR UNDERWOOD: I think she went further than Pendine. She
20 criticised Andrea McKee for wanting to move house, by
21 setting impossible conditions, for sending herself
22 a fake letter and various other things she has thought
23 of since.
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
25 MS DINSMORE: Thank you. Well, I doubt very much if you --
23
1 you weren't present for Miss Smith's evidence?
2 A. No, I wasn't.
3 Q. So if we are happy to leave it that we are ad idem, you
4 and I, that, in relation to her evidence and that of
5 Mr Simpson, you saw nothing to criticise that hit you on
6 reading it at all?
7 A. In relation to the two witnesses?
8 Q. Yes.
9 A. No, nothing whatsoever.
10 MS DINSMORE: Thank you very much, Mr Murray.
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
12 Questions from MR O'CONNOR
13 MR O'CONNOR: Good morning, Mr Murray. I represent only
14 Chief Superintendent McCrum and Mr Irwin.
15 Now, as you know, the chief superintendent was the
16 duty inspector on the night of the incident and Mr Irwin
17 was involved in the investigation?
18 A. That is correct, yes.
19 Q. Did you hear their evidence?
20 A. Yes, I did.
21 Q. Both of these men gave evidence that they policed
22 against a background of lack of resources. Both gave
23 the impression, I am suggesting to you, that they didn't
24 always have the manpower or the resources to do what
25 they wanted to do always.
24
1 A. I think that would be true, yes.
2 Q. I am going to suggest to you that, at the time these two
3 men were operating as police officers in 1997, that was
4 a problem for officers. Do you accept that?
5 A. I think it's a problem to virtually every UK force.
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr O'Connor, the live question for us is not
7 whether there was in general a shortage of manpower, but
8 whether, on the night in question when these two
9 officers were engaged, their efforts were affected by
10 a shortage of manpower.
11 MR O'CONNOR: Yes, Mr Chairman. If you would allow me
12 a couple of questions along the general theme, then
13 I will be more specific, if that's okay.
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Very well.
15 MR O'CONNOR: Very briefly in your statement, in your
16 report, you have referred to the Blakey Report. Isn't
17 that right? At one stage?
18 A. I don't recall.
19 Q. You have referred to a report entitled "A Thematic
20 Inspection of Murder Investigation in the PSNI".
21 A. Sorry. Her Majesty's Inspectorate, yes.
22 Q. Some people call that the Blakey Report. Perhaps you
23 have not heard that term. That was in 2002-2003?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. If you can bring up page [44027] on the screen, please,
25
1 bottom paragraph, paragraph 7.1, this is the conclusion
2 of that report. It is a fairly lengthy investigation
3 into what was available to the PSNI in 2002/2003.
4 Things, I am suggesting, were no better in 1997, and
5 that paragraph reads:
6 "The Police Service of Northern Ireland has
7 a history and a present reality which is different from
8 the forces in England and Wales."
9 What I am suggesting to you out of that is you
10 didn't have any experience of this reality of this lack
11 of resources, that it was different in Northern Ireland,
12 and it wasn't like the police forces that you had served
13 in. Do you accept that?
14 A. No. Well, that's a generic comment.
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. It is not in relation to the assault on Robert Hamill.
17 Q. No, but if I move on then:
18 "To some extent because of that history, priorities
19 have dictated that the investigation of murder has not
20 had the resources and attention paid to it than
21 elsewhere in the United Kingdom."
22 Where you were operating. Isn't that right?
23 A. I mean, it is difficult to just look at that in
24 isolation without having looked at the remaining part of
25 that report, because I did acknowledge yesterday that
26
1 there were times and areas in Northern Ireland where
2 traditional policing was impossible. So I don't know if
3 that's alluding to those really huge problems that the
4 RUC faced.
5 Q. I thought when you quoted the report in your report that
6 you had considered the report in full. You had not
7 considered the report in full? You are not au fait with
8 the contents of that report?
9 A. In truth, the preparation of that report of mine was so
10 far back it is difficult for me to recall the details.
11 Q. Strangely, there -- it is a very short conclusion that
12 only runs to three paragraphs. It has ten
13 recommendations, which I suggest to you were arising out
14 of the problems in Northern Ireland?
15 A. Okay.
16 Q. If we can move over the page very briefly, Mr Chairman,
17 I will finish this general point. [44028].
18 Paragraph 7.2. The report went on:
19 "At present, the service is not as well equipped as
20 it should be to deal with the most serious and complex
21 murder investigations ..."
22 So that's my simple point: that there was a problem
23 specific to Northern Ireland, not general to the UK, and
24 you had no experience of that. Is that fair?
25 A. That's fair.
27
1 Q. Now, if I can bring you then to your own report at
2 page [74409], paragraph 6 .6, and this then -- what I
3 will do for ease of reference is I will deal with the
4 points in relation to then DI -- sorry --
5 Duty Inspector McCrum and then I will deal with the
6 points in relation to Mr Irwin, who was then DI Irwin.
7 In paragraph 6 .6 you say about duty
8 Inspector McCrum:
9 "Apart from directing P89 to ascertain the injuries
10 sustained by the two injured parties, Inspector McCrum
11 did nothing in respect of the assaults. The disturbance
12 in the town centre was later to be described by various
13 officers as a riot and it is therefore surprising that,
14 once the crowd was dispersed, Inspector McCrum directed
15 no further police action."
16 You have heard his evidence and you have heard some
17 detail that he did ask the officers on the ground and he
18 had a general sense that this was like any other
19 Saturday night when he left.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Also, I think specifically Constable Cooke said in his
22 evidence that he just basically gave the inspector the
23 basic facts and those words are out of his statement to
24 the Inquiry.
25 A. That is correct.
28
1 Q. You will have assessed Mr McCrum, like every other
2 witness, with your expertise.
3 If the Inquiry accepts what he says about that, you
4 are handicapped when you are writing this because you
5 are looking at facts on paper, black and white, and you
6 now know that the information that you were talking
7 about was later conveyed as being something of a riot,
8 other things by officers, but at the time, if Mr McCrum
9 is right, and if he got a basic feeling, as
10 an experienced duty inspector, that this was like every
11 other Saturday night -- I am coming to my question
12 now -- did he do anything wrong by going on about his
13 other duties?
14 A. Yes, he did.
15 Q. What do you say he did wrong?
16 A. Well, from the material I have read and the evidence
17 that I have heard and in listening to Mr McCrum, I find
18 no evidence of intrusive supervision to try to establish
19 exactly what had gone on.
20 The evidence was that it took him the best part of
21 an hour to clear the town. Two people had been
22 stretchered off to hospital unconscious. I think there
23 was a much more intrusive style of leadership called for
24 on that night from Inspector McCrum. I am mindful that
25 in his evidence he said he tasked a constable to draw up
29
1 names of people who were present. I understand that
2 that constable denied having been given that
3 instruction.
4 Q. That was after, when he came back to the station.
5 I just want to focus on just before he left to do his
6 other duties in two other police stations.
7 A. I do accept -- and it is very easy to criticise with
8 hindsight. I have been an area commander coming on duty
9 at 8 o'clock in the morning to reflect on occurrences
10 that have been taking place overnight, so I'm not trying
11 to be critical for the sake of it, but I just feel that
12 when I looked at the synopsis of incidents that took
13 place over an eight-month period in Portadown, the scale
14 of this disturbance was significant, and I just believe
15 that formal questioning of officers and the four
16 officers in initial attendance would have given some
17 indication as to the scale of the disorder.
18 So if we are just talking about the immediate action
19 of Inspector McCrum, I would have expected him to talk
20 to the officers from the Land Rover.
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. And I know -- I think he said he did, but I would have
23 expected him to do that and ascertain as best he could
24 exactly the scale of what had gone on.
25 Q. I think his evidence is he did talk to the officers but
30
1 he didn't get any sense that it was anything other than
2 a normal Saturday night. That's the point I am making
3 to you.
4 A. And I have in my report referred to that, and I believe
5 it was viewed as a Saturday night punch-up, and I do
6 accept that, and I do accept that the gravity of that
7 situation did not become known to Inspector McCrum until
8 round about 4 o'clock in the morning, when he made that
9 telephone call.
10 THE CHAIRMAN: I think you say in your report that leaving
11 aside a lack of knowledge of the severity of the
12 injuries, the incident itself called for more than
13 happened?
14 A. Yes, indeed. Yes, that's exactly the point I made.
15 MR O'CONNOR: Of course, when you made your report, you
16 didn't know it was commonplace for ambulances to be at
17 scenes like this.
18 A. Sorry, I didn't know ...?
19 Q. That was his evidence, that it wasn't uncommon to see
20 ambulances arriving at disturbances in Portadown on
21 a Saturday night.
22 A. With respect, and I accept I haven't policed here, it is
23 not unusual to see ambulances in town centres
24 throughout.
25 I just think that merits the question, you know:
31
1 what is the extent of what we are dealing with? Because
2 if early mistakes are made, I believe you really
3 struggle to recover from that. So the more intrusive
4 style of leadership that can be made, the better, in my
5 view and experience.
6 Q. Will you give me this much: that it was difficult for
7 the duty inspector in those circumstances to do
8 everything with a mirror of perfection?
9 A. I don't expect anybody to act with perfection. I am
10 just asking or making the point that there were some
11 minimum issues that he could have undertaken.
12 I mean, you may be able to point this out, but
13 I have seen nothing within the material or anything that
14 I have read that actually merited his immediately
15 leaving Portadown.
16 Now, I may be mistaken on that, but on the scale of
17 the disturbances that had taken place that night, I do
18 believe more than a casual debrief at that time could
19 have elicited the gravity of that situation, and I do
20 accept, I really do accept, in a scene such as this, it
21 is confused, it is not aided by drunkenness, it is not
22 aided by disorderly conduct, and it is very difficult to
23 get a handle on exactly what has gone on, and I do
24 accept that.
25 Q. Just finally on this point, when you say there was
32
1 nothing that merited him leaving the scene, I mean, his
2 duty merited him leaving the scene. If it was a normal
3 Saturday night, he just went about his duty. That's
4 fair?
5 A. If he felt that was a normal Saturday night, then it was
6 very fair for him to say he had responsibilities to the
7 rest of the division, and that would be correct.
8 Q. Then if I can move on, please, to page --
9 THE CHAIRMAN: Just before you do that, is there anything
10 special that was happening in one of his other areas
11 that you are suggesting should have called for his
12 attendance?
13 MR O'CONNOR: No. The evidence was, Mr Chairman --
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Just routine.
15 MR O'CONNOR: -- that he had three areas to look after and
16 he was a very busy duty inspector.
17 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you.
18 MR O'CONNOR: Page [74410], please, paragraph 6.10. This is
19 the debrief point.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. We know that Inspector McCrum went on those other
22 duties. There is no criticism of anything he did in
23 between. So he is back in the station at 4 o'clock in
24 the morning. The first thing he does is phone the
25 hospital, because there is no further word on
33
1 Mr Hamill's condition. Isn't that right?
2 A. That is correct, yes.
3 Q. When he went away, in between times the Land Rover crew
4 came back to the station. They got themselves changed
5 and headed off home.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Now, obviously Inspector McCrum can't debrief if he is
8 not there. Isn't that right?
9 A. Well, obviously, yes.
10 Q. I think there is some evidence that the normal thing
11 would have been for the Land Rover crew to come back on
12 and maybe fill out their statements. It would have been
13 regular enough for them to fill out their statements on
14 their next duty. That was what happened. That was
15 evidence, that that could be what happened.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. But if someone suggests, or anyone suggests, that, when
18 the Land Rover crew got back to the station, they ought
19 to have been debriefed before they left, is it fair to
20 say that the most senior officer at the station at the
21 time ought to have done that?
22 A. If, in effect, they should have been debriefed, then
23 that would be correct, but if that was a Saturday night
24 punch up and the severity of it wasn't known, then I am
25 not suggesting a disciplined debrief should have taken
34
1 place at that time. I just believe that alters once the
2 gravity of the situation becomes known.
3 Q. The debriefing you are referring to is really after
4 4 o'clock?
5 A. It is after 4 o'clock.
6 Q. You have heard the evidence that the duty inspector,
7 once he realised the severity of the incident, called
8 out the CID?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Detective Constable Keys?
11 A. Yes, I have heard that.
12 Q. Can I just deal with -- yes. Thank you. Paragraph 6.10
13 is you saying that, after the 4 o'clock situation, it
14 was really up to Inspector McCrum to debrief. Isn't
15 that right?
16 A. Absolutely.
17 Q. You say it really wasn't that the investigation
18 shouldn't be taken over by CID. It should be continued
19 by uniform and assisted by CID.
20 Is that what you are saying?
21 A. No, that's not what I am saying. It is perfectly proper
22 and correct to call out the night duty CID, but whilst
23 that is being done and he or she is attending the
24 station, the senior officer on duty at that time,
25 Inspector McCrum, I believe should be obtaining as much
35
1 information as he can and setting in place as many
2 fast-track actions that is realistic to -- and
3 I appreciate the staffing was short at that particular
4 time then -- so that, when the night duty detective
5 arrives, he or she can be given as full a briefing as
6 possible.
7 Now, at that point, as the senior officer on duty,
8 Inspector McCrum would still assume responsibility for
9 the management of the incident with the detective
10 working almost in tandem. Once the senior CID officer
11 is called and properly briefed, then the responsibility
12 for the management of that incident changes and is fully
13 handed over to the investigation team led by the senior
14 CID officer.
15 Q. There were a couple of things that Inspector McCrum had
16 a journal entry of. If we go to 6.11, which is the next
17 paragraph on the same page, you say:
18 "If Inspector McCrum is correct that he ordered
19 Constable Cooke to draw up a list of people at the scene
20 and to collect the clothing from the victims, there is
21 no evidence to show that he ensured that those
22 instructions had been carried out."
23 If I can stop there, certainly he had a journal
24 entry and you were aware of the journal entry. You saw
25 his journal entry?
36
1 A. From memory, I can't recall. Well, I saw it at the
2 hearing here, yes.
3 Q. When you made your report, you can't remember whether
4 you had seen his journal entry?
5 A. I can't remember seeing that.
6 Q. I will put this in paragraph in context then of his
7 journal entry.
8 A. Sorry, to interrupt you. Could I just say, if that was
9 in the material bundle, then I would have read that
10 document, that journal entry.
11 Q. I think in your previous -- in fairness, in your
12 previous page you do refer to a notebook, a pocket
13 notebook, but you don't refer to the journal. This is
14 why I am -- if you go to the previous page of your
15 statement, page 19, [74409], at the bottom there,
16 paragraph 6.8. It is on the screen in front of you.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Was that a notebook? That was something different from
19 his journal, was it?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. But you were aware he had made that notebook entry?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You also had a journal, a contemporaneous journal, which
24 had all the proceedings of the day before's duty and the
25 day after's duty in the journal, a handwritten journal.
37
1 A. Okay.
2 Q. There were two pages of detail in relation to the
3 incident in this journal.
4 Part of the detail was --
5 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me, have we heard evidence from
6 Mr McCrum about this, about the content of his journal?
7 MR O'CONNOR: Mr Chairman, the journal, I suggest it would
8 be handed into the Inquiry. It was actually photocopied
9 for the Inquiry. He gave evidence at length about it.
10 But also -- actually, the photocopied papers are Inquiry
11 documents already. There are numbers. I am sure they
12 can be provided again.
13 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly, but I was just asking: did we hear
14 from Mr McCrum about this part of the content of his
15 journal?
16 MR O'CONNOR: In detail, Mr Chairman.
17 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
18 MR O'CONNOR: The detail was, Mr Murray, that he had asked
19 Constable Cooke and Constable Orr to go to the -- this
20 was in the timescale -- to go to the hospital to
21 retrieve clothing and he noted that in his journal
22 before he went off duty at 8.30 in the morning.
23 He also asked Constable Cooke to draw up a list of
24 people, and you have that there, but you seem sceptical
25 in paragraph 6.11 that he actually did that, and your
38
1 reasoning for your scepticism seems to be, final line:
2 "One would have to question why an officer, if so
3 directed, would fail to obey a lawful order, thus
4 leaving him open to discipline proceedings."
5 Do you know that those two officers were served with
6 a Form 17(3) for failing to obey an order?
7 A. Yes, but that was not in relation to failing to follow
8 the order of Inspector McCrum.
9 Q. I understood it was in relation to not going to the
10 hospital to get the clothing?
11 A. Oh, I beg your pardon. They did receive the 17(3) in
12 relation to that, but, as I understand it, they
13 responded that they weren't given that --
14 Q. Order --
15 A. -- but I do accept what you are asking, why one would
16 have to question why an officer, if so directed, because
17 they were then subject to discipline. Yes, I do agree
18 with that.
19 Q. With the knowledge that they were disciplined and they
20 accepted the admonishment, now, with that knowledge, do
21 you have any criticism then --
22 MR UNDERWOOD: Do I hear, "They accepted the admonishment"?
23 The only person who was admonished was the inspector, as
24 far as I was aware, and Constable A.
25 MR O'CONNOR: I understood that Constable Cooke and
39
1 Constable -- were served with 17(3)s in relation to the
2 refusal. Sorry, they were served with the forms.
3 Sorry, they were served with the forms.
4 MR UNDERWOOD: They were served with the forms. They were
5 not admonished.
6 MR O'CONNOR: Sorry. I beg your pardon.
7 So they were served with these forms. With your
8 knowledge now about the notebook and the 17(3)s, do you
9 want to change your conclusion in 6.11 or your
10 suspicion?
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Just before the witness answers, it is
12 necessary that he understands that although those
13 notices were served, they did not result in any adverse
14 finding against the officers. That has to be part of
15 the question to be considered.
16 MR O'CONNOR: There are three things really you maybe didn't
17 know. That is that there was a contemporaneous note in
18 the notebook in relation to those clothes. You see,
19 Inspector McCrum has given evidence that he didn't know
20 there was going to be a public inquiry 11 years later
21 about that contemporaneous note in his notebook. I am
22 suggesting to you the force of that evidence is very
23 strong in his favour that that order was given.
24 Do you accept that?
25 A. I can't reconcile that. I have listened obviously to
40
1 an inspector saying he directed them to and two officers
2 who say they were not directed to.
3 Q. What I am saying to you now is maybe you didn't see that
4 journal notebook. Are you saying, even with the
5 evidence I suggest to you that is strong out of the
6 notebook ...?
7 A. Certainly the journal entry would tend to support the
8 account given by Mr McCrum that he did direct them, yes,
9 but why would he just put that in, if, in fact, he has
10 not done that?
11 Q. Knowing that now, what I am suggesting to you is that
12 paragraph 6.11 is a little bit unfair to
13 Inspector McCrum in those circumstances.
14 A. Yes, I would agree with that.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: You say in 6.11:
17 "If Inspector McCrum is correct in that he ordered
18 Constable Cooke to draw up a list of people ... there is
19 no evidence to show that he ensured that those
20 instructions had be carried out."
21 A. That is correct.
22 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you regard that part of it as unfair?
23 A. No, I don't, because there is no evidence that he did
24 seek to bring those strands together, and that is --
25 THE CHAIRMAN: These things didn't happen?
41
1 A. These things didn't happen, and this is part of all the
2 debrief that I go back to, because if, in effect,
3 Mr McCrum set in train a list of actions and activities,
4 in my view it is his responsibility to ensure that they
5 have been done, because that's the exact point of having
6 the supervision there, and I am sorry, I don't believe
7 it is acceptable -- and I have worked in professional
8 standards as well -- for an officer to say, "Well,
9 I directed this and I directed that". Well, the next
10 question would be: was it done? If it wasn't, "Why
11 wasn't it done and why didn't you make sure it was
12 done?"
13 As the senior officer on duty that night, I do make
14 it clear I do hold Mr McCrum responsible for those
15 activities. Now, if there were lapses, you know, I am
16 sorry, but I do stand by that.
17 I do concede the point about the discipline notices.
18 I can't say for definite, and who can -- Mr McCrum said
19 he told them to. He may well be correct, because why he
20 would put that in a journal is beyond me if he hadn't
21 told them.
22 Q. So it was good policing to tell them to?
23 A. Well, it's a basic principle of policing that, in the
24 event of a serious assault, you will obtain the victim's
25 clothing as soon as practicable, as soon as you can.
42
1 Q. So that's good policing?
2 A. Absolutely.
3 Q. And it is good policing to keep a note in your journal
4 of doing that?
5 A. It is good policing to keep a note of that, yes.
6 Q. At what stage does he then check that has been carried
7 out?
8 A. Well, before he goes off duty. If you set in train
9 a number of things, then I believe -- I would not go off
10 duty without saying, "Has this been done? Has that been
11 done?" because it may well be that those officers had
12 difficulty or misunderstood what had been asked of them,
13 because if they then said, "Sorry, we haven't got the
14 clothing", the question would be, "Well, why not?"
15 Q. He closely liaised with DC Don Keys when he came on duty
16 very shortly after the telephone call to the hospital.
17 A. I have referred in my report -- and I have seen this,
18 and I don't accuse Mr McCrum of this -- that there --
19 I have seen on many, many occasions when the senior
20 uniformed officer on duty calls out a member of the CID
21 and almost abrogates their responsibility.
22 Now, I am not suggesting Inspector McCrum did that,
23 but I don't think Detective Constable Keys had the
24 benefit of a full and thorough briefing because of the
25 difficulty he had in even identifying where the scene
43
1 was. I believe that was an officer who came on duty and
2 was almost left to get on with it.
3 Q. You heard his evidence that once the -- in
4 Northern Ireland, in 1997, once the CID man came on
5 board, then you supported him and he took over the
6 investigation from the start, from the contact with CID?
7 A. I did hear that and I accept that, but that does not
8 mean Mr McCrum had no further responsibility for that
9 incident.
10 THE CHAIRMAN: What do you understand to be included in the
11 need to support the detective?
12 A. Yes. I mean, he is there to provide, in my view,
13 whatever the detective realistically wants. I mean, if
14 the detective had asked for a Scenes of Crime Officer to
15 be called out, then that would be Mr McCrum's decision
16 to call one out, whether or not to do so, or if, say,
17 Detective Constable Keys wanted a dog handler called out
18 or some other resource, the responsibility for that lies
19 with Mr McCrum. So it is that sort of level of support
20 that I believe the detective needs.
21 MR O'CONNOR: I think you alluded at page [74414],
22 paragraph 6.31 back to Her Majesty's Inspectorate
23 report, the Blakey Report:
24 "Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary found
25 evidence of uniformed duty inspectors taking limited
44
1 responsibility at scenes and being content to leave CID
2 in charge of the scene with uniformed constables to
3 continue the scene log. This lack of direction has led
4 to unmanaged scene entry and inconsistent log
5 completion. These circumstances offer opportunities for
6 the integrity of the scene to be challenged."
7 That was a finding in 2002. That was evidence that
8 it was done in Northern Ireland, that the duty inspector
9 would hand over control of the scene in this
10 circumstance to the CID, instead of --
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me, Mr O'Connor. I want to be clear
12 what you are suggesting. Are you suggesting this was
13 a finding that this was the general practice in
14 Northern Ireland?
15 MR O'CONNOR: I am suggesting there was a finding in 2002.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: No, no, no. Are you suggesting this was
17 a finding that this was the general practice? I don't
18 read that into that paragraph, but if I fail to see it,
19 you point it out to me.
20 MR O'CONNOR: No. I am saying there is evidence that was
21 a practice. I think that's very clear from the
22 paragraph, Mr Chairman. It was found to be a problem in
23 Northern Ireland by Her Majesty's Inspectorate in 2002,
24 and what I am saying is that Mr McCrum's evidence was
25 that, in practice, in Northern Ireland in 1997, uniform
45
1 handed over to CID and they took over, and then uniform
2 assisted CID. Whether in England or elsewhere that's
3 not the practice, that was the practice in
4 Northern Ireland.
5 THE CHAIRMAN: Are you saying it was the general practice in
6 Northern Ireland?
7 MR O'CONNOR: Mr McCrum said that was the practice.
8 THE CHAIRMAN: The general practice?
9 MR O'CONNOR: He said that was his experience of the general
10 practice. I don't know anything about policing,
11 Mr Chairman.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: I merely point out you are relying on the
13 HMIC report as giving support to your argument. That
14 depends on whether one is to read that paragraph as the
15 HMIC saying, "This was a general practice in
16 Northern Ireland". Do you follow?
17 MR O'CONNOR: The HMIC -- I haven't used the words "general
18 practice", Mr Chairman. I am saying:
19 "HMIC found evidence of uniformed duty inspectors
20 taking limited responsibility at scenes and being
21 content to leave CID in charge ..."
22 That's all I am putting to the witness: that there
23 is some evidence that would back up Mr McCrum's oral
24 evidence that there was a practice. His evidence was
25 that that was his experience of what the practice was.
46
1 THE CHAIRMAN: I take your point.
2 MR O'CONNOR: You might not have known about that when you
3 were dealing with Inspector McCrum's actions, but there
4 was certainly in his evidence, and some independent
5 evidence, that this was the case?
6 A. I am sorry. I just don't agree with that assertion.
7 There will always come a time when the senior uniform
8 officer on duty will hand over the control of the scene
9 to the specialists, ie., CID and other specialist units.
10 So that is the practice in the UK. That would happen in
11 England, it would happen in Wales, that that uniform
12 inspector would hand over that scene. It is what that
13 uniform inspector does with that scene and in order to
14 support the safely handing over of that scene to the
15 CID.
16 Q. I am not disputing what you are saying.
17 A. But the point I make is that that scene --
18 Detective Constable Keys did not have the benefit of
19 that scene being handed over to him in the manner that
20 I feel that he should.
21 Q. If I can leave Inspector McCrum and move on to DI Irwin,
22 Mr Murray, you have changed your view and, if you like,
23 your addendum about Mr Irwin.
24 Initially, you stated you believed DI Irwin assisted
25 Andrea McKee in perverting the course of justice. You
47
1 don't stand by that comment now, having listened to his
2 evidence?
3 A. No, I don't.
4 Q. You have heard his evidence. You heard all of his
5 evidence?
6 A. Yes, I did.
7 Q. You heard about the efforts he went to to secure
8 a conviction in this case?
9 A. Yes, I did.
10 Q. He was a good DI?
11 A. Yes, very. I think he was very thorough in what he did.
12 Q. When you take into account his position in the chain of
13 command, let's say, and what was going on around him, is
14 it fair of me to say that he worked diligently?
15 A. Yes, I believe he did. On listening to his evidence and
16 looking at the actions that he took, he came on duty on
17 that Monday morning, was very active. I know that he
18 had to review another serious assault. At almost no
19 notice he was able to put together a whole raft of
20 resources to effect arrests and I do believe he worked
21 diligently in that regard.
22 Q. If I can take you to page [74507], conclusion 24.1,
23 saying in relation to the overall -- it is apropos of
24 what you just said, Mr Murray. Your conclusion at the
25 end of your report.
48
1 I am going to leave out the criticism of DI Irwin
2 now and I am going suggest to you this then leaves
3 a picture of someone who did his best:
4 "The murder investigation proved to be ineffective
5 as evidenced by the failure to bring to justice those
6 responsible for the murder of Robert Hamill. However,
7 based upon the papers I have read, I believe the RUC
8 attempted to bring to account those people responsible.
9 In my opinion, DI Irwin was the driving force behind the
10 investigation with DCS McBurney providing ..."
11 Then if we believe out the critical bit:
12 "... he tried to bring the investigation to
13 a satisfactory conclusion."
14 Is it fair to say there was not much more DI Irwin
15 could do in his job that --
16 A. In relation to -- no, I fully stand by that conclusion.
17 MR O'CONNOR: Thank you.
18 MR UNDERWOOD: There is nothing arising. Thank you.
19 Questions from THE PANEL
20 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you just help us about one thing,
21 Mr Murray? You are critical in your report of the fact
22 that statements -- and it comes back to debriefing --
23 there was no debriefing to enable names to be provided
24 and early arrests to be made?
25 A. That is correct. I do believe there was a golden
49
1 opportunity there at the very early stages of that for
2 some information to be gathered from relevant officers,
3 including Constable A, which would have led, and could
4 have led, to some fast-track actions that may have
5 secured some evidence in relation to the assault.
6 THE CHAIRMAN: If there had been early arrests, would there
7 then -- would you have expected to there to be prompt
8 searches?
9 A. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
10 THE CHAIRMAN: Those searches would include searches for
11 clothing and footwear --
12 A. Yes, indeed.
13 THE CHAIRMAN: -- because this was an attack which had
14 involved the victims being kicked on the head --
15 A. That's right.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and there was blood. So in that event,
17 footwear, if recovered soon enough, might have provided
18 valuable evidence to connect the footwear with
19 Robert Hamill?
20 A. Yes, absolutely. It would be a priority to obtain
21 whatever footwear you could because of that very reason,
22 because of the transfer of DNA or blood or anything else
23 from that.
24 I made the point about the droplet of blood on
25 Robert Hamill's trousers that was attributed to
50
1 Stacey Bridgett and the -- that in itself does not prove
2 an assault, but if you were to obtain blood or DNA
3 material from footwear, then somebody has to come up
4 with a very plausible explanation as to how that came to
5 be there and that would indicate clearly an assault. So
6 that, in my view, would be essential.
7 THE CHAIRMAN: This is an indication of the need to get
8 names as quickly as possible and make arrests as quickly
9 as possible. Is that the position?
10 A. That is the position, and it is well-known -- and it is
11 a phrase I don't particularly like -- it is the golden
12 hour. It is what takes place in the first few hours of
13 any major investigation. If you fail to undertake that,
14 then it's very, very difficult to recover.
15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.
16 A. Thank you.
17 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much, Mr Murray.
18 A. Thank you.
19 (The witness withdrew)
20 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, can I map out the course of what's left
21 for the day?
22 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
23 MR UNDERWOOD: I have to read excerpts from a number of
24 witness statements and transcripts of various witnesses.
25 By and large those witnesses who are uncontroversial and
51
1 who nobody has requested the attendance of.
2 Interspersed in them, however, are some very important
3 witnesses, including Miss Cornett, who are too ill to
4 attend, unhappily. Those statements and transcripts
5 will be taken rather more seriously in terms of reading
6 more of the excerpts.
7 We then have two quite short witnesses, a Mr Rogers
8 from the NIO, who deals with the way in which the RUC
9 responded to the Secretary of State's enquiries, and
10 Mr Donnelly, who was the Chairman of the ICPC, who will
11 have some things to say about his late organisation, and
12 then, finally, Mr Armstrong. I apprehend there is
13 probably about an hour or so's worth of reading, but we
14 will comfortably finish all of the evidence today,
15 I trust. So I am in your hands whether you want me to
16 start reading now or break.
17 THE CHAIRMAN: We will start and do a quarter of an hour or
18 thereabouts and then have a break.
19 Statement of ALF ANNESLEY (read)
20 MR UNDERWOOD: I group these witnesses into those who were
21 there on the night, police officers, etc.
22 The first of them is Mr Annesley. He is at
23 page [80025]. We see in paragraph 2:
24 "In April 1997, I worked as a driver for Call-a-Cab
25 in Portadown. I had worked for them for 12 or 13 years
52
1 at that stage and I continued to drive taxis in
2 Portadown until 2002, when I retired on medical
3 grounds."
4 Then at paragraph 4:
5 "I cannot remember making a previous statement to
6 the police, but I am told I did sign a statement dated
7 7th November 2000. I don't deny I made it, but I simply
8 can't remember. I note from that statement that I am
9 asked about a job at an address, the name of which has
10 been redacted."
11 [80026]:
12 "A copy of the statement is now produced and shown
13 to me at page 17367."
14 The next is a transcript, because it is an interview
15 of a gentleman who hasn't signed his statement. That's
16 Conor Black. We have that in .pdf form.
17 Interview of CONOR BLACK (read)
18 If I can jump straight to page [20] of that, about
19 just less than halfway down there is a sentence which
20 starts:
21 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. So you say in your statement
22 you drove up the other end of the town to see what was
23 going on. Are you -- what did you mean by this? So did
24 you?
25 "Conor Black: Well, probably -- I am presuming this
53
1 because we'd seen police cars and whatnot where it
2 happened. It was -- we wanted to have a nosy.
3 "Alannah Fooks: Okay.
4 "Conor Black: I honestly can't remember what
5 prompted us to go up.
6 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. And you saw ambulance and
7 police cars?
8 "Conor Black: Uh-huh.
9 "Alannah Fooks: How many police cars or Land Rovers
10 did you see?"
11 Overleaf, [21]:
12 "Conor Black: I don't know. I've no idea. I can't
13 remember.
14 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. Did you see a Land Rover
15 parked anywhere or you just --
16 "Conor Black: I can't remember, no.
17 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. You say there was a police
18 car blocking the street. Do you know what street that
19 was?
20 "Conor Black: I can't, no, I can't recall where it
21 was.
22 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. Did you see police out on
23 the street?
24 "Conor Black: I honestly don't know. I can't
25 remember, to be truthful. It doesn't say on my
54
1 statement. I can't remember, it's that long ago.
2 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. You said there were quite
3 a few people who seemed to be moving off, but you don't
4 recall whether there was police asking them to move off?
5 "Conor Black: No.
6 "Alannah Fooks: So you said you saw Kyle Magee at
7 this point. Where was he when you saw him? You'd
8 stopped at Call-a-Cab and --
9 "Conor Black: Yes. Yes, I'm presuming somewhere
10 around Call-a-Cab, but I can't recall where exactly."
11 Overleaf [22]:
12 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. And Kyle told you that there
13 had been a fight?
14 "Conor Black: Uh-huh."
15 The reason I am putting these in is that they are,
16 as it were, connective tissue where one has the evidence
17 of Kyle Magee. So that it may be necessary for people,
18 when making their final submissions, to be able to join
19 the dots, as it were.
20 Interview of PHILIP CURRAN (read)
21 The next of these transcripts is Philip Curran.
22 Again, we have that on .pdf form.
23 I will go to page [7] of that, if I may. You will
24 recall this refers to the evidence of a Mr Currie and
25 what he saw, because Mr Curran and Mr Gray were walking
55
1 together and encountered Mr Currie.
2 On page [7] he is dealing with after going to
3 a Chinese take-away. About a third of the way down the
4 page:
5 "Barnaby Pinfield: And after you'd been to the
6 Chinese, where did you go?
7 "Philip Curran: Just took a walk down towards the
8 town centre.
9 "Barnaby Pinfield: So what route is that? Down
10 West Street into Market Street?
11 "Philip Curran: Aye.
12 "Barnaby Pinfield: Were you still with David Gray
13 at that time?
14 "Philip Curran: Uh-huh.
15 "Barnaby Pinfield: What did you see when you were
16 going into the town centre?
17 "Philip Curran: Just got down to halfway down,
18 which would be sort of halfway, I mean, down around here
19 somewhere, past the church more or less."
20 Overleaf, [8]:
21 "Barnaby Pinfield: So you got down to there and
22 what did you see?
23 "Philip Curran: Everybody was just being pushed out
24 of the town.
25 "Barnaby Pinfield: When you say 'everybody',
56
1 roughly how many people were there?
2 "Philip Curran: I couldn't really tell you, to tell
3 you the truth.
4 "Barnaby Pinfield: And who were they being pushed
5 out of town by?
6 "Philip Curran: The police.
7 "Barnaby Pinfield: And again, it may be a rough
8 estimate, how many police officers were there at that
9 time?
10 "Philip Curran: Wouldn't have a clue.
11 "Barnaby Pinfield: So did you have any idea why the
12 police were pushing people back?
13 "Philip Curran: No.
14 "Barnaby Pinfield: Was anything being shouted by
15 the people being pushed back?
16 "Philip Curran: No, just they were -- I was on my
17 way up the town.
18 "Barnaby Pinfield: Did you see any violence from
19 people in that group?
20 "Philip Curran: No."
21 Overleaf, [9]:
22 "Barnaby Pinfield: And you say you walked to the
23 south to see what was happening in your statement.
24 Would that be right?
25 "Philip Curran: As well as I can remember at the
57
1 time, yeah.
2 "Barnaby Pinfield: And you saw a guy lying in the
3 road?
4 "Philip Curran: Uh-huh.
5 "Barnaby Pinfield: Now, where was he lying?
6 "Philip Curran: Just towards the West Street, it
7 was -- no, not West Street, the bottom of Thomas Street.
8 "Barnaby Pinfield: And when you first saw him, was
9 he moving or was he just lying there?
10 "Philip Curran: No, he was just being put into the
11 ambulance.
12 "Barnaby Pinfield: So it may seem a silly question,
13 but how was he being put into the ambulance?
14 "Philip Curran: I think he was just lifted.
15 "Barnaby Pinfield: Did you see any other people
16 around in the area at the time?
17 Overleaf, [10]:
18 "Philip Curran: No.
19 "Barnaby Pinfield: Did you see any police in that
20 area?
21 "Philip Curran: No. We were -- the police were
22 forcing -- at that time, they were in the town centre."
23 Then, if we look at David Gray, again there is
24 a transcript in .pdf. That has gone wrong. We will
25 come back to that.
58
1 Statement of MICHELLE JAMIESON (read)
2 Can I go to a statement of Michelle Jamieson, which
3 is at page [81560]? At paragraph 2 she says:
4 "I gave two statements to the police investigating
5 the murder of Robert Hamill. The first is dated
6 9th May 1997 and contains pages 9146 to 9148. The
7 second is dated 12th May 1997 and contains pages 9149 to
8 9150."
9 If we jump to page [81564], paragraph 25:
10 "I have been asked why I made two separate
11 statements three days apart and why I did not say in my
12 first statement that Wayne Lunt, Lisa Hobson and
13 Joanne Bradley were at my house on the evening of
14 26th April 1997."
15 Over the page, [81565], paragraph 26:
16 "I can confirm that my statements were not based on
17 anything Heidi and I had said to each other and I did
18 not know that she was also making statements to the
19 police. However, I thought that Heidi would not want me
20 to mention who had been at my house because I do not
21 think her parents liked her spending time drinking with
22 certain people. I do not know with whom they would have
23 had a particular problem, but they would have been cross
24 that she was out late because we were only 16 at the
25 time."
59
1 We have seen some fairly sinister reasons why people
2 might not have wanted to assist the police interspersed
3 with these various witnesses who have these very much
4 less sinister reasons for not telling the absolute truth
5 at the time.
6 If we go then to page [80934] --
7 MR McCOMB: Sorry.
8 MR UNDERWOOD: Mr McComb asks me read and I am very happy to
9 take suggestions at this stage, [81563], paragraphs 19
10 and 20:
11 "According to my first statement I was just going to
12 continue walking downtown when I was called over by
13 a woman who was next to an injured man. The injured man
14 was at the Thomas Street/Woodhouse Street junction where
15 the crowd had been. I do not think at that stage there
16 was anyone near him except for the woman. The crowd
17 must have moved away by that stage. The man was lying
18 on the ground but I cannot remember whether he was on
19 the road or pavement, in which direction he was facing
20 or what condition he was in. I cannot actually remember
21 what this man looked like. When his photo appeared in
22 the paper after the incident, it just put a face to that
23 injured person.
24 "It says in my first statement that I knelt by the
25 injured man and listened to his breathing, but I do not
60
1 remember doing this at all. I think the detectives told
2 my mother that somebody saw me doing that. I do not
3 know how to give first aid. I was probably just trying
4 to help him. I cannot remember whether I spoke to the",
5 overleaf, [81564], "woman who was with the man or
6 whether she spoke to me. I cannot describe the woman,
7 but she was probably crying. I cannot recall seeing or
8 speaking to any police officers and I do not remember
9 seeing anyone else injured on the ground or
10 an ambulance."
11 Statement of ELIZABETH IRENE McKEE (read)
12 Then at page [80934], this is a companion piece to
13 the statement of Alf Annesley. It is the statement of
14 Elizabeth Irene McKee. In paragraph 2 she tells us:
15 "In April 1997 I was working at Call-a-Cab in
16 West Street, Portadown as a telephone operator."
17 Then, if we jump to page [80936], paragraph 17:
18 "On page 21168 at 2.15 am is the name", I think
19 that's probably Smith, "for collection, Craigavon to the
20 town. The name does not ring a bell as a regular
21 customer. Neither do I know the address. The driver,
22 number 9, was Alf Annesley. The reference to town could
23 have been anywhere. When the taxi is booked, the
24 customer doesn't necessarily say where in the town."
25 That's simply, as it were, joining the dots again
61
1 with the pick-up from the McKee household.
2 We next have Beatrix Campbell. There are two
3 transcripts I hope on .pdf of interviews with that lady,
4 who is a journalist who wrote a piece in The Guardian
5 about Mr Hamill.
6 This first interview deals in general terms with how
7 she got the information.
8 Statement and interview of BEATRIX CAMPBELL (read)
9 If we go to page [5] of it, please, about a third of
10 the way down she said:
11 "I'm a journalist who writes about politics
12 generally and I've been involved in Northern Ireland for
13 some years, not particularly as -- indeed not as all as
14 a specialist and not particularly involved in what would
15 be regarded as the dominant or overarching issues, ie
16 the armed conflict."
17 If we go to page [9], she is being asked about the
18 source material. The third entry from the bottom you
19 have Suzanne Lambert saying:
20 "So we have the E, Fs -- the 2E, F sisters and
21 Diane Hamill. Who else did you interview?"
22 Blanked out is xxxxxxxxx:
23 "Beatrix Campbell: ... who was the Hamill's
24 solicitor.
25 "Suzanne Lambert: Okay. And was that on one
62
1 occasion or several occasions?"
2 The answer is over the page, [10]:
3 "Beatrix Campbell: I went to see her at her office
4 in Lurgan and she explained some of the issues that
5 were -- that she was trying to address. I have to say
6 I have never forgotten that encounter because it was a
7 very chilling encounter."
8 She goes on to explain why it is chilling and that
9 has no relevance to us. It was to do with death threats
10 to her, that is Miss Nelson.
11 Over at page [11], third entry from the bottom:
12 "Suzanne Lambert: Now just to go back on what
13 you've just said, which is, once you'd finished the
14 article you sent it to her", that's Miss Nelson, "for
15 her to check that the facts were correct?
16 "Beatrix Campbell: Uh-huh."
17 Then over the page at [12], she is asked towards the
18 top:
19 "Suzanne Lambert: Did [xxxxxxxxxxx] then pass
20 that on to the D, E, Fs who were present?
21 "Beatrix Campbell: No. I think that she checked
22 and my communication primarily was with Diane Hamill who
23 was also the conduit to E and F and I sent Diane a copy
24 of the piece. Now I know I did that because I had
25 conversations subsequently about some of the details and
63
1 so my sense was that the family checked out the details
2 in the story, but I couldn't confirm that.
3 "Suzanne Lambert: And did E and F, being there on
4 the night when Robert Hamill was attacked, did they give
5 you a view as to how the incident had started off?
6 "Beatrix Campbell: Well, they described what they
7 had seen and they described their journey from
8 St Patrick's Hall and the feelings they had as they
9 began that journey and the reasons why they took the
10 decisions they did, and what happened when they reached
11 that conjuncture where the Land Rover was and what
12 happened thereafter. So they, E and F, were really the
13 critical witnesses to the events that have night. They
14 were my only witnesses to the events of that night.
15 "Suzanne Lambert: Did you not interview anyone else
16 who was present on the night?
17 "Beatrix Campbell: No, I saw statements from other
18 people who were present."
19 Overleaf, [13]:
20 "Suzanne Lambert: Do you know if you got that from
21 Diane or [xxxxxxxxxxxxx]?
22 "Beatrix Campbell: No, I didn't -- I don't think
23 I got anything from [xxxxxxxxxx]. In truth,
24 I can't remember where I got the statements from, but
25 I think you can be assured that these statements would
64
1 have been flying around, as they always are, because
2 your profession, like mine, trades in documents swirling
3 around.
4 "Suzanne Lambert: And you are sure that, having
5 seen the statements, you didn't actually follow up any
6 of these witnesses yourself?
7 "Beatrix Campbell: Yes, I am sure, and I knew why:
8 that these were witnesses, who didn't want their names
9 used, who wanted the story out. This was what was
10 communicated to me by the family, that there were people
11 who, you know, didn't feel safe but did want their
12 evidence to be transmitted."
13 If we go over, third entry, [14]:
14 "Suzanne Lambert: Well, basically you have answered
15 my question. My question was whether or not you had
16 contact with anyone else besides the D, E and Fs and
17 Diane Hamill [xxxxxxxxxxxxx], who were able to provide
18 you with further information.
19 "Beatrix Campbell: No.
20 "Suzanne Lambert: Because you probably would
21 appreciate that the police didn't necessarily have full
22 contact with everyone present on the night in question
23 and not everyone came forward to the police.
24 "Beatrix Campbell: No, I'm aware that is always
25 a possibility. However, I -- my guess is -- what we
65
1 know -- let's put it like this: what we know of the
2 situation in Northern Ireland is this, and this
3 situation wasn't unusual. There will be people who have
4 got something to say about an event that they've
5 witnessed. They don't feel safe. They don't feel that,
6 if they give their evidence, the police will either do
7 anything with it or respect their right to life."
8 Then, as I say, Miss Campbell very kindly gave
9 another interview to the Inquiry which we have on
10 another .pdf. This is 19th October 2007. You can see
11 what happened from the first entry on page [2] where
12 Miss Enston says:
13 "19th October 2007 and Miss Beatrix Campbell is
14 reading from her notebooks at page 4."
15 What this consists of basically is Miss Campbell
16 having very kindly provided the entirety of her
17 notebooks for the research she did for the article she
18 wrote for The Guardian, and that's set out extensively
19 here.
20 I only want to pick up a little of it, which is at
21 page which is at page [5]. It is the last entry against
22 Miss Campbell's name. This is the quote from her
23 notebook:
24 "'A witness who came out of the pub and tried to
25 help and was beaten back, he says he saw the girls at
66
1 the jeep. He went to the jeep and pulled one of them
2 out and said, 'You sat and watched that happen'."
3 So that helps us a little on the enigma of who it
4 was that pulled Constable Neill and complained that the
5 police had sat there doing nothing, that it is somebody
6 who came out of a pub, which appears to narrow it down
7 to Mr Hull or Mr McNeice. Neither of them, of course,
8 accepted that in evidence.
9 Then we move to page [80242]. You will recall that
10 we had some evidence that amongst the others that
11 DCI P39 attempted to get assistance from on the Catholic
12 side were priests. Father Sean Dooley was one of those.
13 You have also heard some evidence that he was the
14 recipient of an anonymous phone call. I just want to
15 get that clarified here.
16 Statement of FATHER SEAN DOOLEY (read)
17 This is the Father's statement. On the first
18 line in paragraph 4 he says:
19 "On 11th May 1997 I received an anonymous telephone
20 call about the Robert Hamill murder. I think the caller
21 phoned earlier while he was out and asked for me by
22 name. On this occasion I answered the phone. To get
23 a call like that around 9 o'clock in the evening was
24 most unexpected. I wasn't sure of the identity of the
25 person, whom I may have encountered in my duties, or if
67
1 it was somebody just trying to cause trouble, because
2 Portadown was in such a situation at the time that this
3 could have been somebody from a militant wing of the
4 Nationalist community trying to stir up trouble, maybe
5 trying to get me to pass on information for them.
6 I still don't know who made the call, but I assumed it
7 was a policeman because of the amount of information he
8 had. He said that there were four officers in the
9 Land Rover and that they were sleeping. They had been
10 on duty since 4.00 pm and were on overtime but they
11 didn't want to be there."
12 If we go over to paragraph 5, [80243]:
13 "I wrote down what that person said on two small
14 bits of green paper and then I sat down the next morning
15 and wrote it out in long hand on pieces of A4 paper."
16 Jumping down to paragraph 7, he says:
17 "There is now produced and shown to me, marked
18 'SD1', a copy of the notes I made."
19 In fact, for our purposes they are at pages [72782].
20 We have seen those in evidence already.
21 Statement of MAURICE HEWITT (read)
22 Then going to page [80451], we have the statement of
23 Maurice Hewitt. There has been some evidence about him,
24 because he was the conduit through which the document
25 produced by P42 was produced to the police. Recently,
68
1 there has been some cross-examination of officers as to
2 how it was they, as it were, lit upon him.
3 Halfway through paragraph 2 on the left-hand side:
4 "I recall a day or so after the incident when
5 Robert Hamill was attacked in Portadown town centre that
6 P42 told me he had witnessed part of the incident. He
7 told me he was asleep in bed and heard a noise. He got
8 up thinking his car was being damaged, looked out the
9 window and saw a number of people in the street.
10 I suggested to P42 that either he told it to the
11 police or let me go to them and tell them. He said he
12 was very fearful for his safety and was frightened that
13 he would suffer retribution from paramilitary
14 organisations. I was also fearful for him. I told him
15 I would speak to someone. As far as I can remember,
16 I spoke to the collator in Portadown, an officer called
17 [blank].
18 "I passed on the information verbally and left it at
19 that. I told them he would only make an anonymous
20 statement. A DC McCrumlish came to the house later and
21 asked me again whether he would make a statement.
22 I told them, no, because he was too frightened. P42
23 then made an anonymous statement", overleaf [80452],
24 which my daughter typed up for him."
25 Then paragraph 5:
69
1 "I then remember two detectives coming to the house
2 to ask again whether P42 would give a formal statement.
3 One of the detectives was DS H. They knew it was P42
4 who had made the note by that stage. I am also aware
5 that P42 later went into the police station to speak to
6 them, but I don't know anything more about that. I do
7 think this was some time in 1999."
8 Statement of MR HUGHES (read)
9 Then at page [81610] we have the statement of
10 Mr Hughes, who was the wholesaler, or I think the
11 designer, of the silver jackets that may or may not have
12 found their way into the shop called Paranoid.
13 Paragraph 2:
14 "In 1997, I was a clothing wholesaler based in
15 London. I designed and sold my own clothing brand under
16 the name of Skanks. Beyond selling stock to the shop
17 Paranoid in Portadown, I had no other involvement with
18 the town."
19 Paragraph 4:
20 "I have been told other witnesses have described
21 a jacket someone was wearing on the night Robert Hamill
22 was attacked as a bright silver, waist-length,
23 anorak-style jacket with silver sleeves and orange
24 stripes down the sleeves and a black waistband. That
25 does sound similar to the one that I designed and sold
70
1 to Paranoid in Portadown."
2 Overleaf [81611]:
3 "The jacket was part of the autumn/winter 1996
4 collection. I do not recall if there were any jackets
5 of a similar design in the collection."
6 The final sentence of paragraph 5:
7 "I cannot recall how many of these silver jackets
8 were ordered by Paranoid in Portadown."
9 I am told that Mr Gray's statement is now back on
10 the system -- is on the system, rather, so perhaps we
11 could go back to that in .pdf.
12 Interview of DAVID GRAY (read)
13 If I go to page [17] of it, halfway down a question
14 is asked of him which is a quotation from a witness
15 statement of his.
16 "Judy Kemish: 'As we went down to the town, I saw an
17 ambulance parked on the street somewhere adjacent to
18 Woodhouse Street. I seen this person lying in the
19 middle of the street close to the ambulance. At the
20 back of the ambulance I seen a fellow I know as
21 Dermot McNeice.
22 "David Gray: Correct.
23 "Judy Kemish: So what was Dermot McNeice doing at
24 the back of the ambulance?
25 "David Gray: He was just standing there.
71
1 "Judy Kemish: Just standing there?
2 "David Gray: I knew Dermot because I had worked
3 with him in Denny's, but I hadn't seen him since about
4 September last year because I was off sick. I went over
5 and spoke briefly to Dermot'."
6 Then if we go to page [26], the first question:
7 "Judy Kemish: Okay. What did you see when you got
8 to the junction? You can't remember if you walked as
9 far as the junction, but you said you saw the
10 ambulance."
11 The quotation is put to him:
12 "'We went down the town and I saw an ambulance
13 parked on the street somewhere adjacent to
14 Woodhouse Street. I saw a person lying in the middle of
15 the street close to the ambulance'.
16 "Did you recognise that person on the road?
17 "David Gray. No.
18 "Judy Kemish: Can you remember where they were
19 lying?
20 "David Gray: He was at the back of the ambulance,
21 that's all I could fairly say, because the ambulance was
22 there.
23 "Judy Kemish. Sorry, what?
24 "David Gray: He was at the back of an ambulance.
25 The fellow was lying on the road at that time.
72
1 "Judy Kemish: Was Dermot McNeice quite near to
2 him?"
3 Overleaf, [27]:
4 "David Gray: He was standing just there at the
5 door, the door at the back of the ambulance.
6 "Judy Kemish: Near the person on the ground?
7 "David Gray: Uh-huh.
8 "Judy Kemish: Was there anybody else lying on the
9 street that you can remember, anybody else?
10 "David Gray: I didn't see anybody else, to be
11 honest.
12 "Judy Kemish: You didn't see anybody else?
13 "David Gray: If I had, I would have said there,
14 like, but --
15 "Judy Kemish: And did you recognise anyone? Okay,
16 there was a man lying on the street. I think actually
17 he was lying near Eastwoods.
18 "David Gray: But I don't know where Eastwoods was.
19 "Judy Kemish: But it doesn't matter if you didn't
20 know exactly where he was. But what was happening while
21 he was lying on the street? You saw Dermot. There must
22 have been a lot of shouting.
23 "David Gray: There wasn't actually. There was very
24 little people about at that time.
25 "Judy Kemish: Very little people at the time?
73
1 "David Gray: Uh-huh."
2 Overleaf [28]:
3 "Judy Kemish: Did you see a Land Rover, a police
4 Land Rover?
5 "David Gray: There was at that stage -- I mean
6 a few of them."
7 Then one more, which is a transcript, before we get
8 to police witnesses.
9 That's a transcript of Mr Robert Jameson's Inquiry
10 interview. He was asked about the circumstances,
11 amongst other things, in which his son had come to
12 instruct a solicitor before being interviewed by the DPP
13 and counsel about his witness statement. We see that at
14 page [9].
15 Interview of ROBERT JAMESON (read)
16 Halfway down, Michael Stephens puts a question:
17 "Right. I just want to just talk about the fight at
18 Portadown which led to the death of Robert Hamill and in
19 so doing it is about your son, Timothy and how he came
20 to make his statement. When were you aware of that
21 fight in Portadown?
22 "Robert Jameson: What, the actual fight?
23 "Michael Stephens: Yes.
24 "Robert Jameson: I probably would have been aware
25 of it when I heard it on the news, like.
74
1 "Michael Stephens: Did you hear it from your son,
2 Timothy, that he had been in town on that particular
3 night?
4 "Robert Jameson: No."
5 Then if we go to page [11], this refers to the
6 consultation in October 1997. Taking it from the top:
7 "Michael Stephens: Obviously Timothy wasn't
8 represented at that stage. Did you take Timothy to see
9 a solicitor about the statement?
10 "Robert Jameson: I may have at a later date.
11 "Michael Stephens: Can you remember when that was?
12 "Robert Jameson: I honestly couldn't remember.
13 "Michael Stephens: Well, can you tell me who the
14 solicitor was?"
15 It is blanked out. It is not a solicitor who name
16 has appeared hitherto:
17 "Robert Jameson: [Blank] from Banbridge.
18 "Michael Stephens: So Mr [blank], the solicitor at
19 Banbridge?
20 "Robert Jameson: Yes.
21 "Michael Stephens: Is that a solicitor you had used
22 before or was it one you had just picked out?
23 "Robert Jameson: Just one I'd picked out.
24 "Michael Stephens: And your reasons for taking
25 Timothy there?
75
1 "Robert Jameson: Just for advice.
2 "Michael Stephens: Was Timothy expressing concern
3 to you about anything in particular?"
4 Overleaf, [12]:
5 "Robert Jameson: No, we just wanted -- you know,
6 the young fellow had never been in trouble and he -- and
7 it was really just for, strictly for advice."
8 Then at page [18], second entry:
9 "Michael Stephens: Yes. Well, again, I know we've
10 said -- you know he's coming through you. If he didn't
11 say anything at all, was it whether you had discussed it
12 with Timothy and that was why you went to see the
13 solicitor, Mr [blank] because you were concerned about
14 him?
15 "Robert Jameson: Yes, well, I probably was
16 concerned that, as you've said, there were things that
17 didn't -- wouldn't have been fair to Timothy's language
18 in the statement and I was concerned that there was
19 things said that may have been interpreted by the police
20 not what actually Timothy said."
21 So that may or may not give you an insight into the
22 circumstances in which that statement came to be made
23 and withdrawn.
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, we will break off until midday now.
25 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you.
76
1 (11.45 am)
2 (A short break)
3 (12.00 noon)
4 Statement of PAUL ADAMSON (read)
5 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, the next statement, and we are now into
6 those of police officers, is of Paul Adamson. It is at
7 page [80007].
8 In paragraph 2 he says:
9 "I am a police officer in the PSNI with 25 years'
10 experience."
11 Go over to the next page, [80008]. It is
12 paragraphs 5 and 6 I want to take you to:
13 "I remember the time of the Robert Hamill incident
14 as it was the main investigation going on in Portadown,
15 but I didn't know anything or hear anyone talk about it
16 really, just an occasional reference to Allister Hanvey
17 and Tracey Clarke when I was at the gym. In fact, it
18 wasn't really until DCI K interviewed me in
19 November 2000 that I knew who was involved. I knew that
20 Andrea and Michael McKee were involved in the whole
21 thing and also Robert Atkinson and Davy McCaw.
22 "During that interview, I was asked when Davy McCaw
23 first mentioned that he had some information that he was
24 taking to CID. I recall that it was some time after the
25 incident happened, but I can't remember exactly when,
77
1 that Davy McCaw came to me while I was on duty at the
2 gate lodge of the Brownstown business centre and he
3 asked me for the car keys. He said that he had a wee
4 bit of information and was going to speak to CID about
5 it. He didn't tell me, and I didn't ask, what the
6 information was. He just seemed his usual self. Davy
7 had said on previous occasions that he was off to speak
8 to CID about things. He'd a mind of his own. That was
9 just him. I never asked him when he came back what he
10 had been talking about, so I still don't know."
11 We think that was the occasion on which the
12 information about Tracey Clarke was taken from the gym.
13 That may give you some clue about whether the talk of
14 the gym was all about the Hanvey incident or the Hanvey
15 participation as alleged in the incident or not.
16 Statement and Interview of TREVOR ANDERSON (read)
17 Then page [80013]. This is a statement of
18 Mr Anderson from the Complaints and Discipline section.
19 He is too ill, I am sorry to say, to attend. What
20 happened was he signed this statement off in 2006. He
21 was then re-interviewed and we will see that in
22 a transcript. Both this and the transcript deal with
23 what Complaints and Discipline should have done and what
24 he knew.
25 Paragraph 2:
78
1 "In April 1997 I was a team leader at RUC
2 Gough Barracks, which was set up to investigate
3 complaints against police in south region which at that
4 time comprised G, J, K and L divisions. I was
5 responsible for allocating complaints which were
6 notified to me from central office in Belfast."
7 Down to paragraph 3:
8 "The procedure was as follows. The complaint would
9 be forwarded to the superintendent, new complaints,
10 Lishnasharragh, who would allocate it to its appropriate
11 regional office. He also notified the ICPC of that
12 complaint so they could decide whether or not they would
13 supervise the complaint. In the meantime, the papers
14 arrived with me and I handed them over to the
15 investigating officer who prepared the Form 17(3), which
16 was the notice to the alleged officer that a complaint
17 had been made against him. The Form 17(3) had to be
18 prepared and served as soon as practicable so that the
19 officer had plenty of time to retrieve notes, etc. Then
20 the complainant would be requested to attend for
21 an interview.
22 "All complaints should go immediately to new
23 complaints. On 9th May 1997, I was appointed to assist
24 DCS McBurney with the investigation of the complaint
25 made by Diane Hamill of neglect of duty."
79
1 Overleaf, [80014]:
2 "The appointments were made through the Assistant
3 Chief Constable, G Department. The ICPC were asked to,
4 and did, approve the appointment of the senior
5 investigating officer."
6 If we miss out paragraph 5 and go to 6, 7 and 8:
7 "I can't recall whether or not a strategy was agreed
8 with the ICPC, but in the normal course, the ICPC had
9 the upper hand in relation to how things progressed and
10 they would advise the investigating officers. They
11 would probably have communicated with DCS McBurney by
12 letter. When it came to interviewing, they wouldn't ask
13 questions themselves, but would ask for questions to be
14 put, but I can't now remember the detail of this
15 investigation. I was kept up-to-date by CI Bradley, but
16 we would discuss the matter only occasionally.
17 "The complaint investigation and the murder
18 investigation were in essence one and the same, so the
19 evidence from the murder investigation would have formed
20 part of the complaint investigation file. I would
21 therefore probably have been aware of witnesses
22 Tracey Clarke and Timothy Jameson, but I can't remember
23 anything more about them. I do know that I had no
24 direct involvement with them.
25 "I was not made aware that Tracey Clarke had made
80
1 an allegation against RC Robert Atkinson. It was never
2 discussed with me. I can't say whether anyone else
3 referred it to the ICPC, but it wasn't brought to my
4 attention by DCS McBurney or anyone else. Normally
5 during an investigation, if an allegation of criminal
6 conduct by a police officer arises, the officers who had
7 discovered it would be obliged to raise a file on the
8 matter. The file should contain a statement outlining
9 the nature of the complaint and that file would then be
10 forwarded to the superintendent of new complaints.
11 Thereafter, it would be referred to the ICPC and they
12 would decide whether to supervise or not."
13 Overleaf, [80015], at paragraph 9:
14 "I am unaware of anyone called Andrea McKee and
15 unaware that there was any evidence relating to
16 telephone records of Robert Atkinson or Allister Hanvey.
17 DCS McBurney did not discuss anything of that nature
18 with me. In fact, I did not even know that the
19 allegation had been made."
20 I think a lot of incredulity would have been thrown
21 at this witness, had he been well enough to attend, in
22 the light of what we know about the consultations that
23 Mr McBurney had with the Complaints and Discipline
24 present in May 1997.
25 If we look at the transcript on .pdf, you will see
81
1 some documents are then put to Mr Anderson.
2 Page [3]:
3 "Michael Stephens: In paragraph 8 of that statement
4 you state that you were unaware of allegations made by
5 Tracey Clarke against RC Atkinson. Now, do you recall
6 attending meetings with Mr McBurney and Mr [blank] and
7 Mr Mullan ..."
8 The blank I think is Murnaghan:
9 "... from the ICPC?"
10 "Trevor Anderson: Yes, I recall attending two
11 meetings. One was 12th May, I think, and the other one
12 was on 19th May.
13 "Michael Stephens: Now, at those meetings,
14 Mr Mullan recorded meetings in connection ..."
15 I think we have a transcript -- the transcript
16 I want is 10th January 2007. I am so sorry. It is
17 entirely my fault. Thank you very much. I pick it up
18 halfway down again:
19 "Michael Stephens: In paragraph 8 of that statement
20 you state that you were unaware of allegations made by
21 Tracey Clarke against RC Atkinson. Now, do you recall
22 attending meetings with Mr McBurney and Mr Murnaghan and
23 Mr Mullan from the ICPC?
24 "Trevor Anderson: Yes, I recall attending two
25 meetings. One was on 12th May, I think, and the other
82
1 one was on 19th May.
2 "Michael Stephens: Now, at those meetings,
3 Mr Mullan recorded minutes in connection with
4 a complaint being supervised by the ICPC. That
5 complaint was against four officers for neglect of duty
6 or whatever as far as --
7 "Trevor Anderson: Criminal negligence."
8 Overleaf, [4]:
9 "Michael Stephens: Criminal negligence, whatever.
10 In both of those meetings he recalls you as being in
11 attendance. Do you remember attending meetings with
12 those individuals?
13 "Trevor Anderson: I do now that I have had my
14 memory refreshed at this minute.
15 "Michael Stephens: And the reason you didn't raise
16 that at the previous meeting?
17 "Trevor Anderson: I'd just had -- I knew I was at
18 a meeting, but I couldn't recall just when it was. Soon
19 after the allegations were made, I think ."
20 "If we go to page [5], the penultimate entry on the
21 page:
22 "Michael Stephens: It was at this juncture that
23 DCS McBurney referred to a matter arising."
24 This is 12th May he is referring to here:
25 "Trevor Anderson: I can see it. It is the first
83
1 paragraph at the top of page 14823."
2 Overleaf, [6]:
3 "Michael Stephens: Yes."
4 Then there is a quote:
5 "'During the interview with Tracey Clarke, the
6 latter stated she had been talking to a person named [it
7 says 'Henvey' here but it is obviously Hanvey] prior to
8 his arrest by police. According to Miss Clarke, Mr
9 Hanvey had boasted to her that one of the four officers
10 at the scene, RC Atkinson, had told him to get rid of
11 the clothing he was wearing at the time of the assault'.
12 "Do you have any memory of that at all?
13 "Trevor Anderson: I have no memory of that.
14 Whether I was still at the meeting or not, I just don't
15 know, but I have no memory of it. I may have left
16 early, because I do know that CS McBurney was appraising
17 Mr Murnaghan of the extent of the investigation into the
18 murder and I can't remember. There was nothing referred
19 to me prior to that to deal with and I may have left the
20 interview. I just can't be sure.
21 "Michael Stephens: No. Were you aware at all of
22 the witness Tracey Clarke and -- well, there were two
23 witnesses, they were referred to as Witness A and
24 Witness B?
25 "Trevor Anderson: No.
84
1 "Michael Stephens: You can't remember those at all?
2 "Trevor Anderson: I can't remember those. Again,
3 had there been something referred to me to deal with,
4 I would have remembered."
5 Overleaf, [7]:
6 "Michael Stephens: Right. In that respect then,
7 where we've got a criminal allegation being made against
8 a reserve constable or a constable -- it doesn't make
9 any difference really, does it, they are still under the
10 same discipline as far as that's concerned -- what would
11 you have expected to happen where a criminal allegation
12 was made? Would it be referred to you or would it be
13 referred to --
14 "Trevor Anderson: No, I couldn't tell you. It
15 would be part of the file. No, it will be up to the
16 investigating officer himself in conjunction with
17 Mr Murnaghan, one of the ICPC. He's a man with great
18 experience who knew the procedures in relation to
19 following up matters like that. Now, had it been
20 something that came about in the course of things, we
21 might have had to raise another file. It could have
22 become part of the file that's already there."
23 If we go to page [10], at the top:
24 "Michael Stephens: Okay. The second record on
25 19th May and that's at page 14805. Come forward again:
85
1 "'Mr McBurney briefed the ICPC supervising member
2 Mr Murnaghan'.
3 "Now, can you recall that meeting at all?"
4 Now, if we go over the page, [11], second entry:
5 "Michael Stephens: Yes."
6 And there's a quote:
7 "'And the IO dealing with the issue of RC Atkinson
8 allegedly telephoned Mr Hanvey, telephone records are in
9 the process of being seized'.
10 "Have you any recollection of that briefing at all?
11 "Trevor Anderson: No.
12 "Michael Stephens: Do you accept that you may have
13 been at that meeting?
14 "Trevor Anderson: Well, I was obviously at that
15 meeting, but whether I was there when that was discussed
16 or not, I just can't say.
17 "Michael Stephens: Right. So you've got no
18 recollection of any telephone billing being applied for?
19 "Trevor Anderson: No."
20 Of course, you will recall Chief Inspector Bradley
21 who was at the meetings, whose memory was tested about
22 these as well and who this gentleman says would have
23 reported these matters to him. That seems to be the
24 extend of the Complaints and Discipline involvement in
25 the entire matter.
86
1 Statement of DENISE CORNETT (read)
2 Then if we go next to page [80207], this is the
3 statement taken by the Inquiry from Denise Cornett, who,
4 sadly, is very ill after, amongst other things, a very
5 serious car accident. If I pick this up from
6 paragraph 3:
7 "As a Reserve Constable I had three months' training
8 in Garnerville in Belfast and I also received separate
9 training in public order duty as part of my Mobile
10 Support Unit training. At the time, I was trained in
11 first aid. I had no training in preserving forensic
12 evidence or scene preservation generally.
13 "On 26th April 1997, I reported for duty at
14 1600 hours. My shift was to end at midnight. However,
15 I was asked to cover for someone from midnight until
16 0300 hours performing public order duties. I recall
17 that I did not end up finishing my shift until around
18 0400 hours.
19 "At the commencement of my public order duties,
20 I was briefed to pay particular attention to the town
21 centre within the barriers."
22 If we go over the page [80208] and pick it up at
23 paragraphs 7 and 8:
24 "During our patrol of the town centre, we made
25 a stop outside the Instep Sports shop which was near the
87
1 junction of Market Street and Woodhouse Street on the
2 West Street side of the road. I have marked this
3 position LR1 on the map of the city centre produced and
4 shown to me at page 73896. After a few minutes, we then
5 moved down Market Street into the High Street, where
6 I noticed a man walking across the road ahead of us
7 wearing a blue shirt and dark trousers, mouthing
8 something at us. His demeanour was casual. Due to the
9 heavy armour on the Land Rover, I could not hear what
10 the man said.
11 "Constable Neill stopped the vehicle and I have
12 marked this position on the map as LR2. This was only
13 a very short distance from LR1. I opened the door and
14 the man said to me, 'My friends are coming down
15 Thomas Street'. I replied, 'Okay'. I was not concerned
16 by this, as I could not see many others on the street,
17 and the man walked on down Woodhouse Street without any
18 bother. I assumed the friends he referred to were
19 coming from St Patrick's Hall because the man was
20 heading down Woodhouse Street."
21 Overleaf, [80209]:
22 "At this point, I noticed two youths in their early
23 twenties coming towards the Land Rover from High Street
24 towards Market Street. The Land Rover had moved forward
25 a short distance and stopped at position LR3. They
88
1 arrived at the Land Rover after the original man had
2 walked off in the direction of Woodhouse Street."
3 I am going to read the rest of this page:
4 "The Land Rover was parked at an angle on
5 Market Street coming on to High Street with the front
6 pointing to the left towards the footpath. The two
7 youths came over to my door and started to talk to me.
8 At page 9452 of the transcript of my interview with
9 DI Irwin on 2nd October 1997, I told DI Irwin that I had
10 seen the two boys in a verbal exchange with the man that
11 had earlier walked across the front of the Land Rover
12 and that, 'The two boys shouted at the fellow and that,
13 you know, shouted at him'. I cannot really recall what
14 was said between the youths and man today, but I know
15 that I opened my door and that is when they came over to
16 chat to me. I did not know these boys and I can't
17 remember if anyone else in the Land Rover recognised
18 them, but we were all having a general chat. It was
19 quite a short conversation.
20 "Referring to my notebook at the entry dated
21 27.04.97 at page 9678 I have described two men."
22 She goes on to give the description of them:
23 "11. During the conversation I could not really see
24 anything apart from the two youths. This was because,
25 even though the door was open, it was quite a narrow gap
89
1 and the vehicle was parked at an angle. I could still
2 see down the High Street. I did not hear any shouting
3 or anything else going on outside. After only a short
4 time, Constable Neill's door was pulled open by a guy
5 who tried to pull him out of the Land Rover. He was
6 saying, 'What are you doing? You're sitting watching
7 all this. Watching the mob'."
8 I think that's the only reference we have to
9 watching a mob:
10 "He was approximately 30 years of age and wearing a
11 blue shirt and dark trousers."
12 Over the page [80210]:
13 "The two boys who I had been talking to told me not
14 to get out and they ran off."
15 Again, I think that's the only reference we have to
16 anyone warning police not to get out:
17 "I could hear a noise and jumped out of the vehicle.
18 I could see a crowd of people at Market Street on the
19 opposite side of the road to us. There were
20 approximately 60 people and they were all scattered and
21 some were fighting in small groups. There was not one
22 big fight, but numerous fights going on. I saw people
23 throwing punches, but I did not know who they were.
24 I could just see arms swinging but not exactly who was
25 fighting.
90
1 I ran over to the island in the middle of the road
2 and that was when I realised I did not have my radio.
3 I did not see any injured persons at that stage. I ran
4 back to the Land Rover and got out my handheld radio and
5 called the control room in Portadown for assistance, but
6 nobody was answering so I used the Land Rover's radio.
7 I thought my handheld radio wasn't working. The two
8 radios were on separate channels but everyone can hear
9 what I was saying, including the control room. Our
10 radio sign was Juliet Delta 81. However, I initially
11 used the call sign Juliet Delta 80, because I was
12 nervous and scared.
13 "At this stage there was nobody at the Land Rover,
14 and, as I came around, I then saw two fellows lying on
15 the ground. I had not seen these men earlier when I had
16 got out of the Land Rover and gone over to the central
17 reservation. So I radioed for assistance again and
18 said, 'There's two persons down. We need an ambulance
19 urgently'. The bodies were definitely not on the ground
20 when I had first got out of the Land Rover.
21 "One of the injured men was lying on Market Street
22 and the other one was 5 or 6 feet below him.
23 A photograph has been produced and shown to me
24 containing page 222, which is a view looking from
25 High Street into Market Street. Woodhouse Street is on
91
1 the right of this picture and Thomas Street is on the
2 left of the photograph. Another photograph of the
3 junction of Thomas Street and Market Street is produced
4 and shown to me containing page 233. Looking at the
5 photographs, I can confirm that the two men were lying
6 in Market Street at the junction with Thomas Street.
7 They were both on the road."
8 Overleaf, [80211]:
9 "I ran to the first man, who was on his side.
10 I checked his breathing and his pulse which was very
11 rapid and he was gasping. There was blood on the ground
12 near the top of his head. I didn't actually check to
13 see if it was blood, but I assumed it was. I could see
14 broken glass on the ground near his head. There was no
15 blood on his face and I am not sure who turned him on
16 his side into the recovery position. He was unconscious
17 and did not respond when I talked to him. There were
18 two females with this man and I assured them that
19 an ambulance was on its way. One female was wearing
20 a black leather jacket, dark trousers and had long,
21 straight hair. The other female had short brown hair.
22 They were crying and upset. There was no-one else near
23 the body as the crowd were pushed back by police,
24 perhaps 6 or 7 feet away. At this stage, there was
25 still just the four of us police there. I could hear
92
1 people shouting, but I can't recall what they were
2 saying. Something like 'Fenians'.
3 "I then went over to check on the second man lying on
4 the ground. I gave him first aid too. He was about 2 or
5 3 feet away from the other man and he was also on his
6 side and unconscious. He did not respond when I talked
7 to him. I cannot remember seeing any blood but
8 I checked his pulse and listened to his breathing and
9 both were very slow. I do not think anyone was with
10 this man. A female wearing a green jacket and dark
11 trousers with dark auburn hair then came over to me.
12 She was really upset and distressed. She kept saying
13 that, 'This is just awful', and crying. I cannot
14 remember if she knew the injured men and I do not recall
15 her indicating that she had seen anything. The crowd
16 had dispersed and were about 10 or 15 feet away from the
17 second injured man and at no point did I see anyone
18 trying to attack this second man lying on the ground.
19 "Whilst I was with this injured man and the woman in
20 the green jacket, I looked up and saw Constable Neill
21 struggling with a young man at the Land Rover. I got up
22 and ran over to help Constable Neill. I tried to
23 restrain the youth he was struggling with by grabbing
24 him, but then another youth ran over and was trying to
25 kick the man that Constable Neill had a hold of. All
93
1 three were struggling and one of the fellows was kicking
2 out and kicked Constable Neill in the leg. The man who
3 kicked Constable Neill was in his early twenties,
4 wearing a white top, with brown wavy hair."
5 Overleaf, [80212]:
6 "I cannot recall what the other man looked like, but
7 I grabbed one of them by the arm. But in the end, this
8 man got away. I do not know what happened to the man
9 that Constable Neill was originally struggling with, but
10 I checked with Constable Neill to see if he was okay and
11 he said that he was, so I left him at the Land Rover and
12 went back over to the injured then. I was then
13 approached by another female wearing a blue jacket, dark
14 trousers, with shoulder-length hair, who was crying and
15 very distressed. I tried to comfort her. I do not know
16 if she knew the injured men, but I assumed she did so as
17 she was so upset.
18 "At this stage, the crowd were back from the injured
19 men but were still in Market Street. There were other
20 officers in support there by this stage. My colleagues
21 from the Land Rover were trying to restrain the crowd
22 whilst I stayed with the injured men until the ambulance
23 arrived. I did not recognise anybody in the crowd or
24 see anyone going towards the bodies. It seemed like
25 an eternity had passed from when I had first got out of
94
1 the Land Rover until the ambulance eventually arrived.
2 I do not recall either man regaining consciousness
3 whilst I was with them. I recall one ambulance in
4 attendance, but there may have been two. As soon as the
5 paramedics arrived, they went straight to the injured
6 men and I left them to do their job. I didn't speak to
7 them and I do not recall any of the women talking to
8 them.
9 "By the time that ambulance had arrived, more police
10 officers were at the scene and I think that there was
11 a local police car from Banbridge. I recall that the
12 Mobile Support Unit was also at the scene at some stage,
13 but I cannot remember when they arrived. I do not
14 remember seeing an inspector at the scene, but I think
15 there was a sergeant there. When the ambulance arrived,
16 the police had formed a line and were trying to push the
17 crowd back up Market Street and on to West Street. I do
18 not know if any of the officers had their baton drawn
19 but I did not carry one. At that time, female officers
20 were not issued with batons. I did not see any riot
21 guns at the scene.
22 "At this time, people in the crowd were still
23 shouting, but I could see that some of them had left and
24 walked on up the street. I did not see any fighting or
25 bottles", overleaf, [80213], "being thrown, but could
95
1 hear glass smashing. It has been pointed out me that
2 I said in my 1997 statement that there were
3 'approximately 50 Protestants and 10 Catholics', but
4 I cannot remember where these Catholics were. I know
5 that the crowd that was pushed back by the officers was
6 made up of Protestant youths. I remember the word
7 'Fenians' being shouted out and that there were two
8 groups at the scene, but I do not recall one group
9 attacking the other group. There was just different
10 people fighting within a massive crowd. I did not
11 recognise or know any person in the crowd.
12 "Things eventually calmed down and I remember
13 leaving the scene at about 3.30 and finishing duty at
14 3.45. At this time I cannot remember if there were any
15 senior officers at the scene or if I was given any
16 instructions by any other officers before I left. I was
17 told to stand down, but I cannot remember who gave me
18 that order. I do remember speaking to Constable Neill
19 before I went back to the station to change and go home.
20 I went back to the station with Reserve
21 Constables P40 and Atkinson and Constable Neill.
22 I changed my clothes, completed my notebook and went
23 home. Normally, we received a briefing before we
24 terminated duty, but I cannot remember being given
25 a briefing that morning or any instructions before
96
1 I went home.
2 "I recall later being called at home and told to
3 come back to the station. I got back to the station
4 about by 0600 or 0630. I cannot recall who phoned me,
5 but when I arrived at the station, I saw the other
6 members of the Land Rover crew. We went into the CID
7 office and there were other officers there. We were
8 told that there had been two people injured at the scene
9 and one of them was seriously ill. I do not know which
10 officer gave us this information but we were told to
11 make statements about what had happened that morning.
12 I had already completed my notebook before I had
13 terminated duty that morning. I think we were all in
14 the CID office together making our statements, but
15 I cannot remember if we discussed what had happened. At
16 this stage, I was exhausted and I just wanted to get
17 back home and into bed. When I finished making my
18 statement, I handed it in. I cannot remember to whom
19 and I cannot remember if I also handed in my notebook.
20 After that, I left and went back home. It was about
21 0930 when I left the station."
22 Overleaf, [80214]:
23 "In my statement and notebook I gave some detailed
24 descriptions of persons at the scene, but I did not
25 recognise anybody there as I had only just moved to
97
1 Portadown. I was never called in to attend any identity
2 parade or any other identification procedure. I went
3 off sick at the end of April 1997, soon after the
4 incident. I was never asked to clarify my statement and
5 only recall being asked to attend an interview, which
6 I did, on 2nd October 1997, with DI Irwin and Detective
7 Chief Superintendent McBurney. I was not involved in
8 the investigation after 27th April 1997 and I did not
9 have any contact with the other officers from the
10 Land Rover as we never socialised outside work. I went
11 off on long-term sickness and never came back to
12 policing duties.
13 "Everything I know about murder investigation is
14 from watching the television. I was later contacted,
15 though I cannot recall when, by a DS McDowell to attend
16 an interview about Reserve Constable Atkinson.
17 I refused to, as could I not get any representation from
18 the Police Federation, who had told me that this
19 interview was not a police matter and I did not want to
20 go without a solicitor.
21 "At the time of the incident I had only been
22 stationed in Portadown for eight months, and, although
23 I was a member of the public order crew that night,
24 I did not see it as part of my duties to secure the
25 scene. I was mainly concerned with the welfare of the
98
1 two injured men that night, and in any event, I had no
2 training in scene preservation. I'd never experienced
3 violence like that before, even when I was with the
4 Mobile Support Unit."
5 Not very much more, I am pleased to say.
6 Statement of P18 (read)
7 Next is page [81719], the statement of P18. In
8 paragraph 1 he tells us:
9 "In April 1997 I was a detective constable stationed
10 at Portadown."
11 If we jump straight over the page to [81720], I just
12 want to take you to paragraph 7, if I may:
13 "I was engaged on enquiries linked to the
14 investigation and it was the norm to have morning
15 conferences and briefings usually taken by DI Irwin or
16 one of the detective sergeants. I cannot now remember
17 if Detective Chief Inspector P39 was present at those
18 briefings. At those conferences, updates were given on
19 the condition of Robert Hamill and I can remember that
20 his injuries, although serious, did not appear to be
21 life-threatening."
22 So there is some confirmation of the daily
23 conferences.
24 Statement of MICHAEL PORTER (read)
25 Then page [81580] there is the statement of
99
1 Michael Porter. He is one of the team who searched the
2 Hanvey household on 10th May 1997. Again, regrettably,
3 he is too ill to attend.
4 If we go to page [81581], paragraph 6:
5 "The instructions were given orally and I would
6 definitely have made a brief written note of the
7 specific details in my notebook. We were instructed to
8 search for clothing. I am reminded that the search
9 warrant at page [51350] confirms that we were looking
10 for 'trainers and clothing'. I cannot be absolutely
11 sure, but I do not recall being given any specific
12 details as to the type, colour or brand of clothing to
13 look for. Nor do I remember being given specific
14 instructions to look for a silver jacket or burnt
15 clothing. Unless we had been given specific
16 instructions, we would have been told to seize any of
17 these items that we could find."
18 Perhaps I can just jump to page [81584],
19 paragraph 17:
20 "I have again asked whether I was satisfied that the
21 search was thorough and in accordance with the briefing.
22 All I can say is that the search was in accordance with
23 the briefing."
24 Overleaf [81585]:
25 "I had no concerns about how the investigation was
100
1 being carried out at the time, nor do I have any now."
2 Then page [82049] is a Francis Reel. This deals
3 with the question of how the ICPC might have become
4 involved.
5 Paragraph 2, page [82049] --
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Is this the right statement? It says
7 Michael John Porter?
8 MR UNDERWOOD: It is being input, but I see [82049] is not
9 actually coming up with anything at the moment. I will
10 jump from that and come back to it. Page [82047]. No.
11 I will keep trying until I find one.
12 Statement of CARL SIMPSON (read)
13 [81169]. This is the statement of Carl Simpson,
14 Queen's Counsel. If we look at paragraph 2, he says:
15 "I was instructed by the DPP in the case of
16 R v McKee and McKee."
17 What I want to do is take you to paragraph 3, if
18 I may:
19 "My involvement was limited to the prosecution of
20 the McKees. I was instructed by Raymond Kitson."
21 If we go down three lines, a sentence which starts
22 on the right-hand side:
23 "The only advice I gave was in respect of deferring
24 sentence of Andrea McKee pending her giving evidence on
25 another matter. On 31st January 2002, there was
101
1 a meeting at which that issue was raised and I was
2 asked, simply for clarification purposes, to summarise
3 the legal position. I advised that was neither
4 appropriate nor desirable, and in any event, the
5 evidence would be weakened by the fact it could be
6 linked to their future punishment. To be clear, it was
7 not put to me as something the police intended or wanted
8 to do. They simply asked for advice on the matter."
9 Then there is then the transcript of the interview
10 by the Inquiry of Miss Christine Smith, which we find at
11 page [75234]. I don't want or need to read any of this.
12 The reason I am putting it in at this stage is for the
13 sake of good order, because, when I pressed Miss Smith
14 on some of the passages in her statement to the Inquiry,
15 her responses were that the statement was only
16 a synopsis and that she had said rather more in the
17 Inquiry interview. It may be necessary either for me or
18 Mr Emmerson to refer to passages in this out of fairness
19 to her when we come to make submissions.
20 Statement of RAYMOND KITSON (read)
21 Then there is a statement of Mr Kitson, which is at
22 page [75419]. Paragraph 3. You heard from Mr Kitson.
23 He says in paragraph 3:
24 "During the course of his interview on
25 21st August 2009 by Mr Michael Stephens of the Inquiry
102
1 team, the Director undertook to provide certain
2 information to the Inquiry in relation to conviction
3 rates, recommendations from the Police Ombudsman and
4 delay in production of forensic reports."
5 What Mr Kitson does is provide that then in the form
6 firstly of a letter which we see at page [75420], in
7 which he explains a good deal of that. Then some
8 statistics which we find at page [75424]. I was not
9 going to go to those, but perhaps one could look briefly
10 at page [75422].
11 There is there in the final paragraph a reference to
12 a progress and tracking group which is identified
13 earlier in the letter as something that was set up in
14 1992. Second line:
15 "From those records which can be provided, if
16 necessary, to the Inquiry, I see that the progress and
17 tracking group meeting discussed the case of Hobson and
18 others at its meetings on 21st August, 18th September
19 and 16th October 1997. It was noted that the
20 post-mortem report and forensic report were still
21 outstanding. I observe further that at that meeting of
22 21st August the forensic scientist representative at
23 that time Mr [blank] had been unable to attend.
24 Mr [blank] did attend the meetings of 18th September and
25 16th October 1997. The outstanding post-mortem reports
103
1 and forensic report were raised at the meetings, and
2 updates on the progress of finalising the reports were
3 provided by the relevant representatives of the agency
4 involved. Mr [blank] was in a position to seek
5 prioritisation of the report within the Forensic Science
6 Agency."
7 Statement of JOHN STEELE (read)
8 Then finally in this exercise there is a statement
9 of a Mr John Steele, which we find at page [82054].
10 In paragraph 3 he tells us:
11 "In 1997, I was Director of policing and security in
12 the NIO and that was coupled with being Senior Director
13 of Belfast. In other words, I was the administrative
14 peak of the Belfast operation for the NIO as well as
15 being concerned with policing and security."
16 If I take you to page [82060], there is one passage
17 on that page I need to refer you to, sir, which is
18 paragraph 26, where he is dealing with the response from
19 the chief constable to the Secretary of State and from
20 there to the Hamill family:
21 "I think that the final response from the Secretary
22 of State to the Hamill family", it gives
23 page references, "relying on the information provided by
24 the chief constable is actually quite helpful. I have
25 been asked to consider point 5, which the family had
104
1 raised in their letter of 21st November relating to the
2 links between some officers and some of the defendants
3 and the response of the chief constable, 'This
4 allegation has been included in the criminal
5 investigation and will be considered by the Director of
6 Public Prosecutions'."
7 Overleaf, [82061]:
8 "In particular, I have been asked if I would have
9 expected in the reply from the chief constable to the
10 Secretary of State to set out that there was only one
11 alleged link so as not to misinform the family. I would
12 not. He was responding to the point and he was saying
13 if there's that allegation, it is included in the
14 investigation and that's all there is to it.
15 "It went as far as he could possibly go without
16 infringing his independence. He wanted to provide the
17 Secretary of State with whatever information he could
18 factually. This would have been usual."
19 At paragraph 29:
20 "I have also been referred to a document dated
21 June 2000 at page 39675. I had, of course, been retired
22 for a number of years at this point. I have been asked
23 to comment on the fourth line down:
24 "'It is alleged that an officer phoned the
25 individual and advised him how to go about destroying
105
1 forensic evidence and thus avoid detection'.
2 "I have been informed that this was the link between
3 the police officer and the defendant referred to at
4 point 5 of Diane Hamill's letter and I have been asked
5 if I would have expected the chief constable to provide
6 the Secretary of State with these details of the
7 allegation either privately or in correspondence at the
8 point when she was writing to the Hamill family.
9 "Again, my response is, when an arrest or an
10 investigation is carried out, that is purely a police
11 matter, perhaps with ICPC involvement. Once the papers
12 are submitted to the DPP, that is the police role
13 completed unless the DPP put out a request for more
14 information or better particulars. They'd have done the
15 job", overleaf, [82062], "and then the DPP swings into
16 action and takes his decision on whether the information
17 that the police has provided them is likely to sustain
18 a conviction."
19 That brings us surprisingly neatly to the evidence
20 of Mr Rogers, who I now call.
21 MR SIMON THOMAS ALAN ROGERS (sworn)
22 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD
23 MR UNDERWOOD: Morning, Mr Rogers.
24 A. Hello.
25 Q. My name is Underwood. I am Counsel to the Inquiry.
106
1 I have a very few questions for you and I think there
2 will be some more supplementals. May I ask your full
3 name, please?
4 A. My full name is Simon Thomas Alan Rogers.
5 Q. Thank you very much. I think you have been kind enough,
6 in something of a hurry, to sign a statement for us
7 which we find at page [82068]. Perhaps we can look at
8 that. Would you keep your eyes on it while we flick
9 through the ten pages of it?
10 Is that your statement?
11 A. The statement, including a couple of typographical
12 errors, is mine, yes.
13 Q. Thank you very much. Are the contents true apart from
14 the typographical errors?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Do you want to draw our attention to those errors?
17 A. In paragraph 12, last line.
18 Q. That's at page [82072]. The missing "F" from "chief
19 constable", I take it?
20 A. Which has appeared next to the "of".
21 Q. Thank you. At least it is not missing. And the other
22 one?
23 A. It is really that sentence which has gone awry.
24 Q. Can I just ask you to look at a statement we have from
25 Mr Steele? That's relevantly at page [82060].
107
1 In paragraph 26, he is referring to the final
2 response from the Secretary of State to the Hamill
3 family and says that it is actually quite helpful. In
4 the second sentence he says:
5 "I have been asked to consider point 5, which the
6 family had raised in their letter of 21st November,
7 relating to the links between some officers and some of
8 the defendants and the response of the chief constable,
9 'This allegation has been included in the criminal
10 investigation and'", overleaf, [82061], "'will be
11 considered by the Director of Public Prosecutions'.
12 "In particular, I have been asked if I would have
13 expected in the reply from the chief constable to the
14 Secretary of State to set out that there was only one
15 alleged link so as not to misinform the family. I would
16 not. He was responding to the point and he was saying:
17 if there's that allegation, it's included in the
18 investigation and that's all there is to it."
19 Would you agree with that?
20 A. I think I do. I mean, that's the first I have seen
21 that, but I agree with it on the first reading, yes.
22 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 29 on this page, [82061]:
23 "I have also been referred to a document ..."
24 We can look at this document if you want to, but
25 I hope we don't need to:
108
1 "... dated June 2000 at page 39675. I had, of
2 course, been retired for a number of years at this
3 point. I have been asked to comment on the fourth
4 line down:
5 "'It is alleged that an officer phoned the
6 individual and advised him how to go about destroying
7 forensic evidence and thus avoid detection'.
8 "I have been informed that this was the link between
9 the police officer and the defendant referred to at
10 point 5 of Diane Hamill's letter and I have been asked
11 if I would have expected the chief constable to provide
12 the Secretary of State with these details of the
13 allegation either privately or in correspondence at the
14 point when she was writing to the Hamill family.
15 "Again, my response is, when an arrest or
16 an investigation is carried out, that is purely a police
17 matter, perhaps with the ICPC involvement."
18 Again, fair comment?
19 A. Yes. I mean, I think that reflects what I have said in
20 my statement at paragraph 27.
21 MR UNDERWOOD: Yes. Thank you. That's all I ask you. As
22 I say, there are likely to be some supplemental
23 questions elsewhere. Thank you very much.
24 A. Thank you.
25 MR McGRORY: If I may, sir?
109
1 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory.
2 Questions from MR McGRORY
3 MR McGRORY: As you know, my name is McGrory and I represent
4 the family of Robert Hamill. I do have some questions
5 for you.
6 If I may say so, Mr Rogers, you were in a very
7 special position in 1997, in that you were one of those
8 few advisers to the Secretary of State on the issue of
9 policing and policing issues in Northern Ireland. Isn't
10 that correct?
11 A. I was certainly advising on issues around police
12 complaints specifically, but later on, on other aspects
13 of policing, yes.
14 Q. Indeed, the issue of police complaints was a political
15 topic of some sensitivity at that time?
16 A. It was, yes. I mean, I should perhaps mention that
17 I worked for Dr xxxxxxxxxxxx who did the review around
18 that time of police complaints and therefore was
19 involved to quite some degree in the topic.
20 Q. If I could just take you back to April/May 1997. We
21 were in the dying days then of the John Major
22 Government. Isn't that right?
23 A. I don't recall that level of detail.
24 Q. You don't recall at all. In terms of the political
25 situation in Northern Ireland, do you remember that the
110
1 peace process had run aground up to that time, close to
2 that time?
3 A. My involvement -- I had very little involvement in the
4 political side of the NIO and I don't want to give the
5 impression that I was fully au fait with all the
6 machinations, but, I mean, it would have been common
7 knowledge in Northern Ireland and I would have had that
8 common knowledge.
9 Q. It would be common knowledge that perhaps some may have
10 had no interest in, and others, perhaps in a position
11 like yours, might have had a significant interest in?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. In terms of what might be about to happen next, because
14 there was a general election scheduled for early May --
15 isn't that correct -- 1997?
16 A. I don't remember the dates, but I am prepared to accept
17 that is the date, yes.
18 Q. But, indeed, when New Labour came into power in
19 May 1997, Dr Mowlam was then appointed as Secretary of
20 State --
21 A. That's right.
22 Q. -- and things began to move very rapidly in terms of the
23 reinvigoration of the political process, because the IRA
24 ceasefire was renewed in July, a matter of weeks after
25 Dr Mowlam was appointed. Isn't that right?
111
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. The stage was then set for a move towards all party
3 talks, which, of course, did happen in April of 1998.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. One of the major issues in those all party talks was the
6 issue of policing and how it might be changed in the
7 context of Northern Ireland?
8 A. Policing was one of the topics certainly that had to be
9 addressed, although the outcome was that it was
10 ultimately referred for a commission to consider the
11 issue.
12 Q. Yes, indeed. That's, in fact, what happened, but you
13 will be acutely aware, as one of those involved in the
14 Northern Ireland Office in advising ministers about
15 policing issues, albeit in the context of complaints,
16 that indeed the issue of disbandment of the RUC was
17 a live issue at the time?
18 A. The political issues around policing, as you would term
19 them, were not really my area of work, and issues such
20 as that would have fallen to the head of the division
21 rather than to me, and it would have been her who would
22 have prepared all of the materials for Ministers, etc.
23 My input would have been, yes, on police complaints,
24 if there were any issues arising from that, but not
25 directly on political matters.
112
1 Q. Mr Rogers, I don't seek to ask you any detailed
2 questions about this, but I think it would be a matter
3 of almost judicial notice that, at that time, certainly
4 one of the principal parties in the forthcoming talks,
5 their position was that the RUC should be disbanded
6 rather than reformed. Isn't that correct?
7 A. That's correct, yes.
8 Q. Of course, that's not what happened. What happened was
9 that, in fact, the policing issue was handed over to the
10 Patten Commission after Good Friday?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. And you then went on, indeed, to work with the
13 Patten Commission?
14 A. I -- well, I was involved in the appointment of the
15 Patten Commission. I certainly was involved in
16 providing materials to the Patten Commission, but it was
17 an independent body separate from Government and
18 political parties. I then was involved, once it
19 reported, in assisting Government to consider the report
20 and, indeed, to implement the vast bulk of the
21 recommendations which were accepted by the Commission --
22 by the Government.
23 Q. You may or may not be able to help us with this
24 question, Mr Rogers, but we noticed a reference
25 yesterday in papers attached to the statement of
113
1 Mr Langdon who was commissioned to do a report on the
2 Hamill Inquiry -- on the issue of a Hamill Inquiry in
3 2000, that Mr Patten had raised the issue of the Hamill
4 case.
5 Can you help us with that? Do you have any memory
6 of that?
7 A. I have a memory that they met the family and people with
8 the family, but no more than that, because the
9 Commission, as I say, was independent and who it chose
10 to see was entirely a matter for it, not for me, or
11 Government indeed, but I was aware they had met the
12 Hamill family among many other people.
13 Q. Yes, of course. I just want to move on to the specifics
14 of the extent to which the Secretary of State,
15 Dr Mowlam, could have been given perhaps more
16 information about the allegation against Reserve
17 Constable Atkinson when she raised the issues in
18 December of 1997.
19 THE CHAIRMAN: Is this for information which could have been
20 passed on to the Hamill family or that would have been
21 for her eyes only?
22 MR McGRORY: Well, I propose to ask this witness some
23 questions about both of those issues, sir.
24 THE CHAIRMAN: How is this directed to our terms of
25 reference --
114
1 MR McGRORY: Well --
2 THE CHAIRMAN: -- which relate to the investigation?
3 MR McGRORY: Well, the Secretary of State could have done --
4 if she had been given more information, more specifics,
5 it would be my submission that she could have done two
6 things.
7 Firstly, she could have decided it was proper to
8 inform the family and allow the family to raise it with
9 the ICPC that there was a specific allegation. That
10 would have ensured a higher degree of supervision over
11 this aspect of the case.
12 She may have taken the view or been asked not to do
13 that at a particular time for fear of perhaps
14 compromising the investigation in some way. Had she
15 been persuaded of that, she could have taken the view,
16 sir, that she would say nothing to the family for the
17 moment, but that she, herself, could have continued to
18 raise enquiries as to the conduct of the investigation
19 and where it stood and whether or not the ICPC was
20 indeed engaged with it.
21 It will be our eventual submission that she was
22 deprived of doing either of those things because she was
23 utterly unaware of the detail.
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, now the witness has heard your
25 explanation, perhaps he can tell us if they are within
115
1 his knowledge, and, if topics such as that are within
2 his knowledge, whether it would be constitutionally
3 within the Secretary of State's remit to refer -- to
4 deal with those matters. Do you not think?
5 MR McGRORY: Yes. I would have --
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. Can you help us?
7 A. I can't speculate as to what Dr Mowlam might have done
8 with the information, but -- I mean, it's quite a broad
9 area you are asking me to consider. There are aspects
10 of that area which I have covered in my statement, for
11 example. To what extent it is of help, I don't know,
12 but I am obviously happy to give every assistance I can.
13 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I think you may need to confine your
14 questions to matters this witness can deal with.
15 MR McGRORY: Oh, yes.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. You can be guided there by what's
17 in his statement.
18 MR McGRORY: Indeed.
19 Mr Rogers, you have already commented on the
20 specific question that was answered in paragraph 5 of
21 the chief constable's response and you deal with this at
22 paragraph 21 of your statement, but could I have, first
23 of all, just the letter which the Secretary of State
24 wrote to the chief constable? It is at page [60488].
25 The preceding page, [60487],is the first page of the
116
1 letter. It is addressed to Sir Ronnie Flanagan. It is
2 dated 28th November. Do you see that?
3 A. I do, yes.
4 Q. Did you draft that letter for the Secretary of State?
5 A. I did draft it, yes.
6 Q. If you go over the page, at [60488], the bottom
7 paragraph, I see the Secretary of State asked:
8 "I should be grateful, therefore, if you would
9 supply me with as much detail as possible on the points
10 in the attached letter and annex so that I can reply to
11 Diane Hamill."
12 Do you see that?
13 A. I do, yes.
14 Q. She had asked for as much detail as possible.
15 Now, of course, what is at issue here is the extent
16 to which the chief constable's operational independence
17 needed to be protected, but am I right in suggesting to
18 you that information about a case can be given to
19 a Secretary of State without necessarily compromising
20 the independence of the police operation?
21 A. As a general principle, that is correct, yes.
22 MR WOLFE: I am not sure, Chairman, with all due respect,
23 that this witness is in a position to answer that. He
24 is purporting --
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Shall we ask him?
117
1 MR WOLFE: Can I just say this? He is purporting to answer
2 my friend's question which is directed to him, which
3 asks him to consider whether policing independence is
4 compromised by the information sought.
5 This gentleman is coming at it from the other angle.
6 He is not coming at it from a policing perspective. So
7 how does he know whether the independence, the
8 constitutional independence of the policing role could
9 be compromised? That's a matter for police.
10 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, I would have thought that in order for
11 there to be a proper relationship, it would be necessary
12 both for the police and for the Secretary of State to
13 understand what's involved in the independence of the
14 police.
15 If the Secretary of State doesn't know that, she may
16 be asking for all sorts of things which she shouldn't
17 be, because it would compromise the independence of the
18 police. The police can't have an independence that is
19 not known to those others from whom they have to be
20 independent.
21 MR WOLFE: Well, we will see --
22 THE CHAIRMAN: I don't think there is anything that the
23 witness is being asked to say, if it is within his
24 knowledge to answer, that he shouldn't be asked about.
25 Each side must have an appreciation of the other's
118
1 stance.
2 MR WOLFE: Very well. My concern is that, really, this does
3 get into the area of policing understanding of the
4 independence of their investigation, and the concern is
5 that this witness doesn't know -- cannot know the
6 concerns which affect that independence and ...
7 THE CHAIRMAN: I would have thought this witness would know
8 there are certain things you don't try to poke your nose
9 into and would know, if the Secretary of State goes too
10 far, how the Secretary of State might be warned, advised
11 to keep off the grass.
12 MR WOLFE: Very well. We will see where it goes.
13 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory?
14 MR McGRORY: Thank you, sir.
15 Indeed, Mr Rogers, the Secretary of State had
16 a statutory power under Article 8(2) of the Police Act
17 to seek a report. Isn't that right? Sorry. Have I got
18 the right piece of legislation?
19 A. She did have a statutory power. I think I highlight
20 that in my statement.
21 Q. Yes, you do.
22 THE CHAIRMAN: I think it is an order made under the Act,
23 isn't it?
24 MR McGRORY: Yes. In any event, I think what you say in
25 your statement is she had a statutory power to seek
119
1 a report, but there was an understanding really between
2 a Secretary of State and a chief constable that, when
3 information was asked for, it would be supplied without
4 the need to resort to the actual statute?
5 A. Yes. There's a regular flow of correspondence between
6 a division like police division and the Police Service
7 and one would never want to resort to, and never did
8 resort to, the use of something like that power.
9 Q. Could I ask you to look, please, Mr Rogers, at
10 page [15376]? This is the answer that the Secretary of
11 State received to her letter. It is at part 5.
12 Now, the answer is under the heading in which it was
13 asked, "Relationship between some officers and some of
14 the defendants". I think you recount in your statement
15 that this was raised in a letter from Diane Hamill
16 before the meeting with the Secretary of State and would
17 have been discussed during the course of the meeting.
18 A. It was certainly raised in the letter. I'm not certain
19 that it was discussed at the meeting --
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. -- and it's not -- it's not recorded, I think, in
22 the minutes of the meeting that it was discussed.
23 Q. Okay. But it was brought to the Secretary of State's
24 attention, at least in the letter --
25 A. It certainly was, yes.
120
1 Q. -- and in the general that there were concerns on the
2 family's behalf that there were links between the
3 Land Rover police and those who were suspected of the
4 murder, but they had no more information than what they
5 had heard?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Isn't that the gist of what was brought to the Secretary
8 of State's attention?
9 A. That's correct, yes.
10 Q. The answer here says:
11 "This allegation has been included in the criminal
12 investigation and will be considered by the Director of
13 Public Prosecutions."
14 Now, the first half of that sentence:
15 "The allegation has been included in the criminal
16 investigation ..."
17 Would you be surprised to know that it wasn't?
18 A. Again, I do deal with that in my statement in that --
19 sorry, I don't deal with that point directly. I deal
20 with the fact that the ICPC weren't supervising it.
21 Q. That's another point that I am going to come to in
22 a moment.
23 A. Well, I would have taken the letter from the chief
24 constable suggesting it was included in the criminal
25 investigation to suggest that it indeed was, so, yes,
121
1 I would be surprised.
2 Q. Yes. In fact, what did happen is that it wasn't
3 included in the criminal investigation at all. It was
4 dealt with under the heading of neglect, which was, at
5 the beginning, supervised by the ICPC.
6 So that does cause you some surprise then?
7 A. It does.
8 Q. Going on to the second part of that answer that the
9 Secretary of State was giving:
10 "... and will be considered by the Director of
11 Public Prosecutions."
12 In the context of the criminal investigation, of
13 course, it was not considered by the Director of Public
14 Prosecutions, because the file made no mention of it.
15 Does that cause you some surprise?
16 A. Well, if this was not included in the criminal
17 investigation, as you have now told me, then I can see
18 that it wouldn't be considered.
19 MR EMMERSON: I apologise for interrupting. I am not
20 entirely sure that these questions are put on a fully
21 informed factual basis. The fact is it was included
22 within a criminal investigation and within a file
23 submitted to the DPP. It simply wasn't included within
24 the murder file. It may be that the witness is
25 answering questions on the assumption which appears to
122
1 underline the questions as they stand that it wasn't --
2 THE CHAIRMAN: It was in the neglect file which embraced the
3 tipping-off allegation --
4 MR EMMERSON: And was a criminal investigation.
5 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and it was a file prepared for the DPP.
6 It was also sent to C&D to put them in the picture so
7 that they could deal with that.
8 MR EMMERSON: The assumption the witness was working on,
9 that this was a matter that would be included in the
10 criminal investigation file which would then be
11 considered by the DPP, is correct.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: It went to them by a different route, so to
13 speak.
14 MR EMMERSON: Yes.
15 MR McGRORY: I had no intention to mislead the witness.
16 I was about to say to him that it was included in a file
17 which did go to the DPP, but you are clear on that
18 anyway?
19 A. Well, I confess that I was -- thought you were leading
20 me to believe that it was not included in any criminal
21 investigation and I am -- I now note that it was
22 included in an investigation and presumably that did go
23 to the Director of Public Prosecutions.
24 We certainly were working on the assumption on
25 receipt of a letter from the chief constable that these
123
1 aspects were being covered and would indeed go to the
2 DPP, which was an extra level of assurance and
3 reassurance to us.
4 Q. But, of course, the file that did address the issue,
5 which was the neglect file, was prompted by the
6 complaint on the family's behalf that the Land Rover
7 police had done nothing?
8 MR UNDERWOOD: I am sorry to interrupt my friend. There is
9 an issue, of course, about whether the supervision by
10 the ICPC arose out of a self-referral by the chief
11 constable or by that complaint. So prompted by --
12 THE CHAIRMAN: There is an element of confusion.
13 MR UNDERWOOD: Quite.
14 MR McGRORY: I had not finished my question, sir, which is
15 that it was prompted by that or by the self-referral by
16 the chief constable in the context of allegations made
17 publicly that the Land Rover police had failed to
18 intervene. That was the context in which the second
19 file, the neglect file, was opened. Is that your
20 understanding?
21 A. I confess that I don't know anything of the detail of
22 the files. I can't help you with that.
23 Q. No, but insofar as that file was concerned, it being
24 a complaint file, one would have expected that the ICPC
25 would have supervised every aspect of it.
124
1 A. I do deal with that in my statement and I do say that
2 I did expect that the ICPC were supervising this aspect
3 as well as the broader aspects, yes.
4 Q. Indeed, the Secretary of State would have expected that
5 the ICPC would have supervised every aspect of it?
6 A. I can't speak for the Secretary of State, but -- and
7 I didn't advise her directly on the point, because I had
8 taken it that it was being supervised.
9 Q. Yes, indeed, but had it come to the Secretary of State's
10 attention that it wasn't being supervised, it would have
11 been well within the remit of the Secretary of State to
12 make enquiries whether or not it was being supervised
13 and maybe suggest that it should be, but no further than
14 that?
15 A. Yes. I mean, I am loth to talk on behalf of the
16 Secretary of State. What I can tell you is, if I had
17 been aware it was not being supervised, I obviously
18 would have drawn that to the attention of the Secretary
19 of State --
20 Q. Yes, indeed.
21 A. -- and I think could have advised her on what options
22 were available to her.
23 I can only talk of what my function would have been,
24 not what she would have decided.
25 Q. There would have been options available to her short of
125
1 interfering with any investigation that would have
2 ensured that at least it was being covered. Isn't that
3 right?
4 A. Yes, there were statutory provisions available.
5 Q. Yes. Insofar as the details of the allegation are
6 concerned, what we now know, Mr Rogers is that there was
7 a specific allegation against a specific officer that
8 had been made by a witness, Tracey Clarke, that there
9 had been telephone calls made and advice given to
10 destroy clothing to one of the murderers by a policeman.
11 We also know that telephone records obtained very
12 quickly after that allegation had been made at least
13 supported the allegation to the extent that there was
14 telephone contact between the policeman's household and
15 the alleged murderer's household.
16 Now, I want to suggest to you that that is
17 information which could have been given to the Secretary
18 of State without it necessarily in any way interfering
19 with the operational independence of the chief
20 constable. She could have been told that as a point of
21 information?
22 A. I do try to address that in my statement in
23 paragraph 27, where you say that if the chief constable,
24 for example, in advising the Secretary of State was
25 aware of this allegation at this particular time, then
126
1 I would have expected him perhaps to have informed the
2 Secretary of State.
3 Q. Yes. The Secretary of State could have done a number of
4 things. I mean, she could have asked the chief
5 constable for advice as to whether or not she should
6 make any mention of this to the family. She could have
7 done that?
8 A. She could.
9 Q. And if the chief constable had said, "Look, for
10 operational reasons, we would rather this didn't get
11 into the public domain. Check with me before you tell
12 the family anything", she could have done that?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. And she could have been trusted to do that?
15 A. Indeed, the draft letter was put before the police
16 before it issued to the family to ensure there was
17 nothing in it which would cause difficulties for the
18 Police Service.
19 Q. Indeed.
20 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGrory, you are not, are you, suggesting
21 that the Secretary of State might have said, "Well, tell
22 the Hamill family all about this. Tell them about
23 Tracey Clarke. Tell them about Atkinson"?
24 MR McGRORY: No. I have just asked --
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, are you suggesting that?
127
1 MR McGRORY: It is something she might have considered.
2 THE CHAIRMAN: Are you suggesting she should or would have
3 thought it right to tell the family about Tracey Clarke
4 and about Atkinson?
5 MR McGRORY: At a certain point, yes, sir, but not at the
6 point of this letter in December and January, but she
7 may have chosen to discuss with the chief constable
8 whether or not that was an appropriate thing for her to
9 do, and I would suggest that she would have been told
10 "No", but that, come a later point, she may have chosen
11 indeed to tell the family.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, you have made your point. We will
13 consider it. 2.15.
14 (1.12 pm)
15 (The luncheon adjournment)
16 (2.15 pm)
17 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory?
18 MR McGRORY: Sir, I have only three further questions
19 I would like to ask the witness with your permission,
20 sir.
21 Mr Rogers, I think you have said in your statement,
22 and I think Mr Steele has said it as well, that this
23 Secretary of State, Dr Mowlam, was impressed with the
24 Hamill family and had, if not an empathy, at least
25 a sympathy for them and really wanted to do something?
128
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. That's correct, isn't it? This is a question I would
3 like to have asked the Secretary of State, but
4 unfortunately she is deceased, but I think it is fair to
5 ask you that, knowing her and knowing the interest she
6 took in the case, had she the information, some more of
7 the detail about the allegation against the reservist,
8 that she would have at least kept a watching brief on
9 the development of the case?
10 A. I think she did keep a watching brief on the case in any
11 event.
12 Q. Yes, but regrettably she did it without that
13 information. So she would have factored that
14 information into the watching brief that she did keep?
15 A. Presumably, yes. I can't talk for her, but yes, I mean,
16 given that she was already watching it.
17 Q. Indeed, there was nothing constitutionally improper
18 about that?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Secondly, had she known that the ICPC had removed itself
21 from the supervision of the aspect of the case
22 concerning the allegation against Reserve Constable
23 Atkinson, she would most likely have made
24 representations to the ICPC about that?
25 A. I am reluctant to speculate as to what she would have
129
1 done on that. As I have said in my statement, I would
2 have drawn that to her attention, which would have been
3 my role, but what she would have done I can only
4 speculate, and I don't think that's helpful.
5 Q. But certainly she had under the statutory provisions
6 powers of referral herself?
7 A. She did have those, yes.
8 Q. There would have been nothing constitutionally improper
9 about her exercising those powers?
10 A. Not in my view, no.
11 Q. Thank you. One final issue, Mr Rogers. Would you be
12 surprised to learn that neither the police nor the ICPC
13 had informed the family of Robert Hamill at any time of
14 the fact of an allegation that a police officer had
15 assisted those suspected of the murder?
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Are you really qualified to answer whether
17 that would have been operationally appropriate?
18 A. That's my concern, Chairman. I am not sure I am.
19 THE CHAIRMAN: It is outside your provenance.
20 A. It is outside my provenance.
21 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Very well.
22 MR McGRORY: Are you aware the information was conveyed to
23 them by a member of the judiciary in the form of
24 HM Coroner Mr Leckey in January 2000?
25 A. Yes.
130
1 MR McGRORY: Thank you.
2 MR McCOMB: No questions.
3 MS DINSMORE: No questions.
4 MR UNDERWOOD: Nothing arising. Thank you.
5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
6 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much, indeed.
7 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Rogers.
8 A. Thank you.
9 (The witness withdrew)
10 MR UNDERWOOD: Mr Donnelly now, please.
11 MR PAUL DONNELLY (affirmed)
12 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD
13 MR UNDERWOOD: Good afternoon, Mr Donnelly.
14 A. Afternoon.
15 Q. My name is Underwood and I am Counsel to the Inquiry.
16 I have a few questions for you.
17 May I ask your full names, please?
18 A. Paul Alexander Donnelly.
19 Q. If we look at page [82078] on the screen, we see the
20 first page of a six-page document. May I ask you to
21 keep your eyes on that while we flick through those six
22 pages? Is that your witness statement?
23 A. That is indeed, yes.
24 Q. And is it true?
25 A. It is.
131
1 Q. Can I ask you about a matter that is not in there and
2 that's whether you can assist with how it was that the
3 ICPC first became involved in supervising anything
4 arising out of the death of Mr Hamill? Was it the
5 complaint from xxxxxxx or was it a self-referral
6 by the RUC, in other words?
7 A. My recollection is that it was a self-referral by the
8 RUC.
9 Q. Thank you. Can I attempt brutally to sum up what you
10 say in this statement in these propositions, that the
11 ICPC should have been involved in supervising the
12 allegation that Mr Atkinson tipped off Mr Hanvey?
13 A. Uh-huh.
14 Q. Secondly, that it doesn't actually surprise you that it
15 was not involved. Is that fair?
16 A. That's accurate and fair, yes.
17 Q. And that lack of surprise is because in your view it was
18 not, if I can use this phrase, fit for purpose?
19 A. It would have certainly been counter-cultural to have
20 done so, yes.
21 Q. Thank you very much. Others may have some more
22 questions for you.
23 Questions from MR ADAIR
24 MR ADAIR: I just want to ask you about -- you mention in
25 your statement, Mr Donnelly, about a number of the
132
1 members being part-time, for example, Mr Murnaghan?
2 A. Uh-huh, yes.
3 Q. And you mention also that part of the culture was that
4 they didn't discuss their cases amongst each other?
5 A. Uh-huh.
6 Q. They very much kept it to themselves --
7 A. Yes, very rigidly so.
8 Q. -- as part of the integrity of keeping it tight?
9 A. Uh-huh, yes.
10 THE CHAIRMAN: And because they might be sitting on
11 a Tribunal?
12 A. Uh-huh.
13 MR ADAIR: And because in due course there were two members
14 sitting with the chief constable if there was
15 a Disciplinary Tribunal?
16 A. That's right, uh-huh.
17 Q. Now you have made it clear in your statement and your
18 summary of your evidence that there were obviously parts
19 of it that were not satisfactory. Let's put it that
20 way.
21 A. In my view, yes.
22 Q. I personally didn't know Mr Murnaghan, but the evidence
23 we have heard to date from anybody asked is that
24 Mr Murnaghan was a dedicated, robust, very much his own
25 man individual?
133
1 A. Uh-huh.
2 Q. Does that accord with your knowledge of him?
3 A. It would do, yes.
4 Q. In other words, this description -- I know that you have
5 described some of the attitude, that the culture appears
6 to have been I think you even go to the extent of saying
7 verging on sycophantic towards the relationship. Is
8 that right?
9 A. That would be true, yes.
10 Q. The impression I have certainly -- it doesn't matter
11 what my impression is, but the evidence we have heard
12 about Mr Murnaghan is that he would have been anything
13 but sycophantic to anybody?
14 A. That would have been true, yes.
15 Q. If anybody had tried to brush him off or persuade him
16 not to follow a certain course, they would have been
17 told in no uncertain terms where to go?
18 A. I would draw some distinction between Mr Murnaghan as
19 a robust country solicitor and the sorts of bureaucratic
20 corners that all commission members were placed in and
21 their heavy dependence on the full-time staff both as
22 advisers and as assistants in supervising
23 investigations. So in other aspects of his life he was
24 well-known, but this context did place constraints on
25 him and others, yes.
134
1 Q. But he was a man of integrity?
2 A. A man of absolute and unquestionable integrity.
3 Q. A man who if he thought that something should be pursued
4 would pursue it?
5 A. That would be my judgment of him.
6 MR ADAIR: Yes. Thank you.
7 Questions from MR McGRORY
8 MR McGRORY: Sir, I have some questions, if I may, please.
9 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
10 MR McGRORY: Mr Donnelly, my name is McGrory and I represent
11 the family of Robert Hamill in these proceedings.
12 We were given your statement. I know you have
13 travelled a long way and you have been very helpful all
14 day yesterday I think being interviewed and turning this
15 into a statement very quickly, but we have only had
16 a chance to read it over lunch.
17 A. Uh-huh.
18 Q. So if I may be forgiven for maybe taking a little bit
19 longer than I would like to.
20 A. Sure.
21 Q. I would like to draw the Inquiry's attention to
22 a number of sections of your statement. At [82079],
23 which is page 2, paragraph 6, you talk about you have no
24 recollection of the complaint or allegation being
25 referred or a complaint being referred by the Secretary
135
1 of State --
2 A. Uh-huh.
3 Q. -- although you did sometimes have direct referrals from
4 the chief constable, particularly after public order
5 incidents.
6 "Matters such as deaths in custody were referred
7 automatically. The police were generally astute enough
8 to make referrals themselves."
9 What do you mean by that?
10 A. What I mean is there would have been occasionally times
11 when the police would have been less than happy to have
12 made a referral, but because of some of the
13 representations that might have been made to them by my
14 Chief Executive, they would invariably agree to process
15 the complaint.
16 Without going off in any tangent, some of the
17 xxxxxxxx complaints resulted not by the police
18 taking the initiative but by us putting pressure on
19 them. There were others, but that's illustrative of how
20 it might have been.
21 Q. Would another example be that if, for example, a lot of
22 complaints had been made through the media about police
23 conduct, that there might have been a view that, "We
24 should refer this ourselves rather than wait for
25 a complaint"?
136
1 A. We didn't have the statutory power to do that.
2 Q. No, I mean in terms of the police referring it to you?
3 A. Yes, and there would have been times, and, in fact,
4 Ronnie Flanagan on every occasion prepared to refer.
5 His predecessor would have taken a different view at
6 times.
7 Q. If I can move on to paragraph 9 of your statement, in
8 the very last sentence you say:
9 "I do have a clear recollection of discussing the
10 case with Greg Mullan, both when Kevin was supervising
11 the case and afterwards."
12 This is in the context of you having said you don't
13 remember talking to Kevin Murnaghan about it.
14 A. Uh-huh.
15 Q. Now we have had evidence, Mr Donnelly, of the decision
16 on Mr Murnaghan's part not to continue supervising the
17 investigation of the allegation into Reserve Constable
18 Atkinson --
19 A. Uh-huh.
20 Q. -- in terms of tipping off one of the suspect murderers.
21 A. Uh-huh.
22 Q. There is a note in existence where Mr Mullan seems to
23 have said to him, "This is outside your remit".
24 A. That's right, uh-huh.
25 Q. You say you do remember discussing the case with
137
1 Greg Mullan. Would he have sought your advice on what
2 was and was not within the ICPC's remit?
3 A. This is me sort of delving into the depths of memory
4 here.
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. My recollection is I will have had more than one
7 conversation with Mr Mullan. I was concerned about
8 aspects of the case, particularly but not exclusively
9 this secondary -- this piece of information that came to
10 light later, and I sought briefings on the case which,
11 as Chairman, I had a certain degree of right to ask.
12 I had no right to intervene, but I had a right to ask to
13 be informed, and that conversation took place after this
14 advice had been given to Mr Murnaghan and accepted by
15 him. It was a cause of -- I was concerned about that
16 and I was also concerned about aspects of the other
17 complaint allegation. I was very interested to know
18 what motivated the police officers in the vehicle at the
19 time of the incident.
20 Q. Can you help us at all with the timing of that
21 conversation in terms of how long after the ICPC had
22 opted out, for want of a better word, you had that
23 discussion?
24 A. I would struggle to give you an accurate timing of that.
25 I tell you, I mean, Kevin Murnaghan was terminally ill
138
1 at that stage, and he did continue his work while
2 undergoing treatment and while quite seriously ill. So
3 there would have been times when he would have been
4 absent for periods through illness, and it would have
5 been -- my belief is, my recollection is that it was
6 close to Kevin having to buy out of supervising the case
7 and xxxxxxxx picking up the reins of it. I am afraid
8 I can be no more accurate than that. It would not have
9 been a minuted conversation. So there is no
10 documentation that I think I could refer you to.
11 Q. Very well. If I could move on to the next paragraph,
12 you say in the middle of that paragraph 10:
13 "My first impression of the organisation was that it
14 was deferential to the point of being sycophantic at
15 times toward the RUC."
16 You make the observation that:
17 "Some newer members were more robust and more
18 assertive."
19 If some of the older members, faced with a strong
20 representation from a policeman who had a strong
21 personality that, "Really you don't need to be involved
22 in this aspect of it", would it be your impression that
23 they would have acquiesced?
24 A. Yes, they would have. Undoubtedly they would have
25 acquiesced to that. I think that there was a general
139
1 ethos of -- I remember correcting a senior NIO official
2 in this regard -- an official told me the Commission was
3 there to help the police. I corrected him and said,
4 "No, we are there to help policing", which is
5 a different concept. My concern is that many of my
6 colleagues saw their job as helping the police.
7 Q. Thank you. If I could move to paragraph 12, you say in
8 that paragraph:
9 "I have been asked if I could have asked the chief
10 constable to refer the allegation. I could have asked
11 the chief constable in my capacity as Chair and if he
12 had resisted that request, I would have been perfectly
13 happy to go to Mo Mowlam."
14 Had, of course, you known that your own organisation
15 had opted out of supervising this, you would have had no
16 hesitation in going to Dr Mowlam?
17 A. I really do think that the overriding principle was one
18 which would have compelled me to have done that even in
19 the face of my colleagues taking a different view.
20 THE CHAIRMAN: I am not sure that "opted out" is the right
21 description. The fact is, and it seems not to have been
22 perceived by either side at the time, that the
23 tipping-off allegation, which could only be brought to
24 the ICPC by a reference from the chief constable, that
25 had never happened, but both sides seemed to think they
140
1 were seized with it. Then it became clear that they
2 weren't and they had no more to do with it. That's the
3 effect of the evidence we have heard, isn't it, not just
4 opting out?
5 MR McGRORY: Well, I am not at all sure about that. I have
6 to say, sir, I think there is an argument --
7 THE CHAIRMAN: There is no evidence at all that there was
8 ever any referral by the chief constable to the ICPC and
9 this being an internal matter and not a public
10 complaint -- I am speaking of the tipping-off
11 allegation -- if you look at the order, the only way in
12 which it could come before the ICPC would be by
13 a referral by the chief constable under Article 8 or
14 I think by the Secretary of State under another
15 paragraph of Article 8. That's the position in law.
16 MR McGRORY: Yes. We have the evidence of Mr Donnelly that
17 he could have asked the Secretary of State to refer it
18 to him.
19 THE CHAIRMAN: Oh, yes, but, as I say, "opting out" is not
20 the right term. It hadn't been realised.
21 MR UNDERWOOD: Sorry to intervene. It is particularly
22 unfortunate that one of the statements I wanted to read
23 this morning got itself lost on the system, because
24 that's Mr Reel, whose evidence is to the effect that as
25 far as the RUC was concerned, as with Mr Donnelly, the
141
1 original reference was by the RUC, and that certainly
2 there is some evidence I think, although I would have to
3 collect it, that the RUC believed that by putting the
4 whole matter in the hands of the ICPC, they were putting
5 into the hands of the ICPC anything that came up. Of
6 course you are right. There was no specific reference
7 of the tip-off allegation.
8 THE CHAIRMAN: Quite.
9 MR UNDERWOOD: That might be the interesting question.
10 MR McGRORY: The question I wanted to ask Mr Donnelly, sir,
11 is would he have regarded additional information over
12 and above the substance of the complaint that the RUC
13 had failed to intervene that, in fact, one of those
14 officers had made observations in respect of criminal
15 conduct and had not only (a) done nothing about it but
16 (b) had, in fact, assisted the person responsible for
17 the criminal conduct as part and parcel of the very
18 investigation that the ICPC was undertaking -- can
19 Mr Donnelly answer that question?
20 A. Had I been made aware of this secondary -- let's say
21 subsequent, I suppose, secondary allegation, I would
22 have asked the chief constable to refer it to me and
23 I would have asked him on the grounds that this person's
24 alleged criminality was inexorably linked with his
25 status as a sworn constable and therefore it was
142
1 associated with his conduct as a police officer, and we
2 would have claimed that we would have had supervisory
3 jurisdiction in those circumstances.
4 Q. Indeed, there is no reason why Mr Murnaghan couldn't
5 have done that?
6 A. There is no reason why he couldn't have done.
7 Q. Would you take it so far, Mr Donnelly, as to say that
8 you may not even have needed to seek a further referral,
9 because, in fact, this was simply further information
10 concerning the conduct of the police in the Land Rover?
11 THE CHAIRMAN: That's a matter of law rather than for the
12 witness.
13 MR McGRORY: Well, can I ask the witness what his
14 understanding of the law was?
15 THE CHAIRMAN: No. He is not here to instruct us in the
16 law. I don't say that in any way offensively to you.
17 A. No, it is not taken as such.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: We have our jobs to do. Yes?
19 MR McGRORY: Sir, could I make a submission to you that, in
20 fact, it is a matter of fact. It is a matter of
21 interpretation of the manner in which such
22 an investigation should be conducted and the way in
23 which new information comes in should be addressed, and
24 that the witness is entitled to express a view on that.
25 THE CHAIRMAN: No. We will move on now, please.
143
1 MR McGRORY: You say at the very end of paragraph 12,
2 Mr Donnelly:
3 "From my personal perspective I was hemmed in a
4 political agenda, given that we were at an important
5 point of political transition."
6 Can you perhaps expand a little bit on that and tell
7 us what you mean by that?
8 A. Well, within the context of this and within the wider
9 context it was a very important juncture in terms of the
10 political settlement in this jurisdiction. Also bearing
11 in mind Portadown where the Drumcree incidents and the
12 spin-off from the Drumcree incidents were very much
13 alive, it was a fairly toxic sort of mix, and my
14 responsibility as Chair of the organisation was to try
15 to have a sense of sensitivity to those dynamics while
16 at the same time not losing sight of the fundamental
17 purpose of the organisation, which was to provide
18 a robust supervision and direction of complaints against
19 the police.
20 Q. You move on to ask really a key question
21 in paragraph 14, which is that you do not wish to be
22 unduly critical of the question and this is the --
23 I will give you time to have a look at that -- this is
24 the question as to Mr Murnaghan's decision and
25 Mr Mullan's between them that they need not supervise
144
1 the aspect of the investigation that covered the
2 allegation about Reserve Constable Atkinson.
3 You ask yourself the question:
4 "I do not wish to be unduly critical but the
5 question to be asked is why?"
6 Have you come to any resolution as to why?
7 A. No, I haven't. In ways to me it was symptomatic of --
8 the organisation was conflict averse and risk averse.
9 My belief then and I suppose now was, "Let's not trouble
10 trouble".
11 Q. Indeed you go on to say towards the end of your
12 statement in paragraph 23:
13 "The investigating officer would have had a fair
14 amount of opportunity throughout the process to widen
15 the terms of the investigation. There is a degree of
16 autonomy. It is conceivable that he was under pressure
17 not to do so. The atmosphere in Portadown at that time
18 was poisonous."
19 Could you perhaps enlighten us as to the extent of
20 that pressure and why you think it had a bearing on the
21 decision not to remain involved, if I may put it that
22 way?
23 A. Well, certainly, you know, some of the officers in the
24 vehicle at the incident had considerable local
25 connections and were -- certainly Mr Atkinson was
145
1 a community activist of sorts within Portadown. As
2 I said in reply to your last question, there were very
3 powerful community tensions there, and I think in favour
4 of the RUC that they were actively afraid of the
5 consequences of that unravelling and there being further
6 civil disorder, and that -- this is purely speculative;
7 I am expressing an opinion here, not a fact -- certainly
8 had the investigating officer decided that the
9 allegation about Mr Atkinson was worthy of pursuit
10 within the context of the complaint, and the Commission
11 would have supported that, I have little doubt that it
12 would have been incorporated and widened the enquiry.
13 THE CHAIRMAN: If it had been necessary to ask the chief
14 constable to refer it, then the Commission would have
15 been prepared to do that, would they?
16 A. I as Chair would have been prepared to do that.
17 MR McGRORY: Indeed, I think you make the comment that it
18 was an organisation that lacked moral fibre.
19 A. That's an opinion.
20 MR McGRORY: Thank you.
21 Questions from MS DINSMORE
22 MS DINSMORE: Good afternoon, Mr Donnelly.
23 A. Good afternoon.
24 Q. Maybe I do need an introduction to you.
25 Margaret Ann Dinsmore. You might well have been
146
1 familiar with me wearing different hats, Mr Donnelly.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Just can I just take up what Mr McGrory was saying
4 there? I am much obliged to you for you outlining to
5 this Inquiry that many of your comments are speculative.
6 I understand from your statement that you have
7 speculative views about Mr Atkinson. Do you want to see
8 the paragraph?
9 A. Yes, yes.
10 Q. If we could just call up [82083], paragraph 24.
11 I should have said -- you wouldn't know this, though
12 clearly you do know me -- I act on behalf of Eleanor and
13 Robbie Atkinson. Okay?
14 So at paragraph 24 then, Mr Donnelly, you say:
15 "I have got some speculative views but they are not
16 evidentially based."
17 Now in relation to that can you tell me then what do
18 you mean and what is the basis of your speculative views
19 that Mr Atkinson was -- and you have referred to it in
20 your direct evidence -- a community activist?
21 A. Don't forget I have to mine deep into memory here.
22 Q. Well, you were able to make this statement yesterday.
23 You remembered it yesterday, so you won't have to go too
24 deep now. Just what are you referring to?
25 A. You know, a more helpful tone would help my memory.
147
1 I am referring to the fact that my memory of the
2 evidence or memory of the official records indicated
3 that one of Constable Atkinson's defences or responses
4 to the challenges made to him was that he contacted one
5 of the accused, one of the people who had been accused
6 of the assaults on Robert Hamill, late at night
7 supposedly to talk about I think it was a karate club.
8 Q. Just so we are clear then, you are giving evidence,
9 though you are expected -- you are prefacing it now with
10 it being speculative, that Mr Atkinson was a community
11 activist because there was an allegation you know
12 something about, you think you read, about some contact
13 about some judo club. Now I don't want to do you any
14 injustice. Is that a fair representation of what you
15 have just said?
16 A. What I have said is I had speculative views which were
17 not evidentially based.
18 Q. Well, would your speculative -- do you consider
19 a community activist to be a derogatory term?
20 A. No.
21 Q. Tell us what you think "community activist" means.
22 A. I think a community activist is somebody who would be
23 well-known within their community, who would participate
24 in various community-based activities, who would be
25 known and respected.
148
1 Q. I am obliged to you for that clarity. So there can be
2 no misunderstanding that even your speculative views are
3 clearly that they refer to someone respected in their
4 community, someone who is making a contribution -- is
5 that putting it too far -- to the community?
6 A. No, I think that's perfectly ...
7 Q. So the Inquiry Panel now know that paragraph 24 reads as
8 a laudable speculative acclaim on your part. Yes or no?
9 A. It is a speculative statement on my part to the fact
10 that this gentleman was well-known and had considerable
11 influence within his community.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: We shall write our report on the basis of
13 evidence, not speculation.
14 MS DINSMORE: I am much obliged. It is just Mr McGrory will
15 appreciate introduced for a matter which will be
16 entirely for your good self about the weighting about
17 this whole is there an aspect of the equation about
18 community activism.
19 Did you know -- well, of course you knew how
20 appalling Drumcree was for both sides of the community
21 in Northern Ireland and in particular the citizens
22 around Portadown?
23 A. Uh-huh, and I have made reference to that, yes.
24 Q. Do you accept that there were policemen serving without
25 fear or favour within Portadown?
149
1 A. It's a matter of record.
2 Q. Matter of record?
3 A. Uh-huh.
4 Q. Do you know that Mr Atkinson was one of those people who
5 lived for a month in Mahon Road while doing his Drumcree
6 duties?
7 A. I am not acquainted with the details of his personal
8 movements.
9 Q. Maybe your commendation in relation to his community
10 contribution would be increased if you had known that.
11 Is that right or wrong?
12 A. I didn't seek to in any way be making any commendation.
13 I was describing a profile that this individual has.
14 Q. Would you consider it a matter to be commended if
15 a policeman served in the appalling circumstances that
16 living in Mahon Road during Drumcree entailed? Would
17 that be something to be commended of a man doing his
18 duty?
19 A. It would be commendable for everybody who experienced --
20 Q. For everybody?
21 A. For everybody who experienced that.
22 Q. Including a policeman named Atkinson if he did that?
23 A. Absolutely.
24 Q. You know it is a matter of record whether he did it or
25 did not?
150
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Then can I just ask you in relation to that: have you
3 any idea about attacks that there had been on
4 Mr Atkinson from both sides of the community over the
5 years?
6 A. I have no information on that.
7 Q. No. So is it fair to say now that really when you say
8 he was well-known within the community, you are
9 absolutely right?
10 A. Uh-huh.
11 Q. But there's no way that this Inquiry are to consider
12 when they are weighing it up on the evidence -- is your
13 evidence now maybe when you know a little more that this
14 having been known within the community is something
15 which on balance was arising out of commendable
16 behaviour?
17 A. My evidence as expressed in my statement.
18 Q. I mean, I don't want to bother the Chairman. He has
19 come to the end of a long road of me doing that now.
20 This is our last day, but just so that we have clarity,
21 when you say he was a community activist and quite
22 influential within his community, there is no question
23 that your evidence has any suggestion of anything
24 adverse therein?
25 A. My statement is as expressed here.
151
1 Q. Just answer my question.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. I don't understand. Are you now saying after we have
4 had these few minutes together that the community
5 activist and influential within his community has no
6 adverse connotations on your part whatsoever?
7 A. It is a neutrally expressed statement.
8 Q. Right. Well, do you think that the matters which we
9 have outlined are neutral, the service, the service that
10 we have outlined that Mr Atkinson -- is that a neutral
11 thing?
12 A. If that's a matter of record, I have no reason
13 whatsoever to dispute it.
14 Q. Now then if we just move on, you considered the ICPC to
15 be an organisation lacking in moral fibre?
16 A. That's true.
17 Q. Are you suggesting that part-time commissioners did not
18 serve with integrity and without fear or favour? Is
19 that what you are saying?
20 A. That's the implication of what I am saying.
21 Q. That's the implication. Certainly not an implication
22 surely you or anyone you have ever heard refer could
23 possibly, could possibly have applied to the late
24 gentleman Kevin Murnaghan. Isn't that right?
25 A. That's absolutely correct.
152
1 Q. And isn't it correct that there are other persons who
2 have served in the ICPC and they have given judgments,
3 made rulings, and they have been subjected to judiciary
4 view by the Police Authority for the view and stance
5 they have taken, and that Lord Kerr -- but he was simply
6 Mr Justice Kerr in those days -- they upheld the view
7 and the expression given by that commissioner in the
8 face of very strident steps taken by the Police
9 Federation in relation to that decision?
10 A. Uh-huh.
11 Q. Surely you know about the decisions where they were
12 judicially reviewed?
13 A. Of course I do.
14 Q. And isn't that right? Isn't that right? Isn't that
15 factually a matter of record?
16 A. That's factually a matter of record. That matter of
17 record does not detract in any way from the facts
18 surrounding the commission's general operation and its
19 lack of assertiveness in dealing with police complaints.
20 If one were to read annual report after annual report,
21 one would see that clearly the commission was not
22 energetically pursuing its statutory mandate.
23 Q. Well, that's a broad brush. Is that fair to say?
24 A. That's a broad brush. Yes, of course it is.
25 Q. I will debate it no longer with you because it is not
153
1 strictly within the terms of reference of the morality
2 of the individual commissioners. What is relevant here
3 is how the ICPC dealt with this complaint.
4 A. Yes. Uh-huh.
5 Q. And really this is not so much the position I play on
6 the pitch. So I am going to leave it, you will be glad
7 to hear, but suffice to say -- it has been repeated but
8 it merits endless repeating -- a man who took the stance
9 through his life and even joining the ICPC and working
10 as he did in your lifetime, have you come across as many
11 men who have as much integrity and quiet determination
12 as the late great Kevin Murnaghan? Have you met many
13 people like that in your life?
14 A. I have met precious few.
15 Q. Precious few. Thank you.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
17 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD
18 MR UNDERWOOD: Does it remain your evidence, as you set out
19 in paragraph 15 on page [82081], in the final sentence:
20 "Throughout the history of the ICPC it always had
21 the power to withhold a statement of satisfaction, but
22 it only refused to issue a statement in one case during
23 its existence"?
24 A. Yes, that's correct.
25 Q. Can I just ask you to enlarge a little on Mr Murnaghan's
154
1 fatal illness? That was an illness from which he
2 suffered during his time of supervising this particular
3 matter?
4 A. That's my recollection, yes.
5 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much.
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.
7 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much for coming, Mr Donnelly.
8 I am going to ask Ms Yates to deal with the two
9 statements I tried to read this morning but failed.
10 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory?
11 MR McGRORY: Can I ask Mr Donnelly not to leave the building
12 while I seek to make a short submission to you?
13 THE CHAIRMAN: He can sit here, can he?
14 MR McGRORY: Yes.
15 At the risk of irritating the Panel and the Chair
16 further on this issue, I would welcome an opportunity to
17 perhaps expand a little bit on the argument that I seek
18 to make that in respect of this question of whether or
19 not it is a matter of law or a matter of evidence that
20 the ICPC could have included the new information about
21 the allegation of Reserve Constable Atkinson as part and
22 parcel of the very broad and unspecified complaint that
23 was made on the family's behalf that there was some
24 element of collusion between the police and the
25 suspects.
155
1 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
2 MR McGRORY: It would be my respectful submission, sir, that
3 the complaint was very broadly couched on behalf of the
4 family and coincidentally there was a self-referral --
5 not self-referral -- a referral by the chief constable
6 on the strength of the media reports of unhappiness
7 within the Nationalist community that there had been
8 an element of collusion in the sense that the officers
9 did not intervene in the beating of Robert Hamill when
10 they could have done.
11 Now in my respectful submission the complaints
12 having been referred to the ICPC in those broad terms
13 allowed for an interpretation of the statutory remit of
14 the ICPC that would have included supervision of the
15 investigation of the new information coming from
16 Tracey Clarke on 10th May, that, in fact, one of those
17 officers had been making phone calls to one of the
18 suspects, that factually that was consistent with the
19 belief in the community that fuelled the original
20 complaint that there was a significant level of
21 collusion. My submission is that the ICPC may not have
22 needed a separate referral, because this was not
23 necessarily a new matter, and it would not have been
24 unreasonable for the ICPC to have taken the view that it
25 could have continued in its supervision. That's
156
1 a question I would have liked to have asked Mr Donnelly
2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. That's your submission? I am
3 against you.
4 Thank you, Mr Donnelly. We need not detain you
5 further.
6 (The witness withdrew)
7 MS YATES: Thank you, sir. I am reliably informed that the
8 statements are now on the system.
9 Statement of FRANCIS REEL (read)
10 Turning first to the statement of Francis Joseph
11 Reel at page [82049], this is statement is dated 8th
12 September 2009. In paragraph 2 Mr Reel tells the
13 Inquiry:
14 "I joined the RUC in 1959. In 1997 I was the
15 superintendent having responsibility for informal
16 resolutions in G Department, which was Complaints and
17 Discipline."
18 He then tells us in the penultimate part of that
19 paragraph:
20 "I retired on 19th December 1997."
21 In paragraph 3 he tells us:
22 "In 1997 I kept a daily journal. These were
23 destroyed when I retired."
24 Moving on to paragraph 5 on the next page, please,
25 [82050]:
157
1 "When cases were referred to the Complaints and
2 Discipline Department, the Superintendent New Complaints
3 would complete a form. On it he would indicate whether
4 the matter was to be referred to the RUC C&D or fell
5 within the terms of referring to the ICPC and he would
6 tick the necessary boxes. The civil servant staff would
7 pick that up from the superintendent's office and take
8 it down to their circuit registry, and it would be sent
9 from there. If it was urgent, it may have been taken by
10 hand or perhaps faxed. I cannot say for sure if any
11 forms were faxed."
12 In paragraph 7 he tells the Inquiry:
13 "[xxxxxxxxxxx] wrote a letter of complaint on
14 behalf of the Hamill family which was received by
15 Mr Anderson at Gough Barracks on 7 May 1997. It was
16 then routed back to G Department arriving on
17 9th May 1997. In this time Robert Hamill had died. The
18 paperwork with the letter from xxxx was referred
19 under Article 7 but the initial complaint was referred
20 under Article 8.
21 "A part 7 referral is where the chief constable
22 refers cases to the ICPC as a standard procedure and it
23 would be up to the ICPC whether they wished to supervise
24 or not. A part 8 referral is where the chief constable
25 could, because of circumstances, refer it to the ICPC
158
1 and they must then supervise it. The earlier complaint
2 was a part 8 referral from the deputy chief constable.
3 "I have been shown pages 63695 and 63701 which is
4 a form 17(2) in relation to the complaint made by
5 xxxxxxxxx on behalf of the Hamill family. I can
6 confirm", overleaf, [82051], "that the writing on it is
7 my handwriting and my signature. The typing on the form
8 would have been done by the typing pool following
9 Superintendent Macauley's instructions. Superintendent
10 Macauley received the complaint, which means that he
11 received xxxxxxxxxx's letter containing the
12 information. He would have filled in a blank form and
13 sent it down to typing. It would have been typed up and
14 sent back to Macauley to attach the other documentation
15 to the front of it."
16 Moving on to paragraph 12, sir:
17 "I filled in a pro forma on 9th May 1997 referring
18 the complaint to the ICPC which also went to the
19 investigating officer. At point 2, which is 'Previous
20 References to Commission', I wrote 'Article 8 referral
21 of incident'. That meant it had already been sent out
22 in relation to the incident. At point 3 I ticked the
23 box for an Article 7 referral."
24 Skipping then to paragraph 13:
25 "I have a recollection of something being said,
159
1 probably by Superintendent Macauley, to the extent that
2 the deputy chief constable had directed that the whole
3 matter be investigated by the detective chief
4 superintendent. I completed the form on behalf of
5 Superintendent", overleaf, 82552, "Macauley because
6 there was an urgency for the detective chief
7 superintendent to commence his investigation. If
8 Superintendent Macauley was going to be out of the
9 office later that day, then he would have arranged for
10 me to sign the form and send it on."
11 Turning then to paragraph 15:
12 "The deputy chief constable has the ultimate
13 responsibility for discipline within the force. There
14 was also an ACC in charge of the Complaints and
15 Discipline files. The chief constable could refer
16 matters under Article 8, if he wished to do so, but he
17 abrogated his responsibility either to the ACC of
18 G Department or the deputy chief constable as far as
19 discipline was concerned."
20 Moving on to paragraph 16:
21 "The deputy chief constable in 1997 was
22 Blair Wallace. Sir Ronnie Flanagan was the chief
23 constable, but he had not held that position for long.
24 I do not recall having any conversations with
25 Mr Wallace, ACC Hays or Mr Anderson about this matter.
160
1 Any conversations I had were with
2 Superintendent Macauley.
3 "I had nothing to do with the appointment of
4 DCS McBurney as the investigating officer. I was told
5 about it, by Superintendent Macauley, I think, and
6 I wrote it on the form. Mr McBurney was also the senior
7 investigating officer on the murder investigation.
8 "I did not hear anything said at this time regarding
9 a reserve constable having assisted an offender or
10 having advised that he should get rid of his clothing.
11 If such", overleaf, 82553 "an allegation had been
12 made, it should have been reported to C&D Department so
13 that an investigating officer would be appointed, in
14 this case Mr McBurney.
15 "As Mr McBurney was the senior investigating officer
16 on the murder investigation, he should have had the
17 information about such an allegation. If so, he should
18 have routed it to the head of G Department. If any
19 officer makes a complaint or refers something that is
20 improper to another officer, it would be sent off to
21 G Department. That would be recorded as an internal
22 discipline matter and an investigating officer would be
23 appointed.
24 "If the investigating officer believed that the
25 internal discipline matter impacted on another matter
161
1 that the ICPC were supervising, then we would make them
2 aware of it. If there was a serious criminal allegation
3 against one of the officers in the Land Rover, about
4 which the ICPC were supervising a complaint
5 investigation, then the allegation should have been
6 referred to the ICPC under Article 7.
7 "The deputy chief constable would be advised of the
8 allegations and it would be up to him to decide whether
9 or not there should be a suspension."
10 Statement of DANIEL MAGILL (read)
11 Sir, moving on to the statement of Daniel Magill at
12 page [82047], please.
13 This is dated 9th September 2009. In paragraph 2
14 Mr Magill tells the Inquiry:
15 "In 1997 I was the Deputy Director of the DPP
16 office. I had been in that post for five or six years
17 and I left the DPP in September 1997.
18 "I have no recollection of being involved in the
19 Hamill matter at all.
20 "I have been shown a file note [page number 31613]
21 on Deputy Director headed paper following a meeting held
22 on 12th May 1997. The note was signed on my behalf by
23 my secretary. It is copied to Mr Junkin, who was the
24 Senior Assistant Director at that time. According to
25 the file note, I met with Superintendent Hooke and
162
1 Superintendent McBurney.
2 "I have no recollection of this meeting whatsoever,
3 even having read the file note."
4 Moving on to paragraph 8 on the following page,
5 [82048]:
6 "If I had been told that the ICPC were supervising
7 a complaint against a police officer at the scene,
8 I imagine that I would have put that in the file note.
9 Additionally, if I had been told that there was
10 an allegation that a reserve constable had tipped off
11 a suspect to disclose of his clothing, I cannot imagine
12 any circumstance in which I would not have included that
13 in the file note. I would have considered these to be
14 relevant matters and I would have included all relevant
15 matters I was told in the note."
16 Sir, that completes the reading out of the statement
17 for today.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
19 MS YATES: Thank you.
20 MR UNDERWOOD: Which leads me to the final witness of the
21 today, which is Mr Armstrong.
22 MR McGUINNESS: I have a brief submission just as regards to
23 the statement that was read out of Mr Reel. I apologise
24 for cutting across. It may be that's either
25 a typographical error or it's a matter that isn't of
163
1 concern to the Panel, but I raise it now for the sake of
2 completeness.
3 At paragraph 15, at page [82052], of Mr --
4 THE CHAIRMAN: Can we have it up again, please?
5 MR McGUINNESS: Paragraph 15, [82052], the suggestion:
6 "The deputy chief constable was the ultimate
7 responsibility for discipline within the force. There
8 was an ACC in charge of the Complaints and Discipline
9 files. The chief constable could refer matters under
10 Article 8, if he wished to do so, but he abrogated his
11 responsibility."
12 I wonder if that ought to have been "delegated".
13 MR UNDERWOOD: I certainly took it to mean that.
14 MR McGUINNESS: If there is no dispute about that, I am
15 happy. I am obliged.
16 MR UNDERWOOD: Mr Armstrong then, please.
17 MR DAVID KENNETH ARMSTRONG (sworn)
18 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD
19 MR UNDERWOOD: Good afternoon, Mr Armstrong.
20 A. Afternoon.
21 Q. Can you tell us your full names, please?
22 A. David Kenneth Armstrong.
23 Q. Thank you very much. Can you identify the two reports
24 you have kindly done for us? The first at [74592],
25 which runs to 85 pages. Let me just give you the final
164
1 page so we can see if it is the same document.
2 Page [74676]. Is that your first report?
3 A. That is.
4 Q. Thank you. The second one, can I invite your attention
5 to page [75268], please? Is that the start of the
6 second report?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Thank you. I think the body of that finishes at
9 page [75296]. Is that correct?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. Because I am cut to the quick by Ms Dinsmore's
12 accusation that I never listen to her questions, I have
13 asked to be put up at page [75433] a schedule of those
14 witnesses whose evidence you have attended at the
15 hearing. Is that correct?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Thank you. At page [75432], is that a list of
18 typographical errors that we find in the two reports?
19 A. And some grammar errors. That's correct.
20 Q. Subject to the typographical or grammar errors, are
21 those reports your evidence?
22 A. They are.
23 Q. I just want to ask you, in the light of the evidence you
24 have heard, the list we have seen, have you changed your
25 views at all?
165
1 A. No, I haven't changed my views.
2 Q. In the light of the evidence of Mr Murray, have you
3 changed any views you have reached about him?
4 A. No.
5 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much. If you just wait there,
6 I am sure there will be some more questions.
7 Questions from MR WOLFE
8 MR WOLFE: Just a number of brief questions, Mr Armstrong.
9 You joined the RUC in 1978 or 1979. Is that correct?
10 A. 1978, October 1978.
11 Q. That was, of course, at the height of the troubles as we
12 call them?
13 A. Yes. Well, during the '70s I dare say. Towards the
14 latter part of the '70s it was.
15 Q. You continued to serve into the RUC and then into the
16 PSNI. Isn't that right?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. As I understand it from your curriculum vitae, you have
19 experience of serving in a number of uniformed roles --
20 A. I have.
21 Q. -- and then later moving into CID?
22 A. Yes. 21 of my 29 years has been spent in CID.
23 Q. In your time, you have investigated, I expect --
24 A. All types of serious and violent crime.
25 Q. And you have experience of both policing in uniform and
166
1 in CID of what might be called sectarian crime?
2 A. Well, yes. I have to say I have had limited experience
3 in uniform duties up until around -- I think it was
4 around 1986. During that year, I was a sergeant in the
5 Mobile Support Unit for a few years, and which I have
6 indicated in my report that I spent some time in
7 Portadown and various other parts of Northern Ireland
8 dealing with public disorder.
9 Q. I just want to ask you a number of questions about the
10 ethos of the organisation which was the RUC?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Now, obviously, all organisations are made up of
13 individuals, some good and some bad?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. But in terms of the ethos that was handed down to you
16 by, I suppose, your superiors in the organisation, could
17 you say something about that ethos in terms of the
18 attitude of the organisation towards the protection of
19 all life in Northern Ireland?
20 A. Without a doubt. I have the privilege to say I have
21 served with many officers who had no fear or favour
22 towards either section of the community.
23 It was about doing your work, trying to, you know,
24 bring a service to the community and, ultimately, from
25 the point of CID detecting crime, both officers below me
167
1 and above me.
2 Obviously one of the things I have commented on was
3 about the training. Training was an issue and not one
4 that I am criticising, but one I am just trying to be
5 realistic about. The way the situation was in
6 Northern Ireland, there were certain competing demands
7 as regards what training -- what time was spent on
8 training and what type of training was provided. Public
9 order and firearms training were heavily resourced in
10 terms of, you know, putting people out on the street to
11 deal with the various difficult situations they were
12 confronted with.
13 Q. Is it fair to say, in terms of your understanding of the
14 ethos of the organisation, that it was an organisation
15 which directed its officers to show no fear or favour
16 towards either side of the community?
17 A. I was very proud to serve in the RUC.
18 Q. Do you agree that that was the ethos as you understood
19 it?
20 A. I do.
21 Q. In terms of police corruption, officers not doing their
22 job in accordance with that ethos, was that something
23 that was ever discussed in terms of communication from
24 the hierarchy about the tolerance of that kind of thing?
25 A. There was no tolerance given to that type of behaviour.
168
1 If it was found out, it was rooted out, in my
2 experience, and I have been involved in a number of
3 cases where that has happened.
4 Q. In terms of the policing of crime emanating from the
5 Loyalist side of the community, I understand that you
6 might be referred to statistics in due course, but did
7 the organisation, as you understood it, seek to police
8 Loyalist crime and Loyalist paramilitary crime?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Had you personal experience of that?
11 A. Of policing Loyalist crime?
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. Oh, yes. I think I have alluded to a couple of
14 investigations in relation to my CV in which I had
15 experience in Loyalist crime. Again, I go back to the
16 fact it was about providing a service. You have
17 a situation to deal with. You do it to the best, to the
18 utmost of your ability and the resources you have
19 available to you.
20 Obviously there are times, no doubt, you are
21 pressing to go on to the next incident that has happened
22 and you would like to spend more time on other cases you
23 have occasion to deal with, but again, I say it is about
24 prioritising, about doing your best.
25 Q. Now, this Inquiry will be primarily focused on what was
169
1 the actual situation in Portadown in April 1997 and
2 thereafter in terms of its impact on the various
3 investigations, but I suspect it might be helpful if we
4 had a snapshot of the generality as you understand it.
5 In 1997, were you a serving CID officer?
6 A. No, I wasn't.
7 Q. You weren't?
8 A. No, I wasn't. I was in Complaints and Discipline at the
9 time. I was there for roughly two and a half years.
10 I have alluded to that in my report, my main report.
11 Q. You had been in CID until 1995?
12 A. Yes. I had been five years a detective inspector
13 serving in various parts of the province.
14 Q. And then Complaints and Discipline until 1998?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Then back into CID as a detective chief inspector?
17 A. That's right. I was promoted back into CID.
18 Q. Now, through the 1990s, with the troubles still on the
19 boil, what, if any, impact was that having on CID and
20 its work?
21 A. Well, as I say, I have tried to give some sort of
22 contextualisation about some of the figures I provided,
23 and in particular table 5 is an indication about the --
24 obviously the increase in shootings and bombings,
25 intimidation and public disorder crime and murders and
170
1 the type of murders that they were.
2 There is security situation murders, where -- ones
3 which have a sectarian or terrorism influence to them.
4 Those are ultimately your more difficult and the ones it
5 was less likely to get some detection because of the
6 fear factor and the obvious methods that were employed
7 to avoid detection.
8 So, I mean, what I am saying is the demands were
9 still there, the commitment -- the heavy demands, I have
10 to say, in terms of the workload, particularly for CID,
11 because when there was public disorder, there was
12 serious crime. We didn't have the resources to bring in
13 to add, like I have experienced in public order
14 situations where uniform officers from all over the
15 province come to a particular location to assist with
16 that problem. You didn't have the same luxury in CID.
17 Q. You also touch upon training in your report. I think
18 there is a suggestion that really -- correct me if I am
19 wrong on this impression -- training sometimes was
20 a luxury which CID officers often didn't get the benefit
21 of because of their work commitment.
22 A. Well, because of the work commitment and also the
23 demands upon training within the organisation. As
24 I say, there is an appendix Z12 that I refer to and it
25 gives an indication of the type of training over seven
171
1 or eight years to give the Panel a bit of -- to draw
2 their own conclusions as to what was provided and what
3 was not.
4 So, yes, from my experience, I have given my
5 experience in internal training, but it doesn't take
6 away from the actual internal training by working with
7 more experienced officers and the influence they had on
8 me and others in investigation of crime, which
9 ultimately, you know, built one's experience, one's
10 improvement in terms of how you went about various
11 investigations when you were confronted with them.
12 Q. Now, Mr Murray in his report touched upon his concerns
13 about the securing of the crime scene and, secondly,
14 about the whole issue of debriefing.
15 A. Uh-huh.
16 Q. Those are obviously a matter of record in his report,
17 and I think you share some of those concerns. Isn't
18 that right?
19 A. Yes. I share concerns. I acknowledge the comments made
20 by Mr Murray in respect of those areas, but I have to
21 turn to what in practice -- in practical terms was
22 available, what was happening on the ground.
23 There were scenes you'd go to and, yes, you have the
24 seal scene law, if you have a good briefing from
25 a senior officer on the ground and you take it from
172
1 there. But then there were the other occasions where
2 you went and you didn't have the luxury of a scene
3 cordoned off. You had to instruct, you had to show
4 initiative to people to take things forward.
5 Again, that goes back to looking at people's
6 training and experience and the resources they had
7 available, because sometimes resources at scenes didn't
8 have the tape, they didn't have the measures -- the
9 means to protect evidence. I have to say some of them
10 didn't have the awareness or the ability. Again, from
11 an investigator's point, that's something I learned
12 going along by experience. I would simply say that
13 certain situations in my past experience, I could see
14 being faced with the same difficulties that this
15 investigation provided.
16 Q. Moving to the specific of the 27th April 1997, one of
17 the concerns expressed by Mr Murray was in terms of the
18 handling of the crime scene.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. What I want to ask you about is this: since that time --
21 I think you alluded to this in your report -- is it fair
22 say there have been instituted a series of developments
23 and improvements to the whole management of crime scenes
24 within the PSNI?
25 A. You wouldn't recognise it in terms of the changes that
173
1 have been taken forward, and, again, I go -- the
2 organisation, I would suggest, in my humble opinion, has
3 had the opportunity to put in place those changes to
4 provide that level of training, to provide the dedicated
5 resources to concentrate on this type of crime and even
6 to provide the actual facilities.
7 You didn't have dedicated facilities that I could
8 take a team to investigate a murder. You were having to
9 look for an office, part of the CID office, look for
10 somebody to give up their office for a week or so. You
11 know, these were the things you were faced with, but
12 people got on with it and people did the best they
13 could. Certainly, as I have said, you know, I would
14 love to have spent a lot more time on many
15 investigations.
16 Q. Some of the things you allude to in your report such as
17 crime scene managers --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- dedicated -- just to define that, they are dedicated
20 people with responsibility to take over a crime scene
21 and to direct particular actions?
22 A. Yes. Well, I mean, in a situation in 1998 I can refer
23 to when I returned to CID, you may have an incident. In
24 an incident during the night there were two officers
25 available, Scenes of Crime Officers who were available
174
1 on-call. They could only be called out on specific
2 levels of crime -- in other words, a serious crime --
3 but, when they were called out, you could be faced with
4 a Scenes of Crime Officer coming to you who was
5 inexperienced, had maybe only six months or a year's
6 experience on the job. Then you had to call a more
7 senior officer, because you wanted to get that level of
8 scrutiny in terms of making sure that you had covered
9 all the detail in terms of the scene. So that has
10 changed dramatically now.
11 You have crime scene managers, highly trained
12 officers who come out and lead on a scene, assist the
13 SIO in terms of what's required and the debriefing and
14 the priorities that one should aim for in terms of
15 detecting or forensic work that's required.
16 Q. What, in short, has been the trigger for these changes?
17 You say you wouldn't recognise it. Has it come through
18 Patten? Has it been because of the breathing space
19 allowed upon, if you like, the conclusion of the
20 troubles as we once knew them?
21 A. Well, the RUC and the PSNI have been, I would suggest,
22 one of the most scrutinised police organisations in the
23 world, certainly in the UK, and that there, the HMIC
24 reports that have been referred to already. I referred
25 to one in 2005 which released the crime scene
175
1 investigations as still being a problem.
2 But the like of taking on the review process which
3 I was involved in setting up in 2001-2002, where
4 undetected murders, after 28 days, were scrutinised very
5 closely, that in itself triggered a lot of the changes
6 that took place. One of the biggest being in terms of
7 recording information at scenes.
8 The scene logs have now changed in terms of the
9 scrutiny, the information that's required. You will see
10 now, when you look at the TV, you will see people going
11 into scenes and they will be wearing suits. That was
12 all brought about by review, because people were
13 scrutinised. TV programmes became the subject of
14 morning briefings. There is a scene. People are going
15 in with no personal protective equipment. So they are
16 the subject of scrutiny there and then. So a lot of
17 changes have taken place following.
18 You could be right. It could be down to the peace
19 process that has taken place and the lack -- the demands
20 not being as great as what they have been in the past.
21 I can't really put my finger on it, but certainly
22 I wouldn't recognise the organisation now in the last
23 ten years.
24 MR WOLFE: Thank you, Mr Armstrong.
25
176
1 Questions from MR O'HARE
2 MR O'HARE: There is just one matter I would like to touch
3 on. Mr Armstrong, in the main body of your report you
4 have dealt with various statistics. Isn't that correct?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. Yesterday, I understand you were given a further set of
7 statistics --
8 A. Yes, I have them here.
9 Q. -- and those statistics were actually prepared. It
10 starts at page [75409], sir. The actual page need not
11 be brought up on the screen. Those statistics were
12 prepared by the Crime Branch of the RUC and that was in
13 preparation of an extradition hearing against several
14 individuals who were wanted in the north of Ireland?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. The statistics set out details of the numbers of persons
17 murdered on the following pages, shooting incidents,
18 bombing incidents, public order type incidents.
19 Perhaps page [75415] could be brought up, please?
20 This deals with arrests under section 14 of the
21 Prevention of Terrorism Act. It outlines the statistics
22 from 1991 until June of 1996.
23 Do you remember the Kevin Barry extradition case?
24 A. I don't know the details of it. I am familiar with the
25 individual and --
177
1 Q. It was a case that commenced in the late 1990s, but ran
2 several years due to the appeals process in America when
3 the individuals were fighting the extradition, as it
4 were.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Those figures there set out the arrests on a yearly
7 basis up to 30th June, it appears, when the statistics
8 were concluded.
9 Perhaps page [75416] could be put up, please?
10 Again, this shows the prosecution and outcomes in
11 Northern Ireland of scheduled defendants in 1994. When
12 I say scheduled defendants, those were defendants who
13 were tried in what was known as the Diplock courts,
14 non-jury courts?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. It gives the details of Loyalists and Republicans.
17 Proceeded against under Loyalists, we see 269, 67%. In
18 fact, it would appear the total number proceeded against
19 for Loyalists and Republicans in that year were 399, of
20 which 67% of those cases dealt with were against
21 Loyalists.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. When Mr Wolfe was asking you about, was any favour shown
24 to either -- any side of the community in the
25 prosecution of offences, does that occur with your
178
1 experience throughout your years serving with the RUC
2 and latterly the PSNI?
3 A. Yes, as I have said, absolutely.
4 Q. If we go over the page, [75417], again we will see
5 proceeded against, a figure of 265 Loyalists, which was
6 63% of the cases that were dealt with in that year.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Again, that would accord with your experience that no
9 favour was shown to one side of the community or the
10 other?
11 A. Absolutely, yes.
12 MR O'HARE: Thank you, Mr Armstrong.
13 MR McGRORY: No questions, sir.
14 MS DINSMORE: No questions.
15 MR UNDERWOOD: There is nothing arising. Thank you.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.
17 A. Thank you.
18 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much, Mr Armstrong.
19 (The witness withdrew)
20 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, that then concludes the evidence of the
21 Inquiry.
22 Can I set out what is proposed to happen next?
23 The Inquiry will present closing written submissions
24 to those who will be entitled to make further
25 submissions and it proposes to do those by 8th October.
179
1 I think it is now well-known that the format of those
2 will be that they will attempt to set out the issues
3 which might be necessary for you to decide, set out
4 under each of those issues what appears to be the
5 relevant evidence by way of summary and then set out
6 a commentary under each of those issues.
7 It is not my intention and certainly is not my task,
8 I would apprehend, to attempt to suggest any resolution
9 of any issue that emerges, but it will be my task to set
10 out what criticism might emerge of any individual or
11 organisation -- might reasonably emerge from the
12 evidence under any such issue.
13 What will then happen is that those who are entitled
14 to respond will have until 6th November to do so in
15 writing, and provisions made electronically for them to
16 comment against each issue, each piece of the summaries
17 of evidence and each commentary, and it is then
18 anticipated that in the week commencing 9th November the
19 Inquiry will serve a composite document setting out
20 everybody's commentary in that format. We will then
21 commence oral closing submissions on 16th November with
22 a view to finishing them with a break at 18th December.
23 What I will endeavour to do between the arrival
24 everywhere of the composite document and the start of
25 the oral closing submissions is to attempt to identify
180
1 what degree of agreement and disagreement there is about
2 issues, so I at least can focus my oral submissions
3 about the evidence on directing you to the pieces of
4 evidence which I apprehend at least may assist you most
5 in determining what is in disagreement.
6 So that's where we propose to go as at this stage.
7 I can only say to my friends thank you very much.
8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
9 Well, we are on Day 68 and have concluded all our
10 evidence. I would like to, on behalf of the Panel,
11 thank all those who have appeared before us and those
12 who have advised them for the help they have given, and
13 given to Counsel to the Inquiry, and the spirit of
14 cooperation and goodwill, and, I hope, good cheer, that
15 has helped the Inquiry to go along smoothly and to reach
16 this stage. We would like to thank all of you.
17 MR WOLFE: Thank you, sir.
18 MR ADAIR: Thank you, sir.
19 (3.35 pm)
20 (The hearing adjourned until 16th November 2009)
21
22 --ooOoo--
23
24
25
181
1 I N D E X
2
3
MR COLIN JOHN MURRAY (cont.) ..................... 1
4 Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 1
Questions from MS DINSMORE ................ 15
5 Questions from MR O'CONNOR ................ 24
Questions from THE PANEL .................. 49
6
Statement of ALF ANNESLEY (read) ................. 52
7
Interview of CONOR BLACK (read) .................. 53
8
Interview of PHILIP CURRAN (read) ................ 55
9
Statement of MICHELLE JAMIESON ................... 59
10 (read)
11 Statement of ELIZABETH IRENE McKEE ............... 61
(read)
12
Statement and interview of BEATRIX ............... 62
13 CAMPBELL (read)
14 Statement of FATHER SEAN DOOLEY .................. 67
(read)
15
Statement of MAURICE HEWITT (read) ............... 68
16
Statement of MR HUGHES (read) .................... 70
17
Interview of DAVID GRAY (read) ................... 71
18
Interview of ROBERT JAMESON (read) ............... 74
19
Statement of PAUL ADAMSON (read) ................. 77
20
Statement and Interview of TREVOR ................ 78
21 ANDERSON (read)
22 Statement of DENISE CORNETT (read) ............... 87
23 Statement of P18 (read) .......................... 99
24 Statement of MICHAEL PORTER (read) ............... 99
25 Statement of CARL SIMPSON (read) ................. 101
182
1 Statement of RAYMOND KITSON (read) ............... 102
2 Statement of JOHN STEELE (read) .................. 104
3 MR SIMON THOMAS ALAN ROGERS (sworn) .............. 106
Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 106
4 Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 110
5 MR PAUL DONNELLY (affirmed) ...................... 131
Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 131
6 Questions from MR ADAIR ................... 132
Questions from MR McGRORY ................ 135
7 Questions from MS DINSMORE ................ 146
Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD ....... 154
8
Statement of FRANCIS REEL (read) ................. 157
9
Statement of DANIEL MAGILL (read) ................ 162
10
MR DAVID KENNETH ARMSTRONG (sworn) ............... 164
11 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 164
Questions from MR WOLFE ................... 166
12 Questions from MR O'HARE .................. 177
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
183
