- - - - - - - - - - PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF ROBERT HAMILL - - - - - - - - - - Held at: Interpoint 20-24 York Street Belfast on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009 commencing at 10.00 am Day 55 1 Wednesday, 2nd September 2009 2 (10.00 am) 3 (In open session) 4 MR UNDERWOOD: William McCreesh, please. 5 MR WILLIAM DESMOND McCREESH (sworn) 6 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD 7 MR UNDERWOOD: Good morning, Mr McCreesh. My name is 8 Underwood. I am Counsel to the Inquiry. I have a few 9 questions for you. It may well be that, after that, 10 there will be some supplementals from others here. 11 Can I ask your full names, please. 12 A. My full name is William Desmond McCreesh. 13 Q. I know we have drafted a statement for you. I hope we 14 can get that up on screen at page [81919]. I think you 15 have had the opportunity to look through this and there 16 are some changes you would like to make. Is that fair? 17 A. That's correct. 18 Q. Do you want me to run through it or would you -- 19 A. Well, I haven't got the statement on my screen. 20 Q. Naturally. Perhaps we can have your screen fixed. 21 MR UNDERWOOD: Tell you what, Mr McCreesh. Let's be 22 old-fashioned. 23 A. I may have a copy. That's fine. Thank you. 24 Q. Would you prefer me to run through this or would you 25 like to point out any particular -- 1 1 A. No, I will respond to any questions, and where, with 2 respect, I say I may not have been accurate or disagree, 3 I will try and clarify to the Inquiry. 4 Q. I have some general questions for you anyway. You talk 5 in your statement around paragraphs 6-11 about your 6 experience in Portadown and sectarian clashes. I just 7 wonder if you could help us in expanding on that. 8 Was the position in 1997 that tensions were still 9 running high in Portadown? 10 A. Tensions were still running high in Portadown at that 11 particular time, yes. 12 Q. You told us in your statement that it was quite 13 commonplace to have a Land Rover parked in the middle of 14 town at the weekend to police possible clashes. 15 A. That would be common practice, particularly on Friday 16 and Saturday nights. 17 Q. Can you tell us what would generally have happened if 18 a Land Rover was there and a fight broke out? Would the 19 police have been expected to get out or would they have 20 been expected to call for back-up, or what would happen? 21 A. Well, obviously in that particular location I would have 22 expected them to get out and certainly -- their function 23 in being there was to deal with any public order 24 situations and their mere presence to act as 25 a deterrent. 2 1 Q. Really what I am getting at is what happens if it did 2 not act as a deterrent? What would you have expected 3 back then if, say, a group of 40 or 50 people had 4 started fighting in the presence of a Land Rover with 5 four officers in it? 6 A. I would have expected some kind of intervention to 7 ensure a bad enough situation didn't deteriorate 8 further. 9 Q. If a police officer who was expected to police that sort 10 of event was a local officer, would you have expected 11 him to have any reservations about getting involved? 12 A. Absolutely none. 13 Q. Was there any feeling amongst those officers who lived 14 locally that this was the job from hell, having to 15 police their local area? 16 A. Well, put it like this: the police in Portadown during 17 this particular period could well be described as being 18 in a sort of hell, because it was extremely difficult in 19 all aspects of it because there was content tension in 20 the Portadown area over these years. 21 Q. We have had some evidence that the police, as it were, 22 got it from both sides. They weren't popular with 23 either the local Protestant community or the Catholics. 24 A. Well, there is absolutely no doubt of that. I can speak 25 from personal experience on that. I certainly got it 3 1 from both sides of the community, without reservation 2 may I state. 3 Q. Thank you. I want to move on to the question of what 4 happened when you were notified about the events 5 involving Mr Hamill and what you would have expected to 6 have happened on the ground. 7 It looks like, if we look at paragraph 11 onwards of 8 your draft -- it seems likely by the look of it that 9 Inspector McCrum is the one who told you what had 10 happened? 11 A. As far as I can recall, it was Inspector McCrum rang me 12 at some time and told me there had been a public order 13 incident in Portadown. 14 Q. Then what you helpfully deal with over the next couple 15 of paragraphs or so there is what you would have done 16 yourself and what you would have expected to have 17 happened at the police station. I want to ask you a bit 18 more about that, if I may. 19 We know that there was in essence a riot, a large 20 gathering of people scrapping with a fairly large 21 number of police intervening at some point, and that two 22 people were taken away by ambulance, and that at least 23 one, probably two, of the officers thought that one of 24 the two men taken away was seriously injured, perhaps 25 stabbed, and was rasping for breath and was in real 4 1 difficulties. 2 Now, we also know that, as far as we can tell, no 3 senior officer at the scene talked to any of the 4 officers at the scene to find that out. Can you help us 5 from your experience at all levels in this area whether 6 you would have expected a senior officer at the scene to 7 have gone round before he let the officers go off to 8 other duties and asked about what had happened? 9 A. I certainly would. It is very easy from an objective 10 standpoint to say what should have happened or what 11 should have happened, bearing in mind you are dealing 12 with a confused and volatile situation. 13 However, I would have expected at the least that 14 some contact would have been made with these, the police 15 officers involved, to at least get a preliminary brief 16 of exactly what happened and what went on 17 Q. All right. Then we know you were surprised when you 18 discovered from the Inquiry interview that officers had, 19 in fact, been let to go home before they made 20 statements. 21 Can I ask you again -- never mind what would have 22 happened precisely at the scene -- would you have 23 regarded it as absolutely normal for there to be some 24 sort of debriefing before people were let to go off 25 duty? 5 1 A. I would have certainly regarded there should be some 2 type of debriefing, even a preliminary debriefing to at 3 least establish the basic facts as to what was going on 4 or what had happened. 5 Q. Again, you helpfully tell us in your statement that you 6 would have expected the police officers to have been 7 asked about identities of people who were at the scene. 8 Can I ask you to help on just what sort of 9 debriefing you would have expected? Would this have 10 been a formal business or would it just have been 11 getting the officers together to put notebooks together, 12 or what would it have been? 13 A. It would depend on the circumstances. If it had been 14 a very serious incident in which life was imminent, one 15 would have expected a fairly comprehensive initial 16 Inquiry. 17 If, in fact, as indications were, two people had 18 been taken to hospital, one believed to be serious, 19 I would have thought at the very least it would have 20 been a preliminary thing. There might also have been 21 a consideration that the police officers involved in 22 a traumatic experience, whoever decided they could go 23 off duty, might have been working on the premise that 24 they had been caught up in a conflict situation. Maybe 25 it wouldn't have been a bad thing to let them go home, 6 1 say, clean up and come back in at a very early stage to 2 put them through a comprehensive interview. 3 Q. Had anybody put their mind to it, in other words, it 4 would have been a plausible response to let the four 5 officers in the Land Rover go home to sort themselves 6 out before they were brought back in, as long as that 7 was a thought-out strategy. Is that your point? 8 A. It could have been a thought-out strategy. As I say, it 9 is -- what I am trying to emphasise for the benefit of 10 the Inquiry, this was obviously a traumatic situation 11 not only for the unfortunate people -- civilians 12 involved, but obviously for police officers to a certain 13 extent, and basically there might have been a rationale 14 rather than keeping them for hours and doing 15 an exhaustive debrief to get the preliminaries and make 16 arrangements for them to come in where they could be 17 comprehensively and accurately interviewed. 18 Q. So a plausible strategy would have been preliminary 19 debrief, then let them go and have some time? 20 A. That could have been, say, my point. It would depend on 21 the circumstances. 22 Q. Obviously, we will ask Inspector McCrum whether he had 23 that strategy, but as far as you are concerned, if that 24 was the thought-out strategy, that would have been 25 a reasonable one? 7 1 A. It would have been a reasonable one in the 2 circumstances. 3 Q. But you would have still had some preliminary 4 debriefing? 5 A. Obviously. It would need some initial enquiries. 6 I mean, you have to have a starting point. 7 Q. Is there anything else that you have discerned from what 8 you now know happened that you can help us on? 9 For example, is there any part of what you have 10 learned about scene preservation or any other 11 early-stage response that struck you as wrong or odd? 12 A. Very -- in an ideal world, it would be scene 13 preservation and everything by the book. In a volatile 14 situation it's very -- sometimes extremely difficult, 15 particularly when you have loads of people running about 16 and basically a riot situation in Portadown. 17 There were CID at that scene involved in this and 18 certainly they have an investigatory expertise 19 Q. We know the CID were on the scene by 5 o'clock or 20 6 o'clock? 21 A. They were on the scene. 22 Q. Our understanding is, as soon as they get on the scene, 23 they assume responsibility. 24 A. That's exactly right. On my preliminary debriefing of 25 Inspector McCrum -- and I hope this is accurate -- I was 8 1 told CID were at the scene and that the matter was 2 currently under active investigation. 3 Q. Right. That's very helpful. Thank you very much 4 indeed. 5 A. May I just clarify one thing, if I may with, the 6 approval of the Inquiry? 7 Q. Of course. 8 A. I may have stated at some time that, following the 9 Monday, I basically may have had no further dealings 10 with this and that ACC Hall, who I understand is 11 possibly giving evidence to the Inquiry, would have been 12 involved. 13 I may, in fact, in hindsight, have been wrong in 14 that, and that Mr Hall may not have been actually in the 15 Regional Headquarters on the Monday and Tuesday. By way 16 of illustration, I am fairly certain that on the Sunday, 17 and certainly on the Monday, that I had discussions with 18 certain senior CID officers as to the nature and type of 19 this investigation. 20 I know -- I am fairly certain I had discussions with 21 senior officers in J Division, that is Portadown, to 22 ensure that extra resources were put into the Portadown 23 area, because this type of incident would undoubtedly 24 add tremendously to existing tension. 25 Q. That's helpful. Thank you. So is it your impression 9 1 that in at least the days following this incident, there 2 was a sufficiency of resources in Portadown to deal with 3 this? 4 A. There certainly -- there had to be. I was in charge of 5 HMU, which is a response, namely the riot squad. 6 Q. Uh-huh. 7 A. I would have dealt with the resources. At no stage was 8 I asked for additional resources to supplement the 9 ongoing inquiry. 10 MR UNDERWOOD: That's very kind. Thank you very much. As 11 I say, there may be some supplemental questions. 12 MR ADAIR: I have no questions, sir. 13 Questions from MR McGRORY 14 MR McGRORY: I may have a few questions, sir, if I may. 15 My name is McGrory and I represent the family of 16 Robert Hamill. I would have a small number of questions 17 for you. 18 Can you help us just -- maybe I have overlooked 19 this -- with the time that you received the phone call, 20 the time of the night? Can you remember, was it closer 21 to breakfast time or was it in the middle of the night? 22 A. Now, to be absolutely accurate, it's impossible. 23 I would imagine, and this is going back over 12 years, 24 it possibly could have been maybe 5.00, 6.00, 7.00 am, 25 possibly somewhere there. 10 1 Q. It was later in the morning rather than earlier? 2 A. Yes, because, again, I emphasise to the best of my 3 knowledge I can recall being told that CID were at the 4 scene. 5 Q. That would help us put it after 5.00 to 6.00 am. So 6 that's helpful. 7 Can you recall if you specifically directed that 8 clothes be obtained or -- because you say in your 9 statement that that's something you would have done. Is 10 that a specific recollection? 11 A. It is not a specific recollection, but I certainly 12 enquired were police at the hospital or on their way to 13 the hospital and I was told that they were. 14 For me to sit here and tell the Inquiry that I can 15 recall specifically and accurately what specific 16 directions I gave, I am not prepared to say something 17 that I can't stand over 100%. 18 Q. Of course not. Thank you. That's very helpful. 19 If I could just ask you some general questions about 20 Portadown and your experience of it, because you are 21 someone who has had direct experience of the marching 22 controversy in Portadown from the early days of the 23 marches through the tunnel in the 1980s. Isn't that 24 correct? 25 A. That's correct. 11 1 Q. That would have been one of the first occasions when 2 marching issue was directly confronted by the RUC in the 3 sense that marches were stopped going through a specific 4 area. Isn't that correct? 5 A. That is absolutely correct. 6 Q. I think it goes without saying that the majority of the 7 police force came from within the Protestant community. 8 That was a reality? 9 A. That was a reality, yes, at that time. 10 Q. I don't want to get into debates about why that is or 11 the rights or wrongs of it. It was a fact. 12 This caused, undoubtedly, tensions within the RUC in 13 terms of police officers having to go and police members 14 of their own community in the context of these marches. 15 A. It possibly caused some degree of tension, bearing in 16 mind that a lot of police officers would live amongst 17 where the marchers lived. 18 Q. Indeed. For that very reason, you said you had personal 19 experience of this -- it is because the police officers 20 lived within -- came from within the Protestant 21 community and lived within the Protestant community that 22 they were, in a sense, vulnerable to pressures about 23 policing? 24 A. No. I think we had better get this in perspective. 25 When you adorned the RUC uniform -- everybody has 12 1 personalised feelings. You went out to do your duty and 2 your duty was done. I was instrumental in the first 3 rerouting of these parades and so on and I knew what 4 people suffered, but I would certainly assure the 5 Inquiry that the role that was detailed was, in fact, 6 carried out to the best of the RUC's ability. 7 Q. Oh, yes. Let me make it clear to you, Mr McCreesh, I am 8 not suggesting to you for a moment that the police 9 officers didn't do that, but that in doing so that 10 exposed them to possible vilification and attack and 11 pressure from within their own community from those who 12 didn't see it that way? 13 A. I have certainly little doubt that various police 14 officers were subject to ridicule and criticism from 15 certain sections of the community and possibly from 16 people who reside in areas where they themselves 17 resided. 18 Q. Yes. Thank you. The other issue I want to touch on is 19 a comment in your statement about the way in which the 20 Protestant community viewed the centre of Portadown. 21 You said they regarded it as their own? 22 A. I would certainly say that. Portadown has a reputation, 23 well-known to everyone, as a very Loyalist community. 24 Certainly, elements in that, in the Portadown 25 population, would regard the centre of Portadown as 13 1 their territory, whereas the tunnel, say the upper end 2 of Garvaghy Road, would be regarded as Catholic 3 territory for want of a better word. 4 Q. It would follow from that then that Catholics veering 5 into the territory that you speak about, where 6 Protestants regarded it as their own, the centre of 7 Portadown beyond the junction of the centre over towards 8 St Patrick's Hall, would have been very much aware that 9 they were in different territory. Isn't that correct? 10 A. They certainly would. What you are leading to is people 11 going to St Patrick's Hall. I would like to assure the 12 Inquiry St Patrick's Hall has been in existence for 13 many, many years and many, many people would go back and 14 forward to there without any chastisement, shall I say, 15 but if there was a younger element suddenly appeared in 16 that area who were identified, shall we say, as coming 17 from the tunnel area and so on, they would be 18 undoubtedly very conscious that this was what was 19 regarded as Loyalist territory. 20 MR McGRORY: Yes. Thank you very much, Mr McCreesh. 21 A. Thank you. 22 MS DINSMORE: No questions. 23 Questions from MR O'CONNOR 24 MR O'CONNOR: A couple of questions. I represent 25 Inspector McCrum in this Inquiry. When Inspector McCrum 14 1 phoned you, you don't know whether it was 5.00, 6.00 or 2 7.00 in the morning; it could be as early as 5.00 in the 3 morning or as late as 7.00 in the morning. Is that 4 right? 5 A. It could be. I have simply no recollection of the time. 6 Q. He had already telephoned the CID, the duty CID 7 detective, by the time he was talking to you. Do you 8 remember that? 9 A. I think that is correct. In fact, when I talked to 10 Inspector McCrum, he told me that CID were certainly on 11 the ground. 12 Q. That meant he had phoned CID and then was reporting to 13 you what had been done by that stage by the time he was 14 phoning you? 15 A. Yes. I mean, I am sure Inspector McCrum at this 16 particular time for a number of hours was fairly active 17 on the street between one thing and another -- 18 Q. Yes. 19 A. -- and probably phoned me at the first reasonable 20 opportunity he got. 21 Q. I am just going to go back in a minute or two. What 22 I wanted to just clarify was, at the time he telephoned 23 you, do you remember how long the conversation was? 24 A. I have no idea. 25 Q. Do you remember if, by the end of the conversation, you 15 1 were satisfied that everything that could be done was 2 being done or had been done? 3 A. I was satisfied that CID were on the ground -- 4 Q. Yes. 5 A. -- and that there was an active investigation on the 6 way. 7 Q. Yes. 8 A. I was also satisfied that the hospital had been 9 visited -- 10 Q. Yes. 11 A. -- and that a situation which was probably a riot 12 situation, that this situation in Portadown had been at 13 least stabilised and we weren't ending up with 14 an ongoing riot. 15 Q. Yes. The evidence is that Inspector McCrum arrived at 16 the screen at about 1.51 am. Then, after he was 17 satisfied that the situation was under control, he left 18 as duty inspector of Banbridge, and Lurgan police 19 station also. He went to do his duties in those two 20 police stations before returning to Portadown Police 21 Station. Are you aware of that? 22 A. No, I am not aware of that. 23 Q. What on the ground happened was the duty sergeant was 24 Sergeant P89 Inspector McCrum left the scene to go 25 and do other duties, because he was duty inspector in 16 1 three police stations that night. Would that have been 2 normal? 3 A. That would have been normal, yes. 4 Q. Would you call that a heavy workload? 5 A. It certainly was a heavy workload. 6 Q. Was it fair for him to go and do his other duties in 7 those circumstances? 8 A. Well, the point was -- I don't want to give the Inquiry 9 the impression that every weekend the duty inspector -- 10 it was turmoil in any shape or form. He would have been 11 active, but it would depend on the circumstances of what 12 was happening in, say, Banbridge and other places. 13 Q. The debrief then you are talking about you might have 14 expected of the Land Rover crew when they came off duty, 15 I want to discuss that briefly with you. 16 There was a duty sergeant in the police station, 17 Sergeant P89. Inspector McCrum was in Lurgan and 18 Banbridge at the time the Land Rover crew came off duty. 19 So when he returned at 4 o'clock in the morning to the 20 station, the Land Rover crew had already gone. Do you 21 understand? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Who would have, in those circumstances, been responsible 24 for a debrief? 25 A. Well, I think you must never lose sight of the fact that 17 1 in actual fact there were CID on the ground. 2 Q. The CID was called some time after, about 4.30. So what 3 happened was that Inspector McCrum came back about 4 4 o'clock after being in Lurgan and Banbridge. He 5 didn't have enough information from the hospital, so he 6 lifted the telephone and spoke to the senior house 7 officer in the hospital. At that stage, he learned of 8 the seriousness of Robert Hamill's injuries and then he 9 telephoned the Detective Constable in CID, Don Keys. 10 Now, in those circumstances, and there being a duty 11 inspector at the station when the Land Rover crew comes 12 off, who would you have expected to debrief the 13 Land Rover crew? 14 A. If, in fact, the duty inspector had been there, I would 15 have expected him to do an initial debrief. 16 Q. He was not there. The duty sergeant was there. In 17 those circumstances, who would you have expected to do 18 the debrief? 19 A. I would have expected certainly at least some officer of 20 some description to do albeit a preliminary debrief. 21 What I would have expected -- basically, it is 22 irrelevant and immaterial the rank of the person to 23 a certain extent, but that the initial thing was that 24 there would be an initial debrief. 25 I would also point out that when I enquired as to 18 1 the seriousness of the person who had been admitted to 2 Craigavon Hospital, I was told that it was serious, but 3 I would like to inform the Inquiry that at no stage was 4 I ever informed that we were talking something that was 5 life-threatening 6 Q. Yes. There is another aspect also to the debrief. I am 7 suggesting to you that in the circumstances I have 8 outlined, if the Inquiry finds that that, in fact, on 9 the ground was the circumstances, that Sergeant P89 10 would have been expected to debrief the Land Rover crew 11 coming off duty. Is that fair? 12 A. It's a possibility. 13 Q. A possibility? 14 A. But one would also then ask the question what, if any, 15 liaison there would have been between Sergeant P89 16 and, as I now know it, Inspector McCrum. 17 Q. Yes. 18 A. I don't know. 19 Q. In terms of the debrief there has been some evidence 20 about the 15-minute handover period between shifts. Do 21 you remember around that time that was the time period 22 allowed? 23 A. There was. There was a period of brief and debrief, 24 15 minutes' overlap. 25 Q. As I understand it, it was 15 minutes between shifts so 19 1 that there was a 15-minute period allowed in the wages 2 of the police officers for the overlap between shifts? 3 A. Possibly that could be correct, yes. 4 Q. But it wasn't 15 minutes at the start and 15 minutes at 5 the end, it was 15 minutes in total. Is that right? 6 A. I can't comment. I don't basically know. 7 However, I would like to assist the Inquiry in this. 8 What I would be informed in is not the rigid uniformity 9 brief or debrief. The issue I would be concerned with 10 was that there was a period of debrief, not necessarily 11 comprehensively, but enough to establish the basic 12 rights and objectivity of what had actually happened in 13 Portadown. 14 Q. Well, Inspector McCrum got back at 4 o'clock and the 15 Land Rover crew had gone off, I think, some time within 16 the hour before that. They were recalled, I think, 17 within a period of about just over half an hour. 18 In other words, the inspector spoke to the 19 detective. They agreed that the Land Rover crew should 20 be recalled, and they were recalled, so that the 21 Land Rover crew were out of the station perhaps for 22 an hour, an hour and a half, and then they were starting 23 to be recalled again. Then they were asked to make 24 statements fairly promptly. 25 Were those proper steps to take? 20 1 A. In the circumstances I certainly would have no doubt. 2 In fact, in those circumstances that certainly I am not 3 all that familiar with, I would have expected that to 4 do. Not only expected it. It was the right thing to 5 do. 6 Q. We have also heard evidence about debriefs, and 7 sometimes that would be something that certain senior 8 officers would expect, the officers coming off duty to 9 take a note in their notebook. Some of the officers 10 have given evidence that a statement made afterwards 11 would be -- they would be told to make a statement. 12 That would be the nature of the debrief. It might be 13 something as brief as that, to write it all down. 14 A. It possibly would. Again, I emphasise for the 15 information of the Inquiry, sometimes the actions that 16 are taken are dictated by the seriousness of the 17 situation. 18 Q. Yes. 19 A. At this juncture, I have no doubt in my mind that 20 although Mr Hamill was serious, there was never at any 21 stage a contemplation that this would -- his injury was 22 life-threatening, and you cannot, with respect, deal 23 with -- treat everything as a major, because in the 24 number of instances that happen throughout south region, 25 serious incidents, I mean, the entire system would have 21 1 come -- it was always dictated by the circumstances 2 surrounding the incident. 3 Q. Just finally, one of the Land Rover crew gave evidence 4 that his statement was four or five pages long and he 5 reckoned that it would have taken him possibly two hours 6 to write that statement. Would that be normal enough? 7 A. Certainly, if that was what he says was correct, yes. 8 Q. The officers being recalled to make statements of that 9 duration, these officers were on a very long shift in 10 the Land Rover. They had been on an inordinate amount 11 of time. I am struggling to remember the exact times. 12 I don't want to suggest the time, but it was a very long 13 shift. 14 In those circumstances, would overtime be readily 15 available for sitting down and writing a two-hour 16 statement? Do you understand the question? 17 A. No, I don't understand it, with respect. 18 Q. You have talked about the balancing act between the 19 seriousness of the situation and the steps to take. 20 That is for the individual in the circumstances, whoever 21 is in charge. Is that right? 22 A. That's correct and whatever information was available at 23 that pertinent time. 24 Q. The officers -- do you remember overtime being an issue, 25 payment of overtime being an issue around that time? 22 1 A. Certainly I was in charge of the budget for south region 2 and while there were constraints on overtime, I would 3 like this Inquiry to be in absolutely no doubt that 4 budgetary controls would never have influenced me as far 5 as relations or resources were concerned when we were 6 investigating a serious crime which had -- not only was 7 the crime bad, but the connotations that that had in 8 a versatile and volatile situation such as Portadown, 9 budgetary controls would not have been an issue and 10 shouldn't have been an issue. 11 Q. There was a witness, Henry McMullen. Do you know 12 Henry McMullen? 13 A. A civilian witness. 14 Q. No, a police witness. 15 A. Yes, I knew a Chief Inspector McMullen. 16 Q. He gave some evidence about the fact that there were 17 certain issues about police officers looking for a bit 18 more overtime after they came off, that there was only 19 15 minutes allowed and police officers looked for a bit 20 more overtime. There was always issues about that, no 21 major issue, but you would have to ask for authority to 22 be paid for the overtime. Do you know anything about 23 that? 24 A. No. In fact, I would find that -- I would negate that, 25 because in actual fact, the impression, with respect, 23 1 that you are giving is that police officers were 2 basically mercenaries. In my experience -- 3 Q. Not at all. 4 A. -- and a long experience, and particularly in Portadown, 5 the police officers I worked with, they should have been 6 paid for what they worked, but certainly overtime would 7 not -- in my experience of 40 years, overtime has never 8 been an issue when we were investigating serious crime. 9 THE CHAIRMAN: Can I ask you this: if, after an officer had 10 completed the normal hours for his shift, he then had to 11 spend a couple of hours writing a statement, would he be 12 paid for that couple of hours? 13 A. He would -- if he was involved in an active inquiry and 14 making a statement, he would have been paid and, in my 15 opinion, quite rightly so. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 17 MR O'CONNOR: Yes, but in the circumstances outlined, in the 18 circumstances of this incident, the duty inspector would 19 have to also make a decision whether to call the 20 officers back, but also, when the overtime is being 21 considered, he has to say "Yes" or "No" to that. Is 22 that right? 23 I mean, the officers have to come and they have 24 15 minutes of changeover. If at some stage -- you are 25 looking at me, but I am not suggesting that all the 24 1 police officers at that stage or at this stage are 2 mercenaries in any shape or form. What I am simply 3 trying to get at is there was a time issue with tired 4 officers coming off from long duty and letting them go 5 home and maybe letting them make their statements during 6 their police hours in the next day or two in normal 7 circumstances. Do you get my point? 8 A. I again emphasise it would depend on the seriousness. 9 It would depend what enquiries had been revealed at the 10 hospital. 11 Also, one must also consider the tensions and the 12 effect that this incident would have had in a volatile 13 situation such as Portadown, because this would have 14 been magnified and could have added to increased tension 15 in the Portadown area and tensions were bad enough at 16 the best of times. 17 Q. I think to summarise then, once the incident was 18 regarded as serious, overtime is not an issue? 19 A. When you are investigating a crime, overtime, in my 20 opinion, and the way I have worked throughout my career, 21 has never been an issue. There is an onus and 22 obligation on us to satisfy not only law and order, but 23 the community. 24 MR O'CONNOR: Yes. Thank you. 25 25 1 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD. 2 MR UNDERWOOD: Just one matter arising out of some questions 3 you have been asked, Mr McCreesh. 4 If Inspector McCrum had been told that the injuries 5 to Mr Hamill had been potentially or were potentially 6 life-threatening, would you have expected him to have 7 told you that? 8 A. Yes, I would. That's if he knew that. 9 Q. Of course. 10 A. Yes, I would. 11 Q. You understand we are trying to find what happened? 12 A. Yes, I would have expected. 13 Q. You are clear that he didn't tell you that, I think. Is 14 that right? 15 A. I think he told me, to the best of my knowledge -- and 16 I can't sit here and say everything I have said is 100%, 17 but it is the best and honest answer I can give you. 18 When I spoke to him, to the best of my knowledge he told 19 me that police officers were at the hospital, at the 20 hospital. To the best of my knowledge, I don't think he 21 at that stage knew exactly what the condition of 22 Mr Hamill was. 23 Q. The reason I press you on this is this: I get the 24 impression from your evidence that you regarded 25 a sectarian assault in Portadown as something that was 26 1 likely to be problematic and that, if it was a very 2 serious sectarian assault in Portadown, it was likely to 3 set off something. Is that fair? 4 A. That's correct, because one can certainly -- during the 5 time I have spent in Portadown on a number of years when 6 an incident like that happens, it certainly increases 7 tension and reinforces personalised beliefs. 8 Q. What I am getting at here is this: if somebody had told 9 you that there was a sectarian assault in Portadown and 10 it was life-threatening, that's something that would 11 have stuck in your mind. 12 A. It certainly would have stuck in my mind. 13 MR UNDERWOOD: That's what I was getting at. Thank you very 14 much, Mr McCreesh. 15 Questions from THE PANEL 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you just help me about the type of 17 Land Rover that was used on this duty? Did it have any 18 protective skirt under the body? 19 A. It would have had, Mr Chairman. It would have had 20 a protective skirt. Basically, this was to stop -- 21 basically in public order situations stopped something 22 being rolled underneath the Land Rover. 23 Q. What material would that skirt be made of? 24 A. It would certainly be made of a rubberised material done 25 in a criss-crossed format something similar to 27 1 a trellis-work one would anticipate in a garden, but of 2 heavier materials. 3 Q. Would it prevent the Land Rover, for instance, being 4 driven over a kerb? 5 A. I wouldn't have thought so at all. This was basically 6 designed to stop stuff being pushed under the 7 Land Rover. Certainly, it would have affected the 8 manoeuvrability to some extent, but certainly in my 9 opinion I don't think it would have affected it going 10 over the kerb. 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. 12 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much, Mr McCreesh. Thank you 13 very much for coming. 14 (The witness withdrew) 15 MR UNDERWOOD: We need to have a technology change. I think 16 that's likely to take ten or fifteen minutes in all the 17 circumstances. I would invite you to rise for perhaps 18 fifteen minutes to be on the safe side. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Fifteen minutes. 20 (10.40 am) 21 (A short break) 22 (10.55 am) 23 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, can I call Mr Hall, please? 24 MR ROBERT FREDERICK HALL (sworn) 25 28 1 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD 2 MR UNDERWOOD: Good morning, Mr Hall. My name is Underwood. 3 I am Counsel to the Inquiry. I have some questions for 4 you. 5 A. Morning. 6 Q. When I have finished, it may well be that there are some 7 supplemental questions from others here. 8 Can I ask you your full names first, please? 9 A. Robert Frederick Hall. 10 Q. Thank you. You have been kind enough to sign a witness 11 statement for us, which we see at page [81789]. 12 I wonder if we could have a look at the document on the 13 screen to make sure it is that. If we trace through 14 that quite quickly, the 15 pages of it, is that your 15 witness statement? 16 A. That's my statement, yes. 17 Q. Are the contents true? 18 A. They are indeed, sir, yes. 19 Q. Thank you very much. There is another document I'd like 20 to you look at at this stage, if I may. It is at 21 page [74231]. At the bottom there is an entry, 22 12th May 1997. If we could have a look at that. Is 23 this a journal entry of yours? 24 A. That's correct, sir. 25 Q. Did you unearth this after you had been interviewed by 29 1 the Inquiry and given your statement initially? 2 A. That's correct. I had further correspondence, I think, 3 from the Inquiry. 4 Q. Could you help us -- I don't mean to be rude about your 5 handwriting -- with the handwriting and tell us what 6 this entry says? 7 A. Yes. It says: 8 "Ops", short for operations, "Ops meeting at force 9 headquarters - CC in charge", meaning chief constable, 10 "Also briefed CC, deputy CC and ACC C", which meant 11 crime department, "re allegation against Reserve 12 Constable Atkinson, Portadown by Miss S Clarke." 13 The next entry relates to a meeting that afternoon 14 with the military, which is not relevant 15 Q. Right. We will forget about that. Have you 16 a recollection of this meeting? 17 A. Well, to the extent that these notes have refreshed my 18 memory, etc, there was a weekly meeting. This 19 particular meeting was every two weeks, but there was 20 another meeting on alternate weeks. So there were 21 regular meetings is what I am saying. 22 Q. Certainly. 23 A. I can relate to the entry. 24 Q. Do we discern from this that that was the sole topic of 25 the meeting? 30 1 A. Certainly not. 2 Q. Why do you focus on only that issue in this journal? 3 Can you help us with that? 4 A. Yes. A major focus for me would have been the update on 5 the murder investigation into the death of the late 6 Robert Hamill, who had died the previous week. 7 A number of persons had been charged that weekend. It 8 had been -- I was due to be off that weekend, but I had 9 gone specifically on the Sunday afternoon to get 10 a thorough briefing on the progress of the murder 11 investigation. 12 Q. By whom? 13 A. By the late Detective Chief Superintendent McBurney and 14 the assistant, as she was then, SIO P. 15 Q. P39 we call her. 16 A. P39. There were many other issues on the agenda at such 17 meetings at that time of year. We were coming up to two 18 elections. We were coming up to the Drumcree parades. 19 Indeed, we had subsequent murders in other parts of the 20 region, etc. 21 Q. But your journal entry concentrates only on the 22 allegation against Mr Atkinson by Miss Clarke. What the 23 Panel would be very grateful for assistance on is how 24 seriously that allegation was taken and who knew about 25 it. 31 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Can I take you through in stages? Does it follow that 3 on the Sunday that you should have had off but you went 4 in for the briefing by Mr McBurney and P39, that the 5 allegation made against Atkinson formed part of that 6 briefing to you? 7 A. That's correct, yes. 8 Q. I am not sure what day of the week 12th May was. 9 A. Monday morning. 10 Q. Thank you. So directly after that, coincidentally, or 11 perhaps not coincidentally, you have the meeting with 12 the chief constable and deputy chief constable and 13 ACC Crime. You relay that allegation to them. Is that 14 right? 15 A. Anything touching upon the integrity of a police officer 16 is a very -- was a very serious matter in my eyes. 17 Q. Again, if I'm pressing you too far from recollection, 18 tell me. 19 A. No, you are not. 20 Q. How was that news received by this group? 21 A. Well, I can't give you chapter and verse 12 years later 22 out of a plethora of meetings, but they would have held 23 the same -- those officers would have held views similar 24 to my own, that anything touching upon the integrity of 25 a police officer or misbehaviour or alleged criminal 32 1 conduct could not be tolerated and required rigorous 2 investigation. 3 They would have been satisfied, as was I, that the 4 matter was in the hands of the ICPC, the Independent 5 Commission for Police Complaints as part of the overall 6 supervision and investigation into the circumstances 7 touching upon the death of the late Robert Hamill, and 8 that was issued in a press release which has been made 9 available to me, I see, on the Friday morning, the 9th. 10 I gave media interviews extensively post the death 11 on the 8th. There was a press release issued on the 12 9th saying that all circumstances touching upon the 13 death were being investigated by Detective Chief 14 Superintendent McBurney, supervised by the ICPC. So we 15 would have all been, if you like, comforted from the 16 fact that there was independent, rigorous supervision, 17 not only of the earlier allegations, but also hopefully 18 of this one. 19 Q. Again, just going back to this journal entry, there is 20 some confusion apparently about who the deputy chief 21 constable might have been at that stage. 22 We know Blair Wallace was a deputy chief constable 23 and there was funding for a second one. Nobody seems to 24 be clear whether there actually was a second one. Can 25 you help us whether it was Mr Wallace who was present at 33 1 that meeting? 2 A. To my knowledge, it would have been Mr Wallace. 3 Q. Can I ask you a few more general questions then, and we 4 will come back to the question of Mr Atkinson? 5 Firstly, we know, of course, that there was a murder 6 investigation that, as it were, flowed out of the 7 GBH investigation once Mr Hamill died. We know there 8 was a separate investigation into the allegation that 9 the four officers did not get out of the Land Rover at 10 the time. 11 Did you have anything to do with the supply or 12 adequacy of resources for either of those 13 investigations? 14 A. I mean, I couldn't give detail, but it's probable, it's 15 probable that I could have been asked. I mean, that 16 could have been in the area of maybe additional 17 detectives or it could have been more particularly 18 search teams or to make arrests of prisoners or escorts 19 or whatever, but I wouldn't have had any hands-on 20 involvement at my strategic level. 21 My staff or my deputy or whoever who had other roles 22 may have been asked for operational support. Call it 23 that. 24 Q. Do you have any reason to believe there was any scarcity 25 of resources that would have impinged on any part of 34 1 these investigations? 2 A. Oh, absolutely not. Absolutely not. 3 Q. Thank you. We know, as you said, that Mr McBurney was 4 in charge of all aspects of these investigations, and we 5 also know that he, as it were, parcelled them up. On 6 the one hand, he controlled the murder investigation; on 7 the other hand, there was the separate allegation, so 8 far as he was concerned, that was the complaint against 9 the police officers. We also know that he opted to put 10 this tip-off allegation against Mr Atkinson into the 11 complaint box, if you like. So that complaint of the 12 tip-off then was not treated as part of the murder 13 investigation. 14 Were you conscious of that? 15 A. Well, only to the degree that I knew the allegations 16 against police officers, whether it was the alleged 17 initial inaction or the allegations from the 16-year-old 18 girl against Mr Atkinson. 19 When you say "conscious", I was aware, fully 20 conscious, that that was going to be handled by the 21 ICPC, and Mr McBurney and the other Detective Chief 22 Inspector were also carrying on with the murder 23 investigation. From my perspective, a major focus was 24 the murder investigation, because it would not have been 25 prudent for me to be in some way interfering in an 35 1 external investigation against police officers. That 2 would have been frowned upon by the independent body. 3 So once it was passed over to them, they were in charge 4 in that regard. 5 Q. I am just interested in this. We have heard comments 6 from some other senior officers to the effect that they 7 might have expected the allegation against Mr Atkinson 8 that he tipped off Hanvey to be treated as part of the 9 murder investigation rather than part of the complaint 10 investigation, because it was an allegation that he was 11 an accessory in the murder. 12 A. Uh-huh. 13 Q. What I am asking you is whether you were conscious that 14 Mr McBurney had opted for one rather than the other, and 15 whether it surprised you. 16 A. I mean, not that I can recall. I mean, I was satisfied 17 that it was being investigated by an experienced 18 detective chief superintendent, who had investigated 19 hundreds or more of serious crimes and was being 20 supervised by the ICPC. 21 Q. We, of course, know it was not being supervised by the 22 ICPC and I think you know that now. Is that right? 23 A. Well, I was extremely surprised in September 2007 when 24 I was first interviewed by the Inquiry. That is the 25 first time that I ever became aware that it was not 36 1 ultimately supervised by the ICPC, but I see from 2 documentation subsequently revealed to me or disclosed 3 to me by this Inquiry that it looks to me as though it 4 was supervised for a number of months. 12th, 15th, 5 19th May and various other dates and directions appear 6 to have been given to Mr McBurney by the ICPC. 7 Q. Unhappily, we don't have the benefit of Mr Murnaghan. 8 For the sake of clarity, I should take you back to 9 your witness statement. If we could look at 10 page [81803], at paragraph 61 you say: 11 "At some time shortly after I became aware of the 12 allegation that Reserve Constable Atkinson may have 13 acted improperly following the Hamill incident, 14 I telephoned Mr [blank] to his office to confirm that he 15 was aware of the allegation ..." 16 Is that Mr Murnaghan? 17 A. That's correct, yes. 18 Q. There is another blank further down. Just picking up 19 that sentence, you say: 20 "I outlined to Mr [blank] the nature of the 21 allegation which had been made and the reasons for my 22 call. I cannot recall if he already knew of the 23 allegation but simply said something to the effect that, 24 'You never know what comes up in an investigation. We 25 will see what the evidence is'." 37 1 Again, is that Mr Murnaghan? 2 A. That's correct, yes. 3 Q. So you are perfectly clear that not only did the senior 4 officers right up to the chief constable believe that 5 the ICPC were supervising it, you discussed it with 6 Mr Murnaghan and that confirmed your belief? 7 A. That's correct. 8 Q. Can you -- I am so sorry. Go on? 9 A. I mean, on the Sunday I had three objectives at that 10 time. Number 1 was to get the fullest possible overview 11 of the murder investigation, see where we were with 12 prisoners, with arrests, with charges, with resources, 13 as you touched upon earlier, and to be in a position to 14 brief the chief constable and the others at the Monday 15 morning meeting. 16 When I was made aware of the allegation against 17 Reserve Constable Atkinson, in the light of what has now 18 been disclosed to me as well, I see that there was 19 a major strategy meeting planned for the Monday with the 20 ICPC, McBurney and the Complaints and Discipline 21 superintendent, the G Department, who were also 22 involved. So my immediate concern would be, "Is there 23 anything in terms of preservation or evidence or 24 whatever that needs to be done?" 25 Mr McBurney was obviously happy in himself as to how 38 1 he was going to approach the matters. This was a Sunday 2 afternoon. If we were talking about telephone records 3 or whatever, that's a slow time business that you can't 4 get done on a Sunday afternoon. So I would have been 5 concerned no evidence was being lost. 6 My third objective would have been to make sure that 7 the ICPC supervisor was aware, if you like, of this 8 additional element or this additional allegation as 9 quickly as possible just in case he would think of some 10 other urgent action that he wanted taken. 11 Hence my belt and braces, if I can use that term, 12 telephone call to the late Mr Murnaghan, who was 13 a competent, thorough, meticulous lawyer, whom I had 14 known through the professional courts 15 Q. Now that you have had the revelation that the ICPC did 16 not regard themselves as supervising this, at least 17 after the first few weeks, and you have seen materials 18 relating to this, can you offer any explanation about 19 why the ICPC dumped this? 20 A. Absolutely not. It seems to me that they supervised it 21 up until -- they seemed to part their thinking or ways 22 around about September when it came to the interview of 23 Atkinson. The G Department superintendent was involved. 24 ICPC were involved. So far as I was concerned, it was 25 in the proper hands being independently investigated. 39 1 I had to move on to many other things in my diary and it 2 would have been very wrong for me to have been tampering 3 in that type of investigation. 4 Q. Okay. Out of fairness to the ICPC I ought to put this 5 proposition to you, which may be their response. That 6 is that there was no formal request by the RUC that they 7 supervise. 8 A. Uh-huh. 9 Q. What would you say to that? 10 A. Well, I mean, I don't know about that. The records made 11 available to me are clear that on the Monday afternoon 12 the late Mr McBurney briefed the ICPC official and 13 supervisor and the superintendent from the Complaints 14 Department was also present. So all the key people who 15 would have been dealing and furthering this. 16 Now, if somebody didn't complete some internal 17 administrative memo, I don't know anything about that at 18 that level, but it seems to me that -- plus my telephone 19 call, the belt and braces, which I didn't need to do, 20 but which I did do as a conscientious officer, it seemed 21 to me that the matter was in the appropriate arena for 22 progressing from there and subsequent records would seem 23 to indicate that that was accepted. 24 Q. Can you help us about the question of suspension? 25 Obviously the question whether you serve a Form 17(3) on 40 1 an officer and whether you suspend them has to be 2 tempered by the consideration that you might be tipping 3 them off while you are still trying to get evidence 4 against them. Would that be fair? 5 A. That's very fair, yes. 6 Q. So come, say, 12th May, you would have expected the RUC 7 to be considering at some level whether that was the 8 time to suspend and serve a 17(3) or whether you should 9 hold your hand and go round digging to see what else is 10 available. 11 Can you help us with whether there was such 12 a conscious decision whether or not to suspend him? 13 A. No, I can't, because from my perspective it had passed 14 over to the Complaints Department. The superintendent 15 was at the strategy meeting, if you like, with the ICPC 16 supervisors and with Mr McBurney, but, I mean, one of 17 the factors, as I am sure others will have told you, is 18 the availability -- in deciding whether or not to 19 suspend an officer -- there are many issues that would 20 be taken into account by the deputy chief constable if 21 it was referred to him by the Complaints Department, but 22 one of those would be the availability of the admissible 23 evidence against the officer. I don't know at what 24 stage admissible evidence was produced. 25 Q. No, no. Again, I am not asking you what the right 41 1 outcome would be, I am asking if you could help about 2 whether there was actually consideration given. 3 Do I get this as your answer: that we should be 4 asking Complaints and Discipline? That would be the 5 outfit to be enquiring of, would it? 6 A. And the ICPC. I mean, they were looking at it together. 7 This, even today, would be termed an internal 8 investigation, albeit with external supervision. So, 9 therefore, once it moved into that arena, it moved 10 outside my control, as I think you will understand. 11 Q. I am just trying to get your help about whom we should 12 be asking about this. We have gone to the ICPC, we have 13 gone to the Complaints and Discipline, both of whom deny 14 any knowledge of consideration of suspension. 15 What I am getting from you is they should have been 16 considering suspension. Is that fair? 17 A. No. I mean, for some of the reasons you mentioned, it 18 may be, you know, the strategy was -- I mean, gathering 19 the admissible evidence against the officer, whether or 20 not that was going to tip him off, whether or not he was 21 going to be able to interfere with the Inquiry or with 22 other evidence, my recollection is that the people -- 23 the other persons named by the 16-year-old girl were 24 already in custody and indeed were charged in connection 25 with the affray and with the murder. So a lot of things 42 1 had moved on quite quickly. 2 I see from the documents disclosed by ICPC and 3 others now that suspension was considered in September 4 or October -- September, I think, as and when I presume 5 certain evidence had accrued or interviews had taken 6 place, but the officer went sick and it didn't happen. 7 Q. I would like to get your help on that as well, if I may. 8 We know that the telephone records were sought on 9 9th May to substantiate the allegation made by 10 Tracey Clarke and that they arrived about 16th May. 11 They did indeed show a telephone call made at about 12 8.30-odd from the Atkinson household to the Hanvey 13 household. 14 A. Sorry. Did you say they were sought on 9th May? 15 Q. I did, and they were obtained on the 16th. 16 A. I thought the allegation was made on the 10th? 17 Q. The allegation was made about the 8th or 9th. It was 18 recorded on the 10th. 19 A. I see. 20 Q. Take it from me it was treated with such urgency that 21 they did not wait for the ink to even appear on the 22 statement, let alone dry on it, before the records were 23 sought. So obtained about a week later. 24 No step was then taken to interview Mr Atkinson or 25 to seek further evidence about the allegation until 43 1 September, when he was first interviewed about it. As 2 far as we can see, in the absence of Mr McBurney there 3 is a delay then of four months, in which apparently 4 nothing happened. 5 Now, can I put this proposition to you to see if you 6 can help on it: if taking further steps about, for 7 example, interviewing Mr Atkinson about that might have 8 prejudiced the murder investigation, could that perhaps 9 be a reason why Mr McBurney prioritised the murder 10 investigation over the tip-off allegation? 11 A. I mean, I don't know, but it's one possibility. 12 Q. Would that be a reasonable possibility? Would that have 13 been a reasonable step in your view, if an SIO had 14 chosen to do it that way? 15 A. It may well have been. I mean, I don't know what other 16 evidence. I mean, I see -- I know now that there were 17 other personalities, if you like, in that it seems as 18 though there were visitors or people in Atkinson's house 19 at the time. So he may have had many other lines to 20 eliminate or confirm. That detail again I don't know 21 because -- 22 Q. Take it from us he didn't know about those until after 23 September. 24 A. You see, I was in no way privy to that because from my 25 perspective it was all under the supervision of the 44 1 ICPC. 2 Q. That's fine. I think I'm pressing you outside your 3 knowledge here. 4 One final matter if I could get your help with. We 5 now know, of course, with the aid of your journal entry 6 that you raised the tip-off allegation with the chief 7 constable and the deputy chief constable and ACC Crime 8 immediately. 9 Would there have been further meetings at which that 10 was brought up at that sort of level? 11 A. It's unlikely, given that all concerned would have been 12 aware that the ICPC were heading or supervising the 13 inquiry. Any further, if you like, briefings or updates 14 would obviously have come through G Department or 15 whatever, through that kind of internal system, but 16 again the chief inspector or deputy would have been 17 keeping themselves, I assume, reasonably well separated 18 from it on the basis that it was -- the external 19 investigators were getting on with their job. 20 I think it is also -- I mean, I didn't know when 21 I was interviewed, but I know now as well it is probably 22 quite important here to remember that the circumstances 23 of the initial allegations and so forth and the death 24 had been referred to the ICPC before there was a letter 25 of complaint. We, as an organisation, chose under 45 1 Article 8 to call in the ICPC, given the potential 2 community impact and other factors, political and 3 community, surrounding the allegations that were being 4 made. So we had actually taken a proactive decision to 5 ask the ICPC to look at this case ahead of any letter of 6 complaint 7 Q. I am not going to take you to the eventual ICPC reports, 8 but we know that when the ICPC did eventually report, 9 that it was fairly clear from their report that they had 10 not supervised the Atkinson tip-off part of the 11 allegation. 12 Would those reports have been seen within the RUC? 13 A. Sorry. I am not sure which reports ... 14 Q. In the end, the ICPC report to the DPP about whether 15 there is to be a case to be brought against the police 16 for the alleged inaction. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. They make it clear in that that they are not dealing 19 with the tip-off against Atkinson. Do you follow me? 20 A. Yes, I do. 21 Q. Now we know, of course, that those reports went to the 22 DPP. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Would they, as a matter of course, have also gone to the 25 RUC? 46 1 A. I'm not sure, because G Department C&D was the official 2 interface with ICPC. 3 Q. Again, we need to address ourselves to the Complaints 4 and Discipline? 5 A. Clearly Mr McBurney's murder files would have gone via 6 Crime Department headquarters, they didn't come via me. 7 Crime files did not pass by the regional assistant chief 8 constable for all kinds of logistical and resourcing 9 efficiency reasons. They would have gone by the Crime 10 Department Headquarters. The murder file that is. 11 The ICPC internal documents, as I said, either the 12 ICPC official or the relevant G Department person might 13 be able to answer that or should be able to answer 14 that -- 15 Q. That's very kind. 16 A. -- as to which documents were shared between them. 17 MR UNDERWOOD: We will address ourselves that way. Thank 18 you very much indeed, Mr Hall. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you just help us about two matters, 20 Mr Hall? The press release you spoke of, I assume that 21 did not refer to the tipping-off allegation. 22 A. The press -- the one on -- the one I did or the one on 23 the 9th? 24 THE CHAIRMAN: That's right, yes. 25 A. Sorry, sir. Are you asking about the one I did on the 47 1 evening of the 8th -- 2 THE CHAIRMAN: That's right, yes. 3 A. -- or the one on the morning of the 9th? 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Either press release that you prepared, did 5 it refer -- 6 A. No. I didn't know about the allegation until the 7 Sunday, considerably later. 8 THE CHAIRMAN: But you spoke of you and others being 9 satisfied that the tipping-off allegation was in the 10 hands of the ICPC. 11 A. That's right. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: You spoke of preparing a press release. 13 I was just wondering whether any press release ever 14 referred to the tipping-off allegation. 15 A. No. I think, sir, what I said -- forgive me if it was 16 unclear. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: I may have misunderstood. 18 A. First of all, I did the media and press interviews on 19 the evening of the death in terms of my strategic 20 leadership role and everything else to do with community 21 impact, plea for witnesses, sympathy for the family, all 22 of those factors which were very important to me and to 23 my staff. Those were on the Thursday evening, the 8th. 24 Then the ICPC confirmed or approved the SIO, 25 Mr McBurney, from my records on the Friday. 48 1 There was a further short statement went out on the 2 Friday about noon, about lunchtime, saying that all the 3 circumstances touching -- they are in the documents 4 here -- touching upon the death were being investigated 5 by a detective chief superintendent supervised by the 6 ICPC. At that time, I was certainly not aware of the 7 tipping-off allegation. That's Friday noon that 8 statement goes out, or Friday lunchtime. I don't become 9 aware of the other until Sunday. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: I am afraid I misunderstood. Sorry. 11 A. Thank you. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: The other thing is about the question of 13 suspension. You said, "We would need to enquire of C&D 14 and the ICPC". As Mr Underwood has pointed out, they 15 didn't consider the matter. You spoke of a strategy. 16 If there was a strategy that the question of 17 considering suspension should be deferred for the time 18 being, must have that been the responsibility of 19 Mr McBurney? 20 A. That would be the SIO in conjunction with the C&D 21 superintendent, who was also at the meeting with the 22 ICPC. So they would have to assess what admissible or 23 available evidence they had and what their strategy was 24 going to be for the investigation, whether 25 a recommendation for suspension would have been 49 1 justified or whether or not it was going to militate 2 against their strategy in relation to the investigation. 3 I mean, that was quite well-established practice with 4 some other case precedents whereby it would have been 5 deferred pending further analysis of the evidence. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: I am not asking my question critically, but 7 you said we should ask C&D and ICPC. Mr Underwood 8 points out they were not involved. I was just asking 9 then: well, where would the strategy decision have come 10 from? You say effectively Mr McBurney and C&D in 11 conjunction with ICPC? 12 A. That's correct, yes, yes. I mean, if they had thought 13 or believed that the evidence supported or suggested 14 suspension in conjunction with the investigative 15 strategy, then they would have referred that through. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you. 17 A. Through G Department to the deputy chief constable. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 19 Questions from MR McGRORY 20 MR McGRORY: If I may, Mr Chairman, I have a small number of 21 questions. 22 Mr Hall, my name is McGrory and I represent the 23 family of Robert Hamill. 24 You might help with a few further things. You have 25 mentioned that you were very conscious of community 50 1 policing and the impact in the community of an incident 2 such as this. Of course, you would have immediately 3 been alerted by the fact that there were allegations 4 that the police in the Land Rover had not intervened 5 when they should have done in an attack on a small 6 number of Nationalists by a large number of Loyalists. 7 I suppose it goes without saying that you would have 8 been conscious that you wouldn't have wanted allegations 9 of favouritism to the Loyalists by the police? 10 A. That's absolutely correct. 11 Q. I don't need to spell it out. For all of the 12 implications that had for policing. 13 Was that the reason -- I mean, were you involved in 14 the decision to make the Article 8 referral? Were you 15 consulted about that? 16 A. I can't recall the fine detail of that, but I would be 17 surprised if I wasn't, as the regional commander. Round 18 about -- when the allegations, political and otherwise, 19 started to be made through the media, I am quite sure -- 20 I don't have the detail of that and I don't recall the 21 detail of it, but I am quite sure I would have been 22 involved in the discussions with the chief constable, 23 deputy or whoever as to the value of calling in the ICPC 24 to look at this case. 25 Q. In any event, that was before the information about the 51 1 tipping-off allegation on the part of Reserve 2 Constable Atkinson came into the system? 3 A. Well, to my understanding it is, yes. I mean, I didn't 4 recall that kind of detail even when I was interviewed 5 two years ago, because a lot of this documentation was 6 not made available to me then, but, yes, it seems to me 7 from looking at the documents that that was some time 8 the previous week, yes. 9 Q. Then, of course, on Sunday, 11th May, that information 10 is given to you about the tipping-off allegation when 11 you meet Detective Chief Superintendent McBurney and his 12 senior female colleague. 13 A. Yes, yes. 14 Q. You obviously thought that that was sufficiently 15 important and sensitive to be brought to the attention 16 of the very highest senior officers at the meeting the 17 following day? 18 A. That's correct, yes. 19 Q. And, indeed, to record the fact that you had brought 20 that to their attention? 21 A. That's correct, yes. 22 Q. Because I think that's quite a long day. That maybe is 23 the only entry as to what you were doing that day in the 24 journal. Is that correct? 25 A. No, there are some other matters as well. 52 1 Q. But you made sure to note that. 2 Can you cast your mind back to that meeting, 3 Mr Hall, please? Were you conscious when you raised the 4 issue that others at the meeting had been aware already 5 of the incident in any shape or form? 6 A. When you say "of the incident" ... 7 Q. Well, of the fact that Mr Hamill had died and that there 8 was a community issue in the terms of some allegations 9 about police conduct? 10 A. Oh, they would have been very well aware. I mean, he 11 had died on the Thursday evening. I had talked to the 12 chief constable umpteen times in the ensuing two or 13 three days in relation to the murder investigation and 14 the whole impact of it. 15 Q. Oh, right. So you had actually spoken to him on quite 16 a number of occasions between the Thursday and the 17 Monday morning? 18 A. In relation -- as we would have done about all murders 19 and the impact of them. 20 Q. Is it your memory, then, that he had been aware on the 21 Monday morning of the information about the allegation 22 of the tipping-off before you told him, or were you the 23 first person to tell him? 24 A. Well, I don't know that. I don't know that. 25 Q. No. You see, we do know that Chief 53 1 Superintendent McBurney spoke to him twice on 10th May, 2 the day it was recorded. Would you have expected he 3 would have told him? 4 A. He may well have. He may well have. For example, 5 I don't know what time on the 10th the statement was 6 recorded, whether it was morning, evening or what time 7 he spoke to the chief constable. So I can't answer 8 that. 9 Q. No, but would you have expected he would have given him 10 that type of information? 11 A. Well, Mr McBurney, like ourselves, would have regarded 12 any allegation about the integrity of an officer as 13 a very important matter. If the chief constable was 14 seeking information or updates, he may well have said, 15 "There is an additional allegation or factor and I am 16 referring it to the ICPC". 17 Q. Of course, we are not just talking about the integrity 18 of an officer. We are not talking about an allegation 19 that an officer has been drunk driving or has stolen 20 something or something like that -- 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. -- we are talking about an allegation in circumstances 23 where there is already sensitivity about the police 24 conduct and, on top of that, further information comes 25 in that, in fact, one of those officers from the 54 1 Land Rover may well have been involved in the actual 2 crime of the murder, albeit afterwards. 3 So would it be fair to say that that would have been 4 a matter that would have been highly sensitive? 5 A. Of course. Absolutely right, yes. 6 Q. And that those of you at the very top end of the police 7 force would have been very keen to monitor how that 8 progressed? 9 A. Absolutely right. Hence the reason for making sure that 10 the ICPC were fully aware of it at the earliest possible 11 opportunity. 12 Q. Would there not have been some further questions raised 13 by your committee or by those of you at the very top of 14 the police force as to how the investigation was going? 15 A. Not when it's being supervised by the ICPC. If those at 16 the top of the force -- G Department was the official 17 interface with the ICPC. The rest of us could not go 18 around asking questions about an independent 19 externally-supervised investigation, because that would 20 have been open to misinterpretation that we were in some 21 way trying to influence that investigation or interfere. 22 So you have got to understand the balance there. 23 Q. Well, I am only talking about getting information as to, 24 "How are we with this investigation?" 25 Were there telephone calls made? "Did that enquiry 55 1 about the telephone records bottom out? This is a very 2 serious situation". Would you not have taken a deeper 3 interest than that? 4 A. No, we all took a deep interest in serious matters, but 5 you have to understand, and I'm sure you do, where the 6 boundaries are with an independently supervised 7 investigation, and the need -- the sensitivities and the 8 need for confidentiality in such investigations. 9 All of these types of investigations have 10 confidentiality parameters as well and people who need 11 to know do know, but you don't run the risk of spreading 12 it round the whole station or whole team, depending on 13 the type of the investigation, and particularly, as 14 I said, where it is external, and independent -- and 15 that was their purpose. When we put it in that arena, 16 we put our trust in them to do that job, and that's how 17 it was. 18 Q. Were there not really two investigations? There is 19 a complaint which was being supervised by the ICPC about 20 the conduct of the police. 21 A. Uh-huh. 22 Q. Then there is an investigation into the murder -- 23 A. That's correct. 24 Q. -- of Robert Hamill. 25 A. And we wanted to know everything about the murder. 56 1 I did. 2 Q. Well, is the conduct of a police officer who might have 3 tipped off one of the murderers not integral to the 4 murder inquiry? 5 A. It might be, depending on the evidence and the 6 situation. That was something that the SIO in, again, 7 conjunction with the ICPC supervisors had to balance. 8 Q. Because on 16th May, there then came into the system 9 verification of the fact that there had been telephone 10 contact between the Atkinson household and the Hanvey 11 household. 12 Now, whether or not you could read any more into it 13 than that, but putting it in the context of the 14 allegation from Tracey Clarke, would you agree that that 15 was very significant information? 16 A. I'm assuming it could have been. I don't recall ever 17 being aware of that personally, because, as I said, 18 again, the investigation was in the hands of other 19 people, and ... 20 Q. Yes, but, you see, the problem is that the ICPC -- 21 forgive me if I am wrong about the ICPC's remit, but was 22 the ICPC remit not in respect of the complaint about the 23 police as opposed to the conduct of the murder 24 investigation, which was a separate issue? 25 A. Yes. I think two things here. Number 1, from day one 57 1 the ICPC had been called in by us to look at the overall 2 circumstances touching upon the death and the police 3 action/inaction, or whatever, surrounding Robert Hamill. 4 So in my mind that was quite important. 5 The other part of your question is? Sorry. 6 Q. The point is the ICPC didn't supervise the actual murder 7 enquiry. 8 A. That's correct. That's right. 9 Q. So what I am saying to you is: how can you have been 10 confident that the allegation against Reserve 11 Constable Atkinson was being vigorously pursued on the 12 basis that the ICPC were somehow involved but, in fact, 13 that was a separate issue? 14 A. Well, I think in the view of any reasonable person it 15 was a further allegation against a police officer. At 16 that moment, it was coming from a 16-year-old girl on 17 the basis of what is hearsay evidence or whatever. Her 18 boyfriend, as I think he was then, was already in 19 custody and I think was being charged. So on the view 20 of any reasonable person, I believe those allegations, 21 whatever they were, the ones from politicians and the 22 media about alleged inaction, the letter of complaint, 23 the fact we had called in the ICPC to look at the 24 overall circumstances, the further allegation against 25 Reserve Constable Atkinson, in the eyes of any 58 1 reasonable person they were inextricably linked as 2 allegations against the police, and in my mindset that's 3 how they were pursued and investigated independently. 4 I believed supervised by the late Mr Murnaghan, who was 5 a most thorough, meticulous and competent lawyer, who 6 I encountered many times in the criminal courts in my 7 earlier career on a professional basis. 8 Q. But from an investigator perspective, do you agree that 9 progress in respect of the phone call about tipping off 10 a suspect could significantly assist the murder inquiry 11 in respect of Mr Hanvey? 12 A. It's very difficult for me to comment on that 12 years 13 later without, I mean, having documentation or seeing 14 that. 15 Mr McBurney was an experienced SIO of some 30 years. 16 I couldn't comment on that kind of detail on those 17 possible linkages. It is too hypothetical 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGrory, if there is some specific step 19 which you suggest should have been taken but wasn't, it 20 may perhaps be useful to see what the witness says about 21 it. 22 MR McGRORY: What I do suggest, Mr Hall, is that the moment 23 the information about the phone calls from the Atkinson 24 household to the Hanvey household came into the system, 25 the moment it came into the system, action should have 59 1 been taken in terms of arresting and questioning 2 Mr Atkinson about making those phone calls. 3 A. That may or may not have been so. I don't know the 4 detail of the phone calls or the documentation you are 5 talking about. I don't know what the situation then was 6 about service providers giving evidence to prove some of 7 these things. We went through a period when service 8 providers were unwilling to go to court. So there may 9 have been an intelligence value in it. There may have 10 been more than that. 11 I was not privy to any part of that investigation, 12 for the reasons I've explained to you many times over. 13 The guy who was allegedly at that time tipped off 14 I knew was already in custody and I think, indeed, was 15 charged. So there may have been many other factors in 16 terms of the investigative strategy. 17 In any case of assisting offenders, conspiracy or 18 whatever, getting witnesses or a witness with some 19 degree of independence who is prepared to give evidence 20 can be very important. I think I now know that that was 21 ultimately achieved by Mr McBurney in the longer term, 22 albeit it may not have proved anything in the longer 23 term. 24 I can't give you a fuller answer than that all these 25 years later. I am sorry, but a lot of things were 60 1 crossing my -- I'll explain to you the events. I mean, 2 within a few weeks I had two police officers murdered in 3 Lurgan earlier the following month. We had a further 4 murder in Armagh, I see in my notes, one in Downpatrick. 5 We had a lot of major things happening coming up to 6 Drumcree, etc, etc. 7 I was comforted, as were my bosses, that the 8 allegations against the police officers were in the 9 hands of the ICPC and that was their statutory role from 10 our prospective and we were proactive, as I say, in 11 calling them in right from the earliest opportunity 12 Q. But how often in your career, Mr Hall, has it been 13 alleged that a police officer has been involved in 14 a murder? 15 A. Well, sorry, but there are many degrees of murder. Are 16 we saying here that this was an allegation of someone 17 involved in murder, or are we talking -- 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Being an accessory after the fact. 19 A. Yes. Thank you, sir. 20 MR McGRORY: It is involved. The allegation here is that 21 within hours of the attack, a phone call was made from 22 a police officer to one of the suspects in the attack 23 giving him advice on how to escape detection. 24 That's what we are dealing with here. 25 A. Absolutely, and I have already made my position very 61 1 clear on that. 2 Q. I am suggesting to you that senior police at your level 3 and those who attended the meeting you attended on the 4 Monday morning ought to have been more proactive in 5 ensuring that that police officer was vigorously 6 investigated. 7 A. I don't accept that for one moment. There was 8 a detective chief superintendent, probably our most 9 experienced -- one of them -- in the force, carrying out 10 a criminal investigation, independently supervised, we 11 believed, by the ICPC. 12 Now, that's a man whose a trained SIO, etc, etc. 13 Everything was being done. I think my position is 14 abundantly clear in relation to my additional telephone 15 call to Mr Murnaghan to make doubly sure, lest he 16 thought there was any other immediate action that needed 17 taken or that there was some omission. I am not aware 18 that there was. 19 Q. Can I just ask you: have you any information as to how 20 Mr McBurney was appointed the IO before it became 21 a murder, how he was appointed the officer in charge of 22 the complaint? 23 A. Yes, yes. Well, I can explain the procedure. 24 Q. Yes. 25 A. I mean, I can't explain chapter and verse for him. 62 1 Q. No. 2 A. Again, the interface was the G Department, the 3 Complaints and Discipline Department. The ICPC would 4 have, through them, sought the services of 5 an appropriate detective. I might have been asked, 6 "Would Mr McBurney be available, or is he away, or is he 7 involved in ten other things?" or whatever, but 8 G Department would ultimately recommend an investigating 9 officer and the ICPC would have to approve that, which 10 were the terms of the legislation at the time. 11 If they were satisfied with that person after they 12 checked and examined whatever questions they needed to 13 do, then they approved that person and that was 14 communicated to me, and my notes show that. It was 15 communicated to me that he was appointed as the IO. 16 Q. It is just that he wasn't in G Department. 17 A. Oh, no. Who? Mr McBurney? 18 Q. No. 19 A. No, he was the head of CID for the region. 20 Q. Would it not have been more appropriate that someone 21 from G Department be appointed to investigate the 22 complaint? 23 A. Oh, no. You were talking earlier about the nature of 24 the allegation. You wanted an experienced investigator 25 to look into this type of allegation. You didn't want 63 1 someone just to carry out routine interviews or serve 2 discipline documents. So they obviously decided that 3 the most appropriate was a senior-ranking, experienced 4 detective to carry it out. 5 Q. So you think it was because of the sensitivity of the 6 allegation about the police officer and the seriousness 7 of it that it was Mr McBurney who was appointed because 8 of his experience? 9 A. Absolutely. G Department, on behalf of the chief 10 constable and the ICPC, would look at the nature of the 11 allegations, etc, etc, in all cases and decide and 12 approve an appropriate level and experience of 13 investigator. In this case they chose a senior 14 detective. 15 Q. A safe pair of hands, I suppose. 16 A. I don't know. That's maybe your observation. 17 Q. Now, can I just ask you about one matter, an entirely 18 different matter just? You mentioned in your interview 19 to the Inquiry people that you were involved in the 20 devising of policing plans with the Secretary of State. 21 A. That's right. 22 Q. I just want to ask you a little bit about that. It is 23 an entirely different subject, I know. 24 What did that involve? What was a policing plan and 25 how much involvement had the Secretary of State and why? 64 1 Maybe that's too many questions in one. 2 A. Well, I will do my best. 3 Q. Let's start with what is a policing plan? 4 A. The policing plan was the force corporate plan or 5 strategic plan which the force was obliged to provide to 6 the Police Authority of the day. It would have 7 contained about six major goals or objectives that the 8 force hoped to achieve during the particular year and 9 some actions as to how those goals were going to be 10 fulfilled. One or two perhaps would have been set by 11 the Secretary of State of the day. One or two, perhaps 12 one, might have been set by the Police Authority of the 13 day, and the remainder would have been set in 14 consultation with communities. 15 We would have done extensive surveys and 16 consultation with community and police liaison 17 committees. So local police commanders would have drawn 18 up local policing plans to support the corporate plan. 19 So without making it sound too bureaucratic, it was 20 a top down and bottom up approach. 21 Q. Yes, and the Secretary of State through the Northern 22 Ireland Office was involved in that? 23 A. To a limited degree, as he or she still might be, in 24 that he or she might have a particular objective or goal 25 that they wished the police to work towards. Similarly 65 1 with the Police Authority, who represented the broader 2 community and professions and other vocations across 3 society. 4 Q. Would community belief and support of the police be one 5 of those goals? 6 A. Yes. We called it community affairs in those days. It 7 was a major one. Hence the local policing plans and the 8 liaison with the local police and community committees, 9 which, by the way, we had in the RUC many years before 10 they became statutory elsewhere, and those surveys and 11 plans were done regularly, annually, by local commanders 12 and they reported back to local community groups and to 13 council community and police liaison committees. That 14 was well ahead of Patten and other such recommendations 15 nationally. 16 Q. I suppose any issue that would touch upon the community 17 relationships with the police, particularly the Catholic 18 community I may say, about whom there is an issue here 19 in respect of whom, would be of considerable issue to 20 the Secretary of State? 21 A. Well, it's difficult for me to say what interests 22 a particular Secretary of State at particular times. 23 Suffice to say that the police and community 24 relationships, all communities, were very, very 25 important to us, and I and my officers worked very hard 66 1 at fulfilling and delivering those goals and objectives 2 in partnership with local communities and I think we had 3 some very good successes in that regard as well. 4 Q. I suppose -- just one last question -- the way in which 5 the Secretary of State would have fulfilled her or his 6 objective in respect of community relations with the 7 police would have been to deeply involve him or herself 8 in the devising of such plans? 9 A. Oh, no, I wouldn't say, no, not deeply involved. 10 I mean, there were statutory provision in relation to 11 what the Secretary of State's role was, what the Police 12 Authority's role was and what the police chief 13 constable's role was. So I wouldn't want to take us 14 outside those statutory roles and provisions which are 15 now, in my case, a 12-year-old memory. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: There is an old saying, Mr McGrory: you don't 17 keep a dog and bark yourself. 18 MR McGRORY: Of course. 19 Of course, that had a statutory footing. 20 A. The policing plan? 21 Q. Yes. 22 A. Yes. We reported to the Police Authority. We were held 23 to account for the delivery of our services very fully 24 both operationally, community and financially. 25 Q. And through that to the Secretary of State? 67 1 A. That's correct. 2 MR McGRORY: Thank you. 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGrory, I certainly don't want to enter 4 into any discussion, but I make this suggestion to you 5 in case it may be of any help. Maybe it doesn't help. 6 You may at some stage wish to consider the effect 7 investigation of the tipping-off allegation potentially 8 might have upon the availability of Tracey Clarke as 9 a witness, and her safety. 10 As I say, I am not wanting to discuss it now. It 11 may be of some help to you to consider. If it is not, 12 ignore it. 13 MR McGRORY: I am much obliged, sir. 14 Questions from MR MALLON 15 MR MALLON: Just a number of discrete matters. My name is 16 Mallon and I am instructed on behalf of 17 Mr Robert Atkinson and his wife, Eleanor Atkinson. 18 I would like to bring you to paragraph 30 of your 19 statement, [81706], please. In it you say: 20 "If DCS McBurney had a specific issue he wished to 21 raise, he might speak to me or he might speak to the 22 DCS." 23 A. Excuse me. What is the paragraph? Sorry. 24 Q. Paragraph number 30. Do you have it? 25 A. Yes, but I don't see reference to what you are -- it 68 1 doesn't seem to be my paragraph 30. 2 Q. If I can read the paragraph out to you: 3 "If DCS ..." 4 A. I would really like to see it, if it is possible. 5 Q. I understand. I have got it in the old form. I am 6 sorry. It will probably be something similar to it. 7 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we have on our screen at the moment 8 a statement from another witness? 9 A. Yes, we have. 10 MR MALLON: If I can just raise it with you, the same issue 11 arises. 12 MR UNDERWOOD: It is [81796]. 13 MR MALLON: [81796]. If you can go on to paragraph 30, 14 would you like to read that? It is just the example you 15 give whereby DCS McBurney might ask you for specific 16 help. You give an example: if an arrest operation is 17 being planned, there would be six people who would 18 require maybe six arrest teams and six search teams. 19 I was wondering did you, in fact, give any 20 assistance or were you asked for any assistance when 21 Mrs Atkinson and the Hanveys were being arrested? 22 A. Well ... 23 Q. Do you remember if you were? 24 A. I don't remember. I don't know when it was either. 25 Q. They were arrested 10th April 2001. Would you know 69 1 anything about that? 2 A. Sorry. 3 Q. I know it is a long time ago. 4 A. I had long since left south region. Indeed, I had 5 retired from the force in April 2001. 6 Q. So you would not have been asked about that? 7 A. Irrelevant question, sir. 8 Q. I was just wondering from your general background 9 knowledge, would it have been necessary to ask 10 an officer for those additional resources at that time? 11 A. I mean, I can't really comment on that because I don't 12 know what the competing resource demands would have been 13 for my successors or the commanders who were there on 14 the ground -- 15 Q. So you wouldn't know that? 16 A. -- dealing with umpteen other matters. I mean ... 17 Q. Now, before you retired, if one looks at 5th December 18 2000, Detective Chief Superintendent McBurney, DCI K and 19 SIO Chris Mahaffey had a revised strategy meeting 20 involving the investigation into Robert Atkinson. At 21 that time they decided that they would arrest the 22 parties, search their home addresses and that they would 23 begin the commencement of a covert evidence-gathering 24 exercise. 25 Would they have had to come to you at that time to 70 1 get the resources for that? 2 A. Absolutely no knowledge. I left south region at the 3 beginning of January 1998. You are asking me about the 4 year 2000. So I haven't a clue about that. 5 Q. You haven't a clue about that? 6 A. I was long gone, two years. 7 Q. So you left that. So whenever you say that someone 8 would have come to you, it wouldn't have been, as it 9 were, on a colloquial basis, "Look, we meet together. 10 Rather than go through all the procedures, can you get 11 me ...?" by way of a direct approach? 12 A. Sorry. I am not sure I understand. 13 Q. In your statement you give the indication it seems to be 14 quite an informal matter: 15 "If DCS McBurney had a specific issue he wished to 16 raise, he might speak to me or he might speak to the 17 DCS C1 at headquarters ..." 18 A. Yes, yes. 19 Q. Do you ever remember him speaking to you about 20 an intrusive surveillance operation involving 21 Robert Atkinson, something which you were fairly 22 involved in and fairly interested in? 23 A. No, certainly not. 24 Q. Was that a normal enough operation or did it require 25 specific authorisation and specific funding and specific 71 1 equipment? 2 A. Well, back again, what you are referring to clearly did 3 not happen during my tenure. 4 Q. No, but I am asking you as a general question, not 5 specifically about this. 6 A. It was also prior to the enactment of the Regulatory and 7 Investigatory Powers Act. It was prior to that as well. 8 My recollection is that if an investigator, for example, 9 wanted access to telephone records, he or she had to go 10 via the Assistant Chief Constable Crime Department and 11 seek approval at that sort of level, because there were 12 questions of privacy and data protection then as well. 13 Q. What I am trying to direct your mind to is the intrusive 14 surveillance element of it. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. That was actually put into effect in April 2001, but it 17 was discussed and planned in December 2000. 18 A. As I say, I left in January '98, so I am sorry, I can't 19 comment whatsoever on the actions of others. 20 Q. Yes. It was December 2000. Now, I am not asking you to 21 comment on the actions of others, but what I have said 22 to you is it has resourcing implications. Would you or 23 someone at your level have had to consider those 24 resourcing implications? 25 A. It's difficult for me to say that. As I said, a lot of 72 1 things change in all organisations in two or three years 2 procedurally. There was new legislation coming in, new 3 codes of practice. A whole range of things were 4 changing. So it would be very unfair for me to 5 potentially mislead this Inquiry with offering comments 6 on something two, three years outwith my knowledge at 7 that time. 8 Q. You don't seem to want to comment on that. Let me ask 9 you about this: had you any experience with intrusive 10 surveillance operations ever while you were in the 11 police? 12 A. Subsequently, yes. 13 Q. Subsequently. Subsequent to when? 14 MR UNDERWOOD: This is a delicate matter. I wonder if my 15 friend would lay a bit better base for it. 16 MR MALLON: Yes. In relation to this situation, the period 17 that I am involved with in regard to the surveillance is 18 the period covered from the decision to implement it on 19 5th December 2000 and its implementation on 20 10th April 2001 and its conclusion on or about 21 20th April 2001. Now, you have indicated that at that 22 time you were not involved in it. 23 A. That's quite right, yes, nor did I have any knowledge of 24 it. 25 Q. You didn't have any knowledge of it? 73 1 A. And I don't to this day. 2 Q. Yes. You might have seen it in the papers or heard 3 about it subsequently, because there was 4 an investigation into it as to how it was discovered. 5 You didn't know anything about that? 6 A. Sorry. I mean, I retired in 2001. 7 Q. When did you retire? 8 A. March 2001. 9 Q. So this was less than two weeks before this was 10 implemented? 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, the witness says he doesn't know 12 anything about it. 13 MR MALLON: Yes, I appreciate that and he is saying that he 14 retired, but this would have been very well ongoing 15 before you retired. 16 A. Well, I had no knowledge or involvement with it. So far 17 as I was concerned, up until -- I was never -- I was 18 never spoken to or interviewed or re-interviewed by any 19 other investigation or investigators or re-examination 20 of any of these enquiries. 21 Q. I understand that. 22 A. When I finished in the police here, I moved to work in 23 Great Britain for some years. I was detached from this. 24 I was never spoken to by anyone until these Inquiry 25 people -- the people representing this Inquiry spoke to 74 1 me two years ago, when I discovered then this issue 2 about whether or not the ICPC had -- whether or not they 3 had supervised the Atkinson part and for how long. 4 I had no knowledge or involvement in any of the other 5 things that happened once I left south region in 6 January 1998. 7 Q. I appreciate that. 8 A. I can't really add to that. I am sorry. 9 Q. No. I was just wondering whether you had any 10 information you could give us with regard to resourcing 11 levels, both at the time you were in the relevant region 12 and afterwards. If you can't assist us in that -- and 13 you have said you can't -- the only other matter, which 14 is a general question, is in or around this time in 15 south region or any other region in which you were 16 involved -- I am not asking specific operations -- what 17 I am saying to you is: were you aware of the necessity 18 to bring in specialist teams to do that? 19 A. I am sorry. 20 Q. To bring in -- 21 A. Specialist teams to do what? 22 Q. Intrusive surveillance. 23 A. No, I wouldn't have been aware that have. 24 Q. You had never used them or authorised them yourself? 25 A. I don't recollect so. 75 1 Q. Does that mean that you might have? 2 A. No, I don't think so. I mean, again I'm saying to you 3 that many procedures and rules and regulations changed 4 with the new Regulatory Powers Act, etc, etc. I am in 5 no way evading your question. I am just saying I cannot 6 help you. 7 Q. But you just can't remember ever using them. Is that 8 it? 9 A. Sorry. I did not use them. 10 Q. Thank you. 11 A. I did not use them. That would have been in the domain 12 of the Criminal Investigation Department and the 13 Crime Department. 14 MR MALLON: I just wondered in relation to the resources. 15 Thank you. 16 A. Thank you now. 17 Questions from MR ADAIR 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Adair. 19 MR ADAIR: Thank you, sir. 20 Just a few things I want to briefly ask you about, 21 a number of the issues, Mr Hall. 22 Now, it was suggested to you by Mr McGrory that, 23 really, the minute the police became aware from the 24 telephone records, which they obtained in early May, 25 that there had been a call between the Hanvey and 76 1 Atkinson household, basically he should have been 2 arrested there and then. 3 Now, we have heard some evidence about service 4 providers and the basis on which they provided this 5 information. Can you tell us your recollection as to 6 the basis on which they provided the police with 7 telephone records? 8 A. Yes. Well, on a hazy memory again, spanning many, many 9 years, but, I mean, I know it fluctuated because of 10 intimidation and other attacks and threats and different 11 situations, in that some service providers we went 12 through definitely went through a period when they were 13 unwilling to provide witnesses to go to court and they 14 were only willing to undertake checks on an intelligence 15 basis, if you like, or a, if you like, restricted basis. 16 Q. Well, when you say "an intelligence or restricted 17 basis", what does that mean? Does that mean that the 18 information was given to the police but to be treated 19 confidentially and not revealed to people? 20 A. And it would have meant they were unwilling to provide 21 witnesses to prove it. 22 I can't say when that applied or didn't apply. I am 23 just saying over what is nearly now a 40-year memory 24 that it did change significantly because of the effects 25 of terrorism and threats and intimidation 77 1 Q. The next thing I wanted to ask you about was you were 2 being asked again by Mr McGrory as to whether the 3 allegation being made in respect of the tip-off, the 4 suggestion is that that should have been and should have 5 formed part of the murder investigation, because if it's 6 true, he is at least guilty of assisting offenders. 7 A. Sure. 8 Q. I am not sure whether that offence is one in England, 9 sir -- 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. That's the correct description of it. 11 MR ADAIR: -- but that's what we have. He is at least -- 12 you and I know that there are many murder cases where 13 joined on the same indictment will be a charge of murder 14 and against another person there will be a charge of 15 assisting offenders. It used to be the old accessory 16 after the fact and so on. 17 What do you say about the approach that was taken by 18 Mr McBurney in this case? He didn't treat it as part of 19 the murder investigation as potentially assisting 20 offenders. He treated it really as an investigation 21 into these actions, this tip-off, on a separate basis. 22 What do you say about that? Was that reasonable or 23 unreasonable? What would you have done? Can you help 24 us about that? 25 A. Well, from what I have subsequently seen and what has 78 1 been made available to me, it seems to me that his 2 strategy, which I'm again of the opinion appears at 3 least to have been agreed and supervised by the ICPC, 4 was a workable one in that situation in terms of trying 5 to negative possible defences to try to get other 6 witnesses who might provide some evidence against the 7 officer alleged to have done this. 8 Q. I mean, we know that on the Monday morning you briefed 9 the chief constable, the deputy chief constable. We 10 know that basically everybody possible that could know 11 about this knew about the tipping-off allegation. 12 Did you or anyone else ever make the suggestion that 13 it should be treated as part of the murder investigation 14 as opposed to a separate investigation? 15 A. No. I don't recall that. I don't recall it. 16 Q. Did it never enter your mind that it should have been? 17 A. I'm not sure that any -- that it was really discerned by 18 anyone as a specific or major issue on the basis that 19 all the kind of circumstances touching upon the murder 20 were being investigated and supervised, and it's 21 difficult for me to put it beyond that or to kind of 22 qualify that. 23 I mean, you could possibly argue it either way. 24 I am not sure it is one best way, but clearly 25 Mr McBurney's investigative strategy had to be he went 79 1 for the long haul in terms of building his case, which 2 is a well-defined feature of criminal investigation in 3 cases such as this, where you are either relying on 4 perhaps technical evidence. His starting point was 5 an allegation from a 16-year-old girl based on hearsay. 6 Her boyfriend had been arrested, was in custody, was 7 being charged. So I am assuming he had a look at all 8 those factors and, in conjunction with his supervisor, 9 he had to decide which path he went down. 10 I think it's now shown somewhere that he eventually 11 succeeded in getting his witness or potential witness, 12 albeit that not everything may have proved successful in 13 the long-term. 14 Q. What do you say to the suggestion being tentatively 15 suggested by some that he should have treated it as part 16 of the murder investigation? 17 A. Well, I mean, I can't be sure all these years later 18 whether he did or did not, other than everything was 19 clear in my mind. I can only give you my mindset at the 20 time, which was that those allegations were being 21 supervised by the ICPC. Where the beginning and ending 22 was with the murder investigation, I can't really 23 reconcile in my mind now. 24 Q. Let me ask you this: did it ever occur to you to 25 direct -- would you have had the power to direct that it 80 1 should be treated as part of the murder investigation, 2 being a senior officer? 3 A. No, because all internal investigations as it then would 4 have become would have been loosely titled, yes, 5 an allegation against an officer -- it is still called 6 the same today in terms of investigations -- would have 7 been monitored by G Department. So you have the SIO for 8 it, who is the experienced detective. You have the 9 discipline superintendent with him and you have the 10 independent supervisor. 11 Q. I am trying to find out something different. Leave 12 aside the ICPC for the moment. Say they don't know 13 about it or aren't supervising it. We know there is 14 an allegation of criminal behaviour on behalf of 15 Atkinson. If they hadn't been involved at all, ICPC, or 16 G Department, would you have considered directing or 17 enquiring as to whether the allegation against Atkinson 18 was part of the murder investigation or would you have 19 regarded it as something to be treated as a separate 20 investigation? I am just trying to find out what your 21 thoughts would have been. 22 A. Yes, yes, yes. Well, I would think on balance that it 23 would have been part and parcel of the murder 24 investigation. I mean, it would have been the CID 25 officer investigating the murder and any associated 81 1 offences. 2 Q. Right. 3 A. So, you know, in that scenario you had no complaint and 4 no ICPC. I don't think there would have been any kind 5 of alternative question, so to speak. 6 Q. But it is a different scenario once the ICPC are 7 involved and G Department. Is that what you are saying? 8 A. That's correct. That's correct. 9 Q. The other thing I want to ask you about is the 10 appointment of how Mr McBurney was appointed. You have 11 been asked again by Mr McGrory about this. We know that 12 it has to be effectively with the approval of the ICPC 13 or did do in those days. Is that right? 14 A. That's correct. 15 Q. What were the practical mechanics as to the 16 decision-making for the investigative officer into 17 a complaint against the police? 18 A. Uh-huh. 19 Q. I mean, in practical terms -- leave aside formal 20 documents for a moment. 21 A. Yes. The practical situation was the facts were 22 relayed, if you like, via G Department to the ICPC. 23 They decided -- first of all, the ICPC had discretion on 24 which cases they supervised and which ones they didn't. 25 They tended to supervise, naturally, the more serious 82 1 ones. Once they decided they were going to supervise 2 it, then it would have been asking G Department to help 3 them select, for want of a better word, an appropriate 4 SIO, looking obviously at the nature of the allegations, 5 etc, etc, and the gravity of them and the overall 6 scenario. G Department would then have set about 7 finding a suitable and available SIO, bearing in mind we 8 were living in difficult times and murders were 9 commonplace. 10 Q. Okay. 11 A. So G Department, or someone on their behalf, might well 12 have asked me, for example, "Is Detective Superintendent 13 or Chief Superintendent so and so likely to be 14 available, suitable, whatever, available to go and do 15 this if we recommend him to the ICPC?" 16 Q. Okay. 17 A. Then the ICPC would ultimately approve that or not and 18 the answer would be communicated. 19 Q. Okay. If you pull up page [15436], please, on the 20 screen, this, Mr Hall, is a letter from Mr Murnaghan 21 I am told, although the name is redacted. I think 22 Mr Underwood confirms that. It is to the director of 23 the British Irish Rights Watch. It is dated June 1997. 24 If you would just highlight the third paragraph down, do 25 you see where it says: 83 1 "Firstly, I should point out that Detective Chief 2 Superintendent McBurney, Superintendent Anderson and 3 Chief Inspector Bradley are based at Gough Barracks, 4 Armagh and not Portadown RUC station. The decision to 5 approve Detective Chief Superintendent McBurney as 6 investigating officer rather than an officer from 7 outside the RUC was made by myself after careful 8 consideration. The detective chief superintendent has 9 been involved in previous supervised investigations and 10 has the confidence of the Commission to conduct 11 a thorough and meaningful enquiry under my direct 12 supervision." 13 That's obviously referring to -- that's Mr Murnaghan 14 relating his experience of Mr McBurney. So it would 15 appear from this -- and does this accord with your 16 recollection of the practice -- that really the ICPC 17 effectively had a very substantial role in selecting the 18 senior investigating officer for any neglect 19 allegations -- for any allegation against the police? 20 A. Yes, and particularly where it was alleged criminal 21 conduct. Absolutely right. 22 Q. Can you confirm or not from your own recollection 23 whether Mr McBurney had been involved as SIO in 24 a number of investigations overseen by the ICPC? 25 A. Yes. I couldn't name names, but I have no doubt that 84 1 would have been the case. 2 Q. I want to turn briefly to one other issue that you 3 touched upon, and that is the fact that on the Monday, 4 having been told about the tipping-off allegation, you 5 phoned Mr Murnaghan as a belt and braces situation to 6 make sure that he was aware of the tipping-off 7 allegation, as I understand it. Is that right? 8 A. That's correct, yes. 9 Q. Now, there has been some, I suppose -- I was going to 10 say wild speculation, but there has been some 11 speculation yesterday suggested from dealing with this 12 issue that it might be that Mr McBurney at some stage 13 phoned up Mr Murnaghan and really effectively told him 14 to back off or that he was going to look after it and he 15 shouldn't be involved anymore. 16 Now, from what you know -- unfortunately, as we 17 know, Mr Murnaghan is dead. From what you know of 18 Mr Murnaghan, if Mr McBurney had done that, what would 19 Mr Murnaghan's reaction have been? 20 A. Mr Murnaghan would not have countenanced any such 21 suggestion or approach in his wildest dreams. 22 Mr Murnaghan was a most thorough, meticulous and 23 respected lawyer in the Northern Ireland community and 24 was clearly, I am assuming, selected to be a member of 25 the ICPC because of his professionalism and the status 85 1 and esteem that he held in Northern Ireland society. 2 So not for one moment would Mr Murnaghan have 3 countenanced any approaches other than the official way 4 of doing business. 5 Q. I think we are all aware, Mr Hall, that sometimes it can 6 be, when civilians are involved with whatever type of 7 force it is, whether it is the police force or whatever, 8 a cosy relationship can sometimes develop. You know 9 what I am talking about. Do you understand what I am 10 talking about? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Sometimes it can be cosy, and people -- would 13 Mr Murnaghan have been the sort of person who would 14 develop a cosy relationship with police officers? 15 A. No. Certainly not. Mr -- but I want to balance that by 16 saying Mr Murnaghan was polite and courteous in all his 17 dealings, but extremely professional and independent in 18 relation to his business. 19 Q. The final thing I want to ask you about is this: you 20 have told us that it was your belief and, as 21 I understand it, the belief of other senior police 22 officers that the ICPC were overseeing the investigation 23 into the allegation of the tip-off. 24 A. That's correct, yes. 25 Q. You have told us then that you received, I think fairly 86 1 recently, some other documentation which confirmed that 2 belief and you quoted a number of matters. 3 A. Yes, indeed, yes. 4 Q. Is one of those matters -- and I can refer them in due 5 course to the Panel without going through them all now. 6 Page [27254], please. Is one of those matters this file 7 note, which is a file note from Mr Mullan of the ICPC? 8 Is this one of the matters that you recently saw? 9 If you look in particular at paragraph (j). 10 A. That's correct. That's one of them, yes. 11 Q. Is that a file note, are you aware, from the 12 documentation you received recently that Mr Mullan had 13 prepared for a meeting with Chief 14 Superintendent McBurney, Superintendent Anderson from 15 Complaints and Discipline and others on 15th May of 16 1997? 17 A. That's correct. That follows on from the previous 18 meeting with the same people on 12th May, which was the 19 Monday afternoon after my Monday morning meeting. 20 Q. Sir, I am not going to take you through the remainder of 21 the document. 22 A. 19th May was the next one for the record. 23 MR ADAIR: Thank you. Thanks very much. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Adair, just help me about the order which 25 deals with the ICPC. This was not a public complaint. 87 1 Therefore, the only way in which it could come within 2 the pure view of the ICPC would be by way of a reference 3 under Article 8 from the chief constable. 4 MR ADAIR: That's right. I can't solve that. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: In fact, that didn't happen until 2007. 6 MR ADAIR: I know that. I can't -- I haven't got the answer 7 as to why then there is this apparent involvement by the 8 ICPC at this stage, sir. 9 THE CHAIRMAN: As much as they could do and should have done 10 if they had wanted to have their finger in the pie would 11 be to say to the chief constable, "We have learned about 12 this. We would like it if you would refer it to us". 13 That's the only way in which they could become seized of 14 it. 15 MR ADAIR: That's right, properly seized as opposed to what 16 appears to be an involvement without being properly 17 seized. I absolutely agree, sir. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 19 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD 20 MR UNDERWOOD: You heard that exchange, Mr Hall. What do 21 you say about it? 22 A. Well, what I say about it is the very significant first 23 strategy meeting, as I see it now, was being held on the 24 Monday afternoon with the SIO and with the G Department 25 superintendent and with the ICPC official and 88 1 supervisors and Mr McBurney clearly shared the details 2 of this additional allegation. 3 I don't want to sound -- to give the impression of 4 being pedantic in any way. I am not sure if the wording 5 of the legislation would have said "complaint" or 6 "allegation" but here was an additional allegation. 7 Q. It is allegation or other matter. Allegations are 8 things which the ICPC would naturally get -- 9 A. In my view -- sorry. 10 Q. Can I just tell you this? 11 A. Sorry. Yes. 12 Q. Other matters are things which the chief constable could 13 bring to the attention of the ICPC and the ICPC could 14 then ask. 15 A. Well, I step back, as I say, to where we had already 16 called in the ICPC under Article 8 to look at the 17 overall circumstances. Then we had the letter of 18 complaint which added to that against the alleged 19 inaction, and now we have a further allegation. By the 20 time this comes in, the ICPC are involved, Mr McBurney 21 is approved and appointed, and he has been doing various 22 obviously elementary work for the ICPC. Then he has his 23 first, as I see it -- and I am sure he would have made 24 me aware of that on the Sunday, that he was having this 25 major meeting with the ICPC and others. So he reveals 89 1 the additional allegation that he is trying to 2 investigate. It is recorded and noted by the ICPC 3 official and it seems to have been taken on board at 4 a number of subsequent meetings, and, indeed, the -- in 5 my view, supervised and gave instructions to the SIO. 6 So ... 7 Q. Could it be as simple as this? If Mr Murnaghan had 8 thought there was something wrong with the concept he 9 was supervising, presumably you would have been amazed 10 if he hadn't told you that when you spoke to him? 11 A. Oh, yes. In fairness, he wouldn't have seen the detail 12 at that moment. In fairness to Mr Murnaghan, he would 13 not have seen the detail until he looked at that at the 14 subsequent meetings. 15 But, you know, I would have assumed that if there 16 was any difficulty, his official would have referred it 17 back and the superintendent G Department as well was 18 present. So I would have thought if there were any 19 additional forms to be filled or Is or Ts to be dotted 20 or crossed, there were sufficient people present to do 21 that. 22 Q. So as far as you were concerned, not only was it 23 blindingly obvious this was something the ICPC should 24 have been supervising, but that everything was in place 25 for the ICPC to be supervising it? 90 1 A. Well, as I said earlier, to me, the view of the 2 reasonable person, it was inextricably linked. 3 REV. BARONESS RICHARDSON: May I -- I am not a lawyer, so 4 excuse my language. If there had been no letter of 5 complaint which brought it into the remit of the ICPC, 6 would it have been more or less likely that the 7 allegations about the tipping off would be included 8 within the criminal investigation of the murder? 9 A. Baroness, probably we wouldn't have changed it too much, 10 because we had already -- I go back again -- called in 11 the ICPC ahead of the letter of complaint to look at all 12 matters of concern in relation to that 13 incident/investigation. 14 So they were in from day one, if you like, with 15 an open book, because we were proactive in asking them 16 to come in and look at the overall circumstances of this 17 incident. 18 REV. BARONESS RICHARDSON: So those allegations would have 19 been still treated as a complaint against an officer 20 rather than as an investigation into an accessory to 21 murder? 22 A. I would have thought so. yes, I would have thought so. 23 MR UNDERWOOD: Let me go back to the ICPC dipping in and out 24 of this. Let's take a snapshot of the middle of 25 May 1997. As far as everybody is concerned, including 91 1 the ICPC, they are all over it. They are on top of 2 this. They are worrying about whether phone records 3 haven't been got or whether they have been got. Then 4 they drop it. We now know that, at least by October, 5 they are out of it. As far as they are concerned, they 6 are telling us nothing ever to do with them. Good Lord, 7 no. 8 Now, I asked you before: can you give any 9 explanation for why that happened? You told me you 10 couldn't. You have now been offered one explanation, 11 which you roundly rejected, which is that Mr McBurney 12 somehow had a chat with Mr Murnaghan and Mr Murnaghan 13 went away. In the course of rejecting that, you told 14 Mr Adair that Mr Murnaghan was a professional, 15 meticulous man. You stand by that, I take it? 16 A. Without doubt. 17 Q. Secondly, if Mr McBurney had attempted to get him off 18 the case, he would definitely not have gone off the case 19 on that basis. 20 You went on to say he would have only got off the 21 case, as it were, if he had been asked through official 22 channels. Do you mean that? 23 A. Sorry. I don't recall saying "if he had been asked 24 through official channels". 25 Q. We can look at the transcript, of course. My recall is 92 1 you added a rider, when you were asked about whether he 2 would have backed off on Mr McBurney's say-so, that he 3 would only have backed off if he had been asked 4 properly. 5 A. Sorry. I don't think I was asked about backing off. 6 I think what I said, subject to the record, is that 7 Mr McBurney would have only have done things by official 8 channels, by the book. 9 Q. Mr McBurney? 10 A. Sorry. Mr Murnaghan. 11 Q. It must follow, must it not? 12 A. I don't think the suggestion or innuendo that he might 13 have backed off was ever put to me, nor did I for one 14 moment ever think he would have been asked or in 15 a position to back off. 16 Q. Perhaps I am putting two and two together and making 17 five. Let's take the position that we know. 18 As of May, he is supervising the investigation into 19 the tip-off. As of October, he is not. So he did back 20 off. Do you accept that? 21 A. Well, I don't like the term "backing off". 22 Q. All right. Dropped the supervision? 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Withdrew. 24 A. It infers something ... 25 MR UNDERWOOD: He ceased to supervise the allegation that 93 1 the police officer was corrupt? 2 A. Well, I mean, I didn't know that, but I see some notes 3 to that effect, September, October. But then I see 4 notes at the end of the inquiry from the official still 5 making reference to Atkinson, albeit it didn't figure in 6 his certificate of satisfaction. So I am not sure who 7 was saying or doing what in that regard. 8 Q. Take it from me that the evidence we have been given by 9 Mr Mullan is they were not supervising. 10 It is your evidence from your knowledge then of 11 Mr Murnaghan that he would not have ceased to supervise 12 it unless someone in authority had told him to do that. 13 Is that it? 14 A. Well, I am not sure how someone -- who the someone in 15 authority would be to tell him, other than perhaps his 16 own boss. If he was supervising it in accordance with 17 the legislation and practice, I am not sure where the 18 someone might come from to tell him to stop it. 19 Q. Mr McBurney? 20 A. I don't know. I don't know. I don't think that would 21 happen in practice. I can't see how that would be ... 22 Q. Superintendent Anderson? 23 A. Who? 24 Q. Superintendent Anderson from Complaints and Discipline? 25 A. No. I mean, Mr McBurney was a man who knew the law and 94 1 practice and procedure -- sorry, Mr Murnaghan. Whatever 2 he needed to do, he would have done. If there was 3 ultimately something discovered in statutory provision 4 which did not entitle him to still supervise it, then 5 I am sure he would have acted in accordance with the 6 law, but someone saying to him "back off" is a totally 7 different suggestion which I would not -- he would not 8 have countenanced. 9 Q. One other matter. You were asked a fair amount about 10 Mr McBurney's actions as SIO and to offer, as it were, 11 your professional opinion about what an SIO might have 12 done. 13 Can I just take it one step further to see whether 14 you can help us on this? We know that when Mr McBurney 15 did interview Mr Atkinson in September 1997, he told him 16 that there was an allegation that he made a telephone 17 call to the Hanvey household on the morning of 18 27th April. He didn't put to him that the police had 19 telephone records which substantiated that and he let 20 him go away for a month to dig out his own records and 21 come back with those and an explanation. Does any of 22 that strike you as odd? 23 A. I don't think I could say now. On the -- I mean, again, 24 I wasn't an SIO and I don't know what sufficiency of 25 admissible evidence was available. We all know the 95 1 difficulty of having suspicion and all kinds of other 2 things and having evidence as admissible to produce to 3 a court or to sustain a charge, prima facie evidence. 4 So I don't know what other lines Mr McBurney would have 5 been pursuing in terms of were there potential 6 witnesses, etc, etc. 7 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you. I am not take that any further. 8 Unless there is anything else, sir? 9 THE CHAIRMAN: No. 10 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Hall. 11 A. Thank you. That concludes your evidence. Thank you 12 very much for coming. 13 MR UNDERWOOD: I know Mr McKillop has an application to make 14 before the Panel which will be made without everybody 15 else's presence. I apprehend that will probably take 16 you to 1 o'clock or so. Can I suggest not before 17 2 o'clock for the rest? 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 19 (12.40 pm) 20 (The hearing went into closed session) 21 (1.10 pm) 22 (The luncheon adjournment) 23 (1.55 pm) 24 (In public session) 25 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, I threatened us with listening to the 96 1 long, detailed and careful interview that was conducted 2 with Mr McBurney and I now propose to make that threat 3 good. As I said, it is about six and a half hours. 4 I apprehend we can deal with a good third of it today. 5 Again, as I said, we will be able to hear it quite well 6 and follow it by way of transcript on screen, I hope. 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Good. 8 (Recorded interview with Mr Maynard McBurney played) 9 MR UNDERWOOD: Perhaps we should stop as well. Sir, as 10 I say, regrettably I am going to have to chop up this 11 interview into probably more than two goes. We will 12 resume again on Friday on that, I trust, with a view to 13 getting it done in as few bites as we can. I know 14 there is a matter that needs to be dealt with now in 15 closed session. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Are we able to continue with some of this 17 after we have dealt with the other matter? 18 MR UNDERWOOD: I suspect, because of the breaks in the way 19 the IT has to be set up, we would probably waste half 20 an hour in order to achieve that. It is a matter for 21 you, of course, but I suspect it would be quite 22 difficult. 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Does the IT have to be turned off? 24 MR UNDERWOOD: It has to be turned off for the closed 25 session, yes. 97 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Is there another hearing room we could use 2 for the other matter? 3 MR UNDERWOOD: I am in your hands, but I am sure we can find 4 a room. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: I was thinking then we could get on with 6 another half hour or so of this. 7 MR UNDERWOOD: In that case, perhaps it might be better to 8 carry on with this for a bit and then break into closed 9 session, if that's what would work. 10 (Recorded Interview with Mr Maynard McBurney continued) 11 THE CHAIRMAN: We shall stop when the present topic is dealt 12 with. We will stop there. I noticed, Mr Underwood, at 13 page 9, line 9, the words "from one of them". It is, 14 I think, in fact, "from Monaghan". 15 Who, by the way, is Joy Hopkinson? 16 MR UNDERWOOD: She was a witness barrister who was engaged 17 in interviewing a number of the witnesses. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Very well. We will rise now then and 19 come back to deal with the other matter when things are 20 organised. 21 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much. 22 (4.30 pm) 23 (Short adjournment re arrangements for closed session) 24 (4.55 pm) 25 (Public session of the hearing concluded, to be resumed at 98 1 10.30 tomorrow morning) 2 --ooOoo-- 3 I N D E X 4 5 MR WILLIAM DESMOND McCREESH (sworn) .............. 1 6 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 1 Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 10 7 Questions from MR O'CONNOR ................ 14 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD. ...... 26 8 Questions from THE PANEL .................. 27 9 MR ROBERT FREDERICK HALL (sworn) ................. 28 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 29 10 Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 50 Questions from MR MALLON .................. 68 11 Questions from MR ADAIR ................... 76 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD ....... 88 12 (Recorded interview with ......................... 97 13 Mr Maynard McBurney played) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 99