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Hearing: 2nd September 2009, day 55
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PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF
ROBERT HAMILL
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Held at:
Interpoint
20-24 York Street
Belfast
on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
commencing at 10.00 am
Day 55
1 Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
2 (10.00 am)
3 (In open session)
4 MR UNDERWOOD: William McCreesh, please.
5 MR WILLIAM DESMOND McCREESH (sworn)
6 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD
7 MR UNDERWOOD: Good morning, Mr McCreesh. My name is
8 Underwood. I am Counsel to the Inquiry. I have a few
9 questions for you. It may well be that, after that,
10 there will be some supplementals from others here.
11 Can I ask your full names, please.
12 A. My full name is William Desmond McCreesh.
13 Q. I know we have drafted a statement for you. I hope we
14 can get that up on screen at page [81919]. I think you
15 have had the opportunity to look through this and there
16 are some changes you would like to make. Is that fair?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. Do you want me to run through it or would you --
19 A. Well, I haven't got the statement on my screen.
20 Q. Naturally. Perhaps we can have your screen fixed.
21 MR UNDERWOOD: Tell you what, Mr McCreesh. Let's be
22 old-fashioned.
23 A. I may have a copy. That's fine. Thank you.
24 Q. Would you prefer me to run through this or would you
25 like to point out any particular --
1
1 A. No, I will respond to any questions, and where, with
2 respect, I say I may not have been accurate or disagree,
3 I will try and clarify to the Inquiry.
4 Q. I have some general questions for you anyway. You talk
5 in your statement around paragraphs 6-11 about your
6 experience in Portadown and sectarian clashes. I just
7 wonder if you could help us in expanding on that.
8 Was the position in 1997 that tensions were still
9 running high in Portadown?
10 A. Tensions were still running high in Portadown at that
11 particular time, yes.
12 Q. You told us in your statement that it was quite
13 commonplace to have a Land Rover parked in the middle of
14 town at the weekend to police possible clashes.
15 A. That would be common practice, particularly on Friday
16 and Saturday nights.
17 Q. Can you tell us what would generally have happened if
18 a Land Rover was there and a fight broke out? Would the
19 police have been expected to get out or would they have
20 been expected to call for back-up, or what would happen?
21 A. Well, obviously in that particular location I would have
22 expected them to get out and certainly -- their function
23 in being there was to deal with any public order
24 situations and their mere presence to act as
25 a deterrent.
2
1 Q. Really what I am getting at is what happens if it did
2 not act as a deterrent? What would you have expected
3 back then if, say, a group of 40 or 50 people had
4 started fighting in the presence of a Land Rover with
5 four officers in it?
6 A. I would have expected some kind of intervention to
7 ensure a bad enough situation didn't deteriorate
8 further.
9 Q. If a police officer who was expected to police that sort
10 of event was a local officer, would you have expected
11 him to have any reservations about getting involved?
12 A. Absolutely none.
13 Q. Was there any feeling amongst those officers who lived
14 locally that this was the job from hell, having to
15 police their local area?
16 A. Well, put it like this: the police in Portadown during
17 this particular period could well be described as being
18 in a sort of hell, because it was extremely difficult in
19 all aspects of it because there was content tension in
20 the Portadown area over these years.
21 Q. We have had some evidence that the police, as it were,
22 got it from both sides. They weren't popular with
23 either the local Protestant community or the Catholics.
24 A. Well, there is absolutely no doubt of that. I can speak
25 from personal experience on that. I certainly got it
3
1 from both sides of the community, without reservation
2 may I state.
3 Q. Thank you. I want to move on to the question of what
4 happened when you were notified about the events
5 involving Mr Hamill and what you would have expected to
6 have happened on the ground.
7 It looks like, if we look at paragraph 11 onwards of
8 your draft -- it seems likely by the look of it that
9 Inspector McCrum is the one who told you what had
10 happened?
11 A. As far as I can recall, it was Inspector McCrum rang me
12 at some time and told me there had been a public order
13 incident in Portadown.
14 Q. Then what you helpfully deal with over the next couple
15 of paragraphs or so there is what you would have done
16 yourself and what you would have expected to have
17 happened at the police station. I want to ask you a bit
18 more about that, if I may.
19 We know that there was in essence a riot, a large
20 gathering of people scrapping with a fairly large
21 number of police intervening at some point, and that two
22 people were taken away by ambulance, and that at least
23 one, probably two, of the officers thought that one of
24 the two men taken away was seriously injured, perhaps
25 stabbed, and was rasping for breath and was in real
4
1 difficulties.
2 Now, we also know that, as far as we can tell, no
3 senior officer at the scene talked to any of the
4 officers at the scene to find that out. Can you help us
5 from your experience at all levels in this area whether
6 you would have expected a senior officer at the scene to
7 have gone round before he let the officers go off to
8 other duties and asked about what had happened?
9 A. I certainly would. It is very easy from an objective
10 standpoint to say what should have happened or what
11 should have happened, bearing in mind you are dealing
12 with a confused and volatile situation.
13 However, I would have expected at the least that
14 some contact would have been made with these, the police
15 officers involved, to at least get a preliminary brief
16 of exactly what happened and what went on
17 Q. All right. Then we know you were surprised when you
18 discovered from the Inquiry interview that officers had,
19 in fact, been let to go home before they made
20 statements.
21 Can I ask you again -- never mind what would have
22 happened precisely at the scene -- would you have
23 regarded it as absolutely normal for there to be some
24 sort of debriefing before people were let to go off
25 duty?
5
1 A. I would have certainly regarded there should be some
2 type of debriefing, even a preliminary debriefing to at
3 least establish the basic facts as to what was going on
4 or what had happened.
5 Q. Again, you helpfully tell us in your statement that you
6 would have expected the police officers to have been
7 asked about identities of people who were at the scene.
8 Can I ask you to help on just what sort of
9 debriefing you would have expected? Would this have
10 been a formal business or would it just have been
11 getting the officers together to put notebooks together,
12 or what would it have been?
13 A. It would depend on the circumstances. If it had been
14 a very serious incident in which life was imminent, one
15 would have expected a fairly comprehensive initial
16 Inquiry.
17 If, in fact, as indications were, two people had
18 been taken to hospital, one believed to be serious,
19 I would have thought at the very least it would have
20 been a preliminary thing. There might also have been
21 a consideration that the police officers involved in
22 a traumatic experience, whoever decided they could go
23 off duty, might have been working on the premise that
24 they had been caught up in a conflict situation. Maybe
25 it wouldn't have been a bad thing to let them go home,
6
1 say, clean up and come back in at a very early stage to
2 put them through a comprehensive interview.
3 Q. Had anybody put their mind to it, in other words, it
4 would have been a plausible response to let the four
5 officers in the Land Rover go home to sort themselves
6 out before they were brought back in, as long as that
7 was a thought-out strategy. Is that your point?
8 A. It could have been a thought-out strategy. As I say, it
9 is -- what I am trying to emphasise for the benefit of
10 the Inquiry, this was obviously a traumatic situation
11 not only for the unfortunate people -- civilians
12 involved, but obviously for police officers to a certain
13 extent, and basically there might have been a rationale
14 rather than keeping them for hours and doing
15 an exhaustive debrief to get the preliminaries and make
16 arrangements for them to come in where they could be
17 comprehensively and accurately interviewed.
18 Q. So a plausible strategy would have been preliminary
19 debrief, then let them go and have some time?
20 A. That could have been, say, my point. It would depend on
21 the circumstances.
22 Q. Obviously, we will ask Inspector McCrum whether he had
23 that strategy, but as far as you are concerned, if that
24 was the thought-out strategy, that would have been
25 a reasonable one?
7
1 A. It would have been a reasonable one in the
2 circumstances.
3 Q. But you would have still had some preliminary
4 debriefing?
5 A. Obviously. It would need some initial enquiries.
6 I mean, you have to have a starting point.
7 Q. Is there anything else that you have discerned from what
8 you now know happened that you can help us on?
9 For example, is there any part of what you have
10 learned about scene preservation or any other
11 early-stage response that struck you as wrong or odd?
12 A. Very -- in an ideal world, it would be scene
13 preservation and everything by the book. In a volatile
14 situation it's very -- sometimes extremely difficult,
15 particularly when you have loads of people running about
16 and basically a riot situation in Portadown.
17 There were CID at that scene involved in this and
18 certainly they have an investigatory expertise
19 Q. We know the CID were on the scene by 5 o'clock or
20 6 o'clock?
21 A. They were on the scene.
22 Q. Our understanding is, as soon as they get on the scene,
23 they assume responsibility.
24 A. That's exactly right. On my preliminary debriefing of
25 Inspector McCrum -- and I hope this is accurate -- I was
8
1 told CID were at the scene and that the matter was
2 currently under active investigation.
3 Q. Right. That's very helpful. Thank you very much
4 indeed.
5 A. May I just clarify one thing, if I may with, the
6 approval of the Inquiry?
7 Q. Of course.
8 A. I may have stated at some time that, following the
9 Monday, I basically may have had no further dealings
10 with this and that ACC Hall, who I understand is
11 possibly giving evidence to the Inquiry, would have been
12 involved.
13 I may, in fact, in hindsight, have been wrong in
14 that, and that Mr Hall may not have been actually in the
15 Regional Headquarters on the Monday and Tuesday. By way
16 of illustration, I am fairly certain that on the Sunday,
17 and certainly on the Monday, that I had discussions with
18 certain senior CID officers as to the nature and type of
19 this investigation.
20 I know -- I am fairly certain I had discussions with
21 senior officers in J Division, that is Portadown, to
22 ensure that extra resources were put into the Portadown
23 area, because this type of incident would undoubtedly
24 add tremendously to existing tension.
25 Q. That's helpful. Thank you. So is it your impression
9
1 that in at least the days following this incident, there
2 was a sufficiency of resources in Portadown to deal with
3 this?
4 A. There certainly -- there had to be. I was in charge of
5 HMU, which is a response, namely the riot squad.
6 Q. Uh-huh.
7 A. I would have dealt with the resources. At no stage was
8 I asked for additional resources to supplement the
9 ongoing inquiry.
10 MR UNDERWOOD: That's very kind. Thank you very much. As
11 I say, there may be some supplemental questions.
12 MR ADAIR: I have no questions, sir.
13 Questions from MR McGRORY
14 MR McGRORY: I may have a few questions, sir, if I may.
15 My name is McGrory and I represent the family of
16 Robert Hamill. I would have a small number of questions
17 for you.
18 Can you help us just -- maybe I have overlooked
19 this -- with the time that you received the phone call,
20 the time of the night? Can you remember, was it closer
21 to breakfast time or was it in the middle of the night?
22 A. Now, to be absolutely accurate, it's impossible.
23 I would imagine, and this is going back over 12 years,
24 it possibly could have been maybe 5.00, 6.00, 7.00 am,
25 possibly somewhere there.
10
1 Q. It was later in the morning rather than earlier?
2 A. Yes, because, again, I emphasise to the best of my
3 knowledge I can recall being told that CID were at the
4 scene.
5 Q. That would help us put it after 5.00 to 6.00 am. So
6 that's helpful.
7 Can you recall if you specifically directed that
8 clothes be obtained or -- because you say in your
9 statement that that's something you would have done. Is
10 that a specific recollection?
11 A. It is not a specific recollection, but I certainly
12 enquired were police at the hospital or on their way to
13 the hospital and I was told that they were.
14 For me to sit here and tell the Inquiry that I can
15 recall specifically and accurately what specific
16 directions I gave, I am not prepared to say something
17 that I can't stand over 100%.
18 Q. Of course not. Thank you. That's very helpful.
19 If I could just ask you some general questions about
20 Portadown and your experience of it, because you are
21 someone who has had direct experience of the marching
22 controversy in Portadown from the early days of the
23 marches through the tunnel in the 1980s. Isn't that
24 correct?
25 A. That's correct.
11
1 Q. That would have been one of the first occasions when
2 marching issue was directly confronted by the RUC in the
3 sense that marches were stopped going through a specific
4 area. Isn't that correct?
5 A. That is absolutely correct.
6 Q. I think it goes without saying that the majority of the
7 police force came from within the Protestant community.
8 That was a reality?
9 A. That was a reality, yes, at that time.
10 Q. I don't want to get into debates about why that is or
11 the rights or wrongs of it. It was a fact.
12 This caused, undoubtedly, tensions within the RUC in
13 terms of police officers having to go and police members
14 of their own community in the context of these marches.
15 A. It possibly caused some degree of tension, bearing in
16 mind that a lot of police officers would live amongst
17 where the marchers lived.
18 Q. Indeed. For that very reason, you said you had personal
19 experience of this -- it is because the police officers
20 lived within -- came from within the Protestant
21 community and lived within the Protestant community that
22 they were, in a sense, vulnerable to pressures about
23 policing?
24 A. No. I think we had better get this in perspective.
25 When you adorned the RUC uniform -- everybody has
12
1 personalised feelings. You went out to do your duty and
2 your duty was done. I was instrumental in the first
3 rerouting of these parades and so on and I knew what
4 people suffered, but I would certainly assure the
5 Inquiry that the role that was detailed was, in fact,
6 carried out to the best of the RUC's ability.
7 Q. Oh, yes. Let me make it clear to you, Mr McCreesh, I am
8 not suggesting to you for a moment that the police
9 officers didn't do that, but that in doing so that
10 exposed them to possible vilification and attack and
11 pressure from within their own community from those who
12 didn't see it that way?
13 A. I have certainly little doubt that various police
14 officers were subject to ridicule and criticism from
15 certain sections of the community and possibly from
16 people who reside in areas where they themselves
17 resided.
18 Q. Yes. Thank you. The other issue I want to touch on is
19 a comment in your statement about the way in which the
20 Protestant community viewed the centre of Portadown.
21 You said they regarded it as their own?
22 A. I would certainly say that. Portadown has a reputation,
23 well-known to everyone, as a very Loyalist community.
24 Certainly, elements in that, in the Portadown
25 population, would regard the centre of Portadown as
13
1 their territory, whereas the tunnel, say the upper end
2 of Garvaghy Road, would be regarded as Catholic
3 territory for want of a better word.
4 Q. It would follow from that then that Catholics veering
5 into the territory that you speak about, where
6 Protestants regarded it as their own, the centre of
7 Portadown beyond the junction of the centre over towards
8 St Patrick's Hall, would have been very much aware that
9 they were in different territory. Isn't that correct?
10 A. They certainly would. What you are leading to is people
11 going to St Patrick's Hall. I would like to assure the
12 Inquiry St Patrick's Hall has been in existence for
13 many, many years and many, many people would go back and
14 forward to there without any chastisement, shall I say,
15 but if there was a younger element suddenly appeared in
16 that area who were identified, shall we say, as coming
17 from the tunnel area and so on, they would be
18 undoubtedly very conscious that this was what was
19 regarded as Loyalist territory.
20 MR McGRORY: Yes. Thank you very much, Mr McCreesh.
21 A. Thank you.
22 MS DINSMORE: No questions.
23 Questions from MR O'CONNOR
24 MR O'CONNOR: A couple of questions. I represent
25 Inspector McCrum in this Inquiry. When Inspector McCrum
14
1 phoned you, you don't know whether it was 5.00, 6.00 or
2 7.00 in the morning; it could be as early as 5.00 in the
3 morning or as late as 7.00 in the morning. Is that
4 right?
5 A. It could be. I have simply no recollection of the time.
6 Q. He had already telephoned the CID, the duty CID
7 detective, by the time he was talking to you. Do you
8 remember that?
9 A. I think that is correct. In fact, when I talked to
10 Inspector McCrum, he told me that CID were certainly on
11 the ground.
12 Q. That meant he had phoned CID and then was reporting to
13 you what had been done by that stage by the time he was
14 phoning you?
15 A. Yes. I mean, I am sure Inspector McCrum at this
16 particular time for a number of hours was fairly active
17 on the street between one thing and another --
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. -- and probably phoned me at the first reasonable
20 opportunity he got.
21 Q. I am just going to go back in a minute or two. What
22 I wanted to just clarify was, at the time he telephoned
23 you, do you remember how long the conversation was?
24 A. I have no idea.
25 Q. Do you remember if, by the end of the conversation, you
15
1 were satisfied that everything that could be done was
2 being done or had been done?
3 A. I was satisfied that CID were on the ground --
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. -- and that there was an active investigation on the
6 way.
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. I was also satisfied that the hospital had been
9 visited --
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. -- and that a situation which was probably a riot
12 situation, that this situation in Portadown had been at
13 least stabilised and we weren't ending up with
14 an ongoing riot.
15 Q. Yes. The evidence is that Inspector McCrum arrived at
16 the screen at about 1.51 am. Then, after he was
17 satisfied that the situation was under control, he left
18 as duty inspector of Banbridge, and Lurgan police
19 station also. He went to do his duties in those two
20 police stations before returning to Portadown Police
21 Station. Are you aware of that?
22 A. No, I am not aware of that.
23 Q. What on the ground happened was the duty sergeant was
24 Sergeant P89 Inspector McCrum left the scene to go
25 and do other duties, because he was duty inspector in
16
1 three police stations that night. Would that have been
2 normal?
3 A. That would have been normal, yes.
4 Q. Would you call that a heavy workload?
5 A. It certainly was a heavy workload.
6 Q. Was it fair for him to go and do his other duties in
7 those circumstances?
8 A. Well, the point was -- I don't want to give the Inquiry
9 the impression that every weekend the duty inspector --
10 it was turmoil in any shape or form. He would have been
11 active, but it would depend on the circumstances of what
12 was happening in, say, Banbridge and other places.
13 Q. The debrief then you are talking about you might have
14 expected of the Land Rover crew when they came off duty,
15 I want to discuss that briefly with you.
16 There was a duty sergeant in the police station,
17 Sergeant P89. Inspector McCrum was in Lurgan and
18 Banbridge at the time the Land Rover crew came off duty.
19 So when he returned at 4 o'clock in the morning to the
20 station, the Land Rover crew had already gone. Do you
21 understand?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Who would have, in those circumstances, been responsible
24 for a debrief?
25 A. Well, I think you must never lose sight of the fact that
17
1 in actual fact there were CID on the ground.
2 Q. The CID was called some time after, about 4.30. So what
3 happened was that Inspector McCrum came back about
4 4 o'clock after being in Lurgan and Banbridge. He
5 didn't have enough information from the hospital, so he
6 lifted the telephone and spoke to the senior house
7 officer in the hospital. At that stage, he learned of
8 the seriousness of Robert Hamill's injuries and then he
9 telephoned the Detective Constable in CID, Don Keys.
10 Now, in those circumstances, and there being a duty
11 inspector at the station when the Land Rover crew comes
12 off, who would you have expected to debrief the
13 Land Rover crew?
14 A. If, in fact, the duty inspector had been there, I would
15 have expected him to do an initial debrief.
16 Q. He was not there. The duty sergeant was there. In
17 those circumstances, who would you have expected to do
18 the debrief?
19 A. I would have expected certainly at least some officer of
20 some description to do albeit a preliminary debrief.
21 What I would have expected -- basically, it is
22 irrelevant and immaterial the rank of the person to
23 a certain extent, but that the initial thing was that
24 there would be an initial debrief.
25 I would also point out that when I enquired as to
18
1 the seriousness of the person who had been admitted to
2 Craigavon Hospital, I was told that it was serious, but
3 I would like to inform the Inquiry that at no stage was
4 I ever informed that we were talking something that was
5 life-threatening
6 Q. Yes. There is another aspect also to the debrief. I am
7 suggesting to you that in the circumstances I have
8 outlined, if the Inquiry finds that that, in fact, on
9 the ground was the circumstances, that Sergeant P89
10 would have been expected to debrief the Land Rover crew
11 coming off duty. Is that fair?
12 A. It's a possibility.
13 Q. A possibility?
14 A. But one would also then ask the question what, if any,
15 liaison there would have been between Sergeant P89
16 and, as I now know it, Inspector McCrum.
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. I don't know.
19 Q. In terms of the debrief there has been some evidence
20 about the 15-minute handover period between shifts. Do
21 you remember around that time that was the time period
22 allowed?
23 A. There was. There was a period of brief and debrief,
24 15 minutes' overlap.
25 Q. As I understand it, it was 15 minutes between shifts so
19
1 that there was a 15-minute period allowed in the wages
2 of the police officers for the overlap between shifts?
3 A. Possibly that could be correct, yes.
4 Q. But it wasn't 15 minutes at the start and 15 minutes at
5 the end, it was 15 minutes in total. Is that right?
6 A. I can't comment. I don't basically know.
7 However, I would like to assist the Inquiry in this.
8 What I would be informed in is not the rigid uniformity
9 brief or debrief. The issue I would be concerned with
10 was that there was a period of debrief, not necessarily
11 comprehensively, but enough to establish the basic
12 rights and objectivity of what had actually happened in
13 Portadown.
14 Q. Well, Inspector McCrum got back at 4 o'clock and the
15 Land Rover crew had gone off, I think, some time within
16 the hour before that. They were recalled, I think,
17 within a period of about just over half an hour.
18 In other words, the inspector spoke to the
19 detective. They agreed that the Land Rover crew should
20 be recalled, and they were recalled, so that the
21 Land Rover crew were out of the station perhaps for
22 an hour, an hour and a half, and then they were starting
23 to be recalled again. Then they were asked to make
24 statements fairly promptly.
25 Were those proper steps to take?
20
1 A. In the circumstances I certainly would have no doubt.
2 In fact, in those circumstances that certainly I am not
3 all that familiar with, I would have expected that to
4 do. Not only expected it. It was the right thing to
5 do.
6 Q. We have also heard evidence about debriefs, and
7 sometimes that would be something that certain senior
8 officers would expect, the officers coming off duty to
9 take a note in their notebook. Some of the officers
10 have given evidence that a statement made afterwards
11 would be -- they would be told to make a statement.
12 That would be the nature of the debrief. It might be
13 something as brief as that, to write it all down.
14 A. It possibly would. Again, I emphasise for the
15 information of the Inquiry, sometimes the actions that
16 are taken are dictated by the seriousness of the
17 situation.
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. At this juncture, I have no doubt in my mind that
20 although Mr Hamill was serious, there was never at any
21 stage a contemplation that this would -- his injury was
22 life-threatening, and you cannot, with respect, deal
23 with -- treat everything as a major, because in the
24 number of instances that happen throughout south region,
25 serious incidents, I mean, the entire system would have
21
1 come -- it was always dictated by the circumstances
2 surrounding the incident.
3 Q. Just finally, one of the Land Rover crew gave evidence
4 that his statement was four or five pages long and he
5 reckoned that it would have taken him possibly two hours
6 to write that statement. Would that be normal enough?
7 A. Certainly, if that was what he says was correct, yes.
8 Q. The officers being recalled to make statements of that
9 duration, these officers were on a very long shift in
10 the Land Rover. They had been on an inordinate amount
11 of time. I am struggling to remember the exact times.
12 I don't want to suggest the time, but it was a very long
13 shift.
14 In those circumstances, would overtime be readily
15 available for sitting down and writing a two-hour
16 statement? Do you understand the question?
17 A. No, I don't understand it, with respect.
18 Q. You have talked about the balancing act between the
19 seriousness of the situation and the steps to take.
20 That is for the individual in the circumstances, whoever
21 is in charge. Is that right?
22 A. That's correct and whatever information was available at
23 that pertinent time.
24 Q. The officers -- do you remember overtime being an issue,
25 payment of overtime being an issue around that time?
22
1 A. Certainly I was in charge of the budget for south region
2 and while there were constraints on overtime, I would
3 like this Inquiry to be in absolutely no doubt that
4 budgetary controls would never have influenced me as far
5 as relations or resources were concerned when we were
6 investigating a serious crime which had -- not only was
7 the crime bad, but the connotations that that had in
8 a versatile and volatile situation such as Portadown,
9 budgetary controls would not have been an issue and
10 shouldn't have been an issue.
11 Q. There was a witness, Henry McMullen. Do you know
12 Henry McMullen?
13 A. A civilian witness.
14 Q. No, a police witness.
15 A. Yes, I knew a Chief Inspector McMullen.
16 Q. He gave some evidence about the fact that there were
17 certain issues about police officers looking for a bit
18 more overtime after they came off, that there was only
19 15 minutes allowed and police officers looked for a bit
20 more overtime. There was always issues about that, no
21 major issue, but you would have to ask for authority to
22 be paid for the overtime. Do you know anything about
23 that?
24 A. No. In fact, I would find that -- I would negate that,
25 because in actual fact, the impression, with respect,
23
1 that you are giving is that police officers were
2 basically mercenaries. In my experience --
3 Q. Not at all.
4 A. -- and a long experience, and particularly in Portadown,
5 the police officers I worked with, they should have been
6 paid for what they worked, but certainly overtime would
7 not -- in my experience of 40 years, overtime has never
8 been an issue when we were investigating serious crime.
9 THE CHAIRMAN: Can I ask you this: if, after an officer had
10 completed the normal hours for his shift, he then had to
11 spend a couple of hours writing a statement, would he be
12 paid for that couple of hours?
13 A. He would -- if he was involved in an active inquiry and
14 making a statement, he would have been paid and, in my
15 opinion, quite rightly so.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
17 MR O'CONNOR: Yes, but in the circumstances outlined, in the
18 circumstances of this incident, the duty inspector would
19 have to also make a decision whether to call the
20 officers back, but also, when the overtime is being
21 considered, he has to say "Yes" or "No" to that. Is
22 that right?
23 I mean, the officers have to come and they have
24 15 minutes of changeover. If at some stage -- you are
25 looking at me, but I am not suggesting that all the
24
1 police officers at that stage or at this stage are
2 mercenaries in any shape or form. What I am simply
3 trying to get at is there was a time issue with tired
4 officers coming off from long duty and letting them go
5 home and maybe letting them make their statements during
6 their police hours in the next day or two in normal
7 circumstances. Do you get my point?
8 A. I again emphasise it would depend on the seriousness.
9 It would depend what enquiries had been revealed at the
10 hospital.
11 Also, one must also consider the tensions and the
12 effect that this incident would have had in a volatile
13 situation such as Portadown, because this would have
14 been magnified and could have added to increased tension
15 in the Portadown area and tensions were bad enough at
16 the best of times.
17 Q. I think to summarise then, once the incident was
18 regarded as serious, overtime is not an issue?
19 A. When you are investigating a crime, overtime, in my
20 opinion, and the way I have worked throughout my career,
21 has never been an issue. There is an onus and
22 obligation on us to satisfy not only law and order, but
23 the community.
24 MR O'CONNOR: Yes. Thank you.
25
25
1 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD.
2 MR UNDERWOOD: Just one matter arising out of some questions
3 you have been asked, Mr McCreesh.
4 If Inspector McCrum had been told that the injuries
5 to Mr Hamill had been potentially or were potentially
6 life-threatening, would you have expected him to have
7 told you that?
8 A. Yes, I would. That's if he knew that.
9 Q. Of course.
10 A. Yes, I would.
11 Q. You understand we are trying to find what happened?
12 A. Yes, I would have expected.
13 Q. You are clear that he didn't tell you that, I think. Is
14 that right?
15 A. I think he told me, to the best of my knowledge -- and
16 I can't sit here and say everything I have said is 100%,
17 but it is the best and honest answer I can give you.
18 When I spoke to him, to the best of my knowledge he told
19 me that police officers were at the hospital, at the
20 hospital. To the best of my knowledge, I don't think he
21 at that stage knew exactly what the condition of
22 Mr Hamill was.
23 Q. The reason I press you on this is this: I get the
24 impression from your evidence that you regarded
25 a sectarian assault in Portadown as something that was
26
1 likely to be problematic and that, if it was a very
2 serious sectarian assault in Portadown, it was likely to
3 set off something. Is that fair?
4 A. That's correct, because one can certainly -- during the
5 time I have spent in Portadown on a number of years when
6 an incident like that happens, it certainly increases
7 tension and reinforces personalised beliefs.
8 Q. What I am getting at here is this: if somebody had told
9 you that there was a sectarian assault in Portadown and
10 it was life-threatening, that's something that would
11 have stuck in your mind.
12 A. It certainly would have stuck in my mind.
13 MR UNDERWOOD: That's what I was getting at. Thank you very
14 much, Mr McCreesh.
15 Questions from THE PANEL
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you just help me about the type of
17 Land Rover that was used on this duty? Did it have any
18 protective skirt under the body?
19 A. It would have had, Mr Chairman. It would have had
20 a protective skirt. Basically, this was to stop --
21 basically in public order situations stopped something
22 being rolled underneath the Land Rover.
23 Q. What material would that skirt be made of?
24 A. It would certainly be made of a rubberised material done
25 in a criss-crossed format something similar to
27
1 a trellis-work one would anticipate in a garden, but of
2 heavier materials.
3 Q. Would it prevent the Land Rover, for instance, being
4 driven over a kerb?
5 A. I wouldn't have thought so at all. This was basically
6 designed to stop stuff being pushed under the
7 Land Rover. Certainly, it would have affected the
8 manoeuvrability to some extent, but certainly in my
9 opinion I don't think it would have affected it going
10 over the kerb.
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.
12 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much, Mr McCreesh. Thank you
13 very much for coming.
14 (The witness withdrew)
15 MR UNDERWOOD: We need to have a technology change. I think
16 that's likely to take ten or fifteen minutes in all the
17 circumstances. I would invite you to rise for perhaps
18 fifteen minutes to be on the safe side.
19 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Fifteen minutes.
20 (10.40 am)
21 (A short break)
22 (10.55 am)
23 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, can I call Mr Hall, please?
24 MR ROBERT FREDERICK HALL (sworn)
25
28
1 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD
2 MR UNDERWOOD: Good morning, Mr Hall. My name is Underwood.
3 I am Counsel to the Inquiry. I have some questions for
4 you.
5 A. Morning.
6 Q. When I have finished, it may well be that there are some
7 supplemental questions from others here.
8 Can I ask you your full names first, please?
9 A. Robert Frederick Hall.
10 Q. Thank you. You have been kind enough to sign a witness
11 statement for us, which we see at page [81789].
12 I wonder if we could have a look at the document on the
13 screen to make sure it is that. If we trace through
14 that quite quickly, the 15 pages of it, is that your
15 witness statement?
16 A. That's my statement, yes.
17 Q. Are the contents true?
18 A. They are indeed, sir, yes.
19 Q. Thank you very much. There is another document I'd like
20 to you look at at this stage, if I may. It is at
21 page [74231]. At the bottom there is an entry,
22 12th May 1997. If we could have a look at that. Is
23 this a journal entry of yours?
24 A. That's correct, sir.
25 Q. Did you unearth this after you had been interviewed by
29
1 the Inquiry and given your statement initially?
2 A. That's correct. I had further correspondence, I think,
3 from the Inquiry.
4 Q. Could you help us -- I don't mean to be rude about your
5 handwriting -- with the handwriting and tell us what
6 this entry says?
7 A. Yes. It says:
8 "Ops", short for operations, "Ops meeting at force
9 headquarters - CC in charge", meaning chief constable,
10 "Also briefed CC, deputy CC and ACC C", which meant
11 crime department, "re allegation against Reserve
12 Constable Atkinson, Portadown by Miss S Clarke."
13 The next entry relates to a meeting that afternoon
14 with the military, which is not relevant
15 Q. Right. We will forget about that. Have you
16 a recollection of this meeting?
17 A. Well, to the extent that these notes have refreshed my
18 memory, etc, there was a weekly meeting. This
19 particular meeting was every two weeks, but there was
20 another meeting on alternate weeks. So there were
21 regular meetings is what I am saying.
22 Q. Certainly.
23 A. I can relate to the entry.
24 Q. Do we discern from this that that was the sole topic of
25 the meeting?
30
1 A. Certainly not.
2 Q. Why do you focus on only that issue in this journal?
3 Can you help us with that?
4 A. Yes. A major focus for me would have been the update on
5 the murder investigation into the death of the late
6 Robert Hamill, who had died the previous week.
7 A number of persons had been charged that weekend. It
8 had been -- I was due to be off that weekend, but I had
9 gone specifically on the Sunday afternoon to get
10 a thorough briefing on the progress of the murder
11 investigation.
12 Q. By whom?
13 A. By the late Detective Chief Superintendent McBurney and
14 the assistant, as she was then, SIO P.
15 Q. P39 we call her.
16 A. P39. There were many other issues on the agenda at such
17 meetings at that time of year. We were coming up to two
18 elections. We were coming up to the Drumcree parades.
19 Indeed, we had subsequent murders in other parts of the
20 region, etc.
21 Q. But your journal entry concentrates only on the
22 allegation against Mr Atkinson by Miss Clarke. What the
23 Panel would be very grateful for assistance on is how
24 seriously that allegation was taken and who knew about
25 it.
31
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Can I take you through in stages? Does it follow that
3 on the Sunday that you should have had off but you went
4 in for the briefing by Mr McBurney and P39, that the
5 allegation made against Atkinson formed part of that
6 briefing to you?
7 A. That's correct, yes.
8 Q. I am not sure what day of the week 12th May was.
9 A. Monday morning.
10 Q. Thank you. So directly after that, coincidentally, or
11 perhaps not coincidentally, you have the meeting with
12 the chief constable and deputy chief constable and
13 ACC Crime. You relay that allegation to them. Is that
14 right?
15 A. Anything touching upon the integrity of a police officer
16 is a very -- was a very serious matter in my eyes.
17 Q. Again, if I'm pressing you too far from recollection,
18 tell me.
19 A. No, you are not.
20 Q. How was that news received by this group?
21 A. Well, I can't give you chapter and verse 12 years later
22 out of a plethora of meetings, but they would have held
23 the same -- those officers would have held views similar
24 to my own, that anything touching upon the integrity of
25 a police officer or misbehaviour or alleged criminal
32
1 conduct could not be tolerated and required rigorous
2 investigation.
3 They would have been satisfied, as was I, that the
4 matter was in the hands of the ICPC, the Independent
5 Commission for Police Complaints as part of the overall
6 supervision and investigation into the circumstances
7 touching upon the death of the late Robert Hamill, and
8 that was issued in a press release which has been made
9 available to me, I see, on the Friday morning, the 9th.
10 I gave media interviews extensively post the death
11 on the 8th. There was a press release issued on the
12 9th saying that all circumstances touching upon the
13 death were being investigated by Detective Chief
14 Superintendent McBurney, supervised by the ICPC. So we
15 would have all been, if you like, comforted from the
16 fact that there was independent, rigorous supervision,
17 not only of the earlier allegations, but also hopefully
18 of this one.
19 Q. Again, just going back to this journal entry, there is
20 some confusion apparently about who the deputy chief
21 constable might have been at that stage.
22 We know Blair Wallace was a deputy chief constable
23 and there was funding for a second one. Nobody seems to
24 be clear whether there actually was a second one. Can
25 you help us whether it was Mr Wallace who was present at
33
1 that meeting?
2 A. To my knowledge, it would have been Mr Wallace.
3 Q. Can I ask you a few more general questions then, and we
4 will come back to the question of Mr Atkinson?
5 Firstly, we know, of course, that there was a murder
6 investigation that, as it were, flowed out of the
7 GBH investigation once Mr Hamill died. We know there
8 was a separate investigation into the allegation that
9 the four officers did not get out of the Land Rover at
10 the time.
11 Did you have anything to do with the supply or
12 adequacy of resources for either of those
13 investigations?
14 A. I mean, I couldn't give detail, but it's probable, it's
15 probable that I could have been asked. I mean, that
16 could have been in the area of maybe additional
17 detectives or it could have been more particularly
18 search teams or to make arrests of prisoners or escorts
19 or whatever, but I wouldn't have had any hands-on
20 involvement at my strategic level.
21 My staff or my deputy or whoever who had other roles
22 may have been asked for operational support. Call it
23 that.
24 Q. Do you have any reason to believe there was any scarcity
25 of resources that would have impinged on any part of
34
1 these investigations?
2 A. Oh, absolutely not. Absolutely not.
3 Q. Thank you. We know, as you said, that Mr McBurney was
4 in charge of all aspects of these investigations, and we
5 also know that he, as it were, parcelled them up. On
6 the one hand, he controlled the murder investigation; on
7 the other hand, there was the separate allegation, so
8 far as he was concerned, that was the complaint against
9 the police officers. We also know that he opted to put
10 this tip-off allegation against Mr Atkinson into the
11 complaint box, if you like. So that complaint of the
12 tip-off then was not treated as part of the murder
13 investigation.
14 Were you conscious of that?
15 A. Well, only to the degree that I knew the allegations
16 against police officers, whether it was the alleged
17 initial inaction or the allegations from the 16-year-old
18 girl against Mr Atkinson.
19 When you say "conscious", I was aware, fully
20 conscious, that that was going to be handled by the
21 ICPC, and Mr McBurney and the other Detective Chief
22 Inspector were also carrying on with the murder
23 investigation. From my perspective, a major focus was
24 the murder investigation, because it would not have been
25 prudent for me to be in some way interfering in an
35
1 external investigation against police officers. That
2 would have been frowned upon by the independent body.
3 So once it was passed over to them, they were in charge
4 in that regard.
5 Q. I am just interested in this. We have heard comments
6 from some other senior officers to the effect that they
7 might have expected the allegation against Mr Atkinson
8 that he tipped off Hanvey to be treated as part of the
9 murder investigation rather than part of the complaint
10 investigation, because it was an allegation that he was
11 an accessory in the murder.
12 A. Uh-huh.
13 Q. What I am asking you is whether you were conscious that
14 Mr McBurney had opted for one rather than the other, and
15 whether it surprised you.
16 A. I mean, not that I can recall. I mean, I was satisfied
17 that it was being investigated by an experienced
18 detective chief superintendent, who had investigated
19 hundreds or more of serious crimes and was being
20 supervised by the ICPC.
21 Q. We, of course, know it was not being supervised by the
22 ICPC and I think you know that now. Is that right?
23 A. Well, I was extremely surprised in September 2007 when
24 I was first interviewed by the Inquiry. That is the
25 first time that I ever became aware that it was not
36
1 ultimately supervised by the ICPC, but I see from
2 documentation subsequently revealed to me or disclosed
3 to me by this Inquiry that it looks to me as though it
4 was supervised for a number of months. 12th, 15th,
5 19th May and various other dates and directions appear
6 to have been given to Mr McBurney by the ICPC.
7 Q. Unhappily, we don't have the benefit of Mr Murnaghan.
8 For the sake of clarity, I should take you back to
9 your witness statement. If we could look at
10 page [81803], at paragraph 61 you say:
11 "At some time shortly after I became aware of the
12 allegation that Reserve Constable Atkinson may have
13 acted improperly following the Hamill incident,
14 I telephoned Mr [blank] to his office to confirm that he
15 was aware of the allegation ..."
16 Is that Mr Murnaghan?
17 A. That's correct, yes.
18 Q. There is another blank further down. Just picking up
19 that sentence, you say:
20 "I outlined to Mr [blank] the nature of the
21 allegation which had been made and the reasons for my
22 call. I cannot recall if he already knew of the
23 allegation but simply said something to the effect that,
24 'You never know what comes up in an investigation. We
25 will see what the evidence is'."
37
1 Again, is that Mr Murnaghan?
2 A. That's correct, yes.
3 Q. So you are perfectly clear that not only did the senior
4 officers right up to the chief constable believe that
5 the ICPC were supervising it, you discussed it with
6 Mr Murnaghan and that confirmed your belief?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Can you -- I am so sorry. Go on?
9 A. I mean, on the Sunday I had three objectives at that
10 time. Number 1 was to get the fullest possible overview
11 of the murder investigation, see where we were with
12 prisoners, with arrests, with charges, with resources,
13 as you touched upon earlier, and to be in a position to
14 brief the chief constable and the others at the Monday
15 morning meeting.
16 When I was made aware of the allegation against
17 Reserve Constable Atkinson, in the light of what has now
18 been disclosed to me as well, I see that there was
19 a major strategy meeting planned for the Monday with the
20 ICPC, McBurney and the Complaints and Discipline
21 superintendent, the G Department, who were also
22 involved. So my immediate concern would be, "Is there
23 anything in terms of preservation or evidence or
24 whatever that needs to be done?"
25 Mr McBurney was obviously happy in himself as to how
38
1 he was going to approach the matters. This was a Sunday
2 afternoon. If we were talking about telephone records
3 or whatever, that's a slow time business that you can't
4 get done on a Sunday afternoon. So I would have been
5 concerned no evidence was being lost.
6 My third objective would have been to make sure that
7 the ICPC supervisor was aware, if you like, of this
8 additional element or this additional allegation as
9 quickly as possible just in case he would think of some
10 other urgent action that he wanted taken.
11 Hence my belt and braces, if I can use that term,
12 telephone call to the late Mr Murnaghan, who was
13 a competent, thorough, meticulous lawyer, whom I had
14 known through the professional courts
15 Q. Now that you have had the revelation that the ICPC did
16 not regard themselves as supervising this, at least
17 after the first few weeks, and you have seen materials
18 relating to this, can you offer any explanation about
19 why the ICPC dumped this?
20 A. Absolutely not. It seems to me that they supervised it
21 up until -- they seemed to part their thinking or ways
22 around about September when it came to the interview of
23 Atkinson. The G Department superintendent was involved.
24 ICPC were involved. So far as I was concerned, it was
25 in the proper hands being independently investigated.
39
1 I had to move on to many other things in my diary and it
2 would have been very wrong for me to have been tampering
3 in that type of investigation.
4 Q. Okay. Out of fairness to the ICPC I ought to put this
5 proposition to you, which may be their response. That
6 is that there was no formal request by the RUC that they
7 supervise.
8 A. Uh-huh.
9 Q. What would you say to that?
10 A. Well, I mean, I don't know about that. The records made
11 available to me are clear that on the Monday afternoon
12 the late Mr McBurney briefed the ICPC official and
13 supervisor and the superintendent from the Complaints
14 Department was also present. So all the key people who
15 would have been dealing and furthering this.
16 Now, if somebody didn't complete some internal
17 administrative memo, I don't know anything about that at
18 that level, but it seems to me that -- plus my telephone
19 call, the belt and braces, which I didn't need to do,
20 but which I did do as a conscientious officer, it seemed
21 to me that the matter was in the appropriate arena for
22 progressing from there and subsequent records would seem
23 to indicate that that was accepted.
24 Q. Can you help us about the question of suspension?
25 Obviously the question whether you serve a Form 17(3) on
40
1 an officer and whether you suspend them has to be
2 tempered by the consideration that you might be tipping
3 them off while you are still trying to get evidence
4 against them. Would that be fair?
5 A. That's very fair, yes.
6 Q. So come, say, 12th May, you would have expected the RUC
7 to be considering at some level whether that was the
8 time to suspend and serve a 17(3) or whether you should
9 hold your hand and go round digging to see what else is
10 available.
11 Can you help us with whether there was such
12 a conscious decision whether or not to suspend him?
13 A. No, I can't, because from my perspective it had passed
14 over to the Complaints Department. The superintendent
15 was at the strategy meeting, if you like, with the ICPC
16 supervisors and with Mr McBurney, but, I mean, one of
17 the factors, as I am sure others will have told you, is
18 the availability -- in deciding whether or not to
19 suspend an officer -- there are many issues that would
20 be taken into account by the deputy chief constable if
21 it was referred to him by the Complaints Department, but
22 one of those would be the availability of the admissible
23 evidence against the officer. I don't know at what
24 stage admissible evidence was produced.
25 Q. No, no. Again, I am not asking you what the right
41
1 outcome would be, I am asking if you could help about
2 whether there was actually consideration given.
3 Do I get this as your answer: that we should be
4 asking Complaints and Discipline? That would be the
5 outfit to be enquiring of, would it?
6 A. And the ICPC. I mean, they were looking at it together.
7 This, even today, would be termed an internal
8 investigation, albeit with external supervision. So,
9 therefore, once it moved into that arena, it moved
10 outside my control, as I think you will understand.
11 Q. I am just trying to get your help about whom we should
12 be asking about this. We have gone to the ICPC, we have
13 gone to the Complaints and Discipline, both of whom deny
14 any knowledge of consideration of suspension.
15 What I am getting from you is they should have been
16 considering suspension. Is that fair?
17 A. No. I mean, for some of the reasons you mentioned, it
18 may be, you know, the strategy was -- I mean, gathering
19 the admissible evidence against the officer, whether or
20 not that was going to tip him off, whether or not he was
21 going to be able to interfere with the Inquiry or with
22 other evidence, my recollection is that the people --
23 the other persons named by the 16-year-old girl were
24 already in custody and indeed were charged in connection
25 with the affray and with the murder. So a lot of things
42
1 had moved on quite quickly.
2 I see from the documents disclosed by ICPC and
3 others now that suspension was considered in September
4 or October -- September, I think, as and when I presume
5 certain evidence had accrued or interviews had taken
6 place, but the officer went sick and it didn't happen.
7 Q. I would like to get your help on that as well, if I may.
8 We know that the telephone records were sought on
9 9th May to substantiate the allegation made by
10 Tracey Clarke and that they arrived about 16th May.
11 They did indeed show a telephone call made at about
12 8.30-odd from the Atkinson household to the Hanvey
13 household.
14 A. Sorry. Did you say they were sought on 9th May?
15 Q. I did, and they were obtained on the 16th.
16 A. I thought the allegation was made on the 10th?
17 Q. The allegation was made about the 8th or 9th. It was
18 recorded on the 10th.
19 A. I see.
20 Q. Take it from me it was treated with such urgency that
21 they did not wait for the ink to even appear on the
22 statement, let alone dry on it, before the records were
23 sought. So obtained about a week later.
24 No step was then taken to interview Mr Atkinson or
25 to seek further evidence about the allegation until
43
1 September, when he was first interviewed about it. As
2 far as we can see, in the absence of Mr McBurney there
3 is a delay then of four months, in which apparently
4 nothing happened.
5 Now, can I put this proposition to you to see if you
6 can help on it: if taking further steps about, for
7 example, interviewing Mr Atkinson about that might have
8 prejudiced the murder investigation, could that perhaps
9 be a reason why Mr McBurney prioritised the murder
10 investigation over the tip-off allegation?
11 A. I mean, I don't know, but it's one possibility.
12 Q. Would that be a reasonable possibility? Would that have
13 been a reasonable step in your view, if an SIO had
14 chosen to do it that way?
15 A. It may well have been. I mean, I don't know what other
16 evidence. I mean, I see -- I know now that there were
17 other personalities, if you like, in that it seems as
18 though there were visitors or people in Atkinson's house
19 at the time. So he may have had many other lines to
20 eliminate or confirm. That detail again I don't know
21 because --
22 Q. Take it from us he didn't know about those until after
23 September.
24 A. You see, I was in no way privy to that because from my
25 perspective it was all under the supervision of the
44
1 ICPC.
2 Q. That's fine. I think I'm pressing you outside your
3 knowledge here.
4 One final matter if I could get your help with. We
5 now know, of course, with the aid of your journal entry
6 that you raised the tip-off allegation with the chief
7 constable and the deputy chief constable and ACC Crime
8 immediately.
9 Would there have been further meetings at which that
10 was brought up at that sort of level?
11 A. It's unlikely, given that all concerned would have been
12 aware that the ICPC were heading or supervising the
13 inquiry. Any further, if you like, briefings or updates
14 would obviously have come through G Department or
15 whatever, through that kind of internal system, but
16 again the chief inspector or deputy would have been
17 keeping themselves, I assume, reasonably well separated
18 from it on the basis that it was -- the external
19 investigators were getting on with their job.
20 I think it is also -- I mean, I didn't know when
21 I was interviewed, but I know now as well it is probably
22 quite important here to remember that the circumstances
23 of the initial allegations and so forth and the death
24 had been referred to the ICPC before there was a letter
25 of complaint. We, as an organisation, chose under
45
1 Article 8 to call in the ICPC, given the potential
2 community impact and other factors, political and
3 community, surrounding the allegations that were being
4 made. So we had actually taken a proactive decision to
5 ask the ICPC to look at this case ahead of any letter of
6 complaint
7 Q. I am not going to take you to the eventual ICPC reports,
8 but we know that when the ICPC did eventually report,
9 that it was fairly clear from their report that they had
10 not supervised the Atkinson tip-off part of the
11 allegation.
12 Would those reports have been seen within the RUC?
13 A. Sorry. I am not sure which reports ...
14 Q. In the end, the ICPC report to the DPP about whether
15 there is to be a case to be brought against the police
16 for the alleged inaction.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. They make it clear in that that they are not dealing
19 with the tip-off against Atkinson. Do you follow me?
20 A. Yes, I do.
21 Q. Now we know, of course, that those reports went to the
22 DPP.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Would they, as a matter of course, have also gone to the
25 RUC?
46
1 A. I'm not sure, because G Department C&D was the official
2 interface with ICPC.
3 Q. Again, we need to address ourselves to the Complaints
4 and Discipline?
5 A. Clearly Mr McBurney's murder files would have gone via
6 Crime Department headquarters, they didn't come via me.
7 Crime files did not pass by the regional assistant chief
8 constable for all kinds of logistical and resourcing
9 efficiency reasons. They would have gone by the Crime
10 Department Headquarters. The murder file that is.
11 The ICPC internal documents, as I said, either the
12 ICPC official or the relevant G Department person might
13 be able to answer that or should be able to answer
14 that --
15 Q. That's very kind.
16 A. -- as to which documents were shared between them.
17 MR UNDERWOOD: We will address ourselves that way. Thank
18 you very much indeed, Mr Hall.
19 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you just help us about two matters,
20 Mr Hall? The press release you spoke of, I assume that
21 did not refer to the tipping-off allegation.
22 A. The press -- the one on -- the one I did or the one on
23 the 9th?
24 THE CHAIRMAN: That's right, yes.
25 A. Sorry, sir. Are you asking about the one I did on the
47
1 evening of the 8th --
2 THE CHAIRMAN: That's right, yes.
3 A. -- or the one on the morning of the 9th?
4 THE CHAIRMAN: Either press release that you prepared, did
5 it refer --
6 A. No. I didn't know about the allegation until the
7 Sunday, considerably later.
8 THE CHAIRMAN: But you spoke of you and others being
9 satisfied that the tipping-off allegation was in the
10 hands of the ICPC.
11 A. That's right.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: You spoke of preparing a press release.
13 I was just wondering whether any press release ever
14 referred to the tipping-off allegation.
15 A. No. I think, sir, what I said -- forgive me if it was
16 unclear.
17 THE CHAIRMAN: I may have misunderstood.
18 A. First of all, I did the media and press interviews on
19 the evening of the death in terms of my strategic
20 leadership role and everything else to do with community
21 impact, plea for witnesses, sympathy for the family, all
22 of those factors which were very important to me and to
23 my staff. Those were on the Thursday evening, the 8th.
24 Then the ICPC confirmed or approved the SIO,
25 Mr McBurney, from my records on the Friday.
48
1 There was a further short statement went out on the
2 Friday about noon, about lunchtime, saying that all the
3 circumstances touching -- they are in the documents
4 here -- touching upon the death were being investigated
5 by a detective chief superintendent supervised by the
6 ICPC. At that time, I was certainly not aware of the
7 tipping-off allegation. That's Friday noon that
8 statement goes out, or Friday lunchtime. I don't become
9 aware of the other until Sunday.
10 THE CHAIRMAN: I am afraid I misunderstood. Sorry.
11 A. Thank you.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: The other thing is about the question of
13 suspension. You said, "We would need to enquire of C&D
14 and the ICPC". As Mr Underwood has pointed out, they
15 didn't consider the matter. You spoke of a strategy.
16 If there was a strategy that the question of
17 considering suspension should be deferred for the time
18 being, must have that been the responsibility of
19 Mr McBurney?
20 A. That would be the SIO in conjunction with the C&D
21 superintendent, who was also at the meeting with the
22 ICPC. So they would have to assess what admissible or
23 available evidence they had and what their strategy was
24 going to be for the investigation, whether
25 a recommendation for suspension would have been
49
1 justified or whether or not it was going to militate
2 against their strategy in relation to the investigation.
3 I mean, that was quite well-established practice with
4 some other case precedents whereby it would have been
5 deferred pending further analysis of the evidence.
6 THE CHAIRMAN: I am not asking my question critically, but
7 you said we should ask C&D and ICPC. Mr Underwood
8 points out they were not involved. I was just asking
9 then: well, where would the strategy decision have come
10 from? You say effectively Mr McBurney and C&D in
11 conjunction with ICPC?
12 A. That's correct, yes, yes. I mean, if they had thought
13 or believed that the evidence supported or suggested
14 suspension in conjunction with the investigative
15 strategy, then they would have referred that through.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you.
17 A. Through G Department to the deputy chief constable.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
19 Questions from MR McGRORY
20 MR McGRORY: If I may, Mr Chairman, I have a small number of
21 questions.
22 Mr Hall, my name is McGrory and I represent the
23 family of Robert Hamill.
24 You might help with a few further things. You have
25 mentioned that you were very conscious of community
50
1 policing and the impact in the community of an incident
2 such as this. Of course, you would have immediately
3 been alerted by the fact that there were allegations
4 that the police in the Land Rover had not intervened
5 when they should have done in an attack on a small
6 number of Nationalists by a large number of Loyalists.
7 I suppose it goes without saying that you would have
8 been conscious that you wouldn't have wanted allegations
9 of favouritism to the Loyalists by the police?
10 A. That's absolutely correct.
11 Q. I don't need to spell it out. For all of the
12 implications that had for policing.
13 Was that the reason -- I mean, were you involved in
14 the decision to make the Article 8 referral? Were you
15 consulted about that?
16 A. I can't recall the fine detail of that, but I would be
17 surprised if I wasn't, as the regional commander. Round
18 about -- when the allegations, political and otherwise,
19 started to be made through the media, I am quite sure --
20 I don't have the detail of that and I don't recall the
21 detail of it, but I am quite sure I would have been
22 involved in the discussions with the chief constable,
23 deputy or whoever as to the value of calling in the ICPC
24 to look at this case.
25 Q. In any event, that was before the information about the
51
1 tipping-off allegation on the part of Reserve
2 Constable Atkinson came into the system?
3 A. Well, to my understanding it is, yes. I mean, I didn't
4 recall that kind of detail even when I was interviewed
5 two years ago, because a lot of this documentation was
6 not made available to me then, but, yes, it seems to me
7 from looking at the documents that that was some time
8 the previous week, yes.
9 Q. Then, of course, on Sunday, 11th May, that information
10 is given to you about the tipping-off allegation when
11 you meet Detective Chief Superintendent McBurney and his
12 senior female colleague.
13 A. Yes, yes.
14 Q. You obviously thought that that was sufficiently
15 important and sensitive to be brought to the attention
16 of the very highest senior officers at the meeting the
17 following day?
18 A. That's correct, yes.
19 Q. And, indeed, to record the fact that you had brought
20 that to their attention?
21 A. That's correct, yes.
22 Q. Because I think that's quite a long day. That maybe is
23 the only entry as to what you were doing that day in the
24 journal. Is that correct?
25 A. No, there are some other matters as well.
52
1 Q. But you made sure to note that.
2 Can you cast your mind back to that meeting,
3 Mr Hall, please? Were you conscious when you raised the
4 issue that others at the meeting had been aware already
5 of the incident in any shape or form?
6 A. When you say "of the incident" ...
7 Q. Well, of the fact that Mr Hamill had died and that there
8 was a community issue in the terms of some allegations
9 about police conduct?
10 A. Oh, they would have been very well aware. I mean, he
11 had died on the Thursday evening. I had talked to the
12 chief constable umpteen times in the ensuing two or
13 three days in relation to the murder investigation and
14 the whole impact of it.
15 Q. Oh, right. So you had actually spoken to him on quite
16 a number of occasions between the Thursday and the
17 Monday morning?
18 A. In relation -- as we would have done about all murders
19 and the impact of them.
20 Q. Is it your memory, then, that he had been aware on the
21 Monday morning of the information about the allegation
22 of the tipping-off before you told him, or were you the
23 first person to tell him?
24 A. Well, I don't know that. I don't know that.
25 Q. No. You see, we do know that Chief
53
1 Superintendent McBurney spoke to him twice on 10th May,
2 the day it was recorded. Would you have expected he
3 would have told him?
4 A. He may well have. He may well have. For example,
5 I don't know what time on the 10th the statement was
6 recorded, whether it was morning, evening or what time
7 he spoke to the chief constable. So I can't answer
8 that.
9 Q. No, but would you have expected he would have given him
10 that type of information?
11 A. Well, Mr McBurney, like ourselves, would have regarded
12 any allegation about the integrity of an officer as
13 a very important matter. If the chief constable was
14 seeking information or updates, he may well have said,
15 "There is an additional allegation or factor and I am
16 referring it to the ICPC".
17 Q. Of course, we are not just talking about the integrity
18 of an officer. We are not talking about an allegation
19 that an officer has been drunk driving or has stolen
20 something or something like that --
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. -- we are talking about an allegation in circumstances
23 where there is already sensitivity about the police
24 conduct and, on top of that, further information comes
25 in that, in fact, one of those officers from the
54
1 Land Rover may well have been involved in the actual
2 crime of the murder, albeit afterwards.
3 So would it be fair to say that that would have been
4 a matter that would have been highly sensitive?
5 A. Of course. Absolutely right, yes.
6 Q. And that those of you at the very top end of the police
7 force would have been very keen to monitor how that
8 progressed?
9 A. Absolutely right. Hence the reason for making sure that
10 the ICPC were fully aware of it at the earliest possible
11 opportunity.
12 Q. Would there not have been some further questions raised
13 by your committee or by those of you at the very top of
14 the police force as to how the investigation was going?
15 A. Not when it's being supervised by the ICPC. If those at
16 the top of the force -- G Department was the official
17 interface with the ICPC. The rest of us could not go
18 around asking questions about an independent
19 externally-supervised investigation, because that would
20 have been open to misinterpretation that we were in some
21 way trying to influence that investigation or interfere.
22 So you have got to understand the balance there.
23 Q. Well, I am only talking about getting information as to,
24 "How are we with this investigation?"
25 Were there telephone calls made? "Did that enquiry
55
1 about the telephone records bottom out? This is a very
2 serious situation". Would you not have taken a deeper
3 interest than that?
4 A. No, we all took a deep interest in serious matters, but
5 you have to understand, and I'm sure you do, where the
6 boundaries are with an independently supervised
7 investigation, and the need -- the sensitivities and the
8 need for confidentiality in such investigations.
9 All of these types of investigations have
10 confidentiality parameters as well and people who need
11 to know do know, but you don't run the risk of spreading
12 it round the whole station or whole team, depending on
13 the type of the investigation, and particularly, as
14 I said, where it is external, and independent -- and
15 that was their purpose. When we put it in that arena,
16 we put our trust in them to do that job, and that's how
17 it was.
18 Q. Were there not really two investigations? There is
19 a complaint which was being supervised by the ICPC about
20 the conduct of the police.
21 A. Uh-huh.
22 Q. Then there is an investigation into the murder --
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. -- of Robert Hamill.
25 A. And we wanted to know everything about the murder.
56
1 I did.
2 Q. Well, is the conduct of a police officer who might have
3 tipped off one of the murderers not integral to the
4 murder inquiry?
5 A. It might be, depending on the evidence and the
6 situation. That was something that the SIO in, again,
7 conjunction with the ICPC supervisors had to balance.
8 Q. Because on 16th May, there then came into the system
9 verification of the fact that there had been telephone
10 contact between the Atkinson household and the Hanvey
11 household.
12 Now, whether or not you could read any more into it
13 than that, but putting it in the context of the
14 allegation from Tracey Clarke, would you agree that that
15 was very significant information?
16 A. I'm assuming it could have been. I don't recall ever
17 being aware of that personally, because, as I said,
18 again, the investigation was in the hands of other
19 people, and ...
20 Q. Yes, but, you see, the problem is that the ICPC --
21 forgive me if I am wrong about the ICPC's remit, but was
22 the ICPC remit not in respect of the complaint about the
23 police as opposed to the conduct of the murder
24 investigation, which was a separate issue?
25 A. Yes. I think two things here. Number 1, from day one
57
1 the ICPC had been called in by us to look at the overall
2 circumstances touching upon the death and the police
3 action/inaction, or whatever, surrounding Robert Hamill.
4 So in my mind that was quite important.
5 The other part of your question is? Sorry.
6 Q. The point is the ICPC didn't supervise the actual murder
7 enquiry.
8 A. That's correct. That's right.
9 Q. So what I am saying to you is: how can you have been
10 confident that the allegation against Reserve
11 Constable Atkinson was being vigorously pursued on the
12 basis that the ICPC were somehow involved but, in fact,
13 that was a separate issue?
14 A. Well, I think in the view of any reasonable person it
15 was a further allegation against a police officer. At
16 that moment, it was coming from a 16-year-old girl on
17 the basis of what is hearsay evidence or whatever. Her
18 boyfriend, as I think he was then, was already in
19 custody and I think was being charged. So on the view
20 of any reasonable person, I believe those allegations,
21 whatever they were, the ones from politicians and the
22 media about alleged inaction, the letter of complaint,
23 the fact we had called in the ICPC to look at the
24 overall circumstances, the further allegation against
25 Reserve Constable Atkinson, in the eyes of any
58
1 reasonable person they were inextricably linked as
2 allegations against the police, and in my mindset that's
3 how they were pursued and investigated independently.
4 I believed supervised by the late Mr Murnaghan, who was
5 a most thorough, meticulous and competent lawyer, who
6 I encountered many times in the criminal courts in my
7 earlier career on a professional basis.
8 Q. But from an investigator perspective, do you agree that
9 progress in respect of the phone call about tipping off
10 a suspect could significantly assist the murder inquiry
11 in respect of Mr Hanvey?
12 A. It's very difficult for me to comment on that 12 years
13 later without, I mean, having documentation or seeing
14 that.
15 Mr McBurney was an experienced SIO of some 30 years.
16 I couldn't comment on that kind of detail on those
17 possible linkages. It is too hypothetical
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGrory, if there is some specific step
19 which you suggest should have been taken but wasn't, it
20 may perhaps be useful to see what the witness says about
21 it.
22 MR McGRORY: What I do suggest, Mr Hall, is that the moment
23 the information about the phone calls from the Atkinson
24 household to the Hanvey household came into the system,
25 the moment it came into the system, action should have
59
1 been taken in terms of arresting and questioning
2 Mr Atkinson about making those phone calls.
3 A. That may or may not have been so. I don't know the
4 detail of the phone calls or the documentation you are
5 talking about. I don't know what the situation then was
6 about service providers giving evidence to prove some of
7 these things. We went through a period when service
8 providers were unwilling to go to court. So there may
9 have been an intelligence value in it. There may have
10 been more than that.
11 I was not privy to any part of that investigation,
12 for the reasons I've explained to you many times over.
13 The guy who was allegedly at that time tipped off
14 I knew was already in custody and I think, indeed, was
15 charged. So there may have been many other factors in
16 terms of the investigative strategy.
17 In any case of assisting offenders, conspiracy or
18 whatever, getting witnesses or a witness with some
19 degree of independence who is prepared to give evidence
20 can be very important. I think I now know that that was
21 ultimately achieved by Mr McBurney in the longer term,
22 albeit it may not have proved anything in the longer
23 term.
24 I can't give you a fuller answer than that all these
25 years later. I am sorry, but a lot of things were
60
1 crossing my -- I'll explain to you the events. I mean,
2 within a few weeks I had two police officers murdered in
3 Lurgan earlier the following month. We had a further
4 murder in Armagh, I see in my notes, one in Downpatrick.
5 We had a lot of major things happening coming up to
6 Drumcree, etc, etc.
7 I was comforted, as were my bosses, that the
8 allegations against the police officers were in the
9 hands of the ICPC and that was their statutory role from
10 our prospective and we were proactive, as I say, in
11 calling them in right from the earliest opportunity
12 Q. But how often in your career, Mr Hall, has it been
13 alleged that a police officer has been involved in
14 a murder?
15 A. Well, sorry, but there are many degrees of murder. Are
16 we saying here that this was an allegation of someone
17 involved in murder, or are we talking --
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Being an accessory after the fact.
19 A. Yes. Thank you, sir.
20 MR McGRORY: It is involved. The allegation here is that
21 within hours of the attack, a phone call was made from
22 a police officer to one of the suspects in the attack
23 giving him advice on how to escape detection.
24 That's what we are dealing with here.
25 A. Absolutely, and I have already made my position very
61
1 clear on that.
2 Q. I am suggesting to you that senior police at your level
3 and those who attended the meeting you attended on the
4 Monday morning ought to have been more proactive in
5 ensuring that that police officer was vigorously
6 investigated.
7 A. I don't accept that for one moment. There was
8 a detective chief superintendent, probably our most
9 experienced -- one of them -- in the force, carrying out
10 a criminal investigation, independently supervised, we
11 believed, by the ICPC.
12 Now, that's a man whose a trained SIO, etc, etc.
13 Everything was being done. I think my position is
14 abundantly clear in relation to my additional telephone
15 call to Mr Murnaghan to make doubly sure, lest he
16 thought there was any other immediate action that needed
17 taken or that there was some omission. I am not aware
18 that there was.
19 Q. Can I just ask you: have you any information as to how
20 Mr McBurney was appointed the IO before it became
21 a murder, how he was appointed the officer in charge of
22 the complaint?
23 A. Yes, yes. Well, I can explain the procedure.
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. I mean, I can't explain chapter and verse for him.
62
1 Q. No.
2 A. Again, the interface was the G Department, the
3 Complaints and Discipline Department. The ICPC would
4 have, through them, sought the services of
5 an appropriate detective. I might have been asked,
6 "Would Mr McBurney be available, or is he away, or is he
7 involved in ten other things?" or whatever, but
8 G Department would ultimately recommend an investigating
9 officer and the ICPC would have to approve that, which
10 were the terms of the legislation at the time.
11 If they were satisfied with that person after they
12 checked and examined whatever questions they needed to
13 do, then they approved that person and that was
14 communicated to me, and my notes show that. It was
15 communicated to me that he was appointed as the IO.
16 Q. It is just that he wasn't in G Department.
17 A. Oh, no. Who? Mr McBurney?
18 Q. No.
19 A. No, he was the head of CID for the region.
20 Q. Would it not have been more appropriate that someone
21 from G Department be appointed to investigate the
22 complaint?
23 A. Oh, no. You were talking earlier about the nature of
24 the allegation. You wanted an experienced investigator
25 to look into this type of allegation. You didn't want
63
1 someone just to carry out routine interviews or serve
2 discipline documents. So they obviously decided that
3 the most appropriate was a senior-ranking, experienced
4 detective to carry it out.
5 Q. So you think it was because of the sensitivity of the
6 allegation about the police officer and the seriousness
7 of it that it was Mr McBurney who was appointed because
8 of his experience?
9 A. Absolutely. G Department, on behalf of the chief
10 constable and the ICPC, would look at the nature of the
11 allegations, etc, etc, in all cases and decide and
12 approve an appropriate level and experience of
13 investigator. In this case they chose a senior
14 detective.
15 Q. A safe pair of hands, I suppose.
16 A. I don't know. That's maybe your observation.
17 Q. Now, can I just ask you about one matter, an entirely
18 different matter just? You mentioned in your interview
19 to the Inquiry people that you were involved in the
20 devising of policing plans with the Secretary of State.
21 A. That's right.
22 Q. I just want to ask you a little bit about that. It is
23 an entirely different subject, I know.
24 What did that involve? What was a policing plan and
25 how much involvement had the Secretary of State and why?
64
1 Maybe that's too many questions in one.
2 A. Well, I will do my best.
3 Q. Let's start with what is a policing plan?
4 A. The policing plan was the force corporate plan or
5 strategic plan which the force was obliged to provide to
6 the Police Authority of the day. It would have
7 contained about six major goals or objectives that the
8 force hoped to achieve during the particular year and
9 some actions as to how those goals were going to be
10 fulfilled. One or two perhaps would have been set by
11 the Secretary of State of the day. One or two, perhaps
12 one, might have been set by the Police Authority of the
13 day, and the remainder would have been set in
14 consultation with communities.
15 We would have done extensive surveys and
16 consultation with community and police liaison
17 committees. So local police commanders would have drawn
18 up local policing plans to support the corporate plan.
19 So without making it sound too bureaucratic, it was
20 a top down and bottom up approach.
21 Q. Yes, and the Secretary of State through the Northern
22 Ireland Office was involved in that?
23 A. To a limited degree, as he or she still might be, in
24 that he or she might have a particular objective or goal
25 that they wished the police to work towards. Similarly
65
1 with the Police Authority, who represented the broader
2 community and professions and other vocations across
3 society.
4 Q. Would community belief and support of the police be one
5 of those goals?
6 A. Yes. We called it community affairs in those days. It
7 was a major one. Hence the local policing plans and the
8 liaison with the local police and community committees,
9 which, by the way, we had in the RUC many years before
10 they became statutory elsewhere, and those surveys and
11 plans were done regularly, annually, by local commanders
12 and they reported back to local community groups and to
13 council community and police liaison committees. That
14 was well ahead of Patten and other such recommendations
15 nationally.
16 Q. I suppose any issue that would touch upon the community
17 relationships with the police, particularly the Catholic
18 community I may say, about whom there is an issue here
19 in respect of whom, would be of considerable issue to
20 the Secretary of State?
21 A. Well, it's difficult for me to say what interests
22 a particular Secretary of State at particular times.
23 Suffice to say that the police and community
24 relationships, all communities, were very, very
25 important to us, and I and my officers worked very hard
66
1 at fulfilling and delivering those goals and objectives
2 in partnership with local communities and I think we had
3 some very good successes in that regard as well.
4 Q. I suppose -- just one last question -- the way in which
5 the Secretary of State would have fulfilled her or his
6 objective in respect of community relations with the
7 police would have been to deeply involve him or herself
8 in the devising of such plans?
9 A. Oh, no, I wouldn't say, no, not deeply involved.
10 I mean, there were statutory provision in relation to
11 what the Secretary of State's role was, what the Police
12 Authority's role was and what the police chief
13 constable's role was. So I wouldn't want to take us
14 outside those statutory roles and provisions which are
15 now, in my case, a 12-year-old memory.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: There is an old saying, Mr McGrory: you don't
17 keep a dog and bark yourself.
18 MR McGRORY: Of course.
19 Of course, that had a statutory footing.
20 A. The policing plan?
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. Yes. We reported to the Police Authority. We were held
23 to account for the delivery of our services very fully
24 both operationally, community and financially.
25 Q. And through that to the Secretary of State?
67
1 A. That's correct.
2 MR McGRORY: Thank you.
3 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGrory, I certainly don't want to enter
4 into any discussion, but I make this suggestion to you
5 in case it may be of any help. Maybe it doesn't help.
6 You may at some stage wish to consider the effect
7 investigation of the tipping-off allegation potentially
8 might have upon the availability of Tracey Clarke as
9 a witness, and her safety.
10 As I say, I am not wanting to discuss it now. It
11 may be of some help to you to consider. If it is not,
12 ignore it.
13 MR McGRORY: I am much obliged, sir.
14 Questions from MR MALLON
15 MR MALLON: Just a number of discrete matters. My name is
16 Mallon and I am instructed on behalf of
17 Mr Robert Atkinson and his wife, Eleanor Atkinson.
18 I would like to bring you to paragraph 30 of your
19 statement, [81706], please. In it you say:
20 "If DCS McBurney had a specific issue he wished to
21 raise, he might speak to me or he might speak to the
22 DCS."
23 A. Excuse me. What is the paragraph? Sorry.
24 Q. Paragraph number 30. Do you have it?
25 A. Yes, but I don't see reference to what you are -- it
68
1 doesn't seem to be my paragraph 30.
2 Q. If I can read the paragraph out to you:
3 "If DCS ..."
4 A. I would really like to see it, if it is possible.
5 Q. I understand. I have got it in the old form. I am
6 sorry. It will probably be something similar to it.
7 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we have on our screen at the moment
8 a statement from another witness?
9 A. Yes, we have.
10 MR MALLON: If I can just raise it with you, the same issue
11 arises.
12 MR UNDERWOOD: It is [81796].
13 MR MALLON: [81796]. If you can go on to paragraph 30,
14 would you like to read that? It is just the example you
15 give whereby DCS McBurney might ask you for specific
16 help. You give an example: if an arrest operation is
17 being planned, there would be six people who would
18 require maybe six arrest teams and six search teams.
19 I was wondering did you, in fact, give any
20 assistance or were you asked for any assistance when
21 Mrs Atkinson and the Hanveys were being arrested?
22 A. Well ...
23 Q. Do you remember if you were?
24 A. I don't remember. I don't know when it was either.
25 Q. They were arrested 10th April 2001. Would you know
69
1 anything about that?
2 A. Sorry.
3 Q. I know it is a long time ago.
4 A. I had long since left south region. Indeed, I had
5 retired from the force in April 2001.
6 Q. So you would not have been asked about that?
7 A. Irrelevant question, sir.
8 Q. I was just wondering from your general background
9 knowledge, would it have been necessary to ask
10 an officer for those additional resources at that time?
11 A. I mean, I can't really comment on that because I don't
12 know what the competing resource demands would have been
13 for my successors or the commanders who were there on
14 the ground --
15 Q. So you wouldn't know that?
16 A. -- dealing with umpteen other matters. I mean ...
17 Q. Now, before you retired, if one looks at 5th December
18 2000, Detective Chief Superintendent McBurney, DCI K and
19 SIO Chris Mahaffey had a revised strategy meeting
20 involving the investigation into Robert Atkinson. At
21 that time they decided that they would arrest the
22 parties, search their home addresses and that they would
23 begin the commencement of a covert evidence-gathering
24 exercise.
25 Would they have had to come to you at that time to
70
1 get the resources for that?
2 A. Absolutely no knowledge. I left south region at the
3 beginning of January 1998. You are asking me about the
4 year 2000. So I haven't a clue about that.
5 Q. You haven't a clue about that?
6 A. I was long gone, two years.
7 Q. So you left that. So whenever you say that someone
8 would have come to you, it wouldn't have been, as it
9 were, on a colloquial basis, "Look, we meet together.
10 Rather than go through all the procedures, can you get
11 me ...?" by way of a direct approach?
12 A. Sorry. I am not sure I understand.
13 Q. In your statement you give the indication it seems to be
14 quite an informal matter:
15 "If DCS McBurney had a specific issue he wished to
16 raise, he might speak to me or he might speak to the
17 DCS C1 at headquarters ..."
18 A. Yes, yes.
19 Q. Do you ever remember him speaking to you about
20 an intrusive surveillance operation involving
21 Robert Atkinson, something which you were fairly
22 involved in and fairly interested in?
23 A. No, certainly not.
24 Q. Was that a normal enough operation or did it require
25 specific authorisation and specific funding and specific
71
1 equipment?
2 A. Well, back again, what you are referring to clearly did
3 not happen during my tenure.
4 Q. No, but I am asking you as a general question, not
5 specifically about this.
6 A. It was also prior to the enactment of the Regulatory and
7 Investigatory Powers Act. It was prior to that as well.
8 My recollection is that if an investigator, for example,
9 wanted access to telephone records, he or she had to go
10 via the Assistant Chief Constable Crime Department and
11 seek approval at that sort of level, because there were
12 questions of privacy and data protection then as well.
13 Q. What I am trying to direct your mind to is the intrusive
14 surveillance element of it.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. That was actually put into effect in April 2001, but it
17 was discussed and planned in December 2000.
18 A. As I say, I left in January '98, so I am sorry, I can't
19 comment whatsoever on the actions of others.
20 Q. Yes. It was December 2000. Now, I am not asking you to
21 comment on the actions of others, but what I have said
22 to you is it has resourcing implications. Would you or
23 someone at your level have had to consider those
24 resourcing implications?
25 A. It's difficult for me to say that. As I said, a lot of
72
1 things change in all organisations in two or three years
2 procedurally. There was new legislation coming in, new
3 codes of practice. A whole range of things were
4 changing. So it would be very unfair for me to
5 potentially mislead this Inquiry with offering comments
6 on something two, three years outwith my knowledge at
7 that time.
8 Q. You don't seem to want to comment on that. Let me ask
9 you about this: had you any experience with intrusive
10 surveillance operations ever while you were in the
11 police?
12 A. Subsequently, yes.
13 Q. Subsequently. Subsequent to when?
14 MR UNDERWOOD: This is a delicate matter. I wonder if my
15 friend would lay a bit better base for it.
16 MR MALLON: Yes. In relation to this situation, the period
17 that I am involved with in regard to the surveillance is
18 the period covered from the decision to implement it on
19 5th December 2000 and its implementation on
20 10th April 2001 and its conclusion on or about
21 20th April 2001. Now, you have indicated that at that
22 time you were not involved in it.
23 A. That's quite right, yes, nor did I have any knowledge of
24 it.
25 Q. You didn't have any knowledge of it?
73
1 A. And I don't to this day.
2 Q. Yes. You might have seen it in the papers or heard
3 about it subsequently, because there was
4 an investigation into it as to how it was discovered.
5 You didn't know anything about that?
6 A. Sorry. I mean, I retired in 2001.
7 Q. When did you retire?
8 A. March 2001.
9 Q. So this was less than two weeks before this was
10 implemented?
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, the witness says he doesn't know
12 anything about it.
13 MR MALLON: Yes, I appreciate that and he is saying that he
14 retired, but this would have been very well ongoing
15 before you retired.
16 A. Well, I had no knowledge or involvement with it. So far
17 as I was concerned, up until -- I was never -- I was
18 never spoken to or interviewed or re-interviewed by any
19 other investigation or investigators or re-examination
20 of any of these enquiries.
21 Q. I understand that.
22 A. When I finished in the police here, I moved to work in
23 Great Britain for some years. I was detached from this.
24 I was never spoken to by anyone until these Inquiry
25 people -- the people representing this Inquiry spoke to
74
1 me two years ago, when I discovered then this issue
2 about whether or not the ICPC had -- whether or not they
3 had supervised the Atkinson part and for how long.
4 I had no knowledge or involvement in any of the other
5 things that happened once I left south region in
6 January 1998.
7 Q. I appreciate that.
8 A. I can't really add to that. I am sorry.
9 Q. No. I was just wondering whether you had any
10 information you could give us with regard to resourcing
11 levels, both at the time you were in the relevant region
12 and afterwards. If you can't assist us in that -- and
13 you have said you can't -- the only other matter, which
14 is a general question, is in or around this time in
15 south region or any other region in which you were
16 involved -- I am not asking specific operations -- what
17 I am saying to you is: were you aware of the necessity
18 to bring in specialist teams to do that?
19 A. I am sorry.
20 Q. To bring in --
21 A. Specialist teams to do what?
22 Q. Intrusive surveillance.
23 A. No, I wouldn't have been aware that have.
24 Q. You had never used them or authorised them yourself?
25 A. I don't recollect so.
75
1 Q. Does that mean that you might have?
2 A. No, I don't think so. I mean, again I'm saying to you
3 that many procedures and rules and regulations changed
4 with the new Regulatory Powers Act, etc, etc. I am in
5 no way evading your question. I am just saying I cannot
6 help you.
7 Q. But you just can't remember ever using them. Is that
8 it?
9 A. Sorry. I did not use them.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 A. I did not use them. That would have been in the domain
12 of the Criminal Investigation Department and the
13 Crime Department.
14 MR MALLON: I just wondered in relation to the resources.
15 Thank you.
16 A. Thank you now.
17 Questions from MR ADAIR
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Adair.
19 MR ADAIR: Thank you, sir.
20 Just a few things I want to briefly ask you about,
21 a number of the issues, Mr Hall.
22 Now, it was suggested to you by Mr McGrory that,
23 really, the minute the police became aware from the
24 telephone records, which they obtained in early May,
25 that there had been a call between the Hanvey and
76
1 Atkinson household, basically he should have been
2 arrested there and then.
3 Now, we have heard some evidence about service
4 providers and the basis on which they provided this
5 information. Can you tell us your recollection as to
6 the basis on which they provided the police with
7 telephone records?
8 A. Yes. Well, on a hazy memory again, spanning many, many
9 years, but, I mean, I know it fluctuated because of
10 intimidation and other attacks and threats and different
11 situations, in that some service providers we went
12 through definitely went through a period when they were
13 unwilling to provide witnesses to go to court and they
14 were only willing to undertake checks on an intelligence
15 basis, if you like, or a, if you like, restricted basis.
16 Q. Well, when you say "an intelligence or restricted
17 basis", what does that mean? Does that mean that the
18 information was given to the police but to be treated
19 confidentially and not revealed to people?
20 A. And it would have meant they were unwilling to provide
21 witnesses to prove it.
22 I can't say when that applied or didn't apply. I am
23 just saying over what is nearly now a 40-year memory
24 that it did change significantly because of the effects
25 of terrorism and threats and intimidation
77
1 Q. The next thing I wanted to ask you about was you were
2 being asked again by Mr McGrory as to whether the
3 allegation being made in respect of the tip-off, the
4 suggestion is that that should have been and should have
5 formed part of the murder investigation, because if it's
6 true, he is at least guilty of assisting offenders.
7 A. Sure.
8 Q. I am not sure whether that offence is one in England,
9 sir --
10 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. That's the correct description of it.
11 MR ADAIR: -- but that's what we have. He is at least --
12 you and I know that there are many murder cases where
13 joined on the same indictment will be a charge of murder
14 and against another person there will be a charge of
15 assisting offenders. It used to be the old accessory
16 after the fact and so on.
17 What do you say about the approach that was taken by
18 Mr McBurney in this case? He didn't treat it as part of
19 the murder investigation as potentially assisting
20 offenders. He treated it really as an investigation
21 into these actions, this tip-off, on a separate basis.
22 What do you say about that? Was that reasonable or
23 unreasonable? What would you have done? Can you help
24 us about that?
25 A. Well, from what I have subsequently seen and what has
78
1 been made available to me, it seems to me that his
2 strategy, which I'm again of the opinion appears at
3 least to have been agreed and supervised by the ICPC,
4 was a workable one in that situation in terms of trying
5 to negative possible defences to try to get other
6 witnesses who might provide some evidence against the
7 officer alleged to have done this.
8 Q. I mean, we know that on the Monday morning you briefed
9 the chief constable, the deputy chief constable. We
10 know that basically everybody possible that could know
11 about this knew about the tipping-off allegation.
12 Did you or anyone else ever make the suggestion that
13 it should be treated as part of the murder investigation
14 as opposed to a separate investigation?
15 A. No. I don't recall that. I don't recall it.
16 Q. Did it never enter your mind that it should have been?
17 A. I'm not sure that any -- that it was really discerned by
18 anyone as a specific or major issue on the basis that
19 all the kind of circumstances touching upon the murder
20 were being investigated and supervised, and it's
21 difficult for me to put it beyond that or to kind of
22 qualify that.
23 I mean, you could possibly argue it either way.
24 I am not sure it is one best way, but clearly
25 Mr McBurney's investigative strategy had to be he went
79
1 for the long haul in terms of building his case, which
2 is a well-defined feature of criminal investigation in
3 cases such as this, where you are either relying on
4 perhaps technical evidence. His starting point was
5 an allegation from a 16-year-old girl based on hearsay.
6 Her boyfriend had been arrested, was in custody, was
7 being charged. So I am assuming he had a look at all
8 those factors and, in conjunction with his supervisor,
9 he had to decide which path he went down.
10 I think it's now shown somewhere that he eventually
11 succeeded in getting his witness or potential witness,
12 albeit that not everything may have proved successful in
13 the long-term.
14 Q. What do you say to the suggestion being tentatively
15 suggested by some that he should have treated it as part
16 of the murder investigation?
17 A. Well, I mean, I can't be sure all these years later
18 whether he did or did not, other than everything was
19 clear in my mind. I can only give you my mindset at the
20 time, which was that those allegations were being
21 supervised by the ICPC. Where the beginning and ending
22 was with the murder investigation, I can't really
23 reconcile in my mind now.
24 Q. Let me ask you this: did it ever occur to you to
25 direct -- would you have had the power to direct that it
80
1 should be treated as part of the murder investigation,
2 being a senior officer?
3 A. No, because all internal investigations as it then would
4 have become would have been loosely titled, yes,
5 an allegation against an officer -- it is still called
6 the same today in terms of investigations -- would have
7 been monitored by G Department. So you have the SIO for
8 it, who is the experienced detective. You have the
9 discipline superintendent with him and you have the
10 independent supervisor.
11 Q. I am trying to find out something different. Leave
12 aside the ICPC for the moment. Say they don't know
13 about it or aren't supervising it. We know there is
14 an allegation of criminal behaviour on behalf of
15 Atkinson. If they hadn't been involved at all, ICPC, or
16 G Department, would you have considered directing or
17 enquiring as to whether the allegation against Atkinson
18 was part of the murder investigation or would you have
19 regarded it as something to be treated as a separate
20 investigation? I am just trying to find out what your
21 thoughts would have been.
22 A. Yes, yes, yes. Well, I would think on balance that it
23 would have been part and parcel of the murder
24 investigation. I mean, it would have been the CID
25 officer investigating the murder and any associated
81
1 offences.
2 Q. Right.
3 A. So, you know, in that scenario you had no complaint and
4 no ICPC. I don't think there would have been any kind
5 of alternative question, so to speak.
6 Q. But it is a different scenario once the ICPC are
7 involved and G Department. Is that what you are saying?
8 A. That's correct. That's correct.
9 Q. The other thing I want to ask you about is the
10 appointment of how Mr McBurney was appointed. You have
11 been asked again by Mr McGrory about this. We know that
12 it has to be effectively with the approval of the ICPC
13 or did do in those days. Is that right?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. What were the practical mechanics as to the
16 decision-making for the investigative officer into
17 a complaint against the police?
18 A. Uh-huh.
19 Q. I mean, in practical terms -- leave aside formal
20 documents for a moment.
21 A. Yes. The practical situation was the facts were
22 relayed, if you like, via G Department to the ICPC.
23 They decided -- first of all, the ICPC had discretion on
24 which cases they supervised and which ones they didn't.
25 They tended to supervise, naturally, the more serious
82
1 ones. Once they decided they were going to supervise
2 it, then it would have been asking G Department to help
3 them select, for want of a better word, an appropriate
4 SIO, looking obviously at the nature of the allegations,
5 etc, etc, and the gravity of them and the overall
6 scenario. G Department would then have set about
7 finding a suitable and available SIO, bearing in mind we
8 were living in difficult times and murders were
9 commonplace.
10 Q. Okay.
11 A. So G Department, or someone on their behalf, might well
12 have asked me, for example, "Is Detective Superintendent
13 or Chief Superintendent so and so likely to be
14 available, suitable, whatever, available to go and do
15 this if we recommend him to the ICPC?"
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. Then the ICPC would ultimately approve that or not and
18 the answer would be communicated.
19 Q. Okay. If you pull up page [15436], please, on the
20 screen, this, Mr Hall, is a letter from Mr Murnaghan
21 I am told, although the name is redacted. I think
22 Mr Underwood confirms that. It is to the director of
23 the British Irish Rights Watch. It is dated June 1997.
24 If you would just highlight the third paragraph down, do
25 you see where it says:
83
1 "Firstly, I should point out that Detective Chief
2 Superintendent McBurney, Superintendent Anderson and
3 Chief Inspector Bradley are based at Gough Barracks,
4 Armagh and not Portadown RUC station. The decision to
5 approve Detective Chief Superintendent McBurney as
6 investigating officer rather than an officer from
7 outside the RUC was made by myself after careful
8 consideration. The detective chief superintendent has
9 been involved in previous supervised investigations and
10 has the confidence of the Commission to conduct
11 a thorough and meaningful enquiry under my direct
12 supervision."
13 That's obviously referring to -- that's Mr Murnaghan
14 relating his experience of Mr McBurney. So it would
15 appear from this -- and does this accord with your
16 recollection of the practice -- that really the ICPC
17 effectively had a very substantial role in selecting the
18 senior investigating officer for any neglect
19 allegations -- for any allegation against the police?
20 A. Yes, and particularly where it was alleged criminal
21 conduct. Absolutely right.
22 Q. Can you confirm or not from your own recollection
23 whether Mr McBurney had been involved as SIO in
24 a number of investigations overseen by the ICPC?
25 A. Yes. I couldn't name names, but I have no doubt that
84
1 would have been the case.
2 Q. I want to turn briefly to one other issue that you
3 touched upon, and that is the fact that on the Monday,
4 having been told about the tipping-off allegation, you
5 phoned Mr Murnaghan as a belt and braces situation to
6 make sure that he was aware of the tipping-off
7 allegation, as I understand it. Is that right?
8 A. That's correct, yes.
9 Q. Now, there has been some, I suppose -- I was going to
10 say wild speculation, but there has been some
11 speculation yesterday suggested from dealing with this
12 issue that it might be that Mr McBurney at some stage
13 phoned up Mr Murnaghan and really effectively told him
14 to back off or that he was going to look after it and he
15 shouldn't be involved anymore.
16 Now, from what you know -- unfortunately, as we
17 know, Mr Murnaghan is dead. From what you know of
18 Mr Murnaghan, if Mr McBurney had done that, what would
19 Mr Murnaghan's reaction have been?
20 A. Mr Murnaghan would not have countenanced any such
21 suggestion or approach in his wildest dreams.
22 Mr Murnaghan was a most thorough, meticulous and
23 respected lawyer in the Northern Ireland community and
24 was clearly, I am assuming, selected to be a member of
25 the ICPC because of his professionalism and the status
85
1 and esteem that he held in Northern Ireland society.
2 So not for one moment would Mr Murnaghan have
3 countenanced any approaches other than the official way
4 of doing business.
5 Q. I think we are all aware, Mr Hall, that sometimes it can
6 be, when civilians are involved with whatever type of
7 force it is, whether it is the police force or whatever,
8 a cosy relationship can sometimes develop. You know
9 what I am talking about. Do you understand what I am
10 talking about?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Sometimes it can be cosy, and people -- would
13 Mr Murnaghan have been the sort of person who would
14 develop a cosy relationship with police officers?
15 A. No. Certainly not. Mr -- but I want to balance that by
16 saying Mr Murnaghan was polite and courteous in all his
17 dealings, but extremely professional and independent in
18 relation to his business.
19 Q. The final thing I want to ask you about is this: you
20 have told us that it was your belief and, as
21 I understand it, the belief of other senior police
22 officers that the ICPC were overseeing the investigation
23 into the allegation of the tip-off.
24 A. That's correct, yes.
25 Q. You have told us then that you received, I think fairly
86
1 recently, some other documentation which confirmed that
2 belief and you quoted a number of matters.
3 A. Yes, indeed, yes.
4 Q. Is one of those matters -- and I can refer them in due
5 course to the Panel without going through them all now.
6 Page [27254], please. Is one of those matters this file
7 note, which is a file note from Mr Mullan of the ICPC?
8 Is this one of the matters that you recently saw?
9 If you look in particular at paragraph (j).
10 A. That's correct. That's one of them, yes.
11 Q. Is that a file note, are you aware, from the
12 documentation you received recently that Mr Mullan had
13 prepared for a meeting with Chief
14 Superintendent McBurney, Superintendent Anderson from
15 Complaints and Discipline and others on 15th May of
16 1997?
17 A. That's correct. That follows on from the previous
18 meeting with the same people on 12th May, which was the
19 Monday afternoon after my Monday morning meeting.
20 Q. Sir, I am not going to take you through the remainder of
21 the document.
22 A. 19th May was the next one for the record.
23 MR ADAIR: Thank you. Thanks very much.
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Adair, just help me about the order which
25 deals with the ICPC. This was not a public complaint.
87
1 Therefore, the only way in which it could come within
2 the pure view of the ICPC would be by way of a reference
3 under Article 8 from the chief constable.
4 MR ADAIR: That's right. I can't solve that.
5 THE CHAIRMAN: In fact, that didn't happen until 2007.
6 MR ADAIR: I know that. I can't -- I haven't got the answer
7 as to why then there is this apparent involvement by the
8 ICPC at this stage, sir.
9 THE CHAIRMAN: As much as they could do and should have done
10 if they had wanted to have their finger in the pie would
11 be to say to the chief constable, "We have learned about
12 this. We would like it if you would refer it to us".
13 That's the only way in which they could become seized of
14 it.
15 MR ADAIR: That's right, properly seized as opposed to what
16 appears to be an involvement without being properly
17 seized. I absolutely agree, sir.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
19 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD
20 MR UNDERWOOD: You heard that exchange, Mr Hall. What do
21 you say about it?
22 A. Well, what I say about it is the very significant first
23 strategy meeting, as I see it now, was being held on the
24 Monday afternoon with the SIO and with the G Department
25 superintendent and with the ICPC official and
88
1 supervisors and Mr McBurney clearly shared the details
2 of this additional allegation.
3 I don't want to sound -- to give the impression of
4 being pedantic in any way. I am not sure if the wording
5 of the legislation would have said "complaint" or
6 "allegation" but here was an additional allegation.
7 Q. It is allegation or other matter. Allegations are
8 things which the ICPC would naturally get --
9 A. In my view -- sorry.
10 Q. Can I just tell you this?
11 A. Sorry. Yes.
12 Q. Other matters are things which the chief constable could
13 bring to the attention of the ICPC and the ICPC could
14 then ask.
15 A. Well, I step back, as I say, to where we had already
16 called in the ICPC under Article 8 to look at the
17 overall circumstances. Then we had the letter of
18 complaint which added to that against the alleged
19 inaction, and now we have a further allegation. By the
20 time this comes in, the ICPC are involved, Mr McBurney
21 is approved and appointed, and he has been doing various
22 obviously elementary work for the ICPC. Then he has his
23 first, as I see it -- and I am sure he would have made
24 me aware of that on the Sunday, that he was having this
25 major meeting with the ICPC and others. So he reveals
89
1 the additional allegation that he is trying to
2 investigate. It is recorded and noted by the ICPC
3 official and it seems to have been taken on board at
4 a number of subsequent meetings, and, indeed, the -- in
5 my view, supervised and gave instructions to the SIO.
6 So ...
7 Q. Could it be as simple as this? If Mr Murnaghan had
8 thought there was something wrong with the concept he
9 was supervising, presumably you would have been amazed
10 if he hadn't told you that when you spoke to him?
11 A. Oh, yes. In fairness, he wouldn't have seen the detail
12 at that moment. In fairness to Mr Murnaghan, he would
13 not have seen the detail until he looked at that at the
14 subsequent meetings.
15 But, you know, I would have assumed that if there
16 was any difficulty, his official would have referred it
17 back and the superintendent G Department as well was
18 present. So I would have thought if there were any
19 additional forms to be filled or Is or Ts to be dotted
20 or crossed, there were sufficient people present to do
21 that.
22 Q. So as far as you were concerned, not only was it
23 blindingly obvious this was something the ICPC should
24 have been supervising, but that everything was in place
25 for the ICPC to be supervising it?
90
1 A. Well, as I said earlier, to me, the view of the
2 reasonable person, it was inextricably linked.
3 REV. BARONESS RICHARDSON: May I -- I am not a lawyer, so
4 excuse my language. If there had been no letter of
5 complaint which brought it into the remit of the ICPC,
6 would it have been more or less likely that the
7 allegations about the tipping off would be included
8 within the criminal investigation of the murder?
9 A. Baroness, probably we wouldn't have changed it too much,
10 because we had already -- I go back again -- called in
11 the ICPC ahead of the letter of complaint to look at all
12 matters of concern in relation to that
13 incident/investigation.
14 So they were in from day one, if you like, with
15 an open book, because we were proactive in asking them
16 to come in and look at the overall circumstances of this
17 incident.
18 REV. BARONESS RICHARDSON: So those allegations would have
19 been still treated as a complaint against an officer
20 rather than as an investigation into an accessory to
21 murder?
22 A. I would have thought so. yes, I would have thought so.
23 MR UNDERWOOD: Let me go back to the ICPC dipping in and out
24 of this. Let's take a snapshot of the middle of
25 May 1997. As far as everybody is concerned, including
91
1 the ICPC, they are all over it. They are on top of
2 this. They are worrying about whether phone records
3 haven't been got or whether they have been got. Then
4 they drop it. We now know that, at least by October,
5 they are out of it. As far as they are concerned, they
6 are telling us nothing ever to do with them. Good Lord,
7 no.
8 Now, I asked you before: can you give any
9 explanation for why that happened? You told me you
10 couldn't. You have now been offered one explanation,
11 which you roundly rejected, which is that Mr McBurney
12 somehow had a chat with Mr Murnaghan and Mr Murnaghan
13 went away. In the course of rejecting that, you told
14 Mr Adair that Mr Murnaghan was a professional,
15 meticulous man. You stand by that, I take it?
16 A. Without doubt.
17 Q. Secondly, if Mr McBurney had attempted to get him off
18 the case, he would definitely not have gone off the case
19 on that basis.
20 You went on to say he would have only got off the
21 case, as it were, if he had been asked through official
22 channels. Do you mean that?
23 A. Sorry. I don't recall saying "if he had been asked
24 through official channels".
25 Q. We can look at the transcript, of course. My recall is
92
1 you added a rider, when you were asked about whether he
2 would have backed off on Mr McBurney's say-so, that he
3 would only have backed off if he had been asked
4 properly.
5 A. Sorry. I don't think I was asked about backing off.
6 I think what I said, subject to the record, is that
7 Mr McBurney would have only have done things by official
8 channels, by the book.
9 Q. Mr McBurney?
10 A. Sorry. Mr Murnaghan.
11 Q. It must follow, must it not?
12 A. I don't think the suggestion or innuendo that he might
13 have backed off was ever put to me, nor did I for one
14 moment ever think he would have been asked or in
15 a position to back off.
16 Q. Perhaps I am putting two and two together and making
17 five. Let's take the position that we know.
18 As of May, he is supervising the investigation into
19 the tip-off. As of October, he is not. So he did back
20 off. Do you accept that?
21 A. Well, I don't like the term "backing off".
22 Q. All right. Dropped the supervision?
23 THE CHAIRMAN: Withdrew.
24 A. It infers something ...
25 MR UNDERWOOD: He ceased to supervise the allegation that
93
1 the police officer was corrupt?
2 A. Well, I mean, I didn't know that, but I see some notes
3 to that effect, September, October. But then I see
4 notes at the end of the inquiry from the official still
5 making reference to Atkinson, albeit it didn't figure in
6 his certificate of satisfaction. So I am not sure who
7 was saying or doing what in that regard.
8 Q. Take it from me that the evidence we have been given by
9 Mr Mullan is they were not supervising.
10 It is your evidence from your knowledge then of
11 Mr Murnaghan that he would not have ceased to supervise
12 it unless someone in authority had told him to do that.
13 Is that it?
14 A. Well, I am not sure how someone -- who the someone in
15 authority would be to tell him, other than perhaps his
16 own boss. If he was supervising it in accordance with
17 the legislation and practice, I am not sure where the
18 someone might come from to tell him to stop it.
19 Q. Mr McBurney?
20 A. I don't know. I don't know. I don't think that would
21 happen in practice. I can't see how that would be ...
22 Q. Superintendent Anderson?
23 A. Who?
24 Q. Superintendent Anderson from Complaints and Discipline?
25 A. No. I mean, Mr McBurney was a man who knew the law and
94
1 practice and procedure -- sorry, Mr Murnaghan. Whatever
2 he needed to do, he would have done. If there was
3 ultimately something discovered in statutory provision
4 which did not entitle him to still supervise it, then
5 I am sure he would have acted in accordance with the
6 law, but someone saying to him "back off" is a totally
7 different suggestion which I would not -- he would not
8 have countenanced.
9 Q. One other matter. You were asked a fair amount about
10 Mr McBurney's actions as SIO and to offer, as it were,
11 your professional opinion about what an SIO might have
12 done.
13 Can I just take it one step further to see whether
14 you can help us on this? We know that when Mr McBurney
15 did interview Mr Atkinson in September 1997, he told him
16 that there was an allegation that he made a telephone
17 call to the Hanvey household on the morning of
18 27th April. He didn't put to him that the police had
19 telephone records which substantiated that and he let
20 him go away for a month to dig out his own records and
21 come back with those and an explanation. Does any of
22 that strike you as odd?
23 A. I don't think I could say now. On the -- I mean, again,
24 I wasn't an SIO and I don't know what sufficiency of
25 admissible evidence was available. We all know the
95
1 difficulty of having suspicion and all kinds of other
2 things and having evidence as admissible to produce to
3 a court or to sustain a charge, prima facie evidence.
4 So I don't know what other lines Mr McBurney would have
5 been pursuing in terms of were there potential
6 witnesses, etc, etc.
7 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you. I am not take that any further.
8 Unless there is anything else, sir?
9 THE CHAIRMAN: No.
10 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Hall.
11 A. Thank you. That concludes your evidence. Thank you
12 very much for coming.
13 MR UNDERWOOD: I know Mr McKillop has an application to make
14 before the Panel which will be made without everybody
15 else's presence. I apprehend that will probably take
16 you to 1 o'clock or so. Can I suggest not before
17 2 o'clock for the rest?
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
19 (12.40 pm)
20 (The hearing went into closed session)
21 (1.10 pm)
22 (The luncheon adjournment)
23 (1.55 pm)
24 (In public session)
25 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, I threatened us with listening to the
96
1 long, detailed and careful interview that was conducted
2 with Mr McBurney and I now propose to make that threat
3 good. As I said, it is about six and a half hours.
4 I apprehend we can deal with a good third of it today.
5 Again, as I said, we will be able to hear it quite well
6 and follow it by way of transcript on screen, I hope.
7 THE CHAIRMAN: Good.
8 (Recorded interview with Mr Maynard McBurney played)
9 MR UNDERWOOD: Perhaps we should stop as well. Sir, as
10 I say, regrettably I am going to have to chop up this
11 interview into probably more than two goes. We will
12 resume again on Friday on that, I trust, with a view to
13 getting it done in as few bites as we can. I know
14 there is a matter that needs to be dealt with now in
15 closed session.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Are we able to continue with some of this
17 after we have dealt with the other matter?
18 MR UNDERWOOD: I suspect, because of the breaks in the way
19 the IT has to be set up, we would probably waste half
20 an hour in order to achieve that. It is a matter for
21 you, of course, but I suspect it would be quite
22 difficult.
23 THE CHAIRMAN: Does the IT have to be turned off?
24 MR UNDERWOOD: It has to be turned off for the closed
25 session, yes.
97
1 THE CHAIRMAN: Is there another hearing room we could use
2 for the other matter?
3 MR UNDERWOOD: I am in your hands, but I am sure we can find
4 a room.
5 THE CHAIRMAN: I was thinking then we could get on with
6 another half hour or so of this.
7 MR UNDERWOOD: In that case, perhaps it might be better to
8 carry on with this for a bit and then break into closed
9 session, if that's what would work.
10 (Recorded Interview with Mr Maynard McBurney continued)
11 THE CHAIRMAN: We shall stop when the present topic is dealt
12 with. We will stop there. I noticed, Mr Underwood, at
13 page 9, line 9, the words "from one of them". It is,
14 I think, in fact, "from Monaghan".
15 Who, by the way, is Joy Hopkinson?
16 MR UNDERWOOD: She was a witness barrister who was engaged
17 in interviewing a number of the witnesses.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Very well. We will rise now then and
19 come back to deal with the other matter when things are
20 organised.
21 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much.
22 (4.30 pm)
23 (Short adjournment re arrangements for closed session)
24 (4.55 pm)
25 (Public session of the hearing concluded, to be resumed at
98
1 10.30 tomorrow morning)
2 --ooOoo--
3 I N D E X
4
5
MR WILLIAM DESMOND McCREESH (sworn) .............. 1
6 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 1
Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 10
7 Questions from MR O'CONNOR ................ 14
Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD. ...... 26
8 Questions from THE PANEL .................. 27
9 MR ROBERT FREDERICK HALL (sworn) ................. 28
Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 29
10 Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 50
Questions from MR MALLON .................. 68
11 Questions from MR ADAIR ................... 76
Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD ....... 88
12
(Recorded interview with ......................... 97
13 Mr Maynard McBurney played)
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
99
