- - - - - - - - - - PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF ROBERT HAMILL - - - - - - - - - - Held at: Interpoint 20-24 York Street Belfast on Tuesday, 22nd September 2009 commencing at 10.00 am Day 68 1 Tuesday, 22nd September 2009 2 (10.00 am) 3 MR COLIN JOHN MURRAY (cont.) 4 Questions from MR McGRORY 5 MR McGRORY: If I may, sir, my name is McGrory. I am asking 6 questions on behalf of the family of Robert Hamill. 7 Mr Murray, you have over 30 years' experience as 8 a policeman. Isn't that right? 9 A. Yes, I do, yes. 10 Q. Many of those years were at a senior level? 11 A. Yes, they were. 12 Q. During which you were responsible in a leadership role 13 for the conduct of quite a number of murder 14 investigations? 15 A. That's correct. 16 Q. So when it is suggested to you, or when you are asked, 17 "Look, are you in any sort of association of experts?" 18 I am going to say to you that that's not really what are 19 about. You are here to evaluate this situation because 20 of the on-the-job experience that you have? 21 A. That's correct. I am an accredited senior investigative 22 officer. I think, as you are aware, I trained senior 23 officers from across the UK into best practice in 24 relation to the investigation of murder, and it is my 25 experience and that expertise that I bring before this 1 1 hearing here. 2 Q. Yes. Indeed, when you finished your job as an actual 3 working investigator at superintendent level, you were 4 then asked to become engaged in the training of other 5 superintendents? 6 A. That's correct, and I also acted as mentor to senior 7 investigating officers, having retired from Kent police. 8 Q. Thank you. Can I just ask you about, in your 9 experience, the value as an investigator of having 10 someone who might be suspected in a murder inquiry of 11 assisting the offenders after the event investigated as 12 part of the murder investigation? 13 A. I think as far as possible it would be essential to try 14 to do so. I have had experience of similar situations 15 where we have arrested somebody during part of the 16 murder investigation, because that may bring substantial 17 evidence, and I only say may bring substantial evidence, 18 towards the murder investigation. 19 Q. Of course, if it is at all possible, there are 20 considerable advantages to having he who may have 21 assisted the offender tried alongside the offender? 22 A. Absolutely. 23 Q. If I may elaborate on that a little bit, for example, if 24 there is evidence that someone was involved in a murder, 25 obviously the tribunal hearing that case might be 2 1 influenced by the fact that that person needed 2 assistance? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. In other words, it bolsters the case against the 5 offender in as much as it is relevant to the person who 6 assisted the offender? 7 A. Yes, it does. 8 Q. So as an investigating strategy, that would be best 9 practice, if at all possible? 10 A. I believe that to be so, yes. 11 Q. What happened in this case, however, is that Reserve 12 Constable Atkinson was investigated separately as part 13 of the allegations of neglect against the police rather 14 than investigated alongside those accused of the murder. 15 A. Are you talking of the alleged neglect of ...? 16 Q. The Land Rover police. Sorry. 17 A. Yes, yes. 18 Q. How that happened is as follows: that Tracey Clarke came 19 forward and Timothy Jameson came forward in or about the 20 weekend of Friday, 9th, Saturday, 10th May, a short time 21 after Robert Hamill died and still a relatively short 22 time after the incident. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. In terms of how the information about Allister Hanvey 25 and those others who were named by those witnesses as 3 1 being part of the people who murdered Robert Hamill is 2 concerned, they were all immediately arrested? 3 A. They were. 4 Q. The allegations were put to them and they were charged, 5 but that didn't happen with Reserve Constable Atkinson, 6 about whom an allegation had been made that he assisted 7 one of those offenders. 8 A. That's correct. 9 Q. In fact, he wasn't even spoken to about this until the 10 following September. 11 A. That's right. 12 Q. The context in which he was spoken to was in the context 13 of an interview about the neglect -- about allegations 14 of neglect of the Land Rover police in not getting out 15 of the Land Rover quick enough? 16 A. That's correct, yes. 17 Q. In terms of the fruits of any questions that he was 18 asked about the Tracey Clarke allegation of collusion 19 with Hanvey, if I may use the word, that was never fed 20 into the murder file at any time? 21 A. No, it wasn't. 22 Q. In fact, it was eventually included in a neglect file, 23 which was a separate file? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. There was talk at some point that there might -- there 4 1 would have been a third file, an assisting offender 2 file, a criminal file, specific to that allegation, but 3 there never was such a file, sure there wasn't? 4 A. No, there wasn't. 5 Q. But insofar as the neglect file is concerned, Mr Adair 6 asked you yesterday about the language used of 7 scepticism, but the reality is that what we have been 8 told by Inspector Irwin and what we hear from the tapes 9 of Superintendent McBurney is that they never actually 10 believed the alibi presented by Andrea McKee and her 11 husband Michael on behalf of Atkinson -- 12 A. No, they didn't. 13 Q. -- and that nowhere in that file is it clear to the 14 reader that, in fact, the police simply didn't believe 15 it. 16 A. It was not in that file, and I have to say I am very 17 surprised that it wasn't. I do believe, as I said 18 yesterday, that that should have been disclosed. 19 Q. Yes, and, indeed, not just should it have been disclosed 20 that it was disbelieved, but the reasons for the 21 disbelief -- 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. -- should have been disclosed -- 24 A. Absolutely. 25 Q. -- so as the reader of the neglect file would understand 5 1 that this was not a closed situation -- 2 A. That's right. 3 Q. -- this was an ongoing investigation. 4 A. Indeed. 5 Q. But that wasn't done? 6 A. It wasn't done. 7 Q. Now, can I move on just to the thorny question of 8 Superintendent McBurney's motivation for his conduct of 9 the murder inquiry insofar as he took decisions about 10 how to deal with allegations about Reserve Constable 11 Atkinson? 12 Your first impression on reading these papers was, 13 as you have said, that it was -- first of all, you had 14 no comprehension as to why he went about it the way he 15 did in terms of any strategy? 16 A. I didn't see a strategy. 17 Q. No. Insofar as any revision of your opinion has been 18 concerned, you have reconsidered it for a number of 19 reasons, but one of those reasons is that it has now 20 been apparent to you that Mr McBurney has said there was 21 a strategy, a wait-and-see, wait-in-the-long-grass-type 22 strategy? 23 A. Yes, and on listening to the evidence of Mr Irwin, who 24 reflected upon the strategy that Mr McBurney was 25 playing. 6 1 Q. But, of course, you haven't -- I mean, you still can't 2 comprehend the strategy? 3 A. I can't, no, I can't. I find it very difficult to 4 understand how an allegation as serious as that can be 5 made, and for me, in effect, no action taken for the 6 best part of three years. 7 Q. Yes. I mean, one of the other reasons you have put 8 forward for your revision of your first impression is 9 what has been said about Superintendent McBurney -- 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. -- in terms of his dedication and commitment as 12 a policeman. 13 A. That's correct, yes. 14 Q. But has it occurred to you that the more skilled and the 15 more experienced a police officer is, the harder it is 16 to understand this strategy? 17 A. Yes, I agree. 18 Q. And, of course, while we have heard evidence of 19 Superintendent McBurney's commitment in catching 20 criminals of all types from both sides of the community 21 and terrorism, of course, we have heard nothing in terms 22 of any investigation into another policeman? 23 A. No, we haven't, no. 24 Q. Another one of the reasons that you put forward for 25 revising your view was the possible concern, inhibiting 7 1 concern, that those officers would have had for 2 Tracey Clarke's safety. 3 That's one of the reasons you put forward in the 4 document for revising your view on the criminal 5 negligence issue. 6 A. No, not in relation to Tracey Clarke. I alluded to that 7 in relation to the -- the safety of Tracey Clarke was of 8 paramount importance, and I think it has been suggested 9 during the hearing the question was raised: how could 10 we, or how could the RUC, advance the investigation of 11 attempting to pervert the course of justice without 12 endangering Tracey by divulging that? 13 So I was alluding really to the -- I would not have 14 been divulging that statement. That's why 15 I acknowledged the safety of Tracey Clarke, but then 16 wanted to talk about the tactics of the telephone 17 subscriber checks and calls. 18 Q. But, of course, in terms of the safety of Tracey Clarke, 19 there had to be a point in the conduct of the case at 20 which her identity became known to those against whom 21 she was originally going to give evidence. 22 A. From the reading of the material, I think her identity 23 became known quite early, but it would be wrong of the 24 police to openly disclose her identity in an interview. 25 Q. Indeed, there would have been ways to interview those 8 1 suspects, including Atkinson, about the telephone call 2 allegation, as you suggested yesterday, without 3 revealing her identity; for example, if they were all 4 interrogated about the issue of contact and asked for 5 telephone records? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Or if, indeed, telephone records had been sought in 8 relation to them all? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. That would have gone a considerable way to protecting 11 her identity? 12 A. Yes, her identity wouldn't have been revealed. 13 Q. No, because if, for example, Constable Neill was asked 14 about it or any of the others in the Land Rover, then 15 the appearance would have been given, "Well, we are all 16 being investigated about this"? 17 A. I think it could have been a sensible tactic to look at 18 what contact there was between the alleged suspects in 19 order to try to cover for the identity of Tracey Clarke, 20 and that in itself would have revealed the incoming 21 telephone call from the reserve constable's house. 22 Q. Of course, the other factor here is, Mr Murray, that 23 Tracey Clarke withdrew her evidence on 16th October. So 24 thereafter then she was no longer a prosecution witness 25 really. 9 1 A. That's correct. 2 Q. And shortly after that Hanvey and others were released. 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. So the issue of her safety then would have been less of 5 an issue from that point on. 6 A. Yes, possibly. 7 Q. Well, she continued to live in the community and there 8 is no evidence of any harm coming to her at that point. 9 A. No. 10 Q. Of course, in terms of the fake alibi which came in from 11 Andrea McKee, it didn't come in until after that. 12 A. 27th October. 13 Q. Indeed. So in terms of any risk to Tracey Clarke, from 14 an investigating point of view in terms of cracking the 15 fake alibi, that would be a factor that had been 16 significantly reduced by then? 17 A. I am not sure by then whether they would even have had 18 to use Tracey Clarke. 19 Q. Indeed. 20 A. Because on the 27th, as I have suggested, she could have 21 been challenged about the account she put forward at 22 that time. 23 Q. Or indeed a short time after the 27th. 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. There is an issue about whether or not Inspector Irwin 10 1 should have taken that statement. I am not actually 2 going to suggest to you that he shouldn't have done, but 3 once he did, there was then a golden opportunity to 4 crack open the alibi to see what else might have 5 happened. 6 A. There was. 7 Q. Looking briefly in terms of the conduct of the murder 8 investigation, speaking hypothetically, had she 9 disclosed that, in fact, she had been induced to give 10 a false alibi on behalf of Atkinson by Atkinson and her 11 husband, that, then, would have given grounds for the 12 immediate arrest of Atkinson and interrogation about 13 that? 14 A. Yes, it would. 15 Q. Faced with an allegation of assisting an offender, one 16 really doesn't know how Atkinson might have reacted. 17 A. I couldn't say how he would react. 18 Q. No. 19 A. Obviously I think his reaction would depend on the 20 weight of evidence. 21 Q. But one possible reaction, as happens in criminal cases, 22 is that he may have decided to disclose what he knew 23 about what happened on the night? 24 A. Yes, possibly. 25 Q. Now, just finally, Mr Murray, in terms of the telephone 11 1 billing you mentioned in your document that we were 2 furnished with yesterday, one of the reasons why you 3 might be revising your view of McBurney is that you 4 hadn't been aware that there was a difficulty about the 5 telephone providers giving the information in such a way 6 that it could be used in interviews? 7 A. No. Well, if I gave that impression, I need to correct 8 that. 9 Q. Yes, please. 10 A. What I have picked up during the hearing is that, at 11 certain times, service providers here were reluctant to 12 put witnesses before the court because of possible 13 danger. 14 I could understand the logic and the argument that 15 followed, that you would not necessarily advance those 16 as evidence, but that doesn't mean that within -- what 17 you would have is an intelligence document that 18 I believe you could use in the interview of Reserve 19 Constable Atkinson and I think it should have been used. 20 Q. Yes. Did you hear the evidence as well of the chief 21 constable, and I think, indeed, Inspector Irwin, that 22 there was a mechanism by which such information could be 23 obtained through a court order -- 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. -- to, in fact, use it in an interview and subsequently 12 1 evidentially? 2 A. Oh, yes, and I have heard that point made and that's 3 valid. If they wanted records, they could have got 4 a court order and I think I heard it mentioned they 5 could on occasions use service providers from England -- 6 Q. Yes. 7 A. -- to distance them from that. 8 Q. Indeed. 9 A. So, yes, I do believe the records could have been 10 evidence and I do believe they could have been used. 11 MR McGRORY: Yes. Thank you very much. 12 MR ADAIR: Sir, I wonder might I mention one matter while it 13 is fresh in your mind, if I may? It relates to -- and 14 I'm sure it wasn't deliberate -- the suggestion that 15 there has been no evidence of Mr McBurney's involvement 16 in the investigation of policemen. 17 You will recall, sir -- I can't remember the precise 18 document, but the ICPC approved Mr McBurney as the 19 investigating officer in the neglect allegation because 20 of their experience of him in previous investigations 21 with the ICPC. 22 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 23 MR ADAIR: I don't think I need bother the witness with the 24 question, but just to remind the Panel of that evidence. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Murray, can I just ask you this about 13 1 seeking to destroy the alibi that the McKees had put 2 forward? 3 That would be of little value unless one or both of 4 the McKees could then be used as witnesses in 5 a prosecution of Atkinson. Is that right? 6 A. That's correct, yes. 7 THE CHAIRMAN: An accomplice witness starts, or may start, 8 at a disadvantage in the eyes of the court. 9 A. Yes, absolutely. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Would it be important to seek to destroy the 11 alibi in a way in which the attempt didn't at the outset 12 simply produce a lot of denials and lies, which might 13 then be used to discredit the witness in 14 cross-examination? 15 A. Yes. That would be so. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: So how you do it is not an easy matter? 17 A. No, and I am not confident that it could ever have been 18 managed successfully, but it's my view that that should 19 have been attempted. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: Even though you think, if it had been, it 21 might never have been successful in the sense of leaving 22 a witness as intact as possible so far as her 23 credibility was concerned? 24 A. I don't think -- I mean, there are inherent difficulties 25 obviously in using anybody who would later go before 14 1 a court and admit that they perverted the course of 2 justice, and I fully understand that. There are 3 difficulties, but I do believe that Andrea McKee should 4 have been challenged on that statement. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: You see, what we do know is -- and I am 6 leaving aside the delay, which is something we shall 7 have to consider -- that when Andrea McKee was seen, she 8 was ready, if you like, to come clean without any 9 prevarication. 10 A. Yes. 11 THE CHAIRMAN: So her attitude, when approached, didn't 12 provide further material to discredit her as a witness. 13 A. No, and I accept and understand that. 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 15 Questions from MS DINSMORE 16 MS DINSMORE: Good morning, Mr Murray. 17 A. Good morning. 18 Q. My name is Margaret Ann Dinsmore. I appear on behalf of 19 both Eleanor and Robbie Atkinson. I have very little 20 for you, but there are just two things. 21 First of all, I wonder, could we have page [74400] 22 up, please? Now, Mr Murray, if we could just highlight 23 the first two lines of the final paragraph. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you tell us what document this is we are 25 looking at? 15 1 MS DINSMORE: We are looking at Mr Murray's report itself, 2 page 10 of the transcript of his report. This is your 3 report. This was your thinking. Your report initially 4 was done -- and this is no criticism at all -- 5 an incredible exercise that you undertook, a very 6 extensive exercise, but it was a paper exercise. Isn't 7 that right? 8 A. That's correct. 9 Q. This report reflects what you are thinking on certain 10 matters at that stage with what you have before you? 11 That's correct? 12 A. That's correct, absolutely. 13 Q. Can I just take you to the first sentence in that 14 paragraph 4.26? There you refer to Reserve Constable 15 Atkinson and you say: 16 "Reserve Constable Atkinson was perhaps the most 17 active officer initially at the scene." 18 Now, is there anything that you have heard during 19 the course of this Inquiry that changed your views on 20 that? 21 A. Nothing whatsoever. 22 Q. So you were satisfied then and you are satisfied now 23 exactly what is stated there? 24 A. Yes, and I fully believe that still. Reserve Constable 25 Atkinson was very active at that scene. 16 1 Q. Thank you very much. Then I have just one other thing 2 to ask of you. You have been very helpful in providing 3 a further note and coming along to tell us after your 4 consideration of what we have lived and breathed really 5 since 13th January this year. 6 Can you tell us a little about how you went about 7 that exercise? Were you in chamber every day of the 8 last 70 days or so that we are on now? 9 A. No. I was tasked to select those witnesses that 10 I wished to hear give live evidence. I was asked to 11 view initially transcripts of the evidence of certain 12 other witnesses, but because of the extent of that work, 13 that then came down to rely on the reading of 14 a number of statements. 15 I have to say there were some people, with respect, 16 that were almost irrelevant to my report. So those 17 people I took no notes of. 18 Q. Right. Just so I am clear, really you had almost 19 a hybrid exercise in relation to consideration of the 20 evidence which this Inquiry has heard? Some of it was 21 on paper. Some of it was on paper that was -- and 22 I don't mean this in any way derogatory at all, but 23 because of the remit and your terms of reference, some 24 of it on paper was cursory, because you would say, "That 25 wasn't relevant to what I was tasked to do". Is that 17 1 right? 2 A. That's correct. 3 Q. Then we have another category of witnesses and that is 4 a perusal of, really, the transcript that came up in 5 relation to each day? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Then there is the third category which are those 8 witnesses that you thought you wanted to see and hear? 9 A. That's correct, yes. 10 Q. And to see and hear, then were you present in the 11 chamber, or did you do it by way of a link? 12 A. I did both. On occasions I would be in the chamber 13 here, but I have to say I found it more conducive to 14 being in the Inquiry room, where I could make easier 15 notes basically. 16 Q. Right. So even the exercise of observation was 17 a hybrid. You picked your witnesses -- 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. -- that you wanted to be in the presence of? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Physically in the presence of, auditory in the presence 22 of, and then there are those that you said, "Yes, I want 23 to see them, I want to hear them, but I don't need to be 24 in the presence of them"? 25 A. Yes, that is correct. 18 1 Q. Now, can I ask you, what witnesses did you choose to be 2 in the presence of? 3 A. Without going through all my notes, which I don't have 4 with me, I am not, off the top of my head, able to say 5 how many I was in for. 6 Q. Well, can I ask you, for example, were you in for 7 Tracey Hanvey? 8 A. I was in the chamber for Tracey, yes. 9 Q. You were in the chamber for Tracey? 10 A. Because she was by video link. 11 Q. So you saw her and heard her via the video link? 12 A. Yes, I did. 13 Q. What about Andrea McKee? 14 A. No, I wasn't here for Andrea McKee. 15 Q. So you neither saw nor heard orally Andrea McKee? You 16 read obviously I would think, unless it may well be -- 17 THE CHAIRMAN: You have not given him a chance. He is 18 thinking about his answer. 19 MS DINSMORE: I apologise. I am very properly corrected by 20 the Chair. 21 A. I stand to be corrected, but I believe I listened to 22 Andrea McKee. 23 Q. From where? 24 A. From the Inquiry. I can't guarantee that. I would need 25 to do some research into that. 19 1 Q. I appreciate you wouldn't have all your notes here. 2 Would you have your diary here? 3 A. I don't carry a diary. 4 Q. So you wouldn't know whether you were in the province on 5 11th February of this year or not then? 6 A. Without doing some research, I don't know. 7 Q. What about my clients? Were you present for my clients? 8 A. Yes, I was. 9 Q. In the chamber? 10 A. Only for Reserve Constable Atkinson. 11 Q. Were you in the chamber here or ...? 12 A. I was here for both Reserve Constable Atkinson and his 13 wife, and there may -- I have a feeling there was 14 an amalgam of being in the chamber and listening again 15 in the Inquiry. 16 Q. So you -- 17 A. I know I was definitely here at the Robert Hamill 18 Inquiry. 19 Q. You were present in the back. Right. 20 What about the -- you know there were very senior 21 prosecutors who have given evidence at this Inquiry, 22 very, very senior practitioners who have given evidence 23 about interviews that they carried out and views that 24 they formed in relation to Andrea McKee. 25 Were you present, for example, here -- and this you 20 1 won't need your diary for; it is very recent -- for 2 10th September or 3rd September 3 A. Can you tell me ... 4 Q. Christine Smith. 5 A. No, I have read her transcript. 6 Q. But you didn't see her? 7 A. No. 8 Q. What about Mr Gerald Simpson? 9 A. No, I didn't. 10 Q. Was the impression you got from the transcripts you read 11 such as led you to believe that these were very, very 12 senior people indeed who were highly experienced in 13 relation to the task of dealing with potential 14 witnesses? 15 A. Yes, indeed. 16 Q. Have any of your observations meant there was anything 17 further that you wished to add to your report in 18 relation to that category of evidence that we have 19 explored? 20 A. Not really. I am mindful of the views of the first 21 witness you mentioned of the lack of credibility that 22 she felt Andrea McKee had. 23 Q. Yes. Were you impressed by her evidence? 24 A. I mean, I have looked at her professionally and, you 25 know, that is her view obviously. 21 1 Q. Yes, but if you had been a policeman at an investigation 2 and you had prosecutors probably actually, you know, if 3 you were working amongst, you would have known, but was 4 there anything that was unimpressive or inconsistent in 5 relation to the evidence they gave in relation to the 6 conclusion that they formed? 7 A. As I understand it, their issues were in relation to the 8 doctors and the account that Andrea McKee had given in 9 Wrexham. My view is, and was, first of all, 10 Andrea McKee admitted to perverting the course of 11 justice. So her credibility and reliability as 12 a witness was already -- 13 Q. Tarnished? 14 A. -- tarnished. I mean, it must be, because she would 15 have admitted to committing a criminal offence. 16 I didn't think the evidence of her at the surgery 17 actually was very significant, from my point of view, 18 because of that. 19 Q. Surely Miss Smith particularly went a little further 20 than that, did she not, when pressed particularly by 21 Inquiry counsel? 22 When pressed, she went further and gave what her 23 view was about this witness over and above just that one 24 individual aspect of the Pendine. 25 A. I am afraid you would have to refresh my memory with 22 1 exactly what she did say when she was pushed. 2 Q. I am being unfair to you. 3 THE CHAIRMAN: I don't think, in fact, Miss Smith gave us 4 any assessment about the evidence concerning the case. 5 I think her focus was on the effect on Mrs McKee's 6 credibility of what she was saying about Pendine. 7 Am I right, Mr Underwood? 8 MR UNDERWOOD: I am so sorry. I didn't hear. An urgent 9 e-mail. 10 MS DINSMORE: He never listens while I am on my feet. 11 I mean, there is, and in fact there has been from day 12 one, that everybody understands where he is coming from. 13 THE CHAIRMAN: I think the burden of Miss Smith's evidence 14 in criticising Andrea McKee's credibility focused on 15 Pendine. 16 MR UNDERWOOD: It did. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: Not on what she might be able to say about 18 the offence itself? 19 MR UNDERWOOD: I think she went further than Pendine. She 20 criticised Andrea McKee for wanting to move house, by 21 setting impossible conditions, for sending herself 22 a fake letter and various other things she has thought 23 of since. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 25 MS DINSMORE: Thank you. Well, I doubt very much if you -- 23 1 you weren't present for Miss Smith's evidence? 2 A. No, I wasn't. 3 Q. So if we are happy to leave it that we are ad idem, you 4 and I, that, in relation to her evidence and that of 5 Mr Simpson, you saw nothing to criticise that hit you on 6 reading it at all? 7 A. In relation to the two witnesses? 8 Q. Yes. 9 A. No, nothing whatsoever. 10 MS DINSMORE: Thank you very much, Mr Murray. 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 12 Questions from MR O'CONNOR 13 MR O'CONNOR: Good morning, Mr Murray. I represent only 14 Chief Superintendent McCrum and Mr Irwin. 15 Now, as you know, the chief superintendent was the 16 duty inspector on the night of the incident and Mr Irwin 17 was involved in the investigation? 18 A. That is correct, yes. 19 Q. Did you hear their evidence? 20 A. Yes, I did. 21 Q. Both of these men gave evidence that they policed 22 against a background of lack of resources. Both gave 23 the impression, I am suggesting to you, that they didn't 24 always have the manpower or the resources to do what 25 they wanted to do always. 24 1 A. I think that would be true, yes. 2 Q. I am going to suggest to you that, at the time these two 3 men were operating as police officers in 1997, that was 4 a problem for officers. Do you accept that? 5 A. I think it's a problem to virtually every UK force. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr O'Connor, the live question for us is not 7 whether there was in general a shortage of manpower, but 8 whether, on the night in question when these two 9 officers were engaged, their efforts were affected by 10 a shortage of manpower. 11 MR O'CONNOR: Yes, Mr Chairman. If you would allow me 12 a couple of questions along the general theme, then 13 I will be more specific, if that's okay. 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. 15 MR O'CONNOR: Very briefly in your statement, in your 16 report, you have referred to the Blakey Report. Isn't 17 that right? At one stage? 18 A. I don't recall. 19 Q. You have referred to a report entitled "A Thematic 20 Inspection of Murder Investigation in the PSNI". 21 A. Sorry. Her Majesty's Inspectorate, yes. 22 Q. Some people call that the Blakey Report. Perhaps you 23 have not heard that term. That was in 2002-2003? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. If you can bring up page [44027] on the screen, please, 25 1 bottom paragraph, paragraph 7.1, this is the conclusion 2 of that report. It is a fairly lengthy investigation 3 into what was available to the PSNI in 2002/2003. 4 Things, I am suggesting, were no better in 1997, and 5 that paragraph reads: 6 "The Police Service of Northern Ireland has 7 a history and a present reality which is different from 8 the forces in England and Wales." 9 What I am suggesting to you out of that is you 10 didn't have any experience of this reality of this lack 11 of resources, that it was different in Northern Ireland, 12 and it wasn't like the police forces that you had served 13 in. Do you accept that? 14 A. No. Well, that's a generic comment. 15 Q. Yes. 16 A. It is not in relation to the assault on Robert Hamill. 17 Q. No, but if I move on then: 18 "To some extent because of that history, priorities 19 have dictated that the investigation of murder has not 20 had the resources and attention paid to it than 21 elsewhere in the United Kingdom." 22 Where you were operating. Isn't that right? 23 A. I mean, it is difficult to just look at that in 24 isolation without having looked at the remaining part of 25 that report, because I did acknowledge yesterday that 26 1 there were times and areas in Northern Ireland where 2 traditional policing was impossible. So I don't know if 3 that's alluding to those really huge problems that the 4 RUC faced. 5 Q. I thought when you quoted the report in your report that 6 you had considered the report in full. You had not 7 considered the report in full? You are not au fait with 8 the contents of that report? 9 A. In truth, the preparation of that report of mine was so 10 far back it is difficult for me to recall the details. 11 Q. Strangely, there -- it is a very short conclusion that 12 only runs to three paragraphs. It has ten 13 recommendations, which I suggest to you were arising out 14 of the problems in Northern Ireland? 15 A. Okay. 16 Q. If we can move over the page very briefly, Mr Chairman, 17 I will finish this general point. [44028]. 18 Paragraph 7.2. The report went on: 19 "At present, the service is not as well equipped as 20 it should be to deal with the most serious and complex 21 murder investigations ..." 22 So that's my simple point: that there was a problem 23 specific to Northern Ireland, not general to the UK, and 24 you had no experience of that. Is that fair? 25 A. That's fair. 27 1 Q. Now, if I can bring you then to your own report at 2 page [74409], paragraph 6 .6, and this then -- what I 3 will do for ease of reference is I will deal with the 4 points in relation to then DI -- sorry -- 5 Duty Inspector McCrum and then I will deal with the 6 points in relation to Mr Irwin, who was then DI Irwin. 7 In paragraph 6 .6 you say about duty 8 Inspector McCrum: 9 "Apart from directing P89 to ascertain the injuries 10 sustained by the two injured parties, Inspector McCrum 11 did nothing in respect of the assaults. The disturbance 12 in the town centre was later to be described by various 13 officers as a riot and it is therefore surprising that, 14 once the crowd was dispersed, Inspector McCrum directed 15 no further police action." 16 You have heard his evidence and you have heard some 17 detail that he did ask the officers on the ground and he 18 had a general sense that this was like any other 19 Saturday night when he left. 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Also, I think specifically Constable Cooke said in his 22 evidence that he just basically gave the inspector the 23 basic facts and those words are out of his statement to 24 the Inquiry. 25 A. That is correct. 28 1 Q. You will have assessed Mr McCrum, like every other 2 witness, with your expertise. 3 If the Inquiry accepts what he says about that, you 4 are handicapped when you are writing this because you 5 are looking at facts on paper, black and white, and you 6 now know that the information that you were talking 7 about was later conveyed as being something of a riot, 8 other things by officers, but at the time, if Mr McCrum 9 is right, and if he got a basic feeling, as 10 an experienced duty inspector, that this was like every 11 other Saturday night -- I am coming to my question 12 now -- did he do anything wrong by going on about his 13 other duties? 14 A. Yes, he did. 15 Q. What do you say he did wrong? 16 A. Well, from the material I have read and the evidence 17 that I have heard and in listening to Mr McCrum, I find 18 no evidence of intrusive supervision to try to establish 19 exactly what had gone on. 20 The evidence was that it took him the best part of 21 an hour to clear the town. Two people had been 22 stretchered off to hospital unconscious. I think there 23 was a much more intrusive style of leadership called for 24 on that night from Inspector McCrum. I am mindful that 25 in his evidence he said he tasked a constable to draw up 29 1 names of people who were present. I understand that 2 that constable denied having been given that 3 instruction. 4 Q. That was after, when he came back to the station. 5 I just want to focus on just before he left to do his 6 other duties in two other police stations. 7 A. I do accept -- and it is very easy to criticise with 8 hindsight. I have been an area commander coming on duty 9 at 8 o'clock in the morning to reflect on occurrences 10 that have been taking place overnight, so I'm not trying 11 to be critical for the sake of it, but I just feel that 12 when I looked at the synopsis of incidents that took 13 place over an eight-month period in Portadown, the scale 14 of this disturbance was significant, and I just believe 15 that formal questioning of officers and the four 16 officers in initial attendance would have given some 17 indication as to the scale of the disorder. 18 So if we are just talking about the immediate action 19 of Inspector McCrum, I would have expected him to talk 20 to the officers from the Land Rover. 21 Q. Yes. 22 A. And I know -- I think he said he did, but I would have 23 expected him to do that and ascertain as best he could 24 exactly the scale of what had gone on. 25 Q. I think his evidence is he did talk to the officers but 30 1 he didn't get any sense that it was anything other than 2 a normal Saturday night. That's the point I am making 3 to you. 4 A. And I have in my report referred to that, and I believe 5 it was viewed as a Saturday night punch-up, and I do 6 accept that, and I do accept that the gravity of that 7 situation did not become known to Inspector McCrum until 8 round about 4 o'clock in the morning, when he made that 9 telephone call. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: I think you say in your report that leaving 11 aside a lack of knowledge of the severity of the 12 injuries, the incident itself called for more than 13 happened? 14 A. Yes, indeed. Yes, that's exactly the point I made. 15 MR O'CONNOR: Of course, when you made your report, you 16 didn't know it was commonplace for ambulances to be at 17 scenes like this. 18 A. Sorry, I didn't know ...? 19 Q. That was his evidence, that it wasn't uncommon to see 20 ambulances arriving at disturbances in Portadown on 21 a Saturday night. 22 A. With respect, and I accept I haven't policed here, it is 23 not unusual to see ambulances in town centres 24 throughout. 25 I just think that merits the question, you know: 31 1 what is the extent of what we are dealing with? Because 2 if early mistakes are made, I believe you really 3 struggle to recover from that. So the more intrusive 4 style of leadership that can be made, the better, in my 5 view and experience. 6 Q. Will you give me this much: that it was difficult for 7 the duty inspector in those circumstances to do 8 everything with a mirror of perfection? 9 A. I don't expect anybody to act with perfection. I am 10 just asking or making the point that there were some 11 minimum issues that he could have undertaken. 12 I mean, you may be able to point this out, but 13 I have seen nothing within the material or anything that 14 I have read that actually merited his immediately 15 leaving Portadown. 16 Now, I may be mistaken on that, but on the scale of 17 the disturbances that had taken place that night, I do 18 believe more than a casual debrief at that time could 19 have elicited the gravity of that situation, and I do 20 accept, I really do accept, in a scene such as this, it 21 is confused, it is not aided by drunkenness, it is not 22 aided by disorderly conduct, and it is very difficult to 23 get a handle on exactly what has gone on, and I do 24 accept that. 25 Q. Just finally on this point, when you say there was 32 1 nothing that merited him leaving the scene, I mean, his 2 duty merited him leaving the scene. If it was a normal 3 Saturday night, he just went about his duty. That's 4 fair? 5 A. If he felt that was a normal Saturday night, then it was 6 very fair for him to say he had responsibilities to the 7 rest of the division, and that would be correct. 8 Q. Then if I can move on, please, to page -- 9 THE CHAIRMAN: Just before you do that, is there anything 10 special that was happening in one of his other areas 11 that you are suggesting should have called for his 12 attendance? 13 MR O'CONNOR: No. The evidence was, Mr Chairman -- 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Just routine. 15 MR O'CONNOR: -- that he had three areas to look after and 16 he was a very busy duty inspector. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you. 18 MR O'CONNOR: Page [74410], please, paragraph 6.10. This is 19 the debrief point. 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. We know that Inspector McCrum went on those other 22 duties. There is no criticism of anything he did in 23 between. So he is back in the station at 4 o'clock in 24 the morning. The first thing he does is phone the 25 hospital, because there is no further word on 33 1 Mr Hamill's condition. Isn't that right? 2 A. That is correct, yes. 3 Q. When he went away, in between times the Land Rover crew 4 came back to the station. They got themselves changed 5 and headed off home. 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Now, obviously Inspector McCrum can't debrief if he is 8 not there. Isn't that right? 9 A. Well, obviously, yes. 10 Q. I think there is some evidence that the normal thing 11 would have been for the Land Rover crew to come back on 12 and maybe fill out their statements. It would have been 13 regular enough for them to fill out their statements on 14 their next duty. That was what happened. That was 15 evidence, that that could be what happened. 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. But if someone suggests, or anyone suggests, that, when 18 the Land Rover crew got back to the station, they ought 19 to have been debriefed before they left, is it fair to 20 say that the most senior officer at the station at the 21 time ought to have done that? 22 A. If, in effect, they should have been debriefed, then 23 that would be correct, but if that was a Saturday night 24 punch up and the severity of it wasn't known, then I am 25 not suggesting a disciplined debrief should have taken 34 1 place at that time. I just believe that alters once the 2 gravity of the situation becomes known. 3 Q. The debriefing you are referring to is really after 4 4 o'clock? 5 A. It is after 4 o'clock. 6 Q. You have heard the evidence that the duty inspector, 7 once he realised the severity of the incident, called 8 out the CID? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Detective Constable Keys? 11 A. Yes, I have heard that. 12 Q. Can I just deal with -- yes. Thank you. Paragraph 6.10 13 is you saying that, after the 4 o'clock situation, it 14 was really up to Inspector McCrum to debrief. Isn't 15 that right? 16 A. Absolutely. 17 Q. You say it really wasn't that the investigation 18 shouldn't be taken over by CID. It should be continued 19 by uniform and assisted by CID. 20 Is that what you are saying? 21 A. No, that's not what I am saying. It is perfectly proper 22 and correct to call out the night duty CID, but whilst 23 that is being done and he or she is attending the 24 station, the senior officer on duty at that time, 25 Inspector McCrum, I believe should be obtaining as much 35 1 information as he can and setting in place as many 2 fast-track actions that is realistic to -- and 3 I appreciate the staffing was short at that particular 4 time then -- so that, when the night duty detective 5 arrives, he or she can be given as full a briefing as 6 possible. 7 Now, at that point, as the senior officer on duty, 8 Inspector McCrum would still assume responsibility for 9 the management of the incident with the detective 10 working almost in tandem. Once the senior CID officer 11 is called and properly briefed, then the responsibility 12 for the management of that incident changes and is fully 13 handed over to the investigation team led by the senior 14 CID officer. 15 Q. There were a couple of things that Inspector McCrum had 16 a journal entry of. If we go to 6.11, which is the next 17 paragraph on the same page, you say: 18 "If Inspector McCrum is correct that he ordered 19 Constable Cooke to draw up a list of people at the scene 20 and to collect the clothing from the victims, there is 21 no evidence to show that he ensured that those 22 instructions had been carried out." 23 If I can stop there, certainly he had a journal 24 entry and you were aware of the journal entry. You saw 25 his journal entry? 36 1 A. From memory, I can't recall. Well, I saw it at the 2 hearing here, yes. 3 Q. When you made your report, you can't remember whether 4 you had seen his journal entry? 5 A. I can't remember seeing that. 6 Q. I will put this in paragraph in context then of his 7 journal entry. 8 A. Sorry, to interrupt you. Could I just say, if that was 9 in the material bundle, then I would have read that 10 document, that journal entry. 11 Q. I think in your previous -- in fairness, in your 12 previous page you do refer to a notebook, a pocket 13 notebook, but you don't refer to the journal. This is 14 why I am -- if you go to the previous page of your 15 statement, page 19, [74409], at the bottom there, 16 paragraph 6.8. It is on the screen in front of you. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Was that a notebook? That was something different from 19 his journal, was it? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. But you were aware he had made that notebook entry? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. You also had a journal, a contemporaneous journal, which 24 had all the proceedings of the day before's duty and the 25 day after's duty in the journal, a handwritten journal. 37 1 A. Okay. 2 Q. There were two pages of detail in relation to the 3 incident in this journal. 4 Part of the detail was -- 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me, have we heard evidence from 6 Mr McCrum about this, about the content of his journal? 7 MR O'CONNOR: Mr Chairman, the journal, I suggest it would 8 be handed into the Inquiry. It was actually photocopied 9 for the Inquiry. He gave evidence at length about it. 10 But also -- actually, the photocopied papers are Inquiry 11 documents already. There are numbers. I am sure they 12 can be provided again. 13 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly, but I was just asking: did we hear 14 from Mr McCrum about this part of the content of his 15 journal? 16 MR O'CONNOR: In detail, Mr Chairman. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 18 MR O'CONNOR: The detail was, Mr Murray, that he had asked 19 Constable Cooke and Constable Orr to go to the -- this 20 was in the timescale -- to go to the hospital to 21 retrieve clothing and he noted that in his journal 22 before he went off duty at 8.30 in the morning. 23 He also asked Constable Cooke to draw up a list of 24 people, and you have that there, but you seem sceptical 25 in paragraph 6.11 that he actually did that, and your 38 1 reasoning for your scepticism seems to be, final line: 2 "One would have to question why an officer, if so 3 directed, would fail to obey a lawful order, thus 4 leaving him open to discipline proceedings." 5 Do you know that those two officers were served with 6 a Form 17(3) for failing to obey an order? 7 A. Yes, but that was not in relation to failing to follow 8 the order of Inspector McCrum. 9 Q. I understood it was in relation to not going to the 10 hospital to get the clothing? 11 A. Oh, I beg your pardon. They did receive the 17(3) in 12 relation to that, but, as I understand it, they 13 responded that they weren't given that -- 14 Q. Order -- 15 A. -- but I do accept what you are asking, why one would 16 have to question why an officer, if so directed, because 17 they were then subject to discipline. Yes, I do agree 18 with that. 19 Q. With the knowledge that they were disciplined and they 20 accepted the admonishment, now, with that knowledge, do 21 you have any criticism then -- 22 MR UNDERWOOD: Do I hear, "They accepted the admonishment"? 23 The only person who was admonished was the inspector, as 24 far as I was aware, and Constable A. 25 MR O'CONNOR: I understood that Constable Cooke and 39 1 Constable -- were served with 17(3)s in relation to the 2 refusal. Sorry, they were served with the forms. 3 Sorry, they were served with the forms. 4 MR UNDERWOOD: They were served with the forms. They were 5 not admonished. 6 MR O'CONNOR: Sorry. I beg your pardon. 7 So they were served with these forms. With your 8 knowledge now about the notebook and the 17(3)s, do you 9 want to change your conclusion in 6.11 or your 10 suspicion? 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Just before the witness answers, it is 12 necessary that he understands that although those 13 notices were served, they did not result in any adverse 14 finding against the officers. That has to be part of 15 the question to be considered. 16 MR O'CONNOR: There are three things really you maybe didn't 17 know. That is that there was a contemporaneous note in 18 the notebook in relation to those clothes. You see, 19 Inspector McCrum has given evidence that he didn't know 20 there was going to be a public inquiry 11 years later 21 about that contemporaneous note in his notebook. I am 22 suggesting to you the force of that evidence is very 23 strong in his favour that that order was given. 24 Do you accept that? 25 A. I can't reconcile that. I have listened obviously to 40 1 an inspector saying he directed them to and two officers 2 who say they were not directed to. 3 Q. What I am saying to you now is maybe you didn't see that 4 journal notebook. Are you saying, even with the 5 evidence I suggest to you that is strong out of the 6 notebook ...? 7 A. Certainly the journal entry would tend to support the 8 account given by Mr McCrum that he did direct them, yes, 9 but why would he just put that in, if, in fact, he has 10 not done that? 11 Q. Knowing that now, what I am suggesting to you is that 12 paragraph 6.11 is a little bit unfair to 13 Inspector McCrum in those circumstances. 14 A. Yes, I would agree with that. 15 Q. Thank you. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: You say in 6.11: 17 "If Inspector McCrum is correct in that he ordered 18 Constable Cooke to draw up a list of people ... there is 19 no evidence to show that he ensured that those 20 instructions had be carried out." 21 A. That is correct. 22 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you regard that part of it as unfair? 23 A. No, I don't, because there is no evidence that he did 24 seek to bring those strands together, and that is -- 25 THE CHAIRMAN: These things didn't happen? 41 1 A. These things didn't happen, and this is part of all the 2 debrief that I go back to, because if, in effect, 3 Mr McCrum set in train a list of actions and activities, 4 in my view it is his responsibility to ensure that they 5 have been done, because that's the exact point of having 6 the supervision there, and I am sorry, I don't believe 7 it is acceptable -- and I have worked in professional 8 standards as well -- for an officer to say, "Well, 9 I directed this and I directed that". Well, the next 10 question would be: was it done? If it wasn't, "Why 11 wasn't it done and why didn't you make sure it was 12 done?" 13 As the senior officer on duty that night, I do make 14 it clear I do hold Mr McCrum responsible for those 15 activities. Now, if there were lapses, you know, I am 16 sorry, but I do stand by that. 17 I do concede the point about the discipline notices. 18 I can't say for definite, and who can -- Mr McCrum said 19 he told them to. He may well be correct, because why he 20 would put that in a journal is beyond me if he hadn't 21 told them. 22 Q. So it was good policing to tell them to? 23 A. Well, it's a basic principle of policing that, in the 24 event of a serious assault, you will obtain the victim's 25 clothing as soon as practicable, as soon as you can. 42 1 Q. So that's good policing? 2 A. Absolutely. 3 Q. And it is good policing to keep a note in your journal 4 of doing that? 5 A. It is good policing to keep a note of that, yes. 6 Q. At what stage does he then check that has been carried 7 out? 8 A. Well, before he goes off duty. If you set in train 9 a number of things, then I believe -- I would not go off 10 duty without saying, "Has this been done? Has that been 11 done?" because it may well be that those officers had 12 difficulty or misunderstood what had been asked of them, 13 because if they then said, "Sorry, we haven't got the 14 clothing", the question would be, "Well, why not?" 15 Q. He closely liaised with DC Don Keys when he came on duty 16 very shortly after the telephone call to the hospital. 17 A. I have referred in my report -- and I have seen this, 18 and I don't accuse Mr McCrum of this -- that there -- 19 I have seen on many, many occasions when the senior 20 uniformed officer on duty calls out a member of the CID 21 and almost abrogates their responsibility. 22 Now, I am not suggesting Inspector McCrum did that, 23 but I don't think Detective Constable Keys had the 24 benefit of a full and thorough briefing because of the 25 difficulty he had in even identifying where the scene 43 1 was. I believe that was an officer who came on duty and 2 was almost left to get on with it. 3 Q. You heard his evidence that once the -- in 4 Northern Ireland, in 1997, once the CID man came on 5 board, then you supported him and he took over the 6 investigation from the start, from the contact with CID? 7 A. I did hear that and I accept that, but that does not 8 mean Mr McCrum had no further responsibility for that 9 incident. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: What do you understand to be included in the 11 need to support the detective? 12 A. Yes. I mean, he is there to provide, in my view, 13 whatever the detective realistically wants. I mean, if 14 the detective had asked for a Scenes of Crime Officer to 15 be called out, then that would be Mr McCrum's decision 16 to call one out, whether or not to do so, or if, say, 17 Detective Constable Keys wanted a dog handler called out 18 or some other resource, the responsibility for that lies 19 with Mr McCrum. So it is that sort of level of support 20 that I believe the detective needs. 21 MR O'CONNOR: I think you alluded at page [74414], 22 paragraph 6.31 back to Her Majesty's Inspectorate 23 report, the Blakey Report: 24 "Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary found 25 evidence of uniformed duty inspectors taking limited 44 1 responsibility at scenes and being content to leave CID 2 in charge of the scene with uniformed constables to 3 continue the scene log. This lack of direction has led 4 to unmanaged scene entry and inconsistent log 5 completion. These circumstances offer opportunities for 6 the integrity of the scene to be challenged." 7 That was a finding in 2002. That was evidence that 8 it was done in Northern Ireland, that the duty inspector 9 would hand over control of the scene in this 10 circumstance to the CID, instead of -- 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me, Mr O'Connor. I want to be clear 12 what you are suggesting. Are you suggesting this was 13 a finding that this was the general practice in 14 Northern Ireland? 15 MR O'CONNOR: I am suggesting there was a finding in 2002. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: No, no, no. Are you suggesting this was 17 a finding that this was the general practice? I don't 18 read that into that paragraph, but if I fail to see it, 19 you point it out to me. 20 MR O'CONNOR: No. I am saying there is evidence that was 21 a practice. I think that's very clear from the 22 paragraph, Mr Chairman. It was found to be a problem in 23 Northern Ireland by Her Majesty's Inspectorate in 2002, 24 and what I am saying is that Mr McCrum's evidence was 25 that, in practice, in Northern Ireland in 1997, uniform 45 1 handed over to CID and they took over, and then uniform 2 assisted CID. Whether in England or elsewhere that's 3 not the practice, that was the practice in 4 Northern Ireland. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Are you saying it was the general practice in 6 Northern Ireland? 7 MR O'CONNOR: Mr McCrum said that was the practice. 8 THE CHAIRMAN: The general practice? 9 MR O'CONNOR: He said that was his experience of the general 10 practice. I don't know anything about policing, 11 Mr Chairman. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: I merely point out you are relying on the 13 HMIC report as giving support to your argument. That 14 depends on whether one is to read that paragraph as the 15 HMIC saying, "This was a general practice in 16 Northern Ireland". Do you follow? 17 MR O'CONNOR: The HMIC -- I haven't used the words "general 18 practice", Mr Chairman. I am saying: 19 "HMIC found evidence of uniformed duty inspectors 20 taking limited responsibility at scenes and being 21 content to leave CID in charge ..." 22 That's all I am putting to the witness: that there 23 is some evidence that would back up Mr McCrum's oral 24 evidence that there was a practice. His evidence was 25 that that was his experience of what the practice was. 46 1 THE CHAIRMAN: I take your point. 2 MR O'CONNOR: You might not have known about that when you 3 were dealing with Inspector McCrum's actions, but there 4 was certainly in his evidence, and some independent 5 evidence, that this was the case? 6 A. I am sorry. I just don't agree with that assertion. 7 There will always come a time when the senior uniform 8 officer on duty will hand over the control of the scene 9 to the specialists, ie., CID and other specialist units. 10 So that is the practice in the UK. That would happen in 11 England, it would happen in Wales, that that uniform 12 inspector would hand over that scene. It is what that 13 uniform inspector does with that scene and in order to 14 support the safely handing over of that scene to the 15 CID. 16 Q. I am not disputing what you are saying. 17 A. But the point I make is that that scene -- 18 Detective Constable Keys did not have the benefit of 19 that scene being handed over to him in the manner that 20 I feel that he should. 21 Q. If I can leave Inspector McCrum and move on to DI Irwin, 22 Mr Murray, you have changed your view and, if you like, 23 your addendum about Mr Irwin. 24 Initially, you stated you believed DI Irwin assisted 25 Andrea McKee in perverting the course of justice. You 47 1 don't stand by that comment now, having listened to his 2 evidence? 3 A. No, I don't. 4 Q. You have heard his evidence. You heard all of his 5 evidence? 6 A. Yes, I did. 7 Q. You heard about the efforts he went to to secure 8 a conviction in this case? 9 A. Yes, I did. 10 Q. He was a good DI? 11 A. Yes, very. I think he was very thorough in what he did. 12 Q. When you take into account his position in the chain of 13 command, let's say, and what was going on around him, is 14 it fair of me to say that he worked diligently? 15 A. Yes, I believe he did. On listening to his evidence and 16 looking at the actions that he took, he came on duty on 17 that Monday morning, was very active. I know that he 18 had to review another serious assault. At almost no 19 notice he was able to put together a whole raft of 20 resources to effect arrests and I do believe he worked 21 diligently in that regard. 22 Q. If I can take you to page [74507], conclusion 24.1, 23 saying in relation to the overall -- it is apropos of 24 what you just said, Mr Murray. Your conclusion at the 25 end of your report. 48 1 I am going to leave out the criticism of DI Irwin 2 now and I am going suggest to you this then leaves 3 a picture of someone who did his best: 4 "The murder investigation proved to be ineffective 5 as evidenced by the failure to bring to justice those 6 responsible for the murder of Robert Hamill. However, 7 based upon the papers I have read, I believe the RUC 8 attempted to bring to account those people responsible. 9 In my opinion, DI Irwin was the driving force behind the 10 investigation with DCS McBurney providing ..." 11 Then if we believe out the critical bit: 12 "... he tried to bring the investigation to 13 a satisfactory conclusion." 14 Is it fair to say there was not much more DI Irwin 15 could do in his job that -- 16 A. In relation to -- no, I fully stand by that conclusion. 17 MR O'CONNOR: Thank you. 18 MR UNDERWOOD: There is nothing arising. Thank you. 19 Questions from THE PANEL 20 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you just help us about one thing, 21 Mr Murray? You are critical in your report of the fact 22 that statements -- and it comes back to debriefing -- 23 there was no debriefing to enable names to be provided 24 and early arrests to be made? 25 A. That is correct. I do believe there was a golden 49 1 opportunity there at the very early stages of that for 2 some information to be gathered from relevant officers, 3 including Constable A, which would have led, and could 4 have led, to some fast-track actions that may have 5 secured some evidence in relation to the assault. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: If there had been early arrests, would there 7 then -- would you have expected to there to be prompt 8 searches? 9 A. Absolutely. Yes, sir. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Those searches would include searches for 11 clothing and footwear -- 12 A. Yes, indeed. 13 THE CHAIRMAN: -- because this was an attack which had 14 involved the victims being kicked on the head -- 15 A. That's right. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and there was blood. So in that event, 17 footwear, if recovered soon enough, might have provided 18 valuable evidence to connect the footwear with 19 Robert Hamill? 20 A. Yes, absolutely. It would be a priority to obtain 21 whatever footwear you could because of that very reason, 22 because of the transfer of DNA or blood or anything else 23 from that. 24 I made the point about the droplet of blood on 25 Robert Hamill's trousers that was attributed to 50 1 Stacey Bridgett and the -- that in itself does not prove 2 an assault, but if you were to obtain blood or DNA 3 material from footwear, then somebody has to come up 4 with a very plausible explanation as to how that came to 5 be there and that would indicate clearly an assault. So 6 that, in my view, would be essential. 7 THE CHAIRMAN: This is an indication of the need to get 8 names as quickly as possible and make arrests as quickly 9 as possible. Is that the position? 10 A. That is the position, and it is well-known -- and it is 11 a phrase I don't particularly like -- it is the golden 12 hour. It is what takes place in the first few hours of 13 any major investigation. If you fail to undertake that, 14 then it's very, very difficult to recover. 15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. 16 A. Thank you. 17 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much, Mr Murray. 18 A. Thank you. 19 (The witness withdrew) 20 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, can I map out the course of what's left 21 for the day? 22 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 23 MR UNDERWOOD: I have to read excerpts from a number of 24 witness statements and transcripts of various witnesses. 25 By and large those witnesses who are uncontroversial and 51 1 who nobody has requested the attendance of. 2 Interspersed in them, however, are some very important 3 witnesses, including Miss Cornett, who are too ill to 4 attend, unhappily. Those statements and transcripts 5 will be taken rather more seriously in terms of reading 6 more of the excerpts. 7 We then have two quite short witnesses, a Mr Rogers 8 from the NIO, who deals with the way in which the RUC 9 responded to the Secretary of State's enquiries, and 10 Mr Donnelly, who was the Chairman of the ICPC, who will 11 have some things to say about his late organisation, and 12 then, finally, Mr Armstrong. I apprehend there is 13 probably about an hour or so's worth of reading, but we 14 will comfortably finish all of the evidence today, 15 I trust. So I am in your hands whether you want me to 16 start reading now or break. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: We will start and do a quarter of an hour or 18 thereabouts and then have a break. 19 Statement of ALF ANNESLEY (read) 20 MR UNDERWOOD: I group these witnesses into those who were 21 there on the night, police officers, etc. 22 The first of them is Mr Annesley. He is at 23 page [80025]. We see in paragraph 2: 24 "In April 1997, I worked as a driver for Call-a-Cab 25 in Portadown. I had worked for them for 12 or 13 years 52 1 at that stage and I continued to drive taxis in 2 Portadown until 2002, when I retired on medical 3 grounds." 4 Then at paragraph 4: 5 "I cannot remember making a previous statement to 6 the police, but I am told I did sign a statement dated 7 7th November 2000. I don't deny I made it, but I simply 8 can't remember. I note from that statement that I am 9 asked about a job at an address, the name of which has 10 been redacted." 11 [80026]: 12 "A copy of the statement is now produced and shown 13 to me at page 17367." 14 The next is a transcript, because it is an interview 15 of a gentleman who hasn't signed his statement. That's 16 Conor Black. We have that in .pdf form. 17 Interview of CONOR BLACK (read) 18 If I can jump straight to page [20] of that, about 19 just less than halfway down there is a sentence which 20 starts: 21 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. So you say in your statement 22 you drove up the other end of the town to see what was 23 going on. Are you -- what did you mean by this? So did 24 you? 25 "Conor Black: Well, probably -- I am presuming this 53 1 because we'd seen police cars and whatnot where it 2 happened. It was -- we wanted to have a nosy. 3 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. 4 "Conor Black: I honestly can't remember what 5 prompted us to go up. 6 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. And you saw ambulance and 7 police cars? 8 "Conor Black: Uh-huh. 9 "Alannah Fooks: How many police cars or Land Rovers 10 did you see?" 11 Overleaf, [21]: 12 "Conor Black: I don't know. I've no idea. I can't 13 remember. 14 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. Did you see a Land Rover 15 parked anywhere or you just -- 16 "Conor Black: I can't remember, no. 17 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. You say there was a police 18 car blocking the street. Do you know what street that 19 was? 20 "Conor Black: I can't, no, I can't recall where it 21 was. 22 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. Did you see police out on 23 the street? 24 "Conor Black: I honestly don't know. I can't 25 remember, to be truthful. It doesn't say on my 54 1 statement. I can't remember, it's that long ago. 2 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. You said there were quite 3 a few people who seemed to be moving off, but you don't 4 recall whether there was police asking them to move off? 5 "Conor Black: No. 6 "Alannah Fooks: So you said you saw Kyle Magee at 7 this point. Where was he when you saw him? You'd 8 stopped at Call-a-Cab and -- 9 "Conor Black: Yes. Yes, I'm presuming somewhere 10 around Call-a-Cab, but I can't recall where exactly." 11 Overleaf [22]: 12 "Alannah Fooks: Okay. And Kyle told you that there 13 had been a fight? 14 "Conor Black: Uh-huh." 15 The reason I am putting these in is that they are, 16 as it were, connective tissue where one has the evidence 17 of Kyle Magee. So that it may be necessary for people, 18 when making their final submissions, to be able to join 19 the dots, as it were. 20 Interview of PHILIP CURRAN (read) 21 The next of these transcripts is Philip Curran. 22 Again, we have that on .pdf form. 23 I will go to page [7] of that, if I may. You will 24 recall this refers to the evidence of a Mr Currie and 25 what he saw, because Mr Curran and Mr Gray were walking 55 1 together and encountered Mr Currie. 2 On page [7] he is dealing with after going to 3 a Chinese take-away. About a third of the way down the 4 page: 5 "Barnaby Pinfield: And after you'd been to the 6 Chinese, where did you go? 7 "Philip Curran: Just took a walk down towards the 8 town centre. 9 "Barnaby Pinfield: So what route is that? Down 10 West Street into Market Street? 11 "Philip Curran: Aye. 12 "Barnaby Pinfield: Were you still with David Gray 13 at that time? 14 "Philip Curran: Uh-huh. 15 "Barnaby Pinfield: What did you see when you were 16 going into the town centre? 17 "Philip Curran: Just got down to halfway down, 18 which would be sort of halfway, I mean, down around here 19 somewhere, past the church more or less." 20 Overleaf, [8]: 21 "Barnaby Pinfield: So you got down to there and 22 what did you see? 23 "Philip Curran: Everybody was just being pushed out 24 of the town. 25 "Barnaby Pinfield: When you say 'everybody', 56 1 roughly how many people were there? 2 "Philip Curran: I couldn't really tell you, to tell 3 you the truth. 4 "Barnaby Pinfield: And who were they being pushed 5 out of town by? 6 "Philip Curran: The police. 7 "Barnaby Pinfield: And again, it may be a rough 8 estimate, how many police officers were there at that 9 time? 10 "Philip Curran: Wouldn't have a clue. 11 "Barnaby Pinfield: So did you have any idea why the 12 police were pushing people back? 13 "Philip Curran: No. 14 "Barnaby Pinfield: Was anything being shouted by 15 the people being pushed back? 16 "Philip Curran: No, just they were -- I was on my 17 way up the town. 18 "Barnaby Pinfield: Did you see any violence from 19 people in that group? 20 "Philip Curran: No." 21 Overleaf, [9]: 22 "Barnaby Pinfield: And you say you walked to the 23 south to see what was happening in your statement. 24 Would that be right? 25 "Philip Curran: As well as I can remember at the 57 1 time, yeah. 2 "Barnaby Pinfield: And you saw a guy lying in the 3 road? 4 "Philip Curran: Uh-huh. 5 "Barnaby Pinfield: Now, where was he lying? 6 "Philip Curran: Just towards the West Street, it 7 was -- no, not West Street, the bottom of Thomas Street. 8 "Barnaby Pinfield: And when you first saw him, was 9 he moving or was he just lying there? 10 "Philip Curran: No, he was just being put into the 11 ambulance. 12 "Barnaby Pinfield: So it may seem a silly question, 13 but how was he being put into the ambulance? 14 "Philip Curran: I think he was just lifted. 15 "Barnaby Pinfield: Did you see any other people 16 around in the area at the time? 17 Overleaf, [10]: 18 "Philip Curran: No. 19 "Barnaby Pinfield: Did you see any police in that 20 area? 21 "Philip Curran: No. We were -- the police were 22 forcing -- at that time, they were in the town centre." 23 Then, if we look at David Gray, again there is 24 a transcript in .pdf. That has gone wrong. We will 25 come back to that. 58 1 Statement of MICHELLE JAMIESON (read) 2 Can I go to a statement of Michelle Jamieson, which 3 is at page [81560]? At paragraph 2 she says: 4 "I gave two statements to the police investigating 5 the murder of Robert Hamill. The first is dated 6 9th May 1997 and contains pages 9146 to 9148. The 7 second is dated 12th May 1997 and contains pages 9149 to 8 9150." 9 If we jump to page [81564], paragraph 25: 10 "I have been asked why I made two separate 11 statements three days apart and why I did not say in my 12 first statement that Wayne Lunt, Lisa Hobson and 13 Joanne Bradley were at my house on the evening of 14 26th April 1997." 15 Over the page, [81565], paragraph 26: 16 "I can confirm that my statements were not based on 17 anything Heidi and I had said to each other and I did 18 not know that she was also making statements to the 19 police. However, I thought that Heidi would not want me 20 to mention who had been at my house because I do not 21 think her parents liked her spending time drinking with 22 certain people. I do not know with whom they would have 23 had a particular problem, but they would have been cross 24 that she was out late because we were only 16 at the 25 time." 59 1 We have seen some fairly sinister reasons why people 2 might not have wanted to assist the police interspersed 3 with these various witnesses who have these very much 4 less sinister reasons for not telling the absolute truth 5 at the time. 6 If we go then to page [80934] -- 7 MR McCOMB: Sorry. 8 MR UNDERWOOD: Mr McComb asks me read and I am very happy to 9 take suggestions at this stage, [81563], paragraphs 19 10 and 20: 11 "According to my first statement I was just going to 12 continue walking downtown when I was called over by 13 a woman who was next to an injured man. The injured man 14 was at the Thomas Street/Woodhouse Street junction where 15 the crowd had been. I do not think at that stage there 16 was anyone near him except for the woman. The crowd 17 must have moved away by that stage. The man was lying 18 on the ground but I cannot remember whether he was on 19 the road or pavement, in which direction he was facing 20 or what condition he was in. I cannot actually remember 21 what this man looked like. When his photo appeared in 22 the paper after the incident, it just put a face to that 23 injured person. 24 "It says in my first statement that I knelt by the 25 injured man and listened to his breathing, but I do not 60 1 remember doing this at all. I think the detectives told 2 my mother that somebody saw me doing that. I do not 3 know how to give first aid. I was probably just trying 4 to help him. I cannot remember whether I spoke to the", 5 overleaf, [81564], "woman who was with the man or 6 whether she spoke to me. I cannot describe the woman, 7 but she was probably crying. I cannot recall seeing or 8 speaking to any police officers and I do not remember 9 seeing anyone else injured on the ground or 10 an ambulance." 11 Statement of ELIZABETH IRENE McKEE (read) 12 Then at page [80934], this is a companion piece to 13 the statement of Alf Annesley. It is the statement of 14 Elizabeth Irene McKee. In paragraph 2 she tells us: 15 "In April 1997 I was working at Call-a-Cab in 16 West Street, Portadown as a telephone operator." 17 Then, if we jump to page [80936], paragraph 17: 18 "On page 21168 at 2.15 am is the name", I think 19 that's probably Smith, "for collection, Craigavon to the 20 town. The name does not ring a bell as a regular 21 customer. Neither do I know the address. The driver, 22 number 9, was Alf Annesley. The reference to town could 23 have been anywhere. When the taxi is booked, the 24 customer doesn't necessarily say where in the town." 25 That's simply, as it were, joining the dots again 61 1 with the pick-up from the McKee household. 2 We next have Beatrix Campbell. There are two 3 transcripts I hope on .pdf of interviews with that lady, 4 who is a journalist who wrote a piece in The Guardian 5 about Mr Hamill. 6 This first interview deals in general terms with how 7 she got the information. 8 Statement and interview of BEATRIX CAMPBELL (read) 9 If we go to page [5] of it, please, about a third of 10 the way down she said: 11 "I'm a journalist who writes about politics 12 generally and I've been involved in Northern Ireland for 13 some years, not particularly as -- indeed not as all as 14 a specialist and not particularly involved in what would 15 be regarded as the dominant or overarching issues, ie 16 the armed conflict." 17 If we go to page [9], she is being asked about the 18 source material. The third entry from the bottom you 19 have Suzanne Lambert saying: 20 "So we have the E, Fs -- the 2E, F sisters and 21 Diane Hamill. Who else did you interview?" 22 Blanked out is xxxxxxxxx: 23 "Beatrix Campbell: ... who was the Hamill's 24 solicitor. 25 "Suzanne Lambert: Okay. And was that on one 62 1 occasion or several occasions?" 2 The answer is over the page, [10]: 3 "Beatrix Campbell: I went to see her at her office 4 in Lurgan and she explained some of the issues that 5 were -- that she was trying to address. I have to say 6 I have never forgotten that encounter because it was a 7 very chilling encounter." 8 She goes on to explain why it is chilling and that 9 has no relevance to us. It was to do with death threats 10 to her, that is Miss Nelson. 11 Over at page [11], third entry from the bottom: 12 "Suzanne Lambert: Now just to go back on what 13 you've just said, which is, once you'd finished the 14 article you sent it to her", that's Miss Nelson, "for 15 her to check that the facts were correct? 16 "Beatrix Campbell: Uh-huh." 17 Then over the page at [12], she is asked towards the 18 top: 19 "Suzanne Lambert: Did [xxxxxxxxxxx] then pass 20 that on to the D, E, Fs who were present? 21 "Beatrix Campbell: No. I think that she checked 22 and my communication primarily was with Diane Hamill who 23 was also the conduit to E and F and I sent Diane a copy 24 of the piece. Now I know I did that because I had 25 conversations subsequently about some of the details and 63 1 so my sense was that the family checked out the details 2 in the story, but I couldn't confirm that. 3 "Suzanne Lambert: And did E and F, being there on 4 the night when Robert Hamill was attacked, did they give 5 you a view as to how the incident had started off? 6 "Beatrix Campbell: Well, they described what they 7 had seen and they described their journey from 8 St Patrick's Hall and the feelings they had as they 9 began that journey and the reasons why they took the 10 decisions they did, and what happened when they reached 11 that conjuncture where the Land Rover was and what 12 happened thereafter. So they, E and F, were really the 13 critical witnesses to the events that have night. They 14 were my only witnesses to the events of that night. 15 "Suzanne Lambert: Did you not interview anyone else 16 who was present on the night? 17 "Beatrix Campbell: No, I saw statements from other 18 people who were present." 19 Overleaf, [13]: 20 "Suzanne Lambert: Do you know if you got that from 21 Diane or [xxxxxxxxxxxxx]? 22 "Beatrix Campbell: No, I didn't -- I don't think 23 I got anything from [xxxxxxxxxx]. In truth, 24 I can't remember where I got the statements from, but 25 I think you can be assured that these statements would 64 1 have been flying around, as they always are, because 2 your profession, like mine, trades in documents swirling 3 around. 4 "Suzanne Lambert: And you are sure that, having 5 seen the statements, you didn't actually follow up any 6 of these witnesses yourself? 7 "Beatrix Campbell: Yes, I am sure, and I knew why: 8 that these were witnesses, who didn't want their names 9 used, who wanted the story out. This was what was 10 communicated to me by the family, that there were people 11 who, you know, didn't feel safe but did want their 12 evidence to be transmitted." 13 If we go over, third entry, [14]: 14 "Suzanne Lambert: Well, basically you have answered 15 my question. My question was whether or not you had 16 contact with anyone else besides the D, E and Fs and 17 Diane Hamill [xxxxxxxxxxxxx], who were able to provide 18 you with further information. 19 "Beatrix Campbell: No. 20 "Suzanne Lambert: Because you probably would 21 appreciate that the police didn't necessarily have full 22 contact with everyone present on the night in question 23 and not everyone came forward to the police. 24 "Beatrix Campbell: No, I'm aware that is always 25 a possibility. However, I -- my guess is -- what we 65 1 know -- let's put it like this: what we know of the 2 situation in Northern Ireland is this, and this 3 situation wasn't unusual. There will be people who have 4 got something to say about an event that they've 5 witnessed. They don't feel safe. They don't feel that, 6 if they give their evidence, the police will either do 7 anything with it or respect their right to life." 8 Then, as I say, Miss Campbell very kindly gave 9 another interview to the Inquiry which we have on 10 another .pdf. This is 19th October 2007. You can see 11 what happened from the first entry on page [2] where 12 Miss Enston says: 13 "19th October 2007 and Miss Beatrix Campbell is 14 reading from her notebooks at page 4." 15 What this consists of basically is Miss Campbell 16 having very kindly provided the entirety of her 17 notebooks for the research she did for the article she 18 wrote for The Guardian, and that's set out extensively 19 here. 20 I only want to pick up a little of it, which is at 21 page which is at page [5]. It is the last entry against 22 Miss Campbell's name. This is the quote from her 23 notebook: 24 "'A witness who came out of the pub and tried to 25 help and was beaten back, he says he saw the girls at 66 1 the jeep. He went to the jeep and pulled one of them 2 out and said, 'You sat and watched that happen'." 3 So that helps us a little on the enigma of who it 4 was that pulled Constable Neill and complained that the 5 police had sat there doing nothing, that it is somebody 6 who came out of a pub, which appears to narrow it down 7 to Mr Hull or Mr McNeice. Neither of them, of course, 8 accepted that in evidence. 9 Then we move to page [80242]. You will recall that 10 we had some evidence that amongst the others that 11 DCI P39 attempted to get assistance from on the Catholic 12 side were priests. Father Sean Dooley was one of those. 13 You have also heard some evidence that he was the 14 recipient of an anonymous phone call. I just want to 15 get that clarified here. 16 Statement of FATHER SEAN DOOLEY (read) 17 This is the Father's statement. On the first 18 line in paragraph 4 he says: 19 "On 11th May 1997 I received an anonymous telephone 20 call about the Robert Hamill murder. I think the caller 21 phoned earlier while he was out and asked for me by 22 name. On this occasion I answered the phone. To get 23 a call like that around 9 o'clock in the evening was 24 most unexpected. I wasn't sure of the identity of the 25 person, whom I may have encountered in my duties, or if 67 1 it was somebody just trying to cause trouble, because 2 Portadown was in such a situation at the time that this 3 could have been somebody from a militant wing of the 4 Nationalist community trying to stir up trouble, maybe 5 trying to get me to pass on information for them. 6 I still don't know who made the call, but I assumed it 7 was a policeman because of the amount of information he 8 had. He said that there were four officers in the 9 Land Rover and that they were sleeping. They had been 10 on duty since 4.00 pm and were on overtime but they 11 didn't want to be there." 12 If we go over to paragraph 5, [80243]: 13 "I wrote down what that person said on two small 14 bits of green paper and then I sat down the next morning 15 and wrote it out in long hand on pieces of A4 paper." 16 Jumping down to paragraph 7, he says: 17 "There is now produced and shown to me, marked 18 'SD1', a copy of the notes I made." 19 In fact, for our purposes they are at pages [72782]. 20 We have seen those in evidence already. 21 Statement of MAURICE HEWITT (read) 22 Then going to page [80451], we have the statement of 23 Maurice Hewitt. There has been some evidence about him, 24 because he was the conduit through which the document 25 produced by P42 was produced to the police. Recently, 68 1 there has been some cross-examination of officers as to 2 how it was they, as it were, lit upon him. 3 Halfway through paragraph 2 on the left-hand side: 4 "I recall a day or so after the incident when 5 Robert Hamill was attacked in Portadown town centre that 6 P42 told me he had witnessed part of the incident. He 7 told me he was asleep in bed and heard a noise. He got 8 up thinking his car was being damaged, looked out the 9 window and saw a number of people in the street. 10 I suggested to P42 that either he told it to the 11 police or let me go to them and tell them. He said he 12 was very fearful for his safety and was frightened that 13 he would suffer retribution from paramilitary 14 organisations. I was also fearful for him. I told him 15 I would speak to someone. As far as I can remember, 16 I spoke to the collator in Portadown, an officer called 17 [blank]. 18 "I passed on the information verbally and left it at 19 that. I told them he would only make an anonymous 20 statement. A DC McCrumlish came to the house later and 21 asked me again whether he would make a statement. 22 I told them, no, because he was too frightened. P42 23 then made an anonymous statement", overleaf [80452], 24 which my daughter typed up for him." 25 Then paragraph 5: 69 1 "I then remember two detectives coming to the house 2 to ask again whether P42 would give a formal statement. 3 One of the detectives was DS H. They knew it was P42 4 who had made the note by that stage. I am also aware 5 that P42 later went into the police station to speak to 6 them, but I don't know anything more about that. I do 7 think this was some time in 1999." 8 Statement of MR HUGHES (read) 9 Then at page [81610] we have the statement of 10 Mr Hughes, who was the wholesaler, or I think the 11 designer, of the silver jackets that may or may not have 12 found their way into the shop called Paranoid. 13 Paragraph 2: 14 "In 1997, I was a clothing wholesaler based in 15 London. I designed and sold my own clothing brand under 16 the name of Skanks. Beyond selling stock to the shop 17 Paranoid in Portadown, I had no other involvement with 18 the town." 19 Paragraph 4: 20 "I have been told other witnesses have described 21 a jacket someone was wearing on the night Robert Hamill 22 was attacked as a bright silver, waist-length, 23 anorak-style jacket with silver sleeves and orange 24 stripes down the sleeves and a black waistband. That 25 does sound similar to the one that I designed and sold 70 1 to Paranoid in Portadown." 2 Overleaf [81611]: 3 "The jacket was part of the autumn/winter 1996 4 collection. I do not recall if there were any jackets 5 of a similar design in the collection." 6 The final sentence of paragraph 5: 7 "I cannot recall how many of these silver jackets 8 were ordered by Paranoid in Portadown." 9 I am told that Mr Gray's statement is now back on 10 the system -- is on the system, rather, so perhaps we 11 could go back to that in .pdf. 12 Interview of DAVID GRAY (read) 13 If I go to page [17] of it, halfway down a question 14 is asked of him which is a quotation from a witness 15 statement of his. 16 "Judy Kemish: 'As we went down to the town, I saw an 17 ambulance parked on the street somewhere adjacent to 18 Woodhouse Street. I seen this person lying in the 19 middle of the street close to the ambulance. At the 20 back of the ambulance I seen a fellow I know as 21 Dermot McNeice. 22 "David Gray: Correct. 23 "Judy Kemish: So what was Dermot McNeice doing at 24 the back of the ambulance? 25 "David Gray: He was just standing there. 71 1 "Judy Kemish: Just standing there? 2 "David Gray: I knew Dermot because I had worked 3 with him in Denny's, but I hadn't seen him since about 4 September last year because I was off sick. I went over 5 and spoke briefly to Dermot'." 6 Then if we go to page [26], the first question: 7 "Judy Kemish: Okay. What did you see when you got 8 to the junction? You can't remember if you walked as 9 far as the junction, but you said you saw the 10 ambulance." 11 The quotation is put to him: 12 "'We went down the town and I saw an ambulance 13 parked on the street somewhere adjacent to 14 Woodhouse Street. I saw a person lying in the middle of 15 the street close to the ambulance'. 16 "Did you recognise that person on the road? 17 "David Gray. No. 18 "Judy Kemish: Can you remember where they were 19 lying? 20 "David Gray: He was at the back of the ambulance, 21 that's all I could fairly say, because the ambulance was 22 there. 23 "Judy Kemish. Sorry, what? 24 "David Gray: He was at the back of an ambulance. 25 The fellow was lying on the road at that time. 72 1 "Judy Kemish: Was Dermot McNeice quite near to 2 him?" 3 Overleaf, [27]: 4 "David Gray: He was standing just there at the 5 door, the door at the back of the ambulance. 6 "Judy Kemish: Near the person on the ground? 7 "David Gray: Uh-huh. 8 "Judy Kemish: Was there anybody else lying on the 9 street that you can remember, anybody else? 10 "David Gray: I didn't see anybody else, to be 11 honest. 12 "Judy Kemish: You didn't see anybody else? 13 "David Gray: If I had, I would have said there, 14 like, but -- 15 "Judy Kemish: And did you recognise anyone? Okay, 16 there was a man lying on the street. I think actually 17 he was lying near Eastwoods. 18 "David Gray: But I don't know where Eastwoods was. 19 "Judy Kemish: But it doesn't matter if you didn't 20 know exactly where he was. But what was happening while 21 he was lying on the street? You saw Dermot. There must 22 have been a lot of shouting. 23 "David Gray: There wasn't actually. There was very 24 little people about at that time. 25 "Judy Kemish: Very little people at the time? 73 1 "David Gray: Uh-huh." 2 Overleaf [28]: 3 "Judy Kemish: Did you see a Land Rover, a police 4 Land Rover? 5 "David Gray: There was at that stage -- I mean 6 a few of them." 7 Then one more, which is a transcript, before we get 8 to police witnesses. 9 That's a transcript of Mr Robert Jameson's Inquiry 10 interview. He was asked about the circumstances, 11 amongst other things, in which his son had come to 12 instruct a solicitor before being interviewed by the DPP 13 and counsel about his witness statement. We see that at 14 page [9]. 15 Interview of ROBERT JAMESON (read) 16 Halfway down, Michael Stephens puts a question: 17 "Right. I just want to just talk about the fight at 18 Portadown which led to the death of Robert Hamill and in 19 so doing it is about your son, Timothy and how he came 20 to make his statement. When were you aware of that 21 fight in Portadown? 22 "Robert Jameson: What, the actual fight? 23 "Michael Stephens: Yes. 24 "Robert Jameson: I probably would have been aware 25 of it when I heard it on the news, like. 74 1 "Michael Stephens: Did you hear it from your son, 2 Timothy, that he had been in town on that particular 3 night? 4 "Robert Jameson: No." 5 Then if we go to page [11], this refers to the 6 consultation in October 1997. Taking it from the top: 7 "Michael Stephens: Obviously Timothy wasn't 8 represented at that stage. Did you take Timothy to see 9 a solicitor about the statement? 10 "Robert Jameson: I may have at a later date. 11 "Michael Stephens: Can you remember when that was? 12 "Robert Jameson: I honestly couldn't remember. 13 "Michael Stephens: Well, can you tell me who the 14 solicitor was?" 15 It is blanked out. It is not a solicitor who name 16 has appeared hitherto: 17 "Robert Jameson: [Blank] from Banbridge. 18 "Michael Stephens: So Mr [blank], the solicitor at 19 Banbridge? 20 "Robert Jameson: Yes. 21 "Michael Stephens: Is that a solicitor you had used 22 before or was it one you had just picked out? 23 "Robert Jameson: Just one I'd picked out. 24 "Michael Stephens: And your reasons for taking 25 Timothy there? 75 1 "Robert Jameson: Just for advice. 2 "Michael Stephens: Was Timothy expressing concern 3 to you about anything in particular?" 4 Overleaf, [12]: 5 "Robert Jameson: No, we just wanted -- you know, 6 the young fellow had never been in trouble and he -- and 7 it was really just for, strictly for advice." 8 Then at page [18], second entry: 9 "Michael Stephens: Yes. Well, again, I know we've 10 said -- you know he's coming through you. If he didn't 11 say anything at all, was it whether you had discussed it 12 with Timothy and that was why you went to see the 13 solicitor, Mr [blank] because you were concerned about 14 him? 15 "Robert Jameson: Yes, well, I probably was 16 concerned that, as you've said, there were things that 17 didn't -- wouldn't have been fair to Timothy's language 18 in the statement and I was concerned that there was 19 things said that may have been interpreted by the police 20 not what actually Timothy said." 21 So that may or may not give you an insight into the 22 circumstances in which that statement came to be made 23 and withdrawn. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, we will break off until midday now. 25 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you. 76 1 (11.45 am) 2 (A short break) 3 (12.00 noon) 4 Statement of PAUL ADAMSON (read) 5 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, the next statement, and we are now into 6 those of police officers, is of Paul Adamson. It is at 7 page [80007]. 8 In paragraph 2 he says: 9 "I am a police officer in the PSNI with 25 years' 10 experience." 11 Go over to the next page, [80008]. It is 12 paragraphs 5 and 6 I want to take you to: 13 "I remember the time of the Robert Hamill incident 14 as it was the main investigation going on in Portadown, 15 but I didn't know anything or hear anyone talk about it 16 really, just an occasional reference to Allister Hanvey 17 and Tracey Clarke when I was at the gym. In fact, it 18 wasn't really until DCI K interviewed me in 19 November 2000 that I knew who was involved. I knew that 20 Andrea and Michael McKee were involved in the whole 21 thing and also Robert Atkinson and Davy McCaw. 22 "During that interview, I was asked when Davy McCaw 23 first mentioned that he had some information that he was 24 taking to CID. I recall that it was some time after the 25 incident happened, but I can't remember exactly when, 77 1 that Davy McCaw came to me while I was on duty at the 2 gate lodge of the Brownstown business centre and he 3 asked me for the car keys. He said that he had a wee 4 bit of information and was going to speak to CID about 5 it. He didn't tell me, and I didn't ask, what the 6 information was. He just seemed his usual self. Davy 7 had said on previous occasions that he was off to speak 8 to CID about things. He'd a mind of his own. That was 9 just him. I never asked him when he came back what he 10 had been talking about, so I still don't know." 11 We think that was the occasion on which the 12 information about Tracey Clarke was taken from the gym. 13 That may give you some clue about whether the talk of 14 the gym was all about the Hanvey incident or the Hanvey 15 participation as alleged in the incident or not. 16 Statement and Interview of TREVOR ANDERSON (read) 17 Then page [80013]. This is a statement of 18 Mr Anderson from the Complaints and Discipline section. 19 He is too ill, I am sorry to say, to attend. What 20 happened was he signed this statement off in 2006. He 21 was then re-interviewed and we will see that in 22 a transcript. Both this and the transcript deal with 23 what Complaints and Discipline should have done and what 24 he knew. 25 Paragraph 2: 78 1 "In April 1997 I was a team leader at RUC 2 Gough Barracks, which was set up to investigate 3 complaints against police in south region which at that 4 time comprised G, J, K and L divisions. I was 5 responsible for allocating complaints which were 6 notified to me from central office in Belfast." 7 Down to paragraph 3: 8 "The procedure was as follows. The complaint would 9 be forwarded to the superintendent, new complaints, 10 Lishnasharragh, who would allocate it to its appropriate 11 regional office. He also notified the ICPC of that 12 complaint so they could decide whether or not they would 13 supervise the complaint. In the meantime, the papers 14 arrived with me and I handed them over to the 15 investigating officer who prepared the Form 17(3), which 16 was the notice to the alleged officer that a complaint 17 had been made against him. The Form 17(3) had to be 18 prepared and served as soon as practicable so that the 19 officer had plenty of time to retrieve notes, etc. Then 20 the complainant would be requested to attend for 21 an interview. 22 "All complaints should go immediately to new 23 complaints. On 9th May 1997, I was appointed to assist 24 DCS McBurney with the investigation of the complaint 25 made by Diane Hamill of neglect of duty." 79 1 Overleaf, [80014]: 2 "The appointments were made through the Assistant 3 Chief Constable, G Department. The ICPC were asked to, 4 and did, approve the appointment of the senior 5 investigating officer." 6 If we miss out paragraph 5 and go to 6, 7 and 8: 7 "I can't recall whether or not a strategy was agreed 8 with the ICPC, but in the normal course, the ICPC had 9 the upper hand in relation to how things progressed and 10 they would advise the investigating officers. They 11 would probably have communicated with DCS McBurney by 12 letter. When it came to interviewing, they wouldn't ask 13 questions themselves, but would ask for questions to be 14 put, but I can't now remember the detail of this 15 investigation. I was kept up-to-date by CI Bradley, but 16 we would discuss the matter only occasionally. 17 "The complaint investigation and the murder 18 investigation were in essence one and the same, so the 19 evidence from the murder investigation would have formed 20 part of the complaint investigation file. I would 21 therefore probably have been aware of witnesses 22 Tracey Clarke and Timothy Jameson, but I can't remember 23 anything more about them. I do know that I had no 24 direct involvement with them. 25 "I was not made aware that Tracey Clarke had made 80 1 an allegation against RC Robert Atkinson. It was never 2 discussed with me. I can't say whether anyone else 3 referred it to the ICPC, but it wasn't brought to my 4 attention by DCS McBurney or anyone else. Normally 5 during an investigation, if an allegation of criminal 6 conduct by a police officer arises, the officers who had 7 discovered it would be obliged to raise a file on the 8 matter. The file should contain a statement outlining 9 the nature of the complaint and that file would then be 10 forwarded to the superintendent of new complaints. 11 Thereafter, it would be referred to the ICPC and they 12 would decide whether to supervise or not." 13 Overleaf, [80015], at paragraph 9: 14 "I am unaware of anyone called Andrea McKee and 15 unaware that there was any evidence relating to 16 telephone records of Robert Atkinson or Allister Hanvey. 17 DCS McBurney did not discuss anything of that nature 18 with me. In fact, I did not even know that the 19 allegation had been made." 20 I think a lot of incredulity would have been thrown 21 at this witness, had he been well enough to attend, in 22 the light of what we know about the consultations that 23 Mr McBurney had with the Complaints and Discipline 24 present in May 1997. 25 If we look at the transcript on .pdf, you will see 81 1 some documents are then put to Mr Anderson. 2 Page [3]: 3 "Michael Stephens: In paragraph 8 of that statement 4 you state that you were unaware of allegations made by 5 Tracey Clarke against RC Atkinson. Now, do you recall 6 attending meetings with Mr McBurney and Mr [blank] and 7 Mr Mullan ..." 8 The blank I think is Murnaghan: 9 "... from the ICPC?" 10 "Trevor Anderson: Yes, I recall attending two 11 meetings. One was 12th May, I think, and the other one 12 was on 19th May. 13 "Michael Stephens: Now, at those meetings, 14 Mr Mullan recorded meetings in connection ..." 15 I think we have a transcript -- the transcript 16 I want is 10th January 2007. I am so sorry. It is 17 entirely my fault. Thank you very much. I pick it up 18 halfway down again: 19 "Michael Stephens: In paragraph 8 of that statement 20 you state that you were unaware of allegations made by 21 Tracey Clarke against RC Atkinson. Now, do you recall 22 attending meetings with Mr McBurney and Mr Murnaghan and 23 Mr Mullan from the ICPC? 24 "Trevor Anderson: Yes, I recall attending two 25 meetings. One was on 12th May, I think, and the other 82 1 one was on 19th May. 2 "Michael Stephens: Now, at those meetings, 3 Mr Mullan recorded minutes in connection with 4 a complaint being supervised by the ICPC. That 5 complaint was against four officers for neglect of duty 6 or whatever as far as -- 7 "Trevor Anderson: Criminal negligence." 8 Overleaf, [4]: 9 "Michael Stephens: Criminal negligence, whatever. 10 In both of those meetings he recalls you as being in 11 attendance. Do you remember attending meetings with 12 those individuals? 13 "Trevor Anderson: I do now that I have had my 14 memory refreshed at this minute. 15 "Michael Stephens: And the reason you didn't raise 16 that at the previous meeting? 17 "Trevor Anderson: I'd just had -- I knew I was at 18 a meeting, but I couldn't recall just when it was. Soon 19 after the allegations were made, I think ." 20 "If we go to page [5], the penultimate entry on the 21 page: 22 "Michael Stephens: It was at this juncture that 23 DCS McBurney referred to a matter arising." 24 This is 12th May he is referring to here: 25 "Trevor Anderson: I can see it. It is the first 83 1 paragraph at the top of page 14823." 2 Overleaf, [6]: 3 "Michael Stephens: Yes." 4 Then there is a quote: 5 "'During the interview with Tracey Clarke, the 6 latter stated she had been talking to a person named [it 7 says 'Henvey' here but it is obviously Hanvey] prior to 8 his arrest by police. According to Miss Clarke, Mr 9 Hanvey had boasted to her that one of the four officers 10 at the scene, RC Atkinson, had told him to get rid of 11 the clothing he was wearing at the time of the assault'. 12 "Do you have any memory of that at all? 13 "Trevor Anderson: I have no memory of that. 14 Whether I was still at the meeting or not, I just don't 15 know, but I have no memory of it. I may have left 16 early, because I do know that CS McBurney was appraising 17 Mr Murnaghan of the extent of the investigation into the 18 murder and I can't remember. There was nothing referred 19 to me prior to that to deal with and I may have left the 20 interview. I just can't be sure. 21 "Michael Stephens: No. Were you aware at all of 22 the witness Tracey Clarke and -- well, there were two 23 witnesses, they were referred to as Witness A and 24 Witness B? 25 "Trevor Anderson: No. 84 1 "Michael Stephens: You can't remember those at all? 2 "Trevor Anderson: I can't remember those. Again, 3 had there been something referred to me to deal with, 4 I would have remembered." 5 Overleaf, [7]: 6 "Michael Stephens: Right. In that respect then, 7 where we've got a criminal allegation being made against 8 a reserve constable or a constable -- it doesn't make 9 any difference really, does it, they are still under the 10 same discipline as far as that's concerned -- what would 11 you have expected to happen where a criminal allegation 12 was made? Would it be referred to you or would it be 13 referred to -- 14 "Trevor Anderson: No, I couldn't tell you. It 15 would be part of the file. No, it will be up to the 16 investigating officer himself in conjunction with 17 Mr Murnaghan, one of the ICPC. He's a man with great 18 experience who knew the procedures in relation to 19 following up matters like that. Now, had it been 20 something that came about in the course of things, we 21 might have had to raise another file. It could have 22 become part of the file that's already there." 23 If we go to page [10], at the top: 24 "Michael Stephens: Okay. The second record on 25 19th May and that's at page 14805. Come forward again: 85 1 "'Mr McBurney briefed the ICPC supervising member 2 Mr Murnaghan'. 3 "Now, can you recall that meeting at all?" 4 Now, if we go over the page, [11], second entry: 5 "Michael Stephens: Yes." 6 And there's a quote: 7 "'And the IO dealing with the issue of RC Atkinson 8 allegedly telephoned Mr Hanvey, telephone records are in 9 the process of being seized'. 10 "Have you any recollection of that briefing at all? 11 "Trevor Anderson: No. 12 "Michael Stephens: Do you accept that you may have 13 been at that meeting? 14 "Trevor Anderson: Well, I was obviously at that 15 meeting, but whether I was there when that was discussed 16 or not, I just can't say. 17 "Michael Stephens: Right. So you've got no 18 recollection of any telephone billing being applied for? 19 "Trevor Anderson: No." 20 Of course, you will recall Chief Inspector Bradley 21 who was at the meetings, whose memory was tested about 22 these as well and who this gentleman says would have 23 reported these matters to him. That seems to be the 24 extend of the Complaints and Discipline involvement in 25 the entire matter. 86 1 Statement of DENISE CORNETT (read) 2 Then if we go next to page [80207], this is the 3 statement taken by the Inquiry from Denise Cornett, who, 4 sadly, is very ill after, amongst other things, a very 5 serious car accident. If I pick this up from 6 paragraph 3: 7 "As a Reserve Constable I had three months' training 8 in Garnerville in Belfast and I also received separate 9 training in public order duty as part of my Mobile 10 Support Unit training. At the time, I was trained in 11 first aid. I had no training in preserving forensic 12 evidence or scene preservation generally. 13 "On 26th April 1997, I reported for duty at 14 1600 hours. My shift was to end at midnight. However, 15 I was asked to cover for someone from midnight until 16 0300 hours performing public order duties. I recall 17 that I did not end up finishing my shift until around 18 0400 hours. 19 "At the commencement of my public order duties, 20 I was briefed to pay particular attention to the town 21 centre within the barriers." 22 If we go over the page [80208] and pick it up at 23 paragraphs 7 and 8: 24 "During our patrol of the town centre, we made 25 a stop outside the Instep Sports shop which was near the 87 1 junction of Market Street and Woodhouse Street on the 2 West Street side of the road. I have marked this 3 position LR1 on the map of the city centre produced and 4 shown to me at page 73896. After a few minutes, we then 5 moved down Market Street into the High Street, where 6 I noticed a man walking across the road ahead of us 7 wearing a blue shirt and dark trousers, mouthing 8 something at us. His demeanour was casual. Due to the 9 heavy armour on the Land Rover, I could not hear what 10 the man said. 11 "Constable Neill stopped the vehicle and I have 12 marked this position on the map as LR2. This was only 13 a very short distance from LR1. I opened the door and 14 the man said to me, 'My friends are coming down 15 Thomas Street'. I replied, 'Okay'. I was not concerned 16 by this, as I could not see many others on the street, 17 and the man walked on down Woodhouse Street without any 18 bother. I assumed the friends he referred to were 19 coming from St Patrick's Hall because the man was 20 heading down Woodhouse Street." 21 Overleaf, [80209]: 22 "At this point, I noticed two youths in their early 23 twenties coming towards the Land Rover from High Street 24 towards Market Street. The Land Rover had moved forward 25 a short distance and stopped at position LR3. They 88 1 arrived at the Land Rover after the original man had 2 walked off in the direction of Woodhouse Street." 3 I am going to read the rest of this page: 4 "The Land Rover was parked at an angle on 5 Market Street coming on to High Street with the front 6 pointing to the left towards the footpath. The two 7 youths came over to my door and started to talk to me. 8 At page 9452 of the transcript of my interview with 9 DI Irwin on 2nd October 1997, I told DI Irwin that I had 10 seen the two boys in a verbal exchange with the man that 11 had earlier walked across the front of the Land Rover 12 and that, 'The two boys shouted at the fellow and that, 13 you know, shouted at him'. I cannot really recall what 14 was said between the youths and man today, but I know 15 that I opened my door and that is when they came over to 16 chat to me. I did not know these boys and I can't 17 remember if anyone else in the Land Rover recognised 18 them, but we were all having a general chat. It was 19 quite a short conversation. 20 "Referring to my notebook at the entry dated 21 27.04.97 at page 9678 I have described two men." 22 She goes on to give the description of them: 23 "11. During the conversation I could not really see 24 anything apart from the two youths. This was because, 25 even though the door was open, it was quite a narrow gap 89 1 and the vehicle was parked at an angle. I could still 2 see down the High Street. I did not hear any shouting 3 or anything else going on outside. After only a short 4 time, Constable Neill's door was pulled open by a guy 5 who tried to pull him out of the Land Rover. He was 6 saying, 'What are you doing? You're sitting watching 7 all this. Watching the mob'." 8 I think that's the only reference we have to 9 watching a mob: 10 "He was approximately 30 years of age and wearing a 11 blue shirt and dark trousers." 12 Over the page [80210]: 13 "The two boys who I had been talking to told me not 14 to get out and they ran off." 15 Again, I think that's the only reference we have to 16 anyone warning police not to get out: 17 "I could hear a noise and jumped out of the vehicle. 18 I could see a crowd of people at Market Street on the 19 opposite side of the road to us. There were 20 approximately 60 people and they were all scattered and 21 some were fighting in small groups. There was not one 22 big fight, but numerous fights going on. I saw people 23 throwing punches, but I did not know who they were. 24 I could just see arms swinging but not exactly who was 25 fighting. 90 1 I ran over to the island in the middle of the road 2 and that was when I realised I did not have my radio. 3 I did not see any injured persons at that stage. I ran 4 back to the Land Rover and got out my handheld radio and 5 called the control room in Portadown for assistance, but 6 nobody was answering so I used the Land Rover's radio. 7 I thought my handheld radio wasn't working. The two 8 radios were on separate channels but everyone can hear 9 what I was saying, including the control room. Our 10 radio sign was Juliet Delta 81. However, I initially 11 used the call sign Juliet Delta 80, because I was 12 nervous and scared. 13 "At this stage there was nobody at the Land Rover, 14 and, as I came around, I then saw two fellows lying on 15 the ground. I had not seen these men earlier when I had 16 got out of the Land Rover and gone over to the central 17 reservation. So I radioed for assistance again and 18 said, 'There's two persons down. We need an ambulance 19 urgently'. The bodies were definitely not on the ground 20 when I had first got out of the Land Rover. 21 "One of the injured men was lying on Market Street 22 and the other one was 5 or 6 feet below him. 23 A photograph has been produced and shown to me 24 containing page 222, which is a view looking from 25 High Street into Market Street. Woodhouse Street is on 91 1 the right of this picture and Thomas Street is on the 2 left of the photograph. Another photograph of the 3 junction of Thomas Street and Market Street is produced 4 and shown to me containing page 233. Looking at the 5 photographs, I can confirm that the two men were lying 6 in Market Street at the junction with Thomas Street. 7 They were both on the road." 8 Overleaf, [80211]: 9 "I ran to the first man, who was on his side. 10 I checked his breathing and his pulse which was very 11 rapid and he was gasping. There was blood on the ground 12 near the top of his head. I didn't actually check to 13 see if it was blood, but I assumed it was. I could see 14 broken glass on the ground near his head. There was no 15 blood on his face and I am not sure who turned him on 16 his side into the recovery position. He was unconscious 17 and did not respond when I talked to him. There were 18 two females with this man and I assured them that 19 an ambulance was on its way. One female was wearing 20 a black leather jacket, dark trousers and had long, 21 straight hair. The other female had short brown hair. 22 They were crying and upset. There was no-one else near 23 the body as the crowd were pushed back by police, 24 perhaps 6 or 7 feet away. At this stage, there was 25 still just the four of us police there. I could hear 92 1 people shouting, but I can't recall what they were 2 saying. Something like 'Fenians'. 3 "I then went over to check on the second man lying on 4 the ground. I gave him first aid too. He was about 2 or 5 3 feet away from the other man and he was also on his 6 side and unconscious. He did not respond when I talked 7 to him. I cannot remember seeing any blood but 8 I checked his pulse and listened to his breathing and 9 both were very slow. I do not think anyone was with 10 this man. A female wearing a green jacket and dark 11 trousers with dark auburn hair then came over to me. 12 She was really upset and distressed. She kept saying 13 that, 'This is just awful', and crying. I cannot 14 remember if she knew the injured men and I do not recall 15 her indicating that she had seen anything. The crowd 16 had dispersed and were about 10 or 15 feet away from the 17 second injured man and at no point did I see anyone 18 trying to attack this second man lying on the ground. 19 "Whilst I was with this injured man and the woman in 20 the green jacket, I looked up and saw Constable Neill 21 struggling with a young man at the Land Rover. I got up 22 and ran over to help Constable Neill. I tried to 23 restrain the youth he was struggling with by grabbing 24 him, but then another youth ran over and was trying to 25 kick the man that Constable Neill had a hold of. All 93 1 three were struggling and one of the fellows was kicking 2 out and kicked Constable Neill in the leg. The man who 3 kicked Constable Neill was in his early twenties, 4 wearing a white top, with brown wavy hair." 5 Overleaf, [80212]: 6 "I cannot recall what the other man looked like, but 7 I grabbed one of them by the arm. But in the end, this 8 man got away. I do not know what happened to the man 9 that Constable Neill was originally struggling with, but 10 I checked with Constable Neill to see if he was okay and 11 he said that he was, so I left him at the Land Rover and 12 went back over to the injured then. I was then 13 approached by another female wearing a blue jacket, dark 14 trousers, with shoulder-length hair, who was crying and 15 very distressed. I tried to comfort her. I do not know 16 if she knew the injured men, but I assumed she did so as 17 she was so upset. 18 "At this stage, the crowd were back from the injured 19 men but were still in Market Street. There were other 20 officers in support there by this stage. My colleagues 21 from the Land Rover were trying to restrain the crowd 22 whilst I stayed with the injured men until the ambulance 23 arrived. I did not recognise anybody in the crowd or 24 see anyone going towards the bodies. It seemed like 25 an eternity had passed from when I had first got out of 94 1 the Land Rover until the ambulance eventually arrived. 2 I do not recall either man regaining consciousness 3 whilst I was with them. I recall one ambulance in 4 attendance, but there may have been two. As soon as the 5 paramedics arrived, they went straight to the injured 6 men and I left them to do their job. I didn't speak to 7 them and I do not recall any of the women talking to 8 them. 9 "By the time that ambulance had arrived, more police 10 officers were at the scene and I think that there was 11 a local police car from Banbridge. I recall that the 12 Mobile Support Unit was also at the scene at some stage, 13 but I cannot remember when they arrived. I do not 14 remember seeing an inspector at the scene, but I think 15 there was a sergeant there. When the ambulance arrived, 16 the police had formed a line and were trying to push the 17 crowd back up Market Street and on to West Street. I do 18 not know if any of the officers had their baton drawn 19 but I did not carry one. At that time, female officers 20 were not issued with batons. I did not see any riot 21 guns at the scene. 22 "At this time, people in the crowd were still 23 shouting, but I could see that some of them had left and 24 walked on up the street. I did not see any fighting or 25 bottles", overleaf, [80213], "being thrown, but could 95 1 hear glass smashing. It has been pointed out me that 2 I said in my 1997 statement that there were 3 'approximately 50 Protestants and 10 Catholics', but 4 I cannot remember where these Catholics were. I know 5 that the crowd that was pushed back by the officers was 6 made up of Protestant youths. I remember the word 7 'Fenians' being shouted out and that there were two 8 groups at the scene, but I do not recall one group 9 attacking the other group. There was just different 10 people fighting within a massive crowd. I did not 11 recognise or know any person in the crowd. 12 "Things eventually calmed down and I remember 13 leaving the scene at about 3.30 and finishing duty at 14 3.45. At this time I cannot remember if there were any 15 senior officers at the scene or if I was given any 16 instructions by any other officers before I left. I was 17 told to stand down, but I cannot remember who gave me 18 that order. I do remember speaking to Constable Neill 19 before I went back to the station to change and go home. 20 I went back to the station with Reserve 21 Constables P40 and Atkinson and Constable Neill. 22 I changed my clothes, completed my notebook and went 23 home. Normally, we received a briefing before we 24 terminated duty, but I cannot remember being given 25 a briefing that morning or any instructions before 96 1 I went home. 2 "I recall later being called at home and told to 3 come back to the station. I got back to the station 4 about by 0600 or 0630. I cannot recall who phoned me, 5 but when I arrived at the station, I saw the other 6 members of the Land Rover crew. We went into the CID 7 office and there were other officers there. We were 8 told that there had been two people injured at the scene 9 and one of them was seriously ill. I do not know which 10 officer gave us this information but we were told to 11 make statements about what had happened that morning. 12 I had already completed my notebook before I had 13 terminated duty that morning. I think we were all in 14 the CID office together making our statements, but 15 I cannot remember if we discussed what had happened. At 16 this stage, I was exhausted and I just wanted to get 17 back home and into bed. When I finished making my 18 statement, I handed it in. I cannot remember to whom 19 and I cannot remember if I also handed in my notebook. 20 After that, I left and went back home. It was about 21 0930 when I left the station." 22 Overleaf, [80214]: 23 "In my statement and notebook I gave some detailed 24 descriptions of persons at the scene, but I did not 25 recognise anybody there as I had only just moved to 97 1 Portadown. I was never called in to attend any identity 2 parade or any other identification procedure. I went 3 off sick at the end of April 1997, soon after the 4 incident. I was never asked to clarify my statement and 5 only recall being asked to attend an interview, which 6 I did, on 2nd October 1997, with DI Irwin and Detective 7 Chief Superintendent McBurney. I was not involved in 8 the investigation after 27th April 1997 and I did not 9 have any contact with the other officers from the 10 Land Rover as we never socialised outside work. I went 11 off on long-term sickness and never came back to 12 policing duties. 13 "Everything I know about murder investigation is 14 from watching the television. I was later contacted, 15 though I cannot recall when, by a DS McDowell to attend 16 an interview about Reserve Constable Atkinson. 17 I refused to, as could I not get any representation from 18 the Police Federation, who had told me that this 19 interview was not a police matter and I did not want to 20 go without a solicitor. 21 "At the time of the incident I had only been 22 stationed in Portadown for eight months, and, although 23 I was a member of the public order crew that night, 24 I did not see it as part of my duties to secure the 25 scene. I was mainly concerned with the welfare of the 98 1 two injured men that night, and in any event, I had no 2 training in scene preservation. I'd never experienced 3 violence like that before, even when I was with the 4 Mobile Support Unit." 5 Not very much more, I am pleased to say. 6 Statement of P18 (read) 7 Next is page [81719], the statement of P18. In 8 paragraph 1 he tells us: 9 "In April 1997 I was a detective constable stationed 10 at Portadown." 11 If we jump straight over the page to [81720], I just 12 want to take you to paragraph 7, if I may: 13 "I was engaged on enquiries linked to the 14 investigation and it was the norm to have morning 15 conferences and briefings usually taken by DI Irwin or 16 one of the detective sergeants. I cannot now remember 17 if Detective Chief Inspector P39 was present at those 18 briefings. At those conferences, updates were given on 19 the condition of Robert Hamill and I can remember that 20 his injuries, although serious, did not appear to be 21 life-threatening." 22 So there is some confirmation of the daily 23 conferences. 24 Statement of MICHAEL PORTER (read) 25 Then page [81580] there is the statement of 99 1 Michael Porter. He is one of the team who searched the 2 Hanvey household on 10th May 1997. Again, regrettably, 3 he is too ill to attend. 4 If we go to page [81581], paragraph 6: 5 "The instructions were given orally and I would 6 definitely have made a brief written note of the 7 specific details in my notebook. We were instructed to 8 search for clothing. I am reminded that the search 9 warrant at page [51350] confirms that we were looking 10 for 'trainers and clothing'. I cannot be absolutely 11 sure, but I do not recall being given any specific 12 details as to the type, colour or brand of clothing to 13 look for. Nor do I remember being given specific 14 instructions to look for a silver jacket or burnt 15 clothing. Unless we had been given specific 16 instructions, we would have been told to seize any of 17 these items that we could find." 18 Perhaps I can just jump to page [81584], 19 paragraph 17: 20 "I have again asked whether I was satisfied that the 21 search was thorough and in accordance with the briefing. 22 All I can say is that the search was in accordance with 23 the briefing." 24 Overleaf [81585]: 25 "I had no concerns about how the investigation was 100 1 being carried out at the time, nor do I have any now." 2 Then page [82049] is a Francis Reel. This deals 3 with the question of how the ICPC might have become 4 involved. 5 Paragraph 2, page [82049] -- 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Is this the right statement? It says 7 Michael John Porter? 8 MR UNDERWOOD: It is being input, but I see [82049] is not 9 actually coming up with anything at the moment. I will 10 jump from that and come back to it. Page [82047]. No. 11 I will keep trying until I find one. 12 Statement of CARL SIMPSON (read) 13 [81169]. This is the statement of Carl Simpson, 14 Queen's Counsel. If we look at paragraph 2, he says: 15 "I was instructed by the DPP in the case of 16 R v McKee and McKee." 17 What I want to do is take you to paragraph 3, if 18 I may: 19 "My involvement was limited to the prosecution of 20 the McKees. I was instructed by Raymond Kitson." 21 If we go down three lines, a sentence which starts 22 on the right-hand side: 23 "The only advice I gave was in respect of deferring 24 sentence of Andrea McKee pending her giving evidence on 25 another matter. On 31st January 2002, there was 101 1 a meeting at which that issue was raised and I was 2 asked, simply for clarification purposes, to summarise 3 the legal position. I advised that was neither 4 appropriate nor desirable, and in any event, the 5 evidence would be weakened by the fact it could be 6 linked to their future punishment. To be clear, it was 7 not put to me as something the police intended or wanted 8 to do. They simply asked for advice on the matter." 9 Then there is then the transcript of the interview 10 by the Inquiry of Miss Christine Smith, which we find at 11 page [75234]. I don't want or need to read any of this. 12 The reason I am putting it in at this stage is for the 13 sake of good order, because, when I pressed Miss Smith 14 on some of the passages in her statement to the Inquiry, 15 her responses were that the statement was only 16 a synopsis and that she had said rather more in the 17 Inquiry interview. It may be necessary either for me or 18 Mr Emmerson to refer to passages in this out of fairness 19 to her when we come to make submissions. 20 Statement of RAYMOND KITSON (read) 21 Then there is a statement of Mr Kitson, which is at 22 page [75419]. Paragraph 3. You heard from Mr Kitson. 23 He says in paragraph 3: 24 "During the course of his interview on 25 21st August 2009 by Mr Michael Stephens of the Inquiry 102 1 team, the Director undertook to provide certain 2 information to the Inquiry in relation to conviction 3 rates, recommendations from the Police Ombudsman and 4 delay in production of forensic reports." 5 What Mr Kitson does is provide that then in the form 6 firstly of a letter which we see at page [75420], in 7 which he explains a good deal of that. Then some 8 statistics which we find at page [75424]. I was not 9 going to go to those, but perhaps one could look briefly 10 at page [75422]. 11 There is there in the final paragraph a reference to 12 a progress and tracking group which is identified 13 earlier in the letter as something that was set up in 14 1992. Second line: 15 "From those records which can be provided, if 16 necessary, to the Inquiry, I see that the progress and 17 tracking group meeting discussed the case of Hobson and 18 others at its meetings on 21st August, 18th September 19 and 16th October 1997. It was noted that the 20 post-mortem report and forensic report were still 21 outstanding. I observe further that at that meeting of 22 21st August the forensic scientist representative at 23 that time Mr [blank] had been unable to attend. 24 Mr [blank] did attend the meetings of 18th September and 25 16th October 1997. The outstanding post-mortem reports 103 1 and forensic report were raised at the meetings, and 2 updates on the progress of finalising the reports were 3 provided by the relevant representatives of the agency 4 involved. Mr [blank] was in a position to seek 5 prioritisation of the report within the Forensic Science 6 Agency." 7 Statement of JOHN STEELE (read) 8 Then finally in this exercise there is a statement 9 of a Mr John Steele, which we find at page [82054]. 10 In paragraph 3 he tells us: 11 "In 1997, I was Director of policing and security in 12 the NIO and that was coupled with being Senior Director 13 of Belfast. In other words, I was the administrative 14 peak of the Belfast operation for the NIO as well as 15 being concerned with policing and security." 16 If I take you to page [82060], there is one passage 17 on that page I need to refer you to, sir, which is 18 paragraph 26, where he is dealing with the response from 19 the chief constable to the Secretary of State and from 20 there to the Hamill family: 21 "I think that the final response from the Secretary 22 of State to the Hamill family", it gives 23 page references, "relying on the information provided by 24 the chief constable is actually quite helpful. I have 25 been asked to consider point 5, which the family had 104 1 raised in their letter of 21st November relating to the 2 links between some officers and some of the defendants 3 and the response of the chief constable, 'This 4 allegation has been included in the criminal 5 investigation and will be considered by the Director of 6 Public Prosecutions'." 7 Overleaf, [82061]: 8 "In particular, I have been asked if I would have 9 expected in the reply from the chief constable to the 10 Secretary of State to set out that there was only one 11 alleged link so as not to misinform the family. I would 12 not. He was responding to the point and he was saying 13 if there's that allegation, it is included in the 14 investigation and that's all there is to it. 15 "It went as far as he could possibly go without 16 infringing his independence. He wanted to provide the 17 Secretary of State with whatever information he could 18 factually. This would have been usual." 19 At paragraph 29: 20 "I have also been referred to a document dated 21 June 2000 at page 39675. I had, of course, been retired 22 for a number of years at this point. I have been asked 23 to comment on the fourth line down: 24 "'It is alleged that an officer phoned the 25 individual and advised him how to go about destroying 105 1 forensic evidence and thus avoid detection'. 2 "I have been informed that this was the link between 3 the police officer and the defendant referred to at 4 point 5 of Diane Hamill's letter and I have been asked 5 if I would have expected the chief constable to provide 6 the Secretary of State with these details of the 7 allegation either privately or in correspondence at the 8 point when she was writing to the Hamill family. 9 "Again, my response is, when an arrest or an 10 investigation is carried out, that is purely a police 11 matter, perhaps with ICPC involvement. Once the papers 12 are submitted to the DPP, that is the police role 13 completed unless the DPP put out a request for more 14 information or better particulars. They'd have done the 15 job", overleaf, [82062], "and then the DPP swings into 16 action and takes his decision on whether the information 17 that the police has provided them is likely to sustain 18 a conviction." 19 That brings us surprisingly neatly to the evidence 20 of Mr Rogers, who I now call. 21 MR SIMON THOMAS ALAN ROGERS (sworn) 22 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD 23 MR UNDERWOOD: Morning, Mr Rogers. 24 A. Hello. 25 Q. My name is Underwood. I am Counsel to the Inquiry. 106 1 I have a very few questions for you and I think there 2 will be some more supplementals. May I ask your full 3 name, please? 4 A. My full name is Simon Thomas Alan Rogers. 5 Q. Thank you very much. I think you have been kind enough, 6 in something of a hurry, to sign a statement for us 7 which we find at page [82068]. Perhaps we can look at 8 that. Would you keep your eyes on it while we flick 9 through the ten pages of it? 10 Is that your statement? 11 A. The statement, including a couple of typographical 12 errors, is mine, yes. 13 Q. Thank you very much. Are the contents true apart from 14 the typographical errors? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Do you want to draw our attention to those errors? 17 A. In paragraph 12, last line. 18 Q. That's at page [82072]. The missing "F" from "chief 19 constable", I take it? 20 A. Which has appeared next to the "of". 21 Q. Thank you. At least it is not missing. And the other 22 one? 23 A. It is really that sentence which has gone awry. 24 Q. Can I just ask you to look at a statement we have from 25 Mr Steele? That's relevantly at page [82060]. 107 1 In paragraph 26, he is referring to the final 2 response from the Secretary of State to the Hamill 3 family and says that it is actually quite helpful. In 4 the second sentence he says: 5 "I have been asked to consider point 5, which the 6 family had raised in their letter of 21st November, 7 relating to the links between some officers and some of 8 the defendants and the response of the chief constable, 9 'This allegation has been included in the criminal 10 investigation and'", overleaf, [82061], "'will be 11 considered by the Director of Public Prosecutions'. 12 "In particular, I have been asked if I would have 13 expected in the reply from the chief constable to the 14 Secretary of State to set out that there was only one 15 alleged link so as not to misinform the family. I would 16 not. He was responding to the point and he was saying: 17 if there's that allegation, it's included in the 18 investigation and that's all there is to it." 19 Would you agree with that? 20 A. I think I do. I mean, that's the first I have seen 21 that, but I agree with it on the first reading, yes. 22 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 29 on this page, [82061]: 23 "I have also been referred to a document ..." 24 We can look at this document if you want to, but 25 I hope we don't need to: 108 1 "... dated June 2000 at page 39675. I had, of 2 course, been retired for a number of years at this 3 point. I have been asked to comment on the fourth 4 line down: 5 "'It is alleged that an officer phoned the 6 individual and advised him how to go about destroying 7 forensic evidence and thus avoid detection'. 8 "I have been informed that this was the link between 9 the police officer and the defendant referred to at 10 point 5 of Diane Hamill's letter and I have been asked 11 if I would have expected the chief constable to provide 12 the Secretary of State with these details of the 13 allegation either privately or in correspondence at the 14 point when she was writing to the Hamill family. 15 "Again, my response is, when an arrest or 16 an investigation is carried out, that is purely a police 17 matter, perhaps with the ICPC involvement." 18 Again, fair comment? 19 A. Yes. I mean, I think that reflects what I have said in 20 my statement at paragraph 27. 21 MR UNDERWOOD: Yes. Thank you. That's all I ask you. As 22 I say, there are likely to be some supplemental 23 questions elsewhere. Thank you very much. 24 A. Thank you. 25 MR McGRORY: If I may, sir? 109 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory. 2 Questions from MR McGRORY 3 MR McGRORY: As you know, my name is McGrory and I represent 4 the family of Robert Hamill. I do have some questions 5 for you. 6 If I may say so, Mr Rogers, you were in a very 7 special position in 1997, in that you were one of those 8 few advisers to the Secretary of State on the issue of 9 policing and policing issues in Northern Ireland. Isn't 10 that correct? 11 A. I was certainly advising on issues around police 12 complaints specifically, but later on, on other aspects 13 of policing, yes. 14 Q. Indeed, the issue of police complaints was a political 15 topic of some sensitivity at that time? 16 A. It was, yes. I mean, I should perhaps mention that 17 I worked for Dr xxxxxxxxxxxx who did the review around 18 that time of police complaints and therefore was 19 involved to quite some degree in the topic. 20 Q. If I could just take you back to April/May 1997. We 21 were in the dying days then of the John Major 22 Government. Isn't that right? 23 A. I don't recall that level of detail. 24 Q. You don't recall at all. In terms of the political 25 situation in Northern Ireland, do you remember that the 110 1 peace process had run aground up to that time, close to 2 that time? 3 A. My involvement -- I had very little involvement in the 4 political side of the NIO and I don't want to give the 5 impression that I was fully au fait with all the 6 machinations, but, I mean, it would have been common 7 knowledge in Northern Ireland and I would have had that 8 common knowledge. 9 Q. It would be common knowledge that perhaps some may have 10 had no interest in, and others, perhaps in a position 11 like yours, might have had a significant interest in? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. In terms of what might be about to happen next, because 14 there was a general election scheduled for early May -- 15 isn't that correct -- 1997? 16 A. I don't remember the dates, but I am prepared to accept 17 that is the date, yes. 18 Q. But, indeed, when New Labour came into power in 19 May 1997, Dr Mowlam was then appointed as Secretary of 20 State -- 21 A. That's right. 22 Q. -- and things began to move very rapidly in terms of the 23 reinvigoration of the political process, because the IRA 24 ceasefire was renewed in July, a matter of weeks after 25 Dr Mowlam was appointed. Isn't that right? 111 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. The stage was then set for a move towards all party 3 talks, which, of course, did happen in April of 1998. 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. One of the major issues in those all party talks was the 6 issue of policing and how it might be changed in the 7 context of Northern Ireland? 8 A. Policing was one of the topics certainly that had to be 9 addressed, although the outcome was that it was 10 ultimately referred for a commission to consider the 11 issue. 12 Q. Yes, indeed. That's, in fact, what happened, but you 13 will be acutely aware, as one of those involved in the 14 Northern Ireland Office in advising ministers about 15 policing issues, albeit in the context of complaints, 16 that indeed the issue of disbandment of the RUC was 17 a live issue at the time? 18 A. The political issues around policing, as you would term 19 them, were not really my area of work, and issues such 20 as that would have fallen to the head of the division 21 rather than to me, and it would have been her who would 22 have prepared all of the materials for Ministers, etc. 23 My input would have been, yes, on police complaints, 24 if there were any issues arising from that, but not 25 directly on political matters. 112 1 Q. Mr Rogers, I don't seek to ask you any detailed 2 questions about this, but I think it would be a matter 3 of almost judicial notice that, at that time, certainly 4 one of the principal parties in the forthcoming talks, 5 their position was that the RUC should be disbanded 6 rather than reformed. Isn't that correct? 7 A. That's correct, yes. 8 Q. Of course, that's not what happened. What happened was 9 that, in fact, the policing issue was handed over to the 10 Patten Commission after Good Friday? 11 A. That's correct. 12 Q. And you then went on, indeed, to work with the 13 Patten Commission? 14 A. I -- well, I was involved in the appointment of the 15 Patten Commission. I certainly was involved in 16 providing materials to the Patten Commission, but it was 17 an independent body separate from Government and 18 political parties. I then was involved, once it 19 reported, in assisting Government to consider the report 20 and, indeed, to implement the vast bulk of the 21 recommendations which were accepted by the Commission -- 22 by the Government. 23 Q. You may or may not be able to help us with this 24 question, Mr Rogers, but we noticed a reference 25 yesterday in papers attached to the statement of 113 1 Mr Langdon who was commissioned to do a report on the 2 Hamill Inquiry -- on the issue of a Hamill Inquiry in 3 2000, that Mr Patten had raised the issue of the Hamill 4 case. 5 Can you help us with that? Do you have any memory 6 of that? 7 A. I have a memory that they met the family and people with 8 the family, but no more than that, because the 9 Commission, as I say, was independent and who it chose 10 to see was entirely a matter for it, not for me, or 11 Government indeed, but I was aware they had met the 12 Hamill family among many other people. 13 Q. Yes, of course. I just want to move on to the specifics 14 of the extent to which the Secretary of State, 15 Dr Mowlam, could have been given perhaps more 16 information about the allegation against Reserve 17 Constable Atkinson when she raised the issues in 18 December of 1997. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Is this for information which could have been 20 passed on to the Hamill family or that would have been 21 for her eyes only? 22 MR McGRORY: Well, I propose to ask this witness some 23 questions about both of those issues, sir. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: How is this directed to our terms of 25 reference -- 114 1 MR McGRORY: Well -- 2 THE CHAIRMAN: -- which relate to the investigation? 3 MR McGRORY: Well, the Secretary of State could have done -- 4 if she had been given more information, more specifics, 5 it would be my submission that she could have done two 6 things. 7 Firstly, she could have decided it was proper to 8 inform the family and allow the family to raise it with 9 the ICPC that there was a specific allegation. That 10 would have ensured a higher degree of supervision over 11 this aspect of the case. 12 She may have taken the view or been asked not to do 13 that at a particular time for fear of perhaps 14 compromising the investigation in some way. Had she 15 been persuaded of that, she could have taken the view, 16 sir, that she would say nothing to the family for the 17 moment, but that she, herself, could have continued to 18 raise enquiries as to the conduct of the investigation 19 and where it stood and whether or not the ICPC was 20 indeed engaged with it. 21 It will be our eventual submission that she was 22 deprived of doing either of those things because she was 23 utterly unaware of the detail. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, now the witness has heard your 25 explanation, perhaps he can tell us if they are within 115 1 his knowledge, and, if topics such as that are within 2 his knowledge, whether it would be constitutionally 3 within the Secretary of State's remit to refer -- to 4 deal with those matters. Do you not think? 5 MR McGRORY: Yes. I would have -- 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. Can you help us? 7 A. I can't speculate as to what Dr Mowlam might have done 8 with the information, but -- I mean, it's quite a broad 9 area you are asking me to consider. There are aspects 10 of that area which I have covered in my statement, for 11 example. To what extent it is of help, I don't know, 12 but I am obviously happy to give every assistance I can. 13 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I think you may need to confine your 14 questions to matters this witness can deal with. 15 MR McGRORY: Oh, yes. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. You can be guided there by what's 17 in his statement. 18 MR McGRORY: Indeed. 19 Mr Rogers, you have already commented on the 20 specific question that was answered in paragraph 5 of 21 the chief constable's response and you deal with this at 22 paragraph 21 of your statement, but could I have, first 23 of all, just the letter which the Secretary of State 24 wrote to the chief constable? It is at page [60488]. 25 The preceding page, [60487],is the first page of the 116 1 letter. It is addressed to Sir Ronnie Flanagan. It is 2 dated 28th November. Do you see that? 3 A. I do, yes. 4 Q. Did you draft that letter for the Secretary of State? 5 A. I did draft it, yes. 6 Q. If you go over the page, at [60488], the bottom 7 paragraph, I see the Secretary of State asked: 8 "I should be grateful, therefore, if you would 9 supply me with as much detail as possible on the points 10 in the attached letter and annex so that I can reply to 11 Diane Hamill." 12 Do you see that? 13 A. I do, yes. 14 Q. She had asked for as much detail as possible. 15 Now, of course, what is at issue here is the extent 16 to which the chief constable's operational independence 17 needed to be protected, but am I right in suggesting to 18 you that information about a case can be given to 19 a Secretary of State without necessarily compromising 20 the independence of the police operation? 21 A. As a general principle, that is correct, yes. 22 MR WOLFE: I am not sure, Chairman, with all due respect, 23 that this witness is in a position to answer that. He 24 is purporting -- 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Shall we ask him? 117 1 MR WOLFE: Can I just say this? He is purporting to answer 2 my friend's question which is directed to him, which 3 asks him to consider whether policing independence is 4 compromised by the information sought. 5 This gentleman is coming at it from the other angle. 6 He is not coming at it from a policing perspective. So 7 how does he know whether the independence, the 8 constitutional independence of the policing role could 9 be compromised? That's a matter for police. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, I would have thought that in order for 11 there to be a proper relationship, it would be necessary 12 both for the police and for the Secretary of State to 13 understand what's involved in the independence of the 14 police. 15 If the Secretary of State doesn't know that, she may 16 be asking for all sorts of things which she shouldn't 17 be, because it would compromise the independence of the 18 police. The police can't have an independence that is 19 not known to those others from whom they have to be 20 independent. 21 MR WOLFE: Well, we will see -- 22 THE CHAIRMAN: I don't think there is anything that the 23 witness is being asked to say, if it is within his 24 knowledge to answer, that he shouldn't be asked about. 25 Each side must have an appreciation of the other's 118 1 stance. 2 MR WOLFE: Very well. My concern is that, really, this does 3 get into the area of policing understanding of the 4 independence of their investigation, and the concern is 5 that this witness doesn't know -- cannot know the 6 concerns which affect that independence and ... 7 THE CHAIRMAN: I would have thought this witness would know 8 there are certain things you don't try to poke your nose 9 into and would know, if the Secretary of State goes too 10 far, how the Secretary of State might be warned, advised 11 to keep off the grass. 12 MR WOLFE: Very well. We will see where it goes. 13 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory? 14 MR McGRORY: Thank you, sir. 15 Indeed, Mr Rogers, the Secretary of State had 16 a statutory power under Article 8(2) of the Police Act 17 to seek a report. Isn't that right? Sorry. Have I got 18 the right piece of legislation? 19 A. She did have a statutory power. I think I highlight 20 that in my statement. 21 Q. Yes, you do. 22 THE CHAIRMAN: I think it is an order made under the Act, 23 isn't it? 24 MR McGRORY: Yes. In any event, I think what you say in 25 your statement is she had a statutory power to seek 119 1 a report, but there was an understanding really between 2 a Secretary of State and a chief constable that, when 3 information was asked for, it would be supplied without 4 the need to resort to the actual statute? 5 A. Yes. There's a regular flow of correspondence between 6 a division like police division and the Police Service 7 and one would never want to resort to, and never did 8 resort to, the use of something like that power. 9 Q. Could I ask you to look, please, Mr Rogers, at 10 page [15376]? This is the answer that the Secretary of 11 State received to her letter. It is at part 5. 12 Now, the answer is under the heading in which it was 13 asked, "Relationship between some officers and some of 14 the defendants". I think you recount in your statement 15 that this was raised in a letter from Diane Hamill 16 before the meeting with the Secretary of State and would 17 have been discussed during the course of the meeting. 18 A. It was certainly raised in the letter. I'm not certain 19 that it was discussed at the meeting -- 20 Q. Okay. 21 A. -- and it's not -- it's not recorded, I think, in 22 the minutes of the meeting that it was discussed. 23 Q. Okay. But it was brought to the Secretary of State's 24 attention, at least in the letter -- 25 A. It certainly was, yes. 120 1 Q. -- and in the general that there were concerns on the 2 family's behalf that there were links between the 3 Land Rover police and those who were suspected of the 4 murder, but they had no more information than what they 5 had heard? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Isn't that the gist of what was brought to the Secretary 8 of State's attention? 9 A. That's correct, yes. 10 Q. The answer here says: 11 "This allegation has been included in the criminal 12 investigation and will be considered by the Director of 13 Public Prosecutions." 14 Now, the first half of that sentence: 15 "The allegation has been included in the criminal 16 investigation ..." 17 Would you be surprised to know that it wasn't? 18 A. Again, I do deal with that in my statement in that -- 19 sorry, I don't deal with that point directly. I deal 20 with the fact that the ICPC weren't supervising it. 21 Q. That's another point that I am going to come to in 22 a moment. 23 A. Well, I would have taken the letter from the chief 24 constable suggesting it was included in the criminal 25 investigation to suggest that it indeed was, so, yes, 121 1 I would be surprised. 2 Q. Yes. In fact, what did happen is that it wasn't 3 included in the criminal investigation at all. It was 4 dealt with under the heading of neglect, which was, at 5 the beginning, supervised by the ICPC. 6 So that does cause you some surprise then? 7 A. It does. 8 Q. Going on to the second part of that answer that the 9 Secretary of State was giving: 10 "... and will be considered by the Director of 11 Public Prosecutions." 12 In the context of the criminal investigation, of 13 course, it was not considered by the Director of Public 14 Prosecutions, because the file made no mention of it. 15 Does that cause you some surprise? 16 A. Well, if this was not included in the criminal 17 investigation, as you have now told me, then I can see 18 that it wouldn't be considered. 19 MR EMMERSON: I apologise for interrupting. I am not 20 entirely sure that these questions are put on a fully 21 informed factual basis. The fact is it was included 22 within a criminal investigation and within a file 23 submitted to the DPP. It simply wasn't included within 24 the murder file. It may be that the witness is 25 answering questions on the assumption which appears to 122 1 underline the questions as they stand that it wasn't -- 2 THE CHAIRMAN: It was in the neglect file which embraced the 3 tipping-off allegation -- 4 MR EMMERSON: And was a criminal investigation. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and it was a file prepared for the DPP. 6 It was also sent to C&D to put them in the picture so 7 that they could deal with that. 8 MR EMMERSON: The assumption the witness was working on, 9 that this was a matter that would be included in the 10 criminal investigation file which would then be 11 considered by the DPP, is correct. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: It went to them by a different route, so to 13 speak. 14 MR EMMERSON: Yes. 15 MR McGRORY: I had no intention to mislead the witness. 16 I was about to say to him that it was included in a file 17 which did go to the DPP, but you are clear on that 18 anyway? 19 A. Well, I confess that I was -- thought you were leading 20 me to believe that it was not included in any criminal 21 investigation and I am -- I now note that it was 22 included in an investigation and presumably that did go 23 to the Director of Public Prosecutions. 24 We certainly were working on the assumption on 25 receipt of a letter from the chief constable that these 123 1 aspects were being covered and would indeed go to the 2 DPP, which was an extra level of assurance and 3 reassurance to us. 4 Q. But, of course, the file that did address the issue, 5 which was the neglect file, was prompted by the 6 complaint on the family's behalf that the Land Rover 7 police had done nothing? 8 MR UNDERWOOD: I am sorry to interrupt my friend. There is 9 an issue, of course, about whether the supervision by 10 the ICPC arose out of a self-referral by the chief 11 constable or by that complaint. So prompted by -- 12 THE CHAIRMAN: There is an element of confusion. 13 MR UNDERWOOD: Quite. 14 MR McGRORY: I had not finished my question, sir, which is 15 that it was prompted by that or by the self-referral by 16 the chief constable in the context of allegations made 17 publicly that the Land Rover police had failed to 18 intervene. That was the context in which the second 19 file, the neglect file, was opened. Is that your 20 understanding? 21 A. I confess that I don't know anything of the detail of 22 the files. I can't help you with that. 23 Q. No, but insofar as that file was concerned, it being 24 a complaint file, one would have expected that the ICPC 25 would have supervised every aspect of it. 124 1 A. I do deal with that in my statement and I do say that 2 I did expect that the ICPC were supervising this aspect 3 as well as the broader aspects, yes. 4 Q. Indeed, the Secretary of State would have expected that 5 the ICPC would have supervised every aspect of it? 6 A. I can't speak for the Secretary of State, but -- and 7 I didn't advise her directly on the point, because I had 8 taken it that it was being supervised. 9 Q. Yes, indeed, but had it come to the Secretary of State's 10 attention that it wasn't being supervised, it would have 11 been well within the remit of the Secretary of State to 12 make enquiries whether or not it was being supervised 13 and maybe suggest that it should be, but no further than 14 that? 15 A. Yes. I mean, I am loth to talk on behalf of the 16 Secretary of State. What I can tell you is, if I had 17 been aware it was not being supervised, I obviously 18 would have drawn that to the attention of the Secretary 19 of State -- 20 Q. Yes, indeed. 21 A. -- and I think could have advised her on what options 22 were available to her. 23 I can only talk of what my function would have been, 24 not what she would have decided. 25 Q. There would have been options available to her short of 125 1 interfering with any investigation that would have 2 ensured that at least it was being covered. Isn't that 3 right? 4 A. Yes, there were statutory provisions available. 5 Q. Yes. Insofar as the details of the allegation are 6 concerned, what we now know, Mr Rogers is that there was 7 a specific allegation against a specific officer that 8 had been made by a witness, Tracey Clarke, that there 9 had been telephone calls made and advice given to 10 destroy clothing to one of the murderers by a policeman. 11 We also know that telephone records obtained very 12 quickly after that allegation had been made at least 13 supported the allegation to the extent that there was 14 telephone contact between the policeman's household and 15 the alleged murderer's household. 16 Now, I want to suggest to you that that is 17 information which could have been given to the Secretary 18 of State without it necessarily in any way interfering 19 with the operational independence of the chief 20 constable. She could have been told that as a point of 21 information? 22 A. I do try to address that in my statement in 23 paragraph 27, where you say that if the chief constable, 24 for example, in advising the Secretary of State was 25 aware of this allegation at this particular time, then 126 1 I would have expected him perhaps to have informed the 2 Secretary of State. 3 Q. Yes. The Secretary of State could have done a number of 4 things. I mean, she could have asked the chief 5 constable for advice as to whether or not she should 6 make any mention of this to the family. She could have 7 done that? 8 A. She could. 9 Q. And if the chief constable had said, "Look, for 10 operational reasons, we would rather this didn't get 11 into the public domain. Check with me before you tell 12 the family anything", she could have done that? 13 A. That's correct. 14 Q. And she could have been trusted to do that? 15 A. Indeed, the draft letter was put before the police 16 before it issued to the family to ensure there was 17 nothing in it which would cause difficulties for the 18 Police Service. 19 Q. Indeed. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGrory, you are not, are you, suggesting 21 that the Secretary of State might have said, "Well, tell 22 the Hamill family all about this. Tell them about 23 Tracey Clarke. Tell them about Atkinson"? 24 MR McGRORY: No. I have just asked -- 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, are you suggesting that? 127 1 MR McGRORY: It is something she might have considered. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: Are you suggesting she should or would have 3 thought it right to tell the family about Tracey Clarke 4 and about Atkinson? 5 MR McGRORY: At a certain point, yes, sir, but not at the 6 point of this letter in December and January, but she 7 may have chosen to discuss with the chief constable 8 whether or not that was an appropriate thing for her to 9 do, and I would suggest that she would have been told 10 "No", but that, come a later point, she may have chosen 11 indeed to tell the family. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, you have made your point. We will 13 consider it. 2.15. 14 (1.12 pm) 15 (The luncheon adjournment) 16 (2.15 pm) 17 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory? 18 MR McGRORY: Sir, I have only three further questions 19 I would like to ask the witness with your permission, 20 sir. 21 Mr Rogers, I think you have said in your statement, 22 and I think Mr Steele has said it as well, that this 23 Secretary of State, Dr Mowlam, was impressed with the 24 Hamill family and had, if not an empathy, at least 25 a sympathy for them and really wanted to do something? 128 1 A. That's correct. 2 Q. That's correct, isn't it? This is a question I would 3 like to have asked the Secretary of State, but 4 unfortunately she is deceased, but I think it is fair to 5 ask you that, knowing her and knowing the interest she 6 took in the case, had she the information, some more of 7 the detail about the allegation against the reservist, 8 that she would have at least kept a watching brief on 9 the development of the case? 10 A. I think she did keep a watching brief on the case in any 11 event. 12 Q. Yes, but regrettably she did it without that 13 information. So she would have factored that 14 information into the watching brief that she did keep? 15 A. Presumably, yes. I can't talk for her, but yes, I mean, 16 given that she was already watching it. 17 Q. Indeed, there was nothing constitutionally improper 18 about that? 19 A. No. 20 Q. Secondly, had she known that the ICPC had removed itself 21 from the supervision of the aspect of the case 22 concerning the allegation against Reserve Constable 23 Atkinson, she would most likely have made 24 representations to the ICPC about that? 25 A. I am reluctant to speculate as to what she would have 129 1 done on that. As I have said in my statement, I would 2 have drawn that to her attention, which would have been 3 my role, but what she would have done I can only 4 speculate, and I don't think that's helpful. 5 Q. But certainly she had under the statutory provisions 6 powers of referral herself? 7 A. She did have those, yes. 8 Q. There would have been nothing constitutionally improper 9 about her exercising those powers? 10 A. Not in my view, no. 11 Q. Thank you. One final issue, Mr Rogers. Would you be 12 surprised to learn that neither the police nor the ICPC 13 had informed the family of Robert Hamill at any time of 14 the fact of an allegation that a police officer had 15 assisted those suspected of the murder? 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Are you really qualified to answer whether 17 that would have been operationally appropriate? 18 A. That's my concern, Chairman. I am not sure I am. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: It is outside your provenance. 20 A. It is outside my provenance. 21 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Very well. 22 MR McGRORY: Are you aware the information was conveyed to 23 them by a member of the judiciary in the form of 24 HM Coroner Mr Leckey in January 2000? 25 A. Yes. 130 1 MR McGRORY: Thank you. 2 MR McCOMB: No questions. 3 MS DINSMORE: No questions. 4 MR UNDERWOOD: Nothing arising. Thank you. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 6 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much, indeed. 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Rogers. 8 A. Thank you. 9 (The witness withdrew) 10 MR UNDERWOOD: Mr Donnelly now, please. 11 MR PAUL DONNELLY (affirmed) 12 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD 13 MR UNDERWOOD: Good afternoon, Mr Donnelly. 14 A. Afternoon. 15 Q. My name is Underwood and I am Counsel to the Inquiry. 16 I have a few questions for you. 17 May I ask your full names, please? 18 A. Paul Alexander Donnelly. 19 Q. If we look at page [82078] on the screen, we see the 20 first page of a six-page document. May I ask you to 21 keep your eyes on that while we flick through those six 22 pages? Is that your witness statement? 23 A. That is indeed, yes. 24 Q. And is it true? 25 A. It is. 131 1 Q. Can I ask you about a matter that is not in there and 2 that's whether you can assist with how it was that the 3 ICPC first became involved in supervising anything 4 arising out of the death of Mr Hamill? Was it the 5 complaint from xxxxxxx or was it a self-referral 6 by the RUC, in other words? 7 A. My recollection is that it was a self-referral by the 8 RUC. 9 Q. Thank you. Can I attempt brutally to sum up what you 10 say in this statement in these propositions, that the 11 ICPC should have been involved in supervising the 12 allegation that Mr Atkinson tipped off Mr Hanvey? 13 A. Uh-huh. 14 Q. Secondly, that it doesn't actually surprise you that it 15 was not involved. Is that fair? 16 A. That's accurate and fair, yes. 17 Q. And that lack of surprise is because in your view it was 18 not, if I can use this phrase, fit for purpose? 19 A. It would have certainly been counter-cultural to have 20 done so, yes. 21 Q. Thank you very much. Others may have some more 22 questions for you. 23 Questions from MR ADAIR 24 MR ADAIR: I just want to ask you about -- you mention in 25 your statement, Mr Donnelly, about a number of the 132 1 members being part-time, for example, Mr Murnaghan? 2 A. Uh-huh, yes. 3 Q. And you mention also that part of the culture was that 4 they didn't discuss their cases amongst each other? 5 A. Uh-huh. 6 Q. They very much kept it to themselves -- 7 A. Yes, very rigidly so. 8 Q. -- as part of the integrity of keeping it tight? 9 A. Uh-huh, yes. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: And because they might be sitting on 11 a Tribunal? 12 A. Uh-huh. 13 MR ADAIR: And because in due course there were two members 14 sitting with the chief constable if there was 15 a Disciplinary Tribunal? 16 A. That's right, uh-huh. 17 Q. Now you have made it clear in your statement and your 18 summary of your evidence that there were obviously parts 19 of it that were not satisfactory. Let's put it that 20 way. 21 A. In my view, yes. 22 Q. I personally didn't know Mr Murnaghan, but the evidence 23 we have heard to date from anybody asked is that 24 Mr Murnaghan was a dedicated, robust, very much his own 25 man individual? 133 1 A. Uh-huh. 2 Q. Does that accord with your knowledge of him? 3 A. It would do, yes. 4 Q. In other words, this description -- I know that you have 5 described some of the attitude, that the culture appears 6 to have been I think you even go to the extent of saying 7 verging on sycophantic towards the relationship. Is 8 that right? 9 A. That would be true, yes. 10 Q. The impression I have certainly -- it doesn't matter 11 what my impression is, but the evidence we have heard 12 about Mr Murnaghan is that he would have been anything 13 but sycophantic to anybody? 14 A. That would have been true, yes. 15 Q. If anybody had tried to brush him off or persuade him 16 not to follow a certain course, they would have been 17 told in no uncertain terms where to go? 18 A. I would draw some distinction between Mr Murnaghan as 19 a robust country solicitor and the sorts of bureaucratic 20 corners that all commission members were placed in and 21 their heavy dependence on the full-time staff both as 22 advisers and as assistants in supervising 23 investigations. So in other aspects of his life he was 24 well-known, but this context did place constraints on 25 him and others, yes. 134 1 Q. But he was a man of integrity? 2 A. A man of absolute and unquestionable integrity. 3 Q. A man who if he thought that something should be pursued 4 would pursue it? 5 A. That would be my judgment of him. 6 MR ADAIR: Yes. Thank you. 7 Questions from MR McGRORY 8 MR McGRORY: Sir, I have some questions, if I may, please. 9 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 10 MR McGRORY: Mr Donnelly, my name is McGrory and I represent 11 the family of Robert Hamill in these proceedings. 12 We were given your statement. I know you have 13 travelled a long way and you have been very helpful all 14 day yesterday I think being interviewed and turning this 15 into a statement very quickly, but we have only had 16 a chance to read it over lunch. 17 A. Uh-huh. 18 Q. So if I may be forgiven for maybe taking a little bit 19 longer than I would like to. 20 A. Sure. 21 Q. I would like to draw the Inquiry's attention to 22 a number of sections of your statement. At [82079], 23 which is page 2, paragraph 6, you talk about you have no 24 recollection of the complaint or allegation being 25 referred or a complaint being referred by the Secretary 135 1 of State -- 2 A. Uh-huh. 3 Q. -- although you did sometimes have direct referrals from 4 the chief constable, particularly after public order 5 incidents. 6 "Matters such as deaths in custody were referred 7 automatically. The police were generally astute enough 8 to make referrals themselves." 9 What do you mean by that? 10 A. What I mean is there would have been occasionally times 11 when the police would have been less than happy to have 12 made a referral, but because of some of the 13 representations that might have been made to them by my 14 Chief Executive, they would invariably agree to process 15 the complaint. 16 Without going off in any tangent, some of the 17 xxxxxxxx complaints resulted not by the police 18 taking the initiative but by us putting pressure on 19 them. There were others, but that's illustrative of how 20 it might have been. 21 Q. Would another example be that if, for example, a lot of 22 complaints had been made through the media about police 23 conduct, that there might have been a view that, "We 24 should refer this ourselves rather than wait for 25 a complaint"? 136 1 A. We didn't have the statutory power to do that. 2 Q. No, I mean in terms of the police referring it to you? 3 A. Yes, and there would have been times, and, in fact, 4 Ronnie Flanagan on every occasion prepared to refer. 5 His predecessor would have taken a different view at 6 times. 7 Q. If I can move on to paragraph 9 of your statement, in 8 the very last sentence you say: 9 "I do have a clear recollection of discussing the 10 case with Greg Mullan, both when Kevin was supervising 11 the case and afterwards." 12 This is in the context of you having said you don't 13 remember talking to Kevin Murnaghan about it. 14 A. Uh-huh. 15 Q. Now we have had evidence, Mr Donnelly, of the decision 16 on Mr Murnaghan's part not to continue supervising the 17 investigation of the allegation into Reserve Constable 18 Atkinson -- 19 A. Uh-huh. 20 Q. -- in terms of tipping off one of the suspect murderers. 21 A. Uh-huh. 22 Q. There is a note in existence where Mr Mullan seems to 23 have said to him, "This is outside your remit". 24 A. That's right, uh-huh. 25 Q. You say you do remember discussing the case with 137 1 Greg Mullan. Would he have sought your advice on what 2 was and was not within the ICPC's remit? 3 A. This is me sort of delving into the depths of memory 4 here. 5 Q. Yes. 6 A. My recollection is I will have had more than one 7 conversation with Mr Mullan. I was concerned about 8 aspects of the case, particularly but not exclusively 9 this secondary -- this piece of information that came to 10 light later, and I sought briefings on the case which, 11 as Chairman, I had a certain degree of right to ask. 12 I had no right to intervene, but I had a right to ask to 13 be informed, and that conversation took place after this 14 advice had been given to Mr Murnaghan and accepted by 15 him. It was a cause of -- I was concerned about that 16 and I was also concerned about aspects of the other 17 complaint allegation. I was very interested to know 18 what motivated the police officers in the vehicle at the 19 time of the incident. 20 Q. Can you help us at all with the timing of that 21 conversation in terms of how long after the ICPC had 22 opted out, for want of a better word, you had that 23 discussion? 24 A. I would struggle to give you an accurate timing of that. 25 I tell you, I mean, Kevin Murnaghan was terminally ill 138 1 at that stage, and he did continue his work while 2 undergoing treatment and while quite seriously ill. So 3 there would have been times when he would have been 4 absent for periods through illness, and it would have 5 been -- my belief is, my recollection is that it was 6 close to Kevin having to buy out of supervising the case 7 and xxxxxxxx picking up the reins of it. I am afraid 8 I can be no more accurate than that. It would not have 9 been a minuted conversation. So there is no 10 documentation that I think I could refer you to. 11 Q. Very well. If I could move on to the next paragraph, 12 you say in the middle of that paragraph 10: 13 "My first impression of the organisation was that it 14 was deferential to the point of being sycophantic at 15 times toward the RUC." 16 You make the observation that: 17 "Some newer members were more robust and more 18 assertive." 19 If some of the older members, faced with a strong 20 representation from a policeman who had a strong 21 personality that, "Really you don't need to be involved 22 in this aspect of it", would it be your impression that 23 they would have acquiesced? 24 A. Yes, they would have. Undoubtedly they would have 25 acquiesced to that. I think that there was a general 139 1 ethos of -- I remember correcting a senior NIO official 2 in this regard -- an official told me the Commission was 3 there to help the police. I corrected him and said, 4 "No, we are there to help policing", which is 5 a different concept. My concern is that many of my 6 colleagues saw their job as helping the police. 7 Q. Thank you. If I could move to paragraph 12, you say in 8 that paragraph: 9 "I have been asked if I could have asked the chief 10 constable to refer the allegation. I could have asked 11 the chief constable in my capacity as Chair and if he 12 had resisted that request, I would have been perfectly 13 happy to go to Mo Mowlam." 14 Had, of course, you known that your own organisation 15 had opted out of supervising this, you would have had no 16 hesitation in going to Dr Mowlam? 17 A. I really do think that the overriding principle was one 18 which would have compelled me to have done that even in 19 the face of my colleagues taking a different view. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: I am not sure that "opted out" is the right 21 description. The fact is, and it seems not to have been 22 perceived by either side at the time, that the 23 tipping-off allegation, which could only be brought to 24 the ICPC by a reference from the chief constable, that 25 had never happened, but both sides seemed to think they 140 1 were seized with it. Then it became clear that they 2 weren't and they had no more to do with it. That's the 3 effect of the evidence we have heard, isn't it, not just 4 opting out? 5 MR McGRORY: Well, I am not at all sure about that. I have 6 to say, sir, I think there is an argument -- 7 THE CHAIRMAN: There is no evidence at all that there was 8 ever any referral by the chief constable to the ICPC and 9 this being an internal matter and not a public 10 complaint -- I am speaking of the tipping-off 11 allegation -- if you look at the order, the only way in 12 which it could come before the ICPC would be by 13 a referral by the chief constable under Article 8 or 14 I think by the Secretary of State under another 15 paragraph of Article 8. That's the position in law. 16 MR McGRORY: Yes. We have the evidence of Mr Donnelly that 17 he could have asked the Secretary of State to refer it 18 to him. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Oh, yes, but, as I say, "opting out" is not 20 the right term. It hadn't been realised. 21 MR UNDERWOOD: Sorry to intervene. It is particularly 22 unfortunate that one of the statements I wanted to read 23 this morning got itself lost on the system, because 24 that's Mr Reel, whose evidence is to the effect that as 25 far as the RUC was concerned, as with Mr Donnelly, the 141 1 original reference was by the RUC, and that certainly 2 there is some evidence I think, although I would have to 3 collect it, that the RUC believed that by putting the 4 whole matter in the hands of the ICPC, they were putting 5 into the hands of the ICPC anything that came up. Of 6 course you are right. There was no specific reference 7 of the tip-off allegation. 8 THE CHAIRMAN: Quite. 9 MR UNDERWOOD: That might be the interesting question. 10 MR McGRORY: The question I wanted to ask Mr Donnelly, sir, 11 is would he have regarded additional information over 12 and above the substance of the complaint that the RUC 13 had failed to intervene that, in fact, one of those 14 officers had made observations in respect of criminal 15 conduct and had not only (a) done nothing about it but 16 (b) had, in fact, assisted the person responsible for 17 the criminal conduct as part and parcel of the very 18 investigation that the ICPC was undertaking -- can 19 Mr Donnelly answer that question? 20 A. Had I been made aware of this secondary -- let's say 21 subsequent, I suppose, secondary allegation, I would 22 have asked the chief constable to refer it to me and 23 I would have asked him on the grounds that this person's 24 alleged criminality was inexorably linked with his 25 status as a sworn constable and therefore it was 142 1 associated with his conduct as a police officer, and we 2 would have claimed that we would have had supervisory 3 jurisdiction in those circumstances. 4 Q. Indeed, there is no reason why Mr Murnaghan couldn't 5 have done that? 6 A. There is no reason why he couldn't have done. 7 Q. Would you take it so far, Mr Donnelly, as to say that 8 you may not even have needed to seek a further referral, 9 because, in fact, this was simply further information 10 concerning the conduct of the police in the Land Rover? 11 THE CHAIRMAN: That's a matter of law rather than for the 12 witness. 13 MR McGRORY: Well, can I ask the witness what his 14 understanding of the law was? 15 THE CHAIRMAN: No. He is not here to instruct us in the 16 law. I don't say that in any way offensively to you. 17 A. No, it is not taken as such. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: We have our jobs to do. Yes? 19 MR McGRORY: Sir, could I make a submission to you that, in 20 fact, it is a matter of fact. It is a matter of 21 interpretation of the manner in which such 22 an investigation should be conducted and the way in 23 which new information comes in should be addressed, and 24 that the witness is entitled to express a view on that. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: No. We will move on now, please. 143 1 MR McGRORY: You say at the very end of paragraph 12, 2 Mr Donnelly: 3 "From my personal perspective I was hemmed in a 4 political agenda, given that we were at an important 5 point of political transition." 6 Can you perhaps expand a little bit on that and tell 7 us what you mean by that? 8 A. Well, within the context of this and within the wider 9 context it was a very important juncture in terms of the 10 political settlement in this jurisdiction. Also bearing 11 in mind Portadown where the Drumcree incidents and the 12 spin-off from the Drumcree incidents were very much 13 alive, it was a fairly toxic sort of mix, and my 14 responsibility as Chair of the organisation was to try 15 to have a sense of sensitivity to those dynamics while 16 at the same time not losing sight of the fundamental 17 purpose of the organisation, which was to provide 18 a robust supervision and direction of complaints against 19 the police. 20 Q. You move on to ask really a key question 21 in paragraph 14, which is that you do not wish to be 22 unduly critical of the question and this is the -- 23 I will give you time to have a look at that -- this is 24 the question as to Mr Murnaghan's decision and 25 Mr Mullan's between them that they need not supervise 144 1 the aspect of the investigation that covered the 2 allegation about Reserve Constable Atkinson. 3 You ask yourself the question: 4 "I do not wish to be unduly critical but the 5 question to be asked is why?" 6 Have you come to any resolution as to why? 7 A. No, I haven't. In ways to me it was symptomatic of -- 8 the organisation was conflict averse and risk averse. 9 My belief then and I suppose now was, "Let's not trouble 10 trouble". 11 Q. Indeed you go on to say towards the end of your 12 statement in paragraph 23: 13 "The investigating officer would have had a fair 14 amount of opportunity throughout the process to widen 15 the terms of the investigation. There is a degree of 16 autonomy. It is conceivable that he was under pressure 17 not to do so. The atmosphere in Portadown at that time 18 was poisonous." 19 Could you perhaps enlighten us as to the extent of 20 that pressure and why you think it had a bearing on the 21 decision not to remain involved, if I may put it that 22 way? 23 A. Well, certainly, you know, some of the officers in the 24 vehicle at the incident had considerable local 25 connections and were -- certainly Mr Atkinson was 145 1 a community activist of sorts within Portadown. As 2 I said in reply to your last question, there were very 3 powerful community tensions there, and I think in favour 4 of the RUC that they were actively afraid of the 5 consequences of that unravelling and there being further 6 civil disorder, and that -- this is purely speculative; 7 I am expressing an opinion here, not a fact -- certainly 8 had the investigating officer decided that the 9 allegation about Mr Atkinson was worthy of pursuit 10 within the context of the complaint, and the Commission 11 would have supported that, I have little doubt that it 12 would have been incorporated and widened the enquiry. 13 THE CHAIRMAN: If it had been necessary to ask the chief 14 constable to refer it, then the Commission would have 15 been prepared to do that, would they? 16 A. I as Chair would have been prepared to do that. 17 MR McGRORY: Indeed, I think you make the comment that it 18 was an organisation that lacked moral fibre. 19 A. That's an opinion. 20 MR McGRORY: Thank you. 21 Questions from MS DINSMORE 22 MS DINSMORE: Good afternoon, Mr Donnelly. 23 A. Good afternoon. 24 Q. Maybe I do need an introduction to you. 25 Margaret Ann Dinsmore. You might well have been 146 1 familiar with me wearing different hats, Mr Donnelly. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Just can I just take up what Mr McGrory was saying 4 there? I am much obliged to you for you outlining to 5 this Inquiry that many of your comments are speculative. 6 I understand from your statement that you have 7 speculative views about Mr Atkinson. Do you want to see 8 the paragraph? 9 A. Yes, yes. 10 Q. If we could just call up [82083], paragraph 24. 11 I should have said -- you wouldn't know this, though 12 clearly you do know me -- I act on behalf of Eleanor and 13 Robbie Atkinson. Okay? 14 So at paragraph 24 then, Mr Donnelly, you say: 15 "I have got some speculative views but they are not 16 evidentially based." 17 Now in relation to that can you tell me then what do 18 you mean and what is the basis of your speculative views 19 that Mr Atkinson was -- and you have referred to it in 20 your direct evidence -- a community activist? 21 A. Don't forget I have to mine deep into memory here. 22 Q. Well, you were able to make this statement yesterday. 23 You remembered it yesterday, so you won't have to go too 24 deep now. Just what are you referring to? 25 A. You know, a more helpful tone would help my memory. 147 1 I am referring to the fact that my memory of the 2 evidence or memory of the official records indicated 3 that one of Constable Atkinson's defences or responses 4 to the challenges made to him was that he contacted one 5 of the accused, one of the people who had been accused 6 of the assaults on Robert Hamill, late at night 7 supposedly to talk about I think it was a karate club. 8 Q. Just so we are clear then, you are giving evidence, 9 though you are expected -- you are prefacing it now with 10 it being speculative, that Mr Atkinson was a community 11 activist because there was an allegation you know 12 something about, you think you read, about some contact 13 about some judo club. Now I don't want to do you any 14 injustice. Is that a fair representation of what you 15 have just said? 16 A. What I have said is I had speculative views which were 17 not evidentially based. 18 Q. Well, would your speculative -- do you consider 19 a community activist to be a derogatory term? 20 A. No. 21 Q. Tell us what you think "community activist" means. 22 A. I think a community activist is somebody who would be 23 well-known within their community, who would participate 24 in various community-based activities, who would be 25 known and respected. 148 1 Q. I am obliged to you for that clarity. So there can be 2 no misunderstanding that even your speculative views are 3 clearly that they refer to someone respected in their 4 community, someone who is making a contribution -- is 5 that putting it too far -- to the community? 6 A. No, I think that's perfectly ... 7 Q. So the Inquiry Panel now know that paragraph 24 reads as 8 a laudable speculative acclaim on your part. Yes or no? 9 A. It is a speculative statement on my part to the fact 10 that this gentleman was well-known and had considerable 11 influence within his community. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: We shall write our report on the basis of 13 evidence, not speculation. 14 MS DINSMORE: I am much obliged. It is just Mr McGrory will 15 appreciate introduced for a matter which will be 16 entirely for your good self about the weighting about 17 this whole is there an aspect of the equation about 18 community activism. 19 Did you know -- well, of course you knew how 20 appalling Drumcree was for both sides of the community 21 in Northern Ireland and in particular the citizens 22 around Portadown? 23 A. Uh-huh, and I have made reference to that, yes. 24 Q. Do you accept that there were policemen serving without 25 fear or favour within Portadown? 149 1 A. It's a matter of record. 2 Q. Matter of record? 3 A. Uh-huh. 4 Q. Do you know that Mr Atkinson was one of those people who 5 lived for a month in Mahon Road while doing his Drumcree 6 duties? 7 A. I am not acquainted with the details of his personal 8 movements. 9 Q. Maybe your commendation in relation to his community 10 contribution would be increased if you had known that. 11 Is that right or wrong? 12 A. I didn't seek to in any way be making any commendation. 13 I was describing a profile that this individual has. 14 Q. Would you consider it a matter to be commended if 15 a policeman served in the appalling circumstances that 16 living in Mahon Road during Drumcree entailed? Would 17 that be something to be commended of a man doing his 18 duty? 19 A. It would be commendable for everybody who experienced -- 20 Q. For everybody? 21 A. For everybody who experienced that. 22 Q. Including a policeman named Atkinson if he did that? 23 A. Absolutely. 24 Q. You know it is a matter of record whether he did it or 25 did not? 150 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Then can I just ask you in relation to that: have you 3 any idea about attacks that there had been on 4 Mr Atkinson from both sides of the community over the 5 years? 6 A. I have no information on that. 7 Q. No. So is it fair to say now that really when you say 8 he was well-known within the community, you are 9 absolutely right? 10 A. Uh-huh. 11 Q. But there's no way that this Inquiry are to consider 12 when they are weighing it up on the evidence -- is your 13 evidence now maybe when you know a little more that this 14 having been known within the community is something 15 which on balance was arising out of commendable 16 behaviour? 17 A. My evidence as expressed in my statement. 18 Q. I mean, I don't want to bother the Chairman. He has 19 come to the end of a long road of me doing that now. 20 This is our last day, but just so that we have clarity, 21 when you say he was a community activist and quite 22 influential within his community, there is no question 23 that your evidence has any suggestion of anything 24 adverse therein? 25 A. My statement is as expressed here. 151 1 Q. Just answer my question. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. I don't understand. Are you now saying after we have 4 had these few minutes together that the community 5 activist and influential within his community has no 6 adverse connotations on your part whatsoever? 7 A. It is a neutrally expressed statement. 8 Q. Right. Well, do you think that the matters which we 9 have outlined are neutral, the service, the service that 10 we have outlined that Mr Atkinson -- is that a neutral 11 thing? 12 A. If that's a matter of record, I have no reason 13 whatsoever to dispute it. 14 Q. Now then if we just move on, you considered the ICPC to 15 be an organisation lacking in moral fibre? 16 A. That's true. 17 Q. Are you suggesting that part-time commissioners did not 18 serve with integrity and without fear or favour? Is 19 that what you are saying? 20 A. That's the implication of what I am saying. 21 Q. That's the implication. Certainly not an implication 22 surely you or anyone you have ever heard refer could 23 possibly, could possibly have applied to the late 24 gentleman Kevin Murnaghan. Isn't that right? 25 A. That's absolutely correct. 152 1 Q. And isn't it correct that there are other persons who 2 have served in the ICPC and they have given judgments, 3 made rulings, and they have been subjected to judiciary 4 view by the Police Authority for the view and stance 5 they have taken, and that Lord Kerr -- but he was simply 6 Mr Justice Kerr in those days -- they upheld the view 7 and the expression given by that commissioner in the 8 face of very strident steps taken by the Police 9 Federation in relation to that decision? 10 A. Uh-huh. 11 Q. Surely you know about the decisions where they were 12 judicially reviewed? 13 A. Of course I do. 14 Q. And isn't that right? Isn't that right? Isn't that 15 factually a matter of record? 16 A. That's factually a matter of record. That matter of 17 record does not detract in any way from the facts 18 surrounding the commission's general operation and its 19 lack of assertiveness in dealing with police complaints. 20 If one were to read annual report after annual report, 21 one would see that clearly the commission was not 22 energetically pursuing its statutory mandate. 23 Q. Well, that's a broad brush. Is that fair to say? 24 A. That's a broad brush. Yes, of course it is. 25 Q. I will debate it no longer with you because it is not 153 1 strictly within the terms of reference of the morality 2 of the individual commissioners. What is relevant here 3 is how the ICPC dealt with this complaint. 4 A. Yes. Uh-huh. 5 Q. And really this is not so much the position I play on 6 the pitch. So I am going to leave it, you will be glad 7 to hear, but suffice to say -- it has been repeated but 8 it merits endless repeating -- a man who took the stance 9 through his life and even joining the ICPC and working 10 as he did in your lifetime, have you come across as many 11 men who have as much integrity and quiet determination 12 as the late great Kevin Murnaghan? Have you met many 13 people like that in your life? 14 A. I have met precious few. 15 Q. Precious few. Thank you. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 17 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD 18 MR UNDERWOOD: Does it remain your evidence, as you set out 19 in paragraph 15 on page [82081], in the final sentence: 20 "Throughout the history of the ICPC it always had 21 the power to withhold a statement of satisfaction, but 22 it only refused to issue a statement in one case during 23 its existence"? 24 A. Yes, that's correct. 25 Q. Can I just ask you to enlarge a little on Mr Murnaghan's 154 1 fatal illness? That was an illness from which he 2 suffered during his time of supervising this particular 3 matter? 4 A. That's my recollection, yes. 5 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. 7 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much for coming, Mr Donnelly. 8 I am going to ask Ms Yates to deal with the two 9 statements I tried to read this morning but failed. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory? 11 MR McGRORY: Can I ask Mr Donnelly not to leave the building 12 while I seek to make a short submission to you? 13 THE CHAIRMAN: He can sit here, can he? 14 MR McGRORY: Yes. 15 At the risk of irritating the Panel and the Chair 16 further on this issue, I would welcome an opportunity to 17 perhaps expand a little bit on the argument that I seek 18 to make that in respect of this question of whether or 19 not it is a matter of law or a matter of evidence that 20 the ICPC could have included the new information about 21 the allegation of Reserve Constable Atkinson as part and 22 parcel of the very broad and unspecified complaint that 23 was made on the family's behalf that there was some 24 element of collusion between the police and the 25 suspects. 155 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 2 MR McGRORY: It would be my respectful submission, sir, that 3 the complaint was very broadly couched on behalf of the 4 family and coincidentally there was a self-referral -- 5 not self-referral -- a referral by the chief constable 6 on the strength of the media reports of unhappiness 7 within the Nationalist community that there had been 8 an element of collusion in the sense that the officers 9 did not intervene in the beating of Robert Hamill when 10 they could have done. 11 Now in my respectful submission the complaints 12 having been referred to the ICPC in those broad terms 13 allowed for an interpretation of the statutory remit of 14 the ICPC that would have included supervision of the 15 investigation of the new information coming from 16 Tracey Clarke on 10th May, that, in fact, one of those 17 officers had been making phone calls to one of the 18 suspects, that factually that was consistent with the 19 belief in the community that fuelled the original 20 complaint that there was a significant level of 21 collusion. My submission is that the ICPC may not have 22 needed a separate referral, because this was not 23 necessarily a new matter, and it would not have been 24 unreasonable for the ICPC to have taken the view that it 25 could have continued in its supervision. That's 156 1 a question I would have liked to have asked Mr Donnelly 2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. That's your submission? I am 3 against you. 4 Thank you, Mr Donnelly. We need not detain you 5 further. 6 (The witness withdrew) 7 MS YATES: Thank you, sir. I am reliably informed that the 8 statements are now on the system. 9 Statement of FRANCIS REEL (read) 10 Turning first to the statement of Francis Joseph 11 Reel at page [82049], this is statement is dated 8th 12 September 2009. In paragraph 2 Mr Reel tells the 13 Inquiry: 14 "I joined the RUC in 1959. In 1997 I was the 15 superintendent having responsibility for informal 16 resolutions in G Department, which was Complaints and 17 Discipline." 18 He then tells us in the penultimate part of that 19 paragraph: 20 "I retired on 19th December 1997." 21 In paragraph 3 he tells us: 22 "In 1997 I kept a daily journal. These were 23 destroyed when I retired." 24 Moving on to paragraph 5 on the next page, please, 25 [82050]: 157 1 "When cases were referred to the Complaints and 2 Discipline Department, the Superintendent New Complaints 3 would complete a form. On it he would indicate whether 4 the matter was to be referred to the RUC C&D or fell 5 within the terms of referring to the ICPC and he would 6 tick the necessary boxes. The civil servant staff would 7 pick that up from the superintendent's office and take 8 it down to their circuit registry, and it would be sent 9 from there. If it was urgent, it may have been taken by 10 hand or perhaps faxed. I cannot say for sure if any 11 forms were faxed." 12 In paragraph 7 he tells the Inquiry: 13 "[xxxxxxxxxxx] wrote a letter of complaint on 14 behalf of the Hamill family which was received by 15 Mr Anderson at Gough Barracks on 7 May 1997. It was 16 then routed back to G Department arriving on 17 9th May 1997. In this time Robert Hamill had died. The 18 paperwork with the letter from xxxx was referred 19 under Article 7 but the initial complaint was referred 20 under Article 8. 21 "A part 7 referral is where the chief constable 22 refers cases to the ICPC as a standard procedure and it 23 would be up to the ICPC whether they wished to supervise 24 or not. A part 8 referral is where the chief constable 25 could, because of circumstances, refer it to the ICPC 158 1 and they must then supervise it. The earlier complaint 2 was a part 8 referral from the deputy chief constable. 3 "I have been shown pages 63695 and 63701 which is 4 a form 17(2) in relation to the complaint made by 5 xxxxxxxxx on behalf of the Hamill family. I can 6 confirm", overleaf, [82051], "that the writing on it is 7 my handwriting and my signature. The typing on the form 8 would have been done by the typing pool following 9 Superintendent Macauley's instructions. Superintendent 10 Macauley received the complaint, which means that he 11 received xxxxxxxxxx's letter containing the 12 information. He would have filled in a blank form and 13 sent it down to typing. It would have been typed up and 14 sent back to Macauley to attach the other documentation 15 to the front of it." 16 Moving on to paragraph 12, sir: 17 "I filled in a pro forma on 9th May 1997 referring 18 the complaint to the ICPC which also went to the 19 investigating officer. At point 2, which is 'Previous 20 References to Commission', I wrote 'Article 8 referral 21 of incident'. That meant it had already been sent out 22 in relation to the incident. At point 3 I ticked the 23 box for an Article 7 referral." 24 Skipping then to paragraph 13: 25 "I have a recollection of something being said, 159 1 probably by Superintendent Macauley, to the extent that 2 the deputy chief constable had directed that the whole 3 matter be investigated by the detective chief 4 superintendent. I completed the form on behalf of 5 Superintendent", overleaf, [82552], "Macauley because 6 there was an urgency for the detective chief 7 superintendent to commence his investigation. If 8 Superintendent Macauley was going to be out of the 9 office later that day, then he would have arranged for 10 me to sign the form and send it on." 11 Turning then to paragraph 15: 12 "The deputy chief constable has the ultimate 13 responsibility for discipline within the force. There 14 was also an ACC in charge of the Complaints and 15 Discipline files. The chief constable could refer 16 matters under Article 8, if he wished to do so, but he 17 abrogated his responsibility either to the ACC of 18 G Department or the deputy chief constable as far as 19 discipline was concerned." 20 Moving on to paragraph 16: 21 "The deputy chief constable in 1997 was 22 Blair Wallace. Sir Ronnie Flanagan was the chief 23 constable, but he had not held that position for long. 24 I do not recall having any conversations with 25 Mr Wallace, ACC Hays or Mr Anderson about this matter. 160 1 Any conversations I had were with 2 Superintendent Macauley. 3 "I had nothing to do with the appointment of 4 DCS McBurney as the investigating officer. I was told 5 about it, by Superintendent Macauley, I think, and 6 I wrote it on the form. Mr McBurney was also the senior 7 investigating officer on the murder investigation. 8 "I did not hear anything said at this time regarding 9 a reserve constable having assisted an offender or 10 having advised that he should get rid of his clothing. 11 If such", overleaf, [82553] "an allegation had been 12 made, it should have been reported to C&D Department so 13 that an investigating officer would be appointed, in 14 this case Mr McBurney. 15 "As Mr McBurney was the senior investigating officer 16 on the murder investigation, he should have had the 17 information about such an allegation. If so, he should 18 have routed it to the head of G Department. If any 19 officer makes a complaint or refers something that is 20 improper to another officer, it would be sent off to 21 G Department. That would be recorded as an internal 22 discipline matter and an investigating officer would be 23 appointed. 24 "If the investigating officer believed that the 25 internal discipline matter impacted on another matter 161 1 that the ICPC were supervising, then we would make them 2 aware of it. If there was a serious criminal allegation 3 against one of the officers in the Land Rover, about 4 which the ICPC were supervising a complaint 5 investigation, then the allegation should have been 6 referred to the ICPC under Article 7. 7 "The deputy chief constable would be advised of the 8 allegations and it would be up to him to decide whether 9 or not there should be a suspension." 10 Statement of DANIEL MAGILL (read) 11 Sir, moving on to the statement of Daniel Magill at 12 page [82047], please. 13 This is dated 9th September 2009. In paragraph 2 14 Mr Magill tells the Inquiry: 15 "In 1997 I was the Deputy Director of the DPP 16 office. I had been in that post for five or six years 17 and I left the DPP in September 1997. 18 "I have no recollection of being involved in the 19 Hamill matter at all. 20 "I have been shown a file note [page number 31613] 21 on Deputy Director headed paper following a meeting held 22 on 12th May 1997. The note was signed on my behalf by 23 my secretary. It is copied to Mr Junkin, who was the 24 Senior Assistant Director at that time. According to 25 the file note, I met with Superintendent Hooke and 162 1 Superintendent McBurney. 2 "I have no recollection of this meeting whatsoever, 3 even having read the file note." 4 Moving on to paragraph 8 on the following page, 5 [82048]: 6 "If I had been told that the ICPC were supervising 7 a complaint against a police officer at the scene, 8 I imagine that I would have put that in the file note. 9 Additionally, if I had been told that there was 10 an allegation that a reserve constable had tipped off 11 a suspect to disclose of his clothing, I cannot imagine 12 any circumstance in which I would not have included that 13 in the file note. I would have considered these to be 14 relevant matters and I would have included all relevant 15 matters I was told in the note." 16 Sir, that completes the reading out of the statement 17 for today. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 19 MS YATES: Thank you. 20 MR UNDERWOOD: Which leads me to the final witness of the 21 today, which is Mr Armstrong. 22 MR McGUINNESS: I have a brief submission just as regards to 23 the statement that was read out of Mr Reel. I apologise 24 for cutting across. It may be that's either 25 a typographical error or it's a matter that isn't of 163 1 concern to the Panel, but I raise it now for the sake of 2 completeness. 3 At paragraph 15, at page [82052], of Mr -- 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Can we have it up again, please? 5 MR McGUINNESS: Paragraph 15, [82052], the suggestion: 6 "The deputy chief constable was the ultimate 7 responsibility for discipline within the force. There 8 was an ACC in charge of the Complaints and Discipline 9 files. The chief constable could refer matters under 10 Article 8, if he wished to do so, but he abrogated his 11 responsibility." 12 I wonder if that ought to have been "delegated". 13 MR UNDERWOOD: I certainly took it to mean that. 14 MR McGUINNESS: If there is no dispute about that, I am 15 happy. I am obliged. 16 MR UNDERWOOD: Mr Armstrong then, please. 17 MR DAVID KENNETH ARMSTRONG (sworn) 18 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD 19 MR UNDERWOOD: Good afternoon, Mr Armstrong. 20 A. Afternoon. 21 Q. Can you tell us your full names, please? 22 A. David Kenneth Armstrong. 23 Q. Thank you very much. Can you identify the two reports 24 you have kindly done for us? The first at [74592], 25 which runs to 85 pages. Let me just give you the final 164 1 page so we can see if it is the same document. 2 Page [74676]. Is that your first report? 3 A. That is. 4 Q. Thank you. The second one, can I invite your attention 5 to page [75268], please? Is that the start of the 6 second report? 7 A. That's correct. 8 Q. Thank you. I think the body of that finishes at 9 page [75296]. Is that correct? 10 A. That's correct. 11 Q. Because I am cut to the quick by Ms Dinsmore's 12 accusation that I never listen to her questions, I have 13 asked to be put up at page [75433] a schedule of those 14 witnesses whose evidence you have attended at the 15 hearing. Is that correct? 16 A. That's correct. 17 Q. Thank you. At page [75432], is that a list of 18 typographical errors that we find in the two reports? 19 A. And some grammar errors. That's correct. 20 Q. Subject to the typographical or grammar errors, are 21 those reports your evidence? 22 A. They are. 23 Q. I just want to ask you, in the light of the evidence you 24 have heard, the list we have seen, have you changed your 25 views at all? 165 1 A. No, I haven't changed my views. 2 Q. In the light of the evidence of Mr Murray, have you 3 changed any views you have reached about him? 4 A. No. 5 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much. If you just wait there, 6 I am sure there will be some more questions. 7 Questions from MR WOLFE 8 MR WOLFE: Just a number of brief questions, Mr Armstrong. 9 You joined the RUC in 1978 or 1979. Is that correct? 10 A. 1978, October 1978. 11 Q. That was, of course, at the height of the troubles as we 12 call them? 13 A. Yes. Well, during the '70s I dare say. Towards the 14 latter part of the '70s it was. 15 Q. You continued to serve into the RUC and then into the 16 PSNI. Isn't that right? 17 A. That's correct. 18 Q. As I understand it from your curriculum vitae, you have 19 experience of serving in a number of uniformed roles -- 20 A. I have. 21 Q. -- and then later moving into CID? 22 A. Yes. 21 of my 29 years has been spent in CID. 23 Q. In your time, you have investigated, I expect -- 24 A. All types of serious and violent crime. 25 Q. And you have experience of both policing in uniform and 166 1 in CID of what might be called sectarian crime? 2 A. Well, yes. I have to say I have had limited experience 3 in uniform duties up until around -- I think it was 4 around 1986. During that year, I was a sergeant in the 5 Mobile Support Unit for a few years, and which I have 6 indicated in my report that I spent some time in 7 Portadown and various other parts of Northern Ireland 8 dealing with public disorder. 9 Q. I just want to ask you a number of questions about the 10 ethos of the organisation which was the RUC? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Now, obviously, all organisations are made up of 13 individuals, some good and some bad? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. But in terms of the ethos that was handed down to you 16 by, I suppose, your superiors in the organisation, could 17 you say something about that ethos in terms of the 18 attitude of the organisation towards the protection of 19 all life in Northern Ireland? 20 A. Without a doubt. I have the privilege to say I have 21 served with many officers who had no fear or favour 22 towards either section of the community. 23 It was about doing your work, trying to, you know, 24 bring a service to the community and, ultimately, from 25 the point of CID detecting crime, both officers below me 167 1 and above me. 2 Obviously one of the things I have commented on was 3 about the training. Training was an issue and not one 4 that I am criticising, but one I am just trying to be 5 realistic about. The way the situation was in 6 Northern Ireland, there were certain competing demands 7 as regards what training -- what time was spent on 8 training and what type of training was provided. Public 9 order and firearms training were heavily resourced in 10 terms of, you know, putting people out on the street to 11 deal with the various difficult situations they were 12 confronted with. 13 Q. Is it fair to say, in terms of your understanding of the 14 ethos of the organisation, that it was an organisation 15 which directed its officers to show no fear or favour 16 towards either side of the community? 17 A. I was very proud to serve in the RUC. 18 Q. Do you agree that that was the ethos as you understood 19 it? 20 A. I do. 21 Q. In terms of police corruption, officers not doing their 22 job in accordance with that ethos, was that something 23 that was ever discussed in terms of communication from 24 the hierarchy about the tolerance of that kind of thing? 25 A. There was no tolerance given to that type of behaviour. 168 1 If it was found out, it was rooted out, in my 2 experience, and I have been involved in a number of 3 cases where that has happened. 4 Q. In terms of the policing of crime emanating from the 5 Loyalist side of the community, I understand that you 6 might be referred to statistics in due course, but did 7 the organisation, as you understood it, seek to police 8 Loyalist crime and Loyalist paramilitary crime? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Had you personal experience of that? 11 A. Of policing Loyalist crime? 12 Q. Yes. 13 A. Oh, yes. I think I have alluded to a couple of 14 investigations in relation to my CV in which I had 15 experience in Loyalist crime. Again, I go back to the 16 fact it was about providing a service. You have 17 a situation to deal with. You do it to the best, to the 18 utmost of your ability and the resources you have 19 available to you. 20 Obviously there are times, no doubt, you are 21 pressing to go on to the next incident that has happened 22 and you would like to spend more time on other cases you 23 have occasion to deal with, but again, I say it is about 24 prioritising, about doing your best. 25 Q. Now, this Inquiry will be primarily focused on what was 169 1 the actual situation in Portadown in April 1997 and 2 thereafter in terms of its impact on the various 3 investigations, but I suspect it might be helpful if we 4 had a snapshot of the generality as you understand it. 5 In 1997, were you a serving CID officer? 6 A. No, I wasn't. 7 Q. You weren't? 8 A. No, I wasn't. I was in Complaints and Discipline at the 9 time. I was there for roughly two and a half years. 10 I have alluded to that in my report, my main report. 11 Q. You had been in CID until 1995? 12 A. Yes. I had been five years a detective inspector 13 serving in various parts of the province. 14 Q. And then Complaints and Discipline until 1998? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Then back into CID as a detective chief inspector? 17 A. That's right. I was promoted back into CID. 18 Q. Now, through the 1990s, with the troubles still on the 19 boil, what, if any, impact was that having on CID and 20 its work? 21 A. Well, as I say, I have tried to give some sort of 22 contextualisation about some of the figures I provided, 23 and in particular table 5 is an indication about the -- 24 obviously the increase in shootings and bombings, 25 intimidation and public disorder crime and murders and 170 1 the type of murders that they were. 2 There is security situation murders, where -- ones 3 which have a sectarian or terrorism influence to them. 4 Those are ultimately your more difficult and the ones it 5 was less likely to get some detection because of the 6 fear factor and the obvious methods that were employed 7 to avoid detection. 8 So, I mean, what I am saying is the demands were 9 still there, the commitment -- the heavy demands, I have 10 to say, in terms of the workload, particularly for CID, 11 because when there was public disorder, there was 12 serious crime. We didn't have the resources to bring in 13 to add, like I have experienced in public order 14 situations where uniform officers from all over the 15 province come to a particular location to assist with 16 that problem. You didn't have the same luxury in CID. 17 Q. You also touch upon training in your report. I think 18 there is a suggestion that really -- correct me if I am 19 wrong on this impression -- training sometimes was 20 a luxury which CID officers often didn't get the benefit 21 of because of their work commitment. 22 A. Well, because of the work commitment and also the 23 demands upon training within the organisation. As 24 I say, there is an appendix Z12 that I refer to and it 25 gives an indication of the type of training over seven 171 1 or eight years to give the Panel a bit of -- to draw 2 their own conclusions as to what was provided and what 3 was not. 4 So, yes, from my experience, I have given my 5 experience in internal training, but it doesn't take 6 away from the actual internal training by working with 7 more experienced officers and the influence they had on 8 me and others in investigation of crime, which 9 ultimately, you know, built one's experience, one's 10 improvement in terms of how you went about various 11 investigations when you were confronted with them. 12 Q. Now, Mr Murray in his report touched upon his concerns 13 about the securing of the crime scene and, secondly, 14 about the whole issue of debriefing. 15 A. Uh-huh. 16 Q. Those are obviously a matter of record in his report, 17 and I think you share some of those concerns. Isn't 18 that right? 19 A. Yes. I share concerns. I acknowledge the comments made 20 by Mr Murray in respect of those areas, but I have to 21 turn to what in practice -- in practical terms was 22 available, what was happening on the ground. 23 There were scenes you'd go to and, yes, you have the 24 seal scene law, if you have a good briefing from 25 a senior officer on the ground and you take it from 172 1 there. But then there were the other occasions where 2 you went and you didn't have the luxury of a scene 3 cordoned off. You had to instruct, you had to show 4 initiative to people to take things forward. 5 Again, that goes back to looking at people's 6 training and experience and the resources they had 7 available, because sometimes resources at scenes didn't 8 have the tape, they didn't have the measures -- the 9 means to protect evidence. I have to say some of them 10 didn't have the awareness or the ability. Again, from 11 an investigator's point, that's something I learned 12 going along by experience. I would simply say that 13 certain situations in my past experience, I could see 14 being faced with the same difficulties that this 15 investigation provided. 16 Q. Moving to the specific of the 27th April 1997, one of 17 the concerns expressed by Mr Murray was in terms of the 18 handling of the crime scene. 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. What I want to ask you about is this: since that time -- 21 I think you alluded to this in your report -- is it fair 22 say there have been instituted a series of developments 23 and improvements to the whole management of crime scenes 24 within the PSNI? 25 A. You wouldn't recognise it in terms of the changes that 173 1 have been taken forward, and, again, I go -- the 2 organisation, I would suggest, in my humble opinion, has 3 had the opportunity to put in place those changes to 4 provide that level of training, to provide the dedicated 5 resources to concentrate on this type of crime and even 6 to provide the actual facilities. 7 You didn't have dedicated facilities that I could 8 take a team to investigate a murder. You were having to 9 look for an office, part of the CID office, look for 10 somebody to give up their office for a week or so. You 11 know, these were the things you were faced with, but 12 people got on with it and people did the best they 13 could. Certainly, as I have said, you know, I would 14 love to have spent a lot more time on many 15 investigations. 16 Q. Some of the things you allude to in your report such as 17 crime scene managers -- 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. -- dedicated -- just to define that, they are dedicated 20 people with responsibility to take over a crime scene 21 and to direct particular actions? 22 A. Yes. Well, I mean, in a situation in 1998 I can refer 23 to when I returned to CID, you may have an incident. In 24 an incident during the night there were two officers 25 available, Scenes of Crime Officers who were available 174 1 on-call. They could only be called out on specific 2 levels of crime -- in other words, a serious crime -- 3 but, when they were called out, you could be faced with 4 a Scenes of Crime Officer coming to you who was 5 inexperienced, had maybe only six months or a year's 6 experience on the job. Then you had to call a more 7 senior officer, because you wanted to get that level of 8 scrutiny in terms of making sure that you had covered 9 all the detail in terms of the scene. So that has 10 changed dramatically now. 11 You have crime scene managers, highly trained 12 officers who come out and lead on a scene, assist the 13 SIO in terms of what's required and the debriefing and 14 the priorities that one should aim for in terms of 15 detecting or forensic work that's required. 16 Q. What, in short, has been the trigger for these changes? 17 You say you wouldn't recognise it. Has it come through 18 Patten? Has it been because of the breathing space 19 allowed upon, if you like, the conclusion of the 20 troubles as we once knew them? 21 A. Well, the RUC and the PSNI have been, I would suggest, 22 one of the most scrutinised police organisations in the 23 world, certainly in the UK, and that there, the HMIC 24 reports that have been referred to already. I referred 25 to one in 2005 which released the crime scene 175 1 investigations as still being a problem. 2 But the like of taking on the review process which 3 I was involved in setting up in 2001-2002, where 4 undetected murders, after 28 days, were scrutinised very 5 closely, that in itself triggered a lot of the changes 6 that took place. One of the biggest being in terms of 7 recording information at scenes. 8 The scene logs have now changed in terms of the 9 scrutiny, the information that's required. You will see 10 now, when you look at the TV, you will see people going 11 into scenes and they will be wearing suits. That was 12 all brought about by review, because people were 13 scrutinised. TV programmes became the subject of 14 morning briefings. There is a scene. People are going 15 in with no personal protective equipment. So they are 16 the subject of scrutiny there and then. So a lot of 17 changes have taken place following. 18 You could be right. It could be down to the peace 19 process that has taken place and the lack -- the demands 20 not being as great as what they have been in the past. 21 I can't really put my finger on it, but certainly 22 I wouldn't recognise the organisation now in the last 23 ten years. 24 MR WOLFE: Thank you, Mr Armstrong. 25 176 1 Questions from MR O'HARE 2 MR O'HARE: There is just one matter I would like to touch 3 on. Mr Armstrong, in the main body of your report you 4 have dealt with various statistics. Isn't that correct? 5 A. That's correct. 6 Q. Yesterday, I understand you were given a further set of 7 statistics -- 8 A. Yes, I have them here. 9 Q. -- and those statistics were actually prepared. It 10 starts at page [75409], sir. The actual page need not 11 be brought up on the screen. Those statistics were 12 prepared by the Crime Branch of the RUC and that was in 13 preparation of an extradition hearing against several 14 individuals who were wanted in the north of Ireland? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. The statistics set out details of the numbers of persons 17 murdered on the following pages, shooting incidents, 18 bombing incidents, public order type incidents. 19 Perhaps page [75415] could be brought up, please? 20 This deals with arrests under section 14 of the 21 Prevention of Terrorism Act. It outlines the statistics 22 from 1991 until June of 1996. 23 Do you remember the Kevin Barry extradition case? 24 A. I don't know the details of it. I am familiar with the 25 individual and -- 177 1 Q. It was a case that commenced in the late 1990s, but ran 2 several years due to the appeals process in America when 3 the individuals were fighting the extradition, as it 4 were. 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Those figures there set out the arrests on a yearly 7 basis up to 30th June, it appears, when the statistics 8 were concluded. 9 Perhaps page [75416] could be put up, please? 10 Again, this shows the prosecution and outcomes in 11 Northern Ireland of scheduled defendants in 1994. When 12 I say scheduled defendants, those were defendants who 13 were tried in what was known as the Diplock courts, 14 non-jury courts? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. It gives the details of Loyalists and Republicans. 17 Proceeded against under Loyalists, we see 269, 67%. In 18 fact, it would appear the total number proceeded against 19 for Loyalists and Republicans in that year were 399, of 20 which 67% of those cases dealt with were against 21 Loyalists. 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. When Mr Wolfe was asking you about, was any favour shown 24 to either -- any side of the community in the 25 prosecution of offences, does that occur with your 178 1 experience throughout your years serving with the RUC 2 and latterly the PSNI? 3 A. Yes, as I have said, absolutely. 4 Q. If we go over the page, [75417], again we will see 5 proceeded against, a figure of 265 Loyalists, which was 6 63% of the cases that were dealt with in that year. 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Again, that would accord with your experience that no 9 favour was shown to one side of the community or the 10 other? 11 A. Absolutely, yes. 12 MR O'HARE: Thank you, Mr Armstrong. 13 MR McGRORY: No questions, sir. 14 MS DINSMORE: No questions. 15 MR UNDERWOOD: There is nothing arising. Thank you. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. 17 A. Thank you. 18 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much, Mr Armstrong. 19 (The witness withdrew) 20 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, that then concludes the evidence of the 21 Inquiry. 22 Can I set out what is proposed to happen next? 23 The Inquiry will present closing written submissions 24 to those who will be entitled to make further 25 submissions and it proposes to do those by 8th October. 179 1 I think it is now well-known that the format of those 2 will be that they will attempt to set out the issues 3 which might be necessary for you to decide, set out 4 under each of those issues what appears to be the 5 relevant evidence by way of summary and then set out 6 a commentary under each of those issues. 7 It is not my intention and certainly is not my task, 8 I would apprehend, to attempt to suggest any resolution 9 of any issue that emerges, but it will be my task to set 10 out what criticism might emerge of any individual or 11 organisation -- might reasonably emerge from the 12 evidence under any such issue. 13 What will then happen is that those who are entitled 14 to respond will have until 6th November to do so in 15 writing, and provisions made electronically for them to 16 comment against each issue, each piece of the summaries 17 of evidence and each commentary, and it is then 18 anticipated that in the week commencing 9th November the 19 Inquiry will serve a composite document setting out 20 everybody's commentary in that format. We will then 21 commence oral closing submissions on 16th November with 22 a view to finishing them with a break at 18th December. 23 What I will endeavour to do between the arrival 24 everywhere of the composite document and the start of 25 the oral closing submissions is to attempt to identify 180 1 what degree of agreement and disagreement there is about 2 issues, so I at least can focus my oral submissions 3 about the evidence on directing you to the pieces of 4 evidence which I apprehend at least may assist you most 5 in determining what is in disagreement. 6 So that's where we propose to go as at this stage. 7 I can only say to my friends thank you very much. 8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 9 Well, we are on Day 68 and have concluded all our 10 evidence. I would like to, on behalf of the Panel, 11 thank all those who have appeared before us and those 12 who have advised them for the help they have given, and 13 given to Counsel to the Inquiry, and the spirit of 14 cooperation and goodwill, and, I hope, good cheer, that 15 has helped the Inquiry to go along smoothly and to reach 16 this stage. We would like to thank all of you. 17 MR WOLFE: Thank you, sir. 18 MR ADAIR: Thank you, sir. 19 (3.35 pm) 20 (The hearing adjourned until 16th November 2009) 21 22 --ooOoo-- 23 24 25 181 1 I N D E X 2 3 MR COLIN JOHN MURRAY (cont.) ..................... 1 4 Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 1 Questions from MS DINSMORE ................ 15 5 Questions from MR O'CONNOR ................ 24 Questions from THE PANEL .................. 49 6 Statement of ALF ANNESLEY (read) ................. 52 7 Interview of CONOR BLACK (read) .................. 53 8 Interview of PHILIP CURRAN (read) ................ 55 9 Statement of MICHELLE JAMIESON ................... 59 10 (read) 11 Statement of ELIZABETH IRENE McKEE ............... 61 (read) 12 Statement and interview of BEATRIX ............... 62 13 CAMPBELL (read) 14 Statement of FATHER SEAN DOOLEY .................. 67 (read) 15 Statement of MAURICE HEWITT (read) ............... 68 16 Statement of MR HUGHES (read) .................... 70 17 Interview of DAVID GRAY (read) ................... 71 18 Interview of ROBERT JAMESON (read) ............... 74 19 Statement of PAUL ADAMSON (read) ................. 77 20 Statement and Interview of TREVOR ................ 78 21 ANDERSON (read) 22 Statement of DENISE CORNETT (read) ............... 87 23 Statement of P18 (read) .......................... 99 24 Statement of MICHAEL PORTER (read) ............... 99 25 Statement of CARL SIMPSON (read) ................. 101 182 1 Statement of RAYMOND KITSON (read) ............... 102 2 Statement of JOHN STEELE (read) .................. 104 3 MR SIMON THOMAS ALAN ROGERS (sworn) .............. 106 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 106 4 Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 110 5 MR PAUL DONNELLY (affirmed) ...................... 131 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 131 6 Questions from MR ADAIR ................... 132 Questions from MR McGRORY ................ 135 7 Questions from MS DINSMORE ................ 146 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD ....... 154 8 Statement of FRANCIS REEL (read) ................. 157 9 Statement of DANIEL MAGILL (read) ................ 162 10 MR DAVID KENNETH ARMSTRONG (sworn) ............... 164 11 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 164 Questions from MR WOLFE ................... 166 12 Questions from MR O'HARE .................. 177 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 183