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Hearing: 5th May 2009, day 44
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PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF
ROBERT HAMILL
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Held at:
Interpoint
20-24 York Street
Belfast
on Monday, 5th May 2009
commencing at 10.30 am
Day 44
1 Tuesday, 5th May 2009
2 (10.30 am)
3 THE CHAIRMAN: It is nice to see you back, Mr Ferguson.
4 MR FERGUSON: Thank you very much indeed. Thank you.
5 MR ADAIR: Good morning. I think just before the
6 proceedings start, sir, you are probably aware, but
7 I think I should formally say, that I regret to have to
8 inform the Panel of the death of Mr McBurney, who died,
9 unfortunately, this morning.
10 As you know, sir, I had indicated a very short time
11 ago his desire and his instructions, even when seriously
12 ill, to come to this Panel and to answer and deal with
13 the allegations, which are widespread, which were made
14 against him. Unfortunately, that will not be able now
15 to happen.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. May we express our sympathies and
17 extend our condolences to his family?
18 MR ADAIR: Thank you, sir.
19 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Underwood?
20 MR UNDERWOOD: May I call Karen Kennedy, please.
21 MS LYNNE KAREN KENNEDY (sworn)
22 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD
23 MR UNDERWOOD: Morning, Ms Kennedy.
24 A. Thank you very much.
25 Q. Noise comes from all over the place here.
1
1 My name is Underwood. I am Counsel to the Inquiry.
2 It is my task, firstly, to ask you questions of you.
3 When we are finished, it may well be that others have
4 some supplemental questions.
5 May I ask your full names, please?
6 A. Lynne Karen Kennedy.
7 Q. I want you to look on the screen, please, at
8 page [80586]. There is a document there that runs
9 through to page [80594]. If we scroll through it
10 quickly, I wonder if you would just keep your eyes on
11 the screen.
12 Is that your witness statement?
13 A. It is, yes.
14 Q. Are the contents of it true?
15 A. I would like to make one amendment at paragraph 18 of
16 it, please.
17 Q. Please. We see that at page [80589] going over to
18 [80590]. Perhaps we could split the screen and have it
19 on both pages?
20 A. Two things I would just like to clarify. The very first
21 part of paragraph 18:
22 "All the interviews were recorded on tape."
23 That is true, but for one of the officers,
24 Detective Constable Keys, it started off on tape but
25 then the tape was switched off.
2
1 Q. That's contained in your report, I think.
2 A. Yes, it is.
3 The second part I would just like to point out, it
4 says we interviewed nine serving police officers. In
5 fact, that should be ten serving police officers.
6 Q. Okay. Thank you very much.
7 Again, they are all listed in your report?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. I want to ask you, if I may, about the actual practical
10 applied standards in respect of the various matters you
11 were investigating --
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. -- because your report, of course, clearly gives, as it
14 were, the black letter version of what was expected of
15 officers.
16 What I want to investigate is whether, in your
17 experience, that was in every case the standard to be
18 applied. That's just by way of introduction.
19 A. Right. Okay.
20 Q. Before I do that, though, can I ask your experience, as
21 of 1997, in investigatory work in relation to police
22 officers?
23 A. I came to Complaints and Discipline Branch, I think it
24 was 1st April 2001. Prior to that, I had been
25 a subdivisional commander for just over two and a half
3
1 years. During that time, I had carried out one
2 discipline investigation and assisted an assistant chief
3 constable on another.
4 Whenever I arrived into Complaints and Discipline,
5 I inherited a number of investigations because
6 I replaced four superintendents. For my eight and
7 a half months in Complaints and Discipline, I then
8 worked full-time in relation to being either an SIO or
9 assisting assistant chief constables and, of course, all
10 other administrative duties associated with the rank and
11 post.
12 Q. As of 1997, had you conducted any of those
13 investigations that you had conducted before your
14 arrival in 2001?
15 A. Prior to 1997, no.
16 Q. Can you help us with whether your approach to the
17 matters you were investigating in 2001 was influenced by
18 any standard changes that had happened since 1997?
19 A. Could you elaborate or could you clarify exactly what
20 you mean, please?
21 Q. You were looking back four years.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Of course, you had the benefit of hindsight, the
24 disadvantage that some evidence was not available to
25 you. The thing I am also interested in is whether
4
1 standards had in practical terms changed over those four
2 years?
3 A. I think it would be fair to say that standards possibly
4 had, insofar as there was certainly additional service
5 instructions and guidance about a number of areas we
6 looked at since 1997 and that were there in 2001.
7 Q. Again, to be fair, where that had happened, you noted in
8 your report --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- that there had been, for example, changes in force
11 orders in 1999, for example?
12 A. That's correct, yes.
13 Q. In practical terms, were you aware of any change in
14 culture or shift in the way in which people approached
15 force orders and so on between 1997 and 2001?
16 A. Not especially, no.
17 Q. Right. Can I move on, then, to some of the actual
18 standards that you were applying to people?
19 First of all, I want to deal with scene
20 preservation. Now, of course, we have seen your report.
21 We have seen the way in which scene preservation was the
22 responsibility of all officers and, as it were, it was
23 the second thing to do after preserving life.
24 In real terms, was that what happened? I don't mean
25 in this investigation. I mean in respect of constables
5
1 in the RUC. Did constables in the RUC adhere to that?
2 A. If a scene was sealed, then, yes, I would suggest that
3 they would.
4 Q. Which may beg a question about sealing the scene. We
5 will come to that.
6 Take an ordinary case where a constable may see
7 a mugging on the street or something, or a bit of
8 disturbance. The first thing he does is to make sure
9 people are safe. Would that constable then, never mind
10 sealing the scene, be expected to go round searching for
11 forensic evidence?
12 A. It is always a judgment call. I think it is very easy
13 if it is quite obviously a very serious incident. Then
14 the scene, I would suggest, would always be sealed and
15 examination take place.
16 In terms of other crimes that may not initially be
17 regarded perhaps as serious, it is really a judgment
18 call on the part of police officers, but I think it is
19 fair to say in practical terms that not every crime
20 would result in a scene preservation.
21 Q. Let me go on to sealing the scene. Here you have
22 a crossroads where there has been what has variously
23 been described as a riot, an affray, pandemonium. There
24 is no vehicle traffic through there apart from police
25 vehicles between the time of the assault and the early
6
1 morning when detectives turned up.
2 Would you regard the fact that no vehicles were
3 allowed through as a sufficient sealing?
4 A. Personally, no. There would have been other vehicles
5 forbye police vehicles. Ambulances would have also been
6 presumably vehicles at the screen.
7 Proper scene preservation is in relation to sealing
8 off the scene properly with tape and setting up a scene
9 log and very tightly controlling people who would then
10 enter the scene.
11 Q. Again, to come back to your assessment that these were
12 sometimes a judgment call, but in very serious crimes it
13 was natural you would seal the scene by way of tape, but
14 in others you may have to exercise judgment, here you
15 have two people taken away by ambulance, one of whom is
16 at the time unconscious.
17 Was that sufficient in itself, would you have said,
18 in the ordinary course, to have triggered a sealing of
19 the scene?
20 A. With the benefit of hindsight, one would have to say
21 yes, but at the time, it would seem that certainly the
22 police officers at the scene did not realise the
23 seriousness of Mr Hamill's injuries and were regarding
24 it, I think, as probably a Saturday night fracas.
25 But certainly with the benefit of hindsight, I would
7
1 suggest, yes, but at that time, I believe the officers
2 did not realise the seriousness of Mr Hamill's injuries.
3 Q. What I am getting at really is: assuming for the moment
4 that officers at the scene thought it was a normal
5 Saturday night punch-up in which a couple of people were
6 stretchered away, and it was no worse than was quite
7 commonplace, in your experience that wouldn't have
8 justified a scene seal. Would that be fair?
9 A. To be honest, you are asking me a hypothetical
10 situation. The way you have described it, it would be
11 a judgment call, I would suggest.
12 Q. Again, I am really not asking for your value judgment on
13 what people did here. What I am attempting to get from
14 you is what the general standards were and to tease out,
15 if I may, other experience of similar situations?
16 A. All I would say in response to that is it is very
17 difficult for me to answer in general terms.
18 Q. Okay. I want to ask you also about the interplay
19 between uniformed officers and detectives where you have
20 something like an assault which has uniformed officers
21 at the scene and then there is a translation over to the
22 CID.
23 At this scene, to take an example, you have
24 a number of police vehicles, each of which has at least
25 one full-time constable in. You have a sergeant and
8
1 an inspector, both uniformed. We know that some hours
2 later a detective and then a senior detective come on
3 the scene.
4 Can you just help us with what the relative
5 obligations and powers were of these various people?
6 For a start, in your report you single out
7 Constable A -- I hope you know who we are talking about
8 there --
9 A. Yes, I do.
10 Q. -- as being an officer who would have been responsible
11 for taking charge --
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. -- because she was an observer in an important back-up
14 vehicle.
15 Can I just ask, first of all, why single her out for
16 that role? Why not, for example, Constable Neill, who
17 was the full-time constable in the Land Rover or one of
18 the observers in the other back-up cars?
19 A. We were never able to determine who was regarded as the
20 investigating officer for the initial assault.
21 What I said in my report is that, based certainly on
22 normal police procedure, the observer in 7-0, which is
23 the main lead response vehicle, would be the person that
24 I would expect to have been investigating officer for
25 the initial assault.
9
1 Q. Would they be self-appointing or would --
2 A. No, that would come with the task, the fact they are
3 observer in 7-0. That would be assumed as part of the
4 role.
5 Q. Because that's the first back-up car on the scene?
6 A. 7-0 is the main response vehicle.
7 Q. What makes you say it was the main response vehicle?
8 A. Because the designated call sign suggests that. 7-0 was
9 the call sign given to all main vehicles that were
10 regarded as the main response vehicles in any turn of
11 duty.
12 Q. Would the presence at a scene of a uniformed sergeant or
13 uniformed inspector change your view about that?
14 A. No. It still would be the constable as observer in 7-0
15 that would be expected to be the investigating officer.
16 Q. And an observer in a car designated 7-0 then would have
17 been expected to know that, I take it?
18 A. Yes. That would be the vehicle that would be tasked to
19 most crimes or most incidents as the first vehicle,
20 first vehicle choice.
21 Q. Just taking it through serially, you would have expected
22 that officer to brief or debrief senior officers
23 arriving, would you?
24 A. Potentially yes, but I think the situation was such it
25 was described as a violent situation. So I think
10
1 probably at the time that senior officers arrived, there
2 was quite a hectic situation in place. So that may have
3 been actually quite practically difficult.
4 Q. In practical terms where you have the officer who is the
5 observer in the 7-0 car at an incident where all hell is
6 breaking loose, if I can put it that way, what would be
7 their first investigative task?
8 A. Well, in many ways similar to the first response at the
9 scene of a crime. Obviously they would be
10 ascertaining -- I mean, in this particular situation it
11 was slightly difficult, of course, because you had
12 a riot situation forbye the assault.
13 But if you are talking about an officer in the main
14 response vehicle going out to the scene of a crime, then
15 obviously they would be ascertaining if a crime has been
16 committed, who the injured party is, if there are any
17 suspects, any evidence, usual normal investigative
18 process.
19 Q. We know, in fact, that Constable A opened the log.
20 A. She opened a log at 7.27 am after the scene had been
21 sealed by CID officers.
22 Q. The normal expectation would be that that observer in
23 that car would be opening the log ordinarily. Is that
24 right?
25 A. Possibly. Possibly. Well, not necessarily, actually.
11
1 Some other officer could be appointed as scene log. The
2 purpose of a scene log officer is to tightly control
3 people and ensure that only authorised people enter, and
4 that their names are put on the log sheets for
5 statements and so on to be put in the log at a later
6 date.
7 It may or may not be someone necessarily from the
8 main response vehicle. As it happens, in this case it
9 was this particular constable, yes.
10 Q. I am still on the point about translation from uniformed
11 over to detectives. Take a different scene. Take a 7-0
12 response vehicle being called to the aftermath of
13 an incident where everything has quietened down and that
14 observer then ascertains whether a crime has been
15 committed, who the victim was, whether there were any
16 witnesses.
17 Then what? What does that officer do in relation to
18 the CID?
19 A. Well, if it is a crime that CID would be deemed to be
20 the most appropriate people to investigate, then they
21 would be tasked and CID would then presumably come out
22 to the scene and would probably take over the
23 investigation.
24 Q. And being briefed by the uniformed officer in charge?
25 A. I would expect so, yes.
12
1 Q. Of course, that's in an ideal world where that uniformed
2 officer has not been sent off to do a drink drive by
3 somebody else, I take it, because presumably they don't
4 have autonomy.
5 If a senior officer to them sends them off to do, as
6 we know here, a drink drive between the incident and
7 7.27 sealing, they have no power to say, "No, I am the
8 senior officer in charge here", do they?
9 A. Not as such, but there were supervisors at the scene as
10 well in this particular incident, so there were other
11 people who were aware as to what was happening.
12 Q. It is clear, is it, that despite the fact that
13 an observer in the JD70 car is expected to be the senior
14 investigating officer at the scene, nonetheless if there
15 is a sergeant or inspector there to tells them to go off
16 and do something else, they can't say "No". Is that
17 fair?
18 A. I am sure if they felt for some reason it really
19 required their presence at a particular crime, they
20 would put that point of view to their supervisor, but,
21 ultimately, it would be up to the supervisor to direct
22 as appropriate.
23 Q. Again, you would expect the supervisor, would you, to
24 know that the observer in the JD70 car was supposed to
25 be there running the investigation until the detectives
13
1 came?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Again, take an ideal world. You have the observer in
4 the JD70, who comes to the aftermath of a scene, takes
5 command, finds out what he or she should be finding out,
6 detectives are called in.
7 Does that investigating officer stay at the scene
8 until the detective comes along and then brief the
9 detective?
10 A. Well, you would expect the detective would need to be
11 briefed and that would seem the obvious person, yes.
12 Q. Presumably that uniformed officer would back out of it,
13 would he or she?
14 A. They may assist the detective. It really depends -- the
15 responsibility for investigation would pass to the
16 detective at that stage, so it depends whether the
17 continued assistance of the uniformed officer would be
18 required. Quite possibly it would be. That would be,
19 again, a judgment call for the officers at the time.
20 Q. You make the point, I think, in your report that DC Keys
21 was able to ask for officers to be recalled, but had no
22 power to order their recall.
23 Just help with us the command structure here.
24 Once the detective is on the ground, assuming it is
25 a detective constable, and he or she wants constables or
14
1 reservists to be recalled to give statements, did
2 a detective have power to order a uniformed constable or
3 reserve constable?
4 A. It is a bit difficult to answer that. I think in this
5 particular situation the authority to bring back
6 officers, recall them to duty, properly did rest with
7 the supervisor.
8 If a detective made an approach to the supervisor
9 because of the seriousness of an investigation and asked
10 for officers to be recalled to duty, I would expect that
11 that would be adhered to.
12 But it is simply an authority decision by
13 supervisory officers for them to be recalled.
14 Q. Now, I want to ask about debriefing.
15 We know, because we have heard quite a bit of
16 evidence about this, that there is the public order
17 manual, which you have set out in your report, which has
18 clear statements about briefing and debriefing, the
19 importance and what's supposed to happen in particular
20 about debriefing.
21 What we have been hearing is that in practical
22 terms, officers, at the end of a shift, or after
23 a scene, were often not debriefed in any real sense at
24 all. They might have a quick chat with somebody. They
25 might be told to make a list of things to put in their
15
1 notebooks once they have had a sleep. They might just
2 be let go, basically.
3 Now, again, can you help us on the actual practical
4 application of standards of debriefing in 1997?
5 A. Well, to be quite honest, the instructions are actually
6 fairly clear about this. The first thing I would say on
7 a normal turn of duty is there was always, like,
8 15 minutes overtime built into the end of a turn of duty
9 for debriefing to take place.
10 Q. Can I stop you there?
11 Again, we have heard discussion about this between
12 witnesses about whether that was applied in 1997. Can
13 you tell us that, in 1997, officers were paid for
14 fifteen minutes worth of debrief?
15 A. To the best of my recollection, yes.
16 Q. Again, presumably the degree of debriefing would depend
17 on the degree of excitement, as it were, the degree of
18 activity there had been during the shift?
19 A. Yes, yes. If there was little or no activity during the
20 shift, then the debriefing would have been a brief
21 discussion about it and primarily then just a completing
22 of situation records in relation to incidents that were
23 attended to, but if it was more serious, then you would
24 expect a deeper debrief.
25 THE CHAIRMAN: If the debriefing took longer than
16
1 15 minutes, would you expect the officers to be paid for
2 that additional time as well?
3 A. I think if a debrief needed to be a longer period of
4 time, that would be acceptable.
5 THE CHAIRMAN: To be paid for it?
6 A. I believe so. I'll be honest, I am not sure if there is
7 a requirement for a minimum amount of time for officers
8 to work; if it is a 15-minute slot, for example, before
9 they are paid for it, I am honestly just not sure.
10 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Underwood, the matter has been raised
11 earlier. It may be that we shall be hearing clear
12 evidence about this.
13 MR UNDERWOOD: Yes. I will make a note to try to track
14 somebody down who had purse strings.
15 Can I ask next about notebooks? Again, we have
16 heard some evidence which goes more than one way on
17 completion of notebook entries.
18 What's your position on what was the standard
19 procedure for constables compiling notebook entries at
20 the end of an incident or the end of a shift?
21 A. Well, there would be an expectation that an officer
22 would complete his or her notebook at the end of the
23 shift, or at least immediately as soon thereafter.
24 Q. So if there had been a particular incident on a shift,
25 would that not merit an entry until the end of the
17
1 shift?
2 A. It might be -- I mean, I certainly have known officers
3 that would complete a notebook as they go through their
4 tour of duty. It just simply depends what sort of time
5 they have or if they complete it more at the end of the
6 tour of duty. It is possible, even, it would be
7 completed at the start of the next tour of duty.
8 Q. It wouldn't be a cause for criticism if an officer went
9 through an entire shift without making a note?
10 A. I would say it would be a cause for criticism if there
11 were events or incidents which he/she attended which had
12 a significant -- in other words, there should have been
13 an entry made if it was a significant call.
14 Q. Take a riot, however it has been described. You have,
15 I think, a clear impression of the sort of event that
16 took place in the early hours of 27th April here.
17 Given your understanding of what officers actually
18 saw and were caught up in, would your expectation of the
19 normal standard have been that these officers should
20 have made notebook entries before they went off duty?
21 A. I would have expected that, yes.
22 Q. There seems to have been a lively debate about the
23 merits and demerits of officers pooling their
24 recollections before they either made notebook entries
25 or statements.
18
1 What was your position on that as of 1997?
2 A. Sorry. In relation to this particular investigation?
3 Q. Generally. Would it have been regarded as permissible
4 or wrong for officers to pool recollections if they had
5 been at a scene?
6 A. It would generally be regarded as probably wrong that
7 they would pool together a list of suspects at a scene.
8 It would have been individual recollections by officers
9 themselves.
10 Q. Next, I want to deal with statements. If you got
11 a situation where a number of uniformed officers are
12 present at the scene of a crime and detectives come on
13 board later and wish to collect from those officers all
14 the detail they could get about who was present so they
15 could conduct interviews, etc, how would the statements
16 be taken in the ordinary course in 1997?
17 A. Individual officers would probably be asked to make
18 their duty statements there and then by CID.
19 Q. Would there be any other process by which information
20 was teased out of the officer?
21 A. Well, a proper debrief, of course, would have gathered
22 certain information.
23 Q. In practical terms, how would that have worked then?
24 You would have expected the officers to make statements
25 and then detectives to go through and debrief individual
19
1 officers on the basis of the statements?
2 A. No. I probably would have expected uniformed
3 supervisors to have carried out an initial debrief in
4 relation to the incident. As a result of that, officers
5 then would be asked to make duty statements to CID.
6 CID may even have been present during a debrief, for
7 example, as well.
8 Q. Would CID have then had any further role in that. Would
9 they have teased out more information or not?
10 A. Possibly. Certainly in this inquiry there were further
11 statements taken by CID. So it is possible. It is
12 possible that further evidence came to light that they
13 may need to re-interview officers.
14 Q. You see, we know, for example, that at least one of the
15 officers who was on the scene here thought that
16 Mr Hamill was very seriously injured. He thought he had
17 been stabbed, because of his breathing.
18 Would that have been the sort of thing you would
19 have expected to emerge from a debriefing from
20 a supervisor?
21 A. Yes, I would.
22 Q. I want to move into the investigative phase proper now.
23 Assume this: there is an event at which uniformed
24 officers attend. They are then debriefed by
25 a supervisor. They make statements. The CID then go
20
1 through those statements and perhaps do some further
2 teasing out.
3 How would a witness strategy emerge from that
4 process in practical terms?
5 A. Do you mean witnesses to the incident?
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. Well, again, that would be identified in the police
8 officers' statements, any witnesses they had come
9 across, the injured parties, and I would assume then
10 that CID would actually then draw up a list of witnesses
11 to be interviewed.
12 Q. We know here questionnaires were administered and in
13 some cases statements then followed from that
14 questionnaire process.
15 Was a questionnaire strategy a commonplace one in
16 1997?
17 A. Not in my experience.
18 Q. So you would have expected, as it were, full-blown
19 interviews, would you?
20 A. I mean, I can't explain why there was a decision to use
21 questionnaires. I would find it unusual.
22 Q. Were they regarded as less satisfactory than full-blown
23 interviews?
24 A. Well, a duty statement or a statement of evidence would
25 obviously have much more evidential quality than
21
1 a questionnaire, I would suggest, but it may be
2 a preliminary way to gather information. I don't know
3 what the rationale was for using it.
4 Q. We know, of course, that where HOLMES is in use, there
5 is a HOLMES reader, receiver, who collects information
6 that comes in from a process like that and raises
7 actions so that further interviews could be conducted
8 off the back of what's learned.
9 Where you don't have a HOLMES system or a MIRIAM
10 system, what would have happened? Sorry. I am making
11 this a long question.
12 Assume there are three or four detectives going out
13 questioning witnesses and those witnesses themselves
14 come up with other names of witnesses, without a MIRIAM
15 or HOLMES system, how is that put into practical effect?
16 A. Well, again, I would have assumed that would have been
17 done either through conferencing or debriefing by the
18 CID officer who either was in charge or the detective
19 sergeant.
20 Q. Right.
21 THE CHAIRMAN: Just going back to the questionnaires, I can
22 see, if the questions are quite rigid, then you may not
23 discover information which is there to be had.
24 If you have open questions, not necessarily all, but
25 if you do have open questions, would that remove the
22
1 reservations about the questionnaires?
2 A. Well, I think if there was open questions, there would
3 be a natural inclination to supply more information, but
4 personally, I think that a duty statement, a statement
5 of evidence, would be preferable, but in the initial
6 instances, certainly the use of open questions I think
7 would assist.
8 SIR JOHN EVANS: I am sorry to interrupt your chain of
9 thought, Mr Underwood, and if I am getting ahead of you,
10 please correct me.
11 Did the officers themselves complete questionnaires?
12 MR UNDERWOOD: The officers didn't. As best we understand
13 it, all the officers made -- I think all the constables
14 made statements on the 27th. The sergeant and the
15 inspector made their statements, I think, on 2nd May.
16 A. 7th May.
17 Q. Thank you. I think the four officers in the Land Rover
18 were then questioned on the 28th by Detective
19 Sergeant Bradley to get some more information out of
20 them, but as far as we can ascertain -- perhaps you can
21 put me wrong or right on this: as far as we can
22 ascertain, no other officers were asked follow-up
23 questions to tease out information.
24 A. Not that I'm aware.
25 SIR JOHN EVANS: Yes. I think it is important to
23
1 distinguish that questionnaires were not made to
2 officers. The witness is talking about the use of
3 a questionnaire, but that relates only to witnesses
4 other than police.
5 MR UNDERWOOD: That's correct, isn't it?
6 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.
7 SIR JOHN EVANS: Thank you.
8 MR UNDERWOOD: So again, take a different inquiry,
9 an inquiry where you have a number of officers who give
10 their statements. As a result of that, witnesses are
11 interviewed. Those witnesses are then seen and either
12 questionnaires administered or statements taken.
13 How would an arrest strategy evolve from that?
14 A. Well, that would obviously be -- all the statements
15 would be looked at, the evidence ascertained, and
16 obviously the identification of any suspects, and then
17 it would be looked at, the evidence to be put to those
18 suspects, and then presumably dates and times would be
19 set up as to carry out any arrests --
20 Q. And -- I am so sorry. Please carry on.
21 A. -- and anything else that may go with that.
22 Q. Again, unless you have a MIRIAM or HOLMES system, would
23 this be conducted by way of conferencing?
24 A. I would suggest so, yes.
25 Q. In terms of -- I am so sorry.
24
1 I am going to ask you a hypothetical question again
2 and see if you can help.
3 Where you have, as a result of what we have just
4 been talking about, enough information to arrest, say,
5 three people, but you have reason to believe that if you
6 do some more investigation you may make a better case
7 against them before you arrest them, how would the
8 competing imperatives work here?
9 Would you arrest and search in order to get forensic
10 information and perhaps something out of interviews or
11 would you try to build the best case you can in
12 the short-term before you can arrest?
13 A. I think that's a very unfair question, to be honest. It
14 is a judgment call at the time. It may be that there is
15 some benefit to seeing evidence or whatever for further
16 forensic examination, but it is a judgment call at the
17 time. It is very difficult for me to answer.
18 Q. Can we take from that that there was no overriding
19 imperative in all circumstances to seize forensic
20 materials at all costs?
21 A. I can't say that, because we were not made aware of any
22 strategy that there may have been to seize clothing.
23 Q. No, no --
24 A. But some of -- sorry?
25 Q. I am trying to keep this in the general rather than this
25
1 particular investigation, you see. What I am interested
2 in is what general standards were.
3 Can you help us on this, whether the seizure of
4 scientifically important clothing, for example, was such
5 an overriding matter that it would tend to overshadow
6 the possibility of building a better case before you
7 arrest someone?
8 A. Again, that's a judgment call dependent on any
9 investigation.
10 Q. Can I talk about recording for a moment? We have heard
11 that as soon as an officer reached inspector rank, and
12 certainly above inspector rank, they kept journals
13 rather than notebooks. Is that your experience?
14 A. Yes, it is.
15 Q. Where you have an investigator of, say, chief inspector
16 rank who is running a non-MIRIAM, non-HOLMES
17 investigation, conducting conferences that you have just
18 been discussing, would you expect what might be regarded
19 as policy decisions to be recorded in the journals?
20 A. In the journals or by means of a conferencing book or
21 policy book.
22 Q. We have heard evidence that, certainly in 1997, journals
23 were regarded as the personal property of the officer
24 and, when they retired, they took them with them. Was
25 that your understanding?
26
1 A. Journals are the property of the chief constable. They
2 are not the property of individuals who complete them.
3 Q. You made a recommendation about this, didn't you?
4 A. I did, yes.
5 Q. Before that recommendation was implemented, what was the
6 position?
7 A. Well, that would always have been the legal position.
8 Q. Right.
9 A. What I would have to say is I don't believe that was
10 necessarily ever communicated to the service.
11 Q. For example, there was a question raised on Friday about
12 what would happen if somebody retired with their
13 journals and then destroyed them, despite the fact there
14 may be a continuing criminal investigation.
15 Was that something about which one would be
16 critical?
17 A. Yes, I would suggest so. In 1997, there were not the
18 accounting procedures for journals. There were for
19 notebooks, but not for journals.
20 I think the difficulty is that many officers,
21 whether it be CID or senior police officers, regarded
22 journals as containing probably a lot of information,
23 everything from even management decisions, personnel
24 matters, as well as crimes and so on that had been
25 attended.
27
1 I think there was a mindset that, when people
2 retired, they took their journals with them for
3 safekeeping and looking after, but the reality is that
4 journals are the property of the chief constable and not
5 an individual person's property, but I don't think the
6 organisation made steps, in 1997, to stop retired
7 members from bringing journals -- from taking them with
8 them when they retired.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 Now, your investigation in essence covered the
11 period from 27th April until about 6th May, I think. Is
12 that right?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. So it did not cover the allegation or the treatment of
15 the allegation against Mr Atkinson that only emerged on
16 9th or 10th May?
17 A. That was a completely separate investigation from mine.
18 Q. But I think you know, don't you, what the allegation
19 was?
20 A. Only in broad terms.
21 Q. Can I just ask your help on this? Again, it is a matter
22 of standards to be expected rather than what happened in
23 practical terms here.
24 Where, in the course of a criminal investigation,
25 an allegation emerged against a police officer of
28
1 a serious crime, how would it be treated? In practical
2 terms, what would happen to it?
3 A. Well, obviously that would be criminally investigated,
4 obviously by CID.
5 Q. How?
6 A. Well, in the way that any other criminal
7 investigation -- I mean, it could be even that the
8 officer would be arrested and interviewed. A decision
9 then is made, obviously, when it is as serious as that,
10 whether or not the officer should be suspended, for
11 example, and the investigation would be carried out in
12 the normal context.
13 Q. Assume you are the SIO of a murder investigation and in
14 the course of your investigation you uncover a piece of
15 information that amounts to an allegation against
16 a serving officer?
17 A. A criminal allegation?
18 Q. A criminal -- it is not an allegation as such. It is
19 information which amounts, if true, to a crime,
20 a serious crime by a serving officer.
21 As an SIO, what do you do with that? Do you take it
22 higher to report it? Do you ask for another SIO to be
23 appointed on that?
24 A. Quite possibly. But I would like to emphasise that this
25 investigation of mine was purely an internal discipline
29
1 investigation, and this was not an area I had to face.
2 I would like to emphasise that.
3 Q. Of course. Because you were a senior officer in
4 Complaints and Discipline, you would presumably have
5 an understanding of how complaints against officers went
6 through the system. Is that fair?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. So, for example, where in the course of an investigation
9 something emerged that might point to a serious crime by
10 a serving officer, that's something that you might in
11 the ordinary course of your work have encountered?
12 A. I didn't, but -- I didn't encounter that.
13 Q. Can you help us on the interplay between Complaints and
14 Discipline and the criminal side of it? Where you got,
15 as I say, information which might point to a serious
16 crime, that is presumably also a breach of Complaints
17 and Discipline, is it?
18 A. It is, yes. The criminal investigation into an officer
19 would take precedence over the disciplinary
20 investigation.
21 Q. But at what point in the revelation about a potential
22 serious crime would you expect Complaints and Discipline
23 to be informed of it?
24 A. Complaints and Discipline would be informed at a very
25 early stage, because a 17-3 would be served on the
30
1 officer, but Complaints and Discipline would take no
2 further role until the criminal proceedings were
3 concluded.
4 Q. Would they be kept informed about the way in which the
5 investigation was going?
6 A. I would expect so, yes.
7 Q. Can I ask you about the dissemination of manuals and
8 Codes of Practice? As I understand it from your report
9 and statement, and Mr Jackson's statement, individual
10 officers had loose-leaf manuals. Is that right?
11 A. That's correct. The manual -- the police manual is
12 issued to recruits, but throughout one's service updates
13 are received. Therefore, they are sort of in large
14 folders that you can just open and insert new amendments
15 and then you mark when those amendments were inserted.
16 So it is a live document, so to speak, in that officers
17 are kept up-to-date with amendments to that manual.
18 Q. Dare I say so, like lawyers, there will be a variable
19 quality of updating. Is that fair?
20 A. I would agree with that.
21 Q. I just want to ask you a little about your
22 investigation, not very much.
23 In particular, a number of retired officers didn't
24 cooperate. What I want to ask about is, in the case of
25 each of them, what effect that might have had on your
31
1 investigation.
2 Firstly, Reserve Constable Cornett I think didn't
3 engage with the process.
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. Can you give us any impression of how much that hampered
6 your process?
7 A. I truthfully can't, because we didn't have the
8 opportunity to interview her.
9 Q. Would that be the same of another officer we are calling
10 P40, who was in the Land Rover?
11 A. Yes, I would agree.
12 MR UNDERWOOD: That's all I want to ask you.
13 Thank you very much indeed. As I said, other people
14 may have more questions for you.
15 A. Of course.
16 MR FERGUSON: No questions. Thank you.
17 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you give me a moment and just help us
18 about this? Suppose there is evidence which may
19 implicate a police officer in some wrongdoing, but also
20 that evidence may go against a defendant who is
21 suspected of committing a serious crime and be relevant
22 to the investigation of his case.
23 Can you see any warrant then for separating the
24 investigation, the criminal investigation, of the police
25 officer from the further criminal investigation of the
32
1 suspect?
2 A. I think there could be a case for that. Yes, I think
3 there could be a case for that.
4 THE CHAIRMAN: Of separating?
5 A. Yes, of separating them. I think there could be,
6 although, again, it is a little bit of a judgment call
7 and would depend on the circumstances, which sounds as
8 if I am sitting on the fence, but it would probably
9 ultimately depend on the circumstances, but there may
10 well be a situation where you would want to separate
11 them.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr O'Hare?
13 Questions from MR O'HARE
14 MR O'HARE: Ms Kennedy, I appear on behalf of a number of
15 serving and retired police officers.
16 Mr Underwood was asking you about officers who
17 didn't attend to cooperate with your investigation.
18 Isn't it correct to say that those serving officers, the
19 ten that you mentioned in paragraph 18 of your Inquiry
20 statement, did cooperate with this investigation?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. Now, generally, this investigation of yours, it actually
23 commenced before you became involved in it. Isn't that
24 right --
25 A. That's correct.
33
1 Q. -- under Superintendent xxxxxxxxxx. It was
2 an investigation that was being supervised by the Police
3 Ombudsman's Office --
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. -- and in particular under the direction of Mr Mahaffey?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. During the currency of your investigation, in fact, you
8 really had to seek the prior approval of the Ombudsman's
9 Office before you could really do anything. Is that
10 correct?
11 A. The Ombudsman's Office had to actually approve my
12 appointment.
13 Q. Your initial appointment had to be approved. It was
14 done verbally, first of all, and then subsequently in
15 writing?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Then, for example, in terms of the 17-3s that were
18 served on the individual officers, drafts of those had
19 to be submitted to Mr Mahaffey for his approval --
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. -- as to the content of those --
22 A. Yes, that is correct.
23 Q. -- of those 17-3s? Indeed, when it came to the stage of
24 interviewing the officers, in fact, the actual questions
25 that the officers were going to be asked during those
34
1 interviews, those questions had to be supplied to
2 Mr Mahaffey?
3 A. That's correct. They were forwarded down to the Police
4 Ombudsman's Office, yes.
5 Q. Throughout the currency of your investigation, in fact,
6 it was being supervised by the Police Ombudsman's
7 Office?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. Now, Detective Inspector Jackson, I believe, was really
10 your right-hand man in this investigation?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. In connection with -- sorry. At the time you undertook
13 or took over this investigation, obviously you were
14 aware of the media interest in the events surrounding
15 the death of Robert Hamill and the subsequent police
16 investigations into it?
17 A. Yes, I was aware of the media interest.
18 Q. Also, would it be fair to say that the Ombudsman's
19 Office, at this stage, whenever you took over this
20 investigation, they would have been under some pressure,
21 along with Internal Investigations Branch, to carry out
22 this investigation that you were involved in?
23 A. I can't comment on any pressure that the Ombudsman's
24 Office may or may not have felt.
25 Q. But, certainly, you were conscious of the fact that it
35
1 was -- your investigation would be looked at closely as
2 well. Isn't that correct?
3 A. Yes, I was aware it probably would.
4 Q. In the terms of the -- you were asked generally by
5 Mr Underwood about debriefing. If I understand you
6 correctly, initially that responsibility should be --
7 I am talking about uniformed police officers now -- the
8 initial responsibility for that would be uniformed
9 supervisor?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. Am I correct in saying that your view would be that
12 statements should have been taken; for example, the
13 night in question -- we will deal with this --
14 statements should have been taken from officers who were
15 at the scene --
16 A. Yes, I would agree.
17 Q. -- before they left, before they went home?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And in that context, a debriefing by the uniformed
20 supervisor?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. In practical terms, where you have four occupants of
23 a Land Rover, two back-up vehicles and DMSU arriving on
24 the screen, in practical terms, would that have been
25 feasible on the night in question?
36
1 A. I believe a debrief would have been feasible on the
2 night in question, yes.
3 Q. In terms of all of those police officers, for example --
4 we are talking about 10, 12 officers -- having to make
5 their statements of evidence.
6 A. Well, a debrief would ascertain those who had evidence
7 to put into a statement.
8 Q. But in terms of actually making their statements before
9 they end their duty?
10 A. I still contend that statements should have been made by
11 the key people at the scene before they terminated duty
12 on that day.
13 Q. That includes those in the back-up vehicles?
14 A. Well, again, I mean, that's for a debrief to determine,
15 those officers who have evidence to give and then
16 a direction that they complete their statements before
17 the end of a turn of duty.
18 Q. How long would that take if you have 10 or 12 officers?
19 A. Well, they would all be making them presumably at the
20 same time. It is as long as a statement takes.
21 Q. It certainly wouldn't be 15 minutes?
22 A. It is as long as a statement takes.
23 Q. In fact, it would be a couple of hours. Isn't that
24 correct?
25 A. It is as long as a statement takes.
37
1 Q. In terms of the arrest strategy you were being asked
2 about in terms of witnesses, that really is a judgment
3 call, depending on the individual circumstances in every
4 case?
5 A. An arrest strategy?
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. Yes, it's dependent on the evidence that is available,
8 yes.
9 Q. For example, if it is purely information that somebody
10 was involved in something without hard evidence to be
11 put to that suspect, an officer would be justified in
12 waiting until such times as hard evidence could be
13 gathered to put to that suspect when interviewed?
14 A. Again, that's a judgment call.
15 Q. In terms of your report, eventually that again was
16 approved by the Ombudsman's Office. Isn't that correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Your recommendations really concentrated on policy and
19 procedural issues?
20 A. Yes.
21 MR O'HARE: Thank you, Ms Kennedy.
22 Questions from MR McGRORY
23 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory.
24 MR McGRORY: I am obliged, sir.
25 My name is McGrory and I represent the family of
38
1 Robert Hamill.
2 There are a few things I would just like you to
3 expand upon briefly, please.
4 The first one is this issue of the judgment call.
5 I would suggest there are really two questions arising
6 from that.
7 One is whose responsibility it is to make the
8 judgment call that the scene needs to be immediately
9 preserved and further investigative action taken, and
10 then, secondly, whether or not that judgment call should
11 have been taken at an early stage in this case.
12 So let me deal with the first of those two
13 propositions. In terms of whose responsibility it was,
14 in this case we have a number of officers in the
15 Land Rover and then we have the support vehicles. You
16 have given evidence about the main vehicle and we know
17 there was another vehicle. Then on the scene, within
18 a reasonably short period of time, comes a sergeant and
19 then, a little later, an inspector.
20 Whose responsibility is it to make the call that
21 this is a serious incident and there needs to be,
22 firstly, scene preservation measures put in place?
23 A. In this particular incident, given the involvement of
24 two supervisory officers, I would contend that it would
25 be one of the two supervisory officers.
39
1 Q. Of course, in order to make that judgment call, one or
2 other of them needs to get sufficient information?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. Now, if I could just perhaps visit briefly -- the first
5 written information we have about what did happen
6 emerges from the statements that are made on 27th April,
7 later on that morning or that day.
8 You have read those statements and are very familiar
9 with them, I know. Mr Underwood has already mentioned
10 the evidence of Constable Silcock to you in terms of his
11 concern that Mr Hamill might have been stabbed because
12 of his breathing.
13 In fact, other officers give evidence which I would
14 suggest reveals this was a serious incident. For
15 example, Reserve Constable Atkinson himself says in his
16 statement that he could see out of the corner of his eye
17 a number of youths jumping on the head of one of the
18 males. I think Silcock says something similar in terms
19 of he had information that someone had jumped on the
20 head.
21 Would information that there had been someone whose
22 head had been jumped on not suggest to you that this was
23 a serious matter?
24 A. Which is why I think if a debrief had been held shortly
25 after the incident, I think that's the sort of
40
1 information that would have become apparent.
2 Q. Yes, yes. I need not go on, but there are statements
3 from Constable Neill, Constable Cooke and so forth, all
4 of whom make it clear that they were aware on the scene
5 that Mr Hamill was: (a) unconscious when he was taken
6 away; and (b) that he was attacked violently while lying
7 on the ground.
8 What I am suggesting to you is that that information
9 alone was enough to trigger those serious investigative
10 steps.
11 A. I would agree and if a proper debriefing had taken
12 place, I think that may have become apparent at a much
13 earlier stage.
14 Q. Thank you. Now, we heard evidence from P39 -- do you
15 know who that is --
16 A. I do, yes.
17 Q. -- on Friday about the official label that might be put
18 on the nature of this investigation, whether or not it
19 was HOLMES or MIRIAM or whatever now?
20 She said it wasn't quite a MIRIAM. She called it
21 a mini-MIRIAM. Have you ever heard of a mini-MIRIAM?
22 A. Personally, no. I would have thought -- certainly the
23 information we were given is that it was initially
24 conducted as a MIRIAM, under the MIRIAM system.
25 Q. Indeed, the Chairman raised on Friday afternoon the
41
1 point that -- are there any guidelines within MIRIAM as
2 to suggest when a MIRIAM is started as opposed to some
3 lesser type of investigation?
4 A. Without checking the relevant general order, I can't say
5 with any certainty. There was certainly a general order
6 out identifying the differences in MIRIAM and HOLMES
7 I think back in 1994 possibly, but I would need to check
8 the exact wording in relation to that general order.
9 THE CHAIRMAN: Presumably, Mr McGrory, when P39 spoke of
10 a mini-MIRIAM investigation, she was speaking of
11 adopting certain aspects of a MIRIAM investigation but
12 not all.
13 MR McGRORY: Indeed.
14 THE CHAIRMAN: In other words, using it as a helpful
15 guideline.
16 MR McGRORY: Indeed. The purpose of these questions is to
17 try to establish whether or not a full MIRIAM, as
18 described in the MIRIAM document, should have been
19 commenced on 27th April.
20 A. To be honest, I can't comment on that.
21 Q. By the early part -- by, say, the middle of the day, in
22 any event it had been established that Mr Hamill had
23 been moved to the Royal Victoria Hospital and that this
24 was a serious matter?
25 A. Yes. What I would say in relation to this and P39, is
42
1 that we never had the benefit of cooperation from P39 in
2 our investigation. So it is difficult to really pass
3 any comment or judgment in relation to activities that
4 she may have outlined on Friday.
5 Q. If I could maybe ask you in the abstract in terms of
6 a situation where there has been an assault, which was
7 clearly a serious assault emerging, where the victim was
8 unconscious and has been brought to the Royal Victoria
9 Hospital, so we are in the realms of a GBH -- do you
10 agree?
11 A. Yes. In fact, I think at 4.00 am the duty inspector was
12 made aware it could be life-threatening.
13 Q. We could have had an attempted murder on our hands?
14 A. I would agree, yes.
15 Q. Is that not the sort of case that would have merited
16 a full MIRIAM?
17 A. I would assume so, but I have never been a senior
18 detective, and I cannot comment on what P39 -- the
19 rationale for using a mini-MIRIAM. I really just can't
20 comment on that.
21 MR McGRORY: Thank you.
22 Questions from MS DINSMORE
23 MS DINSMORE: Chief Superintendent, I appear on behalf of
24 Reserve Constable Atkinson and I understand from your
25 evidence-in-chief that, really, investigating matters
43
1 pertaining to Mr Atkinson was no part of your remit?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. And that that was, in fact, carried out by way of
4 entirely separate investigation?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. By Detective Chief Inspector K?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And subsequently taken over by Superintendent Stewart?
9 A. Yes, that's correct.
10 Q. Really, the only dealings that you would have had in
11 relation to that was one general meeting with Stewart
12 where that was just one aspect of a number of matters
13 that were being considered, and that you had some input
14 into the form 17-3?
15 A. That's correct. The 17-3 on Reserve Constable Atkinson
16 was served by myself, but that was in conjunction with
17 the investigating officer in terms of the wording and
18 when it could be served. That was my only involvement
19 with R/Con Atkinson.
20 Q. Apart from that, apart from essentially a courtesy
21 letter from the Department of the Director of Public
22 Prosecutions in December 2002 by way of information to
23 inform you that there had been a decision to prosecute
24 charges, there were no other dealings really you had
25 with the issue regarding Reserve Constable Atkinson?
44
1 A. That's correct. No other dealings.
2 Can I just clarify that letter? I left Complaints and
3 Discipline in 2001 on promotion and took up a post as
4 head of C2 branch, which was a different branch than the
5 current C2 branch. So that letter in December 2002 came
6 to me in my capacity as head of C2 branch, not in my
7 capacity as the investigating officer of this
8 investigation.
9 MS DINSMORE: Thank you very much.
10 MR UNDERWOOD: No questions arising out of that. Thank you.
11 SIR JOHN EVANS: Forgive me, Chairman. It is just a small
12 matter of clarification.
13 If I could take you back to what you said about
14 Constable A --
15 A. Yes.
16 SIR JOHN EVANS: -- and her responsibility as the lead
17 investigator, if you like, because of the role she was
18 in on that night?
19 A. Yes.
20 SIR JOHN EVANS: Is that despite the fact that a Land Rover
21 with four officers had been present earlier? Is that
22 still the case?
23 A. Yes. I would agree. That is my assessment. The
24 Land Rover crew was a dedicated public order crew, which
25 would have been there for an entirely different reason.
45
1 As I said earlier, the observer in 7-0 was the main
2 response vehicle and there would be an expectation that
3 that would be the officer that would carry out any
4 investigations.
5 I mean, if there was to be a change to that, that's
6 something that should have been identified by one of the
7 supervisory officers.
8 This is part of the problem. It was never entirely
9 clear who actually had been appointed to investigate the
10 initial assault on Mr Hamill.
11 SIR JOHN EVANS: Thank you.
12 MR UNDERWOOD: Unless there is anything else arising?
13 Thank you.
14 (The witness withdrew)
15 We have Mr Jackson next, who I suspect will be quite
16 short, but I suspect the shorthand writer would benefit
17 from a break.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: We will have our break now. Fifteen minutes.
19 (11.35 am)
20 (A short break)
21 (11.50 am)
22 MR UNDERWOOD: Desmond Jackson, please.
23 MR DESMOND GEORGE JACKSON (sworn)
24 A. Desmond George Jackson.
25 MR UNDERWOOD: Please sit down, Mr Jackson. My name is
46
1 Underwood and I am Counsel to the Inquiry. I have some
2 questions for you. It may be, after that, there will be
3 some supplemental questions from other lawyers here.
4 Can I ask you to look, please, at a statement which
5 we should see on screen at page [80542]?
6 This runs through to [80552]. If you wouldn't mind
7 having a look as we scroll through it and I will ask at
8 the end whether it is your statement.
9 Is that your statement?
10 A. It is fairly quick, but, yes.
11 Q. Can I just ask you, before I ask you to confirm its
12 contents, to look at paragraph 30, which we will find on
13 page [80551]? You say there:
14 "The first real point of concern I identified was
15 the delay before the scene was secured. Furthermore, we
16 found no evidence of any debrief."
17 Then there is another sentence. Then you say:
18 "During my time in IIB, I had not come across other
19 complaints of failing to be brief."
20 Should that say "debrief", by any chance?
21 A. Correct, sir.
22 Q. Apart from that correction, are the contents of this
23 statement true?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. Thank you very much.
47
1 I just want to ask you some questions about matters
2 that have emerged which touch on your evidence. In
3 practical terms, if an observer in a back-up car
4 designated JD70 arrived at a scene of a crime, would
5 that observer be, in practical terms, the investigating
6 officer or senior officer for investigative purposes?
7 A. Depending on what the case would be, the observer would
8 be the normal person who would respond to and deal with
9 the incident, but depending on the gravity of the
10 offence.
11 Q. Would that be influenced at all if more senior officers
12 were also present?
13 A. In practical terms, if you had a road traffic accident
14 that happened and the observer was a constable and the
15 inspector was in the back of the police vehicle, a road
16 traffic accident, I am not saying it is not serious, but
17 the observer would deal with the road traffic accident
18 irrespective of the fact that the inspector was in the
19 back of the car.
20 Q. If it were a more serious incident, say a GBH, GBH with
21 intent, would the fact of an inspector's presence alter
22 the situation?
23 A. The senior officer would be given the role of guiding,
24 allocating resources, making decisions in relation to
25 who would deal with it, and possibly directing if, for
48
1 example, it was a GBH or serious assault, that the
2 constable not deal with it and somebody else deal with
3 it.
4 Q. Again, dealing with the prospect that fairly senior
5 uniformed officers were on the scene of a crime, we have
6 obviously just touched on paragraph 30 of your
7 statement, which deals with debriefing.
8 Where you have senior officers at the scene of
9 a crime, at what point would they organise a debrief?
10 Could they do it at the scene?
11 A. A debriefing could take place at the scene, yes, but you
12 mean, in terms of a debriefing at the scene, you would
13 surmise there were questions being asked of what in
14 actual fact happened, who saw what, who did what, what
15 had to be done in terms of follow-up. So in terms of
16 a debrief at the scene, yes, a debrief could take place
17 to get essential information to allow something to be
18 developed or acted on. So a debriefing, yes, could take
19 place at the scene.
20 In terms of a full debrief, one would imagine that
21 a full debrief would take place in a room with officers
22 present where directions are given, questions are asked
23 and directions are given on how to further the matter.
24 Q. What the Panel may be very assisted by is your
25 experience of the practical application of the policies
49
1 that we are dealing with here.
2 We know that in the immediate aftermath of the
3 assault here there were a dozen or so officers who had
4 either been at the scene in the first place or arrived
5 as back-up, and may have seen witnesses, may have seen
6 how serious the assault was, may have seen how seriously
7 injured Mr Hamill was.
8 Would you, in your experience, have expected
9 a senior officer to have taken advantage of the presence
10 of everybody there to get some sort of debrief or not?
11 A. I mean, I'm answering this question with the benefit of
12 hindsight.
13 Q. Of course.
14 A. Going back and looking at the situation there, at
15 a stage during this incident there was call for an FRG
16 or a Federal riot gun. That is a situation where
17 calling for that item to be signed out and taken on to
18 the street is evidence or an indication that it was
19 a very volatile situation. So somebody had to give that
20 direction to have that done.
21 That's an area then, as a senior officer, I feel
22 that you would have had to ask the question, "What
23 happened here, or what was the extent of what happened,
24 that we arrived at a situation of asking for a Federal
25 riot gun to be brought to the scene?".
50
1 Q. In a sense, there were two aspects here, weren't there?
2 There was the seriousness of the disorder to which that
3 FRG question goes --
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. -- and there was the seriousness of the injury, which,
6 so far as we can tell, went unchecked until about
7 4 o'clock.
8 Do you see a distinction between those two in terms
9 of debriefing?
10 A. From investigation, what this inquiry established was
11 that nobody really knew the extent of the injury at the
12 initial stages. I think there is evidence of a reserve
13 constable actually leaning over Mr Hamill, protecting
14 Mr Hamill from further events. I think his statement
15 will say he did remove a piece of glass, but the inquiry
16 established that nobody really was aware of the extent
17 of the injury.
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. So in relation to a debrief about the injury, I can't
20 really answer that, because I don't know what the senior
21 officer would have been told.
22 Q. This is what I am getting at. Of course, as you say, we
23 have the benefit of hindsight, and we know that some of
24 the constables at the scene, and reserve constables at
25 the scene, thought this was a serious injury. We also
51
1 know that they weren't asked about that.
2 What I am asking you about is: never mind hindsight,
3 would you expect, where there is a serious disorder and
4 two people taken away by ambulance, the senior officer
5 at the scene to get everybody round and say, "What
6 happened there? How serious is that?"
7 A. I wouldn't expect him to get everybody round, but, yes,
8 I would expect him to ask the question, "What happened
9 and how serious? Where has he gone?"
10 Q. There is also this problem, isn't there, for the senior
11 officer at the scene: that he has his dozen or so
12 constables who have perhaps witnessed the events, and
13 they are about to go off and do all sorts of other
14 things. It may be quite difficult for a senior officer
15 to gather them all within a reasonable time after they
16 have gone. Is that fair?
17 A. To gather them all, yes, is a fair comment. To gather
18 some would have been realistic.
19 Q. Right.
20 THE CHAIRMAN: Can I just go back to see if I have followed?
21 I will be corrected if I am wrong. The officers who
22 were going to the police station to get a riot gun saw
23 on their way there -- I think it was Inspector McCrum,
24 wasn't it, and the sergeant?
25 MR UNDERWOOD: That's right, Sergeant P89.
52
1 THE CHAIRMAN: The inspector was told what they were going
2 for and he gave his approval.
3 Now, would that fact put him in the position, as
4 events later transpired, of, really, the senior
5 investigator or the investigating officer; in other
6 words, would he supplant the observer from the back-up
7 car as a result of that?
8 A. He would have been in charge at that time of the scene,
9 but as events developed, other -- another officer of
10 another similar rank or with expertise would have been
11 called in and allocated to investigate the matter.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: But once he had authorised obtaining a riot
13 gun, would that put him in the position of the
14 investigator until the detective branch took over,
15 rather than the observer from the back-up car?
16 A. He would have been taking control. He would have been
17 in charge, yes.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Is that the same thing as saying he then
19 became, until the CID took over, the investigating
20 officer --
21 A. Yes.
22 THE CHAIRMAN: -- rather than the observer from the back-up
23 car?
24 A. I would accept that, yes.
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Just a moment. Thank you.
53
1 MR UNDERWOOD: I want to get the best picture we can for the
2 Panel of the roles of the uniformed and detective
3 branches here.
4 You say that a senior officer on the scene would
5 have been able to collect at least some of the officers
6 within a reasonable time to debrief them. That,
7 I think, was your last answer to me. Was that fair?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. So what would you have expected a senior officer,
10 an inspector or sergeant attending a scene like this to
11 do, in terms of making arrangements for the officers who
12 had been present to tell their side of it?
13 A. Again, I'm answering this, you know, with hindsight and
14 not being there. The facts that were established was
15 that there was a very volatile, violent situation had
16 happened. Police responded to that. There was
17 a direction given to move one faction from the scene, if
18 I can say, left towards St Mark's Church. There was
19 an ambulance called for. There were two people taken in
20 the ambulance. One would surmise as to what would have
21 been asked. "What happened there? How serious are the
22 injuries? Do we need to send somebody to the hospital
23 to check up on the injuries?"
24 Q. Again, you prefaced that with another comment about
25 hindsight, and we all bear that in mind.
54
1 What I am interested in is your experience relevant
2 to the way people actually worked in practice in 1997.
3 In practice, in 1997, would the ordinary course have
4 been for the senior officer at the scene to say, "What
5 happened? How serious was this?"
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Then what would they do? Would they actually ensure
8 people did not go off shift, for example, before they
9 had made statements?
10 A. If there was a necessity to collect the best evidence in
11 terms of recording statements or having a statement
12 recorded from what individual officers saw, yes, you
13 would instruct or instructions would have been given to
14 make those statements.
15 Q. Again, I am going to be asking you hypothetical
16 questions, I am afraid, but again not in order to try to
17 demonstrate what you think people here might have done
18 wrong, purely in order to try to get from you your
19 expertise about what was expected of people.
20 If, on asking, "What has gone on here?" a senior
21 officer learns, "I think he got stabbed", or, "I think
22 he got kicked in the head. I think somebody jumped on
23 his head. It is serious", would that have injected
24 a sense of urgency into a senior officer about getting
25 statements from people?
55
1 A. It would have injected a whole lot of -- not only
2 getting statements; preserving scenes, getting somebody
3 to the hospital, getting CID called in, possibly
4 arranging for a debrief to take place.
5 Q. Again, trying to avoid all the benefits of hindsight, in
6 1997, would a senior uniformed officer, a sergeant or
7 inspector, have appreciated the advantage of seizing
8 clothing quickly to get DNA evidence?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. I have left hanging in the air two answers you gave
11 about debriefing. One is that you might do a sort of
12 debrief at the scene, but you would do a proper debrief
13 later.
14 Can you help us with what would you have expected
15 about a proper debrief of officers who had been present
16 at a scene that we are talking about here?
17 A. Well, it would have been the basic routine questions.
18 "What happened?". From, "What happened?" to, "What did
19 you see? Can you identify any persons that were there?
20 Can you draw up a duty statement? Can you make
21 a comprehensive notebook entry?"
22 In other words, "Can you start the evidential trail
23 of what happened to allow whoever was going to take the
24 role on to further it?"
25 Q. Just to be clear, you would have expected a uniformed
56
1 officer to undertake that debriefing process, would you?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. When it comes to making statements in a situation like
4 that, was it your experience that officers would, after
5 that, be allowed to make their own statements or would
6 they have statements taken from them by detectives?
7 A. At the initial stages, they would have either written
8 a comprehensive notebook entry, which could have been
9 photocopied and left, written their own statement in
10 terms of what they saw or who they identified, and then
11 yes, certainly, at a further stage, as things developed,
12 it would not have been uncommon -- in fact, it would
13 have been common for a CID officer to be appointed to go
14 through the statement, go through the notebook and ask
15 further questions.
16 Q. There is just one other matter I want to ask you about.
17 You, in drafting the report that Superintendent Kennedy
18 signed off, recommended admonishment for
19 Inspector McCrum. Is that right?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. You didn't have the advantage, of course, in drafting
22 your report, of what the lady we are calling P39 did or
23 may have done.
24 Do you know who we are talking about?
25 A. Yes.
57
1 Q. Because her journal has gone missing, I think.
2 A. Sorry. Would you ask the question again?
3 Q. Let me break it down into bite-sized questions.
4 P39 did not cooperate with your investigation. Is
5 that right?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. You were unable to get her journal, because she told you
8 that she had destroyed her journals. Is that right?
9 A. Journal or policy book.
10 Q. Did the absence of her assistance or her journals have
11 any bearing on your ability to take a view about
12 Inspector McCrum's actions?
13 A. No.
14 Q. So as far as you are concerned, his role was discrete
15 from P39's. Is that fair?
16 A. Had P39 assisted, then obviously there could have been
17 further questions asked of the inspector. In relation
18 to the recommendation that was made against the
19 inspector, the inquiry and the facts that were there
20 allowed that recommendation to be made.
21 REV. BARONESS KATHLEEN RICHARDSON: Mr Underwood, may I ask
22 the question about the policy book?
23 MR UNDERWOOD: Please.
24 REV. BARONESS KATHLEEN RICHARDSON: Because we have seen the
25 policy book, but it appears it wasn't available to this
58
1 team. Is there a reason for that?
2 MR UNDERWOOD: Can I break this down into two things?
3 First of all, I think your investigation stopped
4 short as of 6th May, did it not?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. That's because the terms of reference for it were
7 limited to the events which had all occurred by then.
8 Is that right?
9 A. The immediate aftermath of the scene, yes.
10 Q. Also, it is true to say, isn't it, you were unable to
11 locate a policy book?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. In fact, we have seen it and we know it didn't start
14 until 8th May. So that presumably would not have
15 influenced your outcome anyway, would it?
16 A. I think the policy book that the Inquiry team sought to
17 get was in relation to the events after 7.20 am on the
18 date of the assault. That was the policy book that we
19 were looking for.
20 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much. Those are the only
21 questions I have for you. As I said, it may well be
22 that others have some more. Thank you very much.
23 MR FERGUSON: No questions.
24 MR ADAIR: No questions.
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGrory?
59
1 Questions from MR McGRORY
2 MR McGRORY: Just one matter, sir. I am obliged. I could
3 not resist asking at least a couple of questions, sir.
4 Just one matter you can perhaps assist us with,
5 Mr Jackson. This is the issue as to whether or not
6 steps should have been taken to perhaps investigate in
7 a deeper form whether or not Reserve Constable Atkinson
8 was involved in the crime of assisting offenders.
9 As I asked the question, sir, I realise, if you
10 finished on 6th May, that information does not become
11 available until the 9th. I don't know if you can help
12 us specifically in regard to this investigation, but if
13 I might just ask you in a general form, if you have
14 a situation where a crime is committed, either attempted
15 murder or murder, or even grievous bodily harm, and
16 there is evidence emerging or being sought as to who
17 perpetrated the crime, that, as an investigator, as
18 an experienced detective, if evidence emerges that
19 ex post facto the crime someone might have given
20 assistance to those who committed the crime, whether or
21 not that suspect should be treated as part of the
22 original investigation?
23 A. That's quite a good question there. If I can answer it
24 by saying this, in relation to Reserve
25 Constable Atkinson and our inquiry, the directions that
60
1 Mrs Kennedy got, which I got, were very, very clear;
2 that Reserve Constable Atkinson was being dealt with by
3 others who were enquiring into him.
4 So, therefore, we were not allowed to look at
5 Reserve Constable Atkinson, because others were
6 investigating. The only thing that we did do was ensure
7 that there was a 17-3, as the form is known, served on
8 him, to put him under notice that he was the subject of
9 a misconduct/disciplinary investigation.
10 Our inquiry was a disciplinary investigation, not
11 a criminal investigation. The remit was that others
12 would be dealing with Reserve Constable Atkinson, and
13 they may be able to answer that question, sir.
14 Q. Yes. Just getting away from this case and Reserve
15 Constable Atkinson and the personalities, just as
16 an investigating detective, if you came across any crime
17 in which there is evidence of both -- as to both who
18 committed the crime and who might have assisted those
19 afterwards, in general terms, as an investigator, would
20 you regard it as part and parcel of the same
21 investigation?
22 A. You would investigate it, but I am answering that by
23 saying, yes, you would investigate it there, but I can't
24 fully comment on Reserve Constable Atkinson, because
25 I don't know then and I don't know now -- and I am very,
61
1 very genuine in what I say. I don't know what the
2 extent of the investigation against Reserve
3 Constable Atkinson specifically was. I have heard
4 innuendos and bits and pieces. So I have difficulty in
5 answering that there, because our remit was very, very
6 clear: there is another team investigating Reserve
7 Constable Atkinson.
8 MR McGRORY: I am talking about a hypothetical situation
9 away from this case, but I think you have given me the
10 answer, which is that it would be investigated.
11 I don't think I can take this issue any further.
12 Thank you.
13 A. I will accept that.
14 MR MALLON: No questions.
15 Questions from MR O'CONNOR
16 MR O'CONNOR: Just a couple of questions, Mr Chairman, sir.
17 In relation to the keeping of journals, do you
18 remember what the procedure was about journals when you
19 left the force in 1997?
20 A. Again, you would have to go through the papers here, but
21 we sought a legal direction in relation to who owns
22 a journal; is it the individual member's or is it the
23 Chief Constable's?
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. I am happy to say -- I have not got it in front of me --
62
1 there was a legal directive came back in relation to
2 those journals.
3 THE CHAIRMAN: But do you know what the practice was?
4 A. Prior to that, in reality the practice was that you kept
5 your journal. As senior officer, you kept your journal.
6 MR O'CONNOR: Was that procedure written anywhere at that
7 time?
8 A. I can't genuinely, honestly answer that. I don't know.
9 You have asked the question there, and the answer to it
10 was that senior officers normally kept their own
11 journals.
12 I am not saying there may have been a few asked that
13 they be secured, you know, in police stations. The
14 general direction was you took your journal with you.
15 Q. You were aware at that stage that P39 hadn't kept their
16 journal -- is that right -- when you were investigating?
17 A. In relation to P39, at the commencement of our
18 investigation, the Ombudsman -- I don't know if he has
19 anonymity or not --
20 Q. You can say Mr Mahaffey. You can say that name.
21 A. Mr Chris Mahaffey had indicated he had talked to P39
22 along with another person. They, at that stage, and
23 again from recall, were satisfied that P39 would come in
24 and speak with them, corroborate whatever it is. They
25 were seeking P39's journal.
63
1 P39 did not come in and speak with Mr Mahaffey.
2 Somewhere along the line there was a complaint made by
3 P39. From recollection, Mr Mahaffey or his office had
4 sent that person a letter which had been delivered to
5 the wrong address and a complaint was made.
6 At that stage, we came in and wrote to P39 asking
7 her for her journal and policy book. There was a reply
8 that came back. I am satisfied it is on the papers
9 somewhere. It is covered in my statement there, the
10 reply to it.
11 So that's the extent of all I know about P39. There
12 was a further letter written to P39 after that, but
13 there was no response made to that letter.
14 Q. What I am trying to explore briefly is the difference in
15 procedure, what was done, and what constables -- or what
16 officers knew ought to be done --
17 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we have had evidence from more than
18 one witness, have we not, that the practice was that you
19 kept your journals?
20 MR O'CONNOR: I understand that, Mr Chairman.
21 You were involved in this investigation with
22 Mrs Kennedy. Isn't that right? You were tasked
23 specifically to look at a certain area?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. In relation to that, you had to go and seek legal advice
64
1 as to whether someone ought to -- not what their
2 practice was, but what they were supposed to do.
3 Do you see my point?
4 A. I see the point, but the legal advice -- again, I am
5 corrected by what's in the papers -- the legal advice
6 that was sought was "Who owns the journal?"
7 For example, "Does my journal belong to me or is it
8 the property of the Chief Constable?"
9 Q. I understand that point, but my point is that you, as
10 the investigator at this time, had to go and seek that
11 legal advice.
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. How was a person with a journal supposed to know what
14 they were supposed to do with the journal; not what was
15 the practice at the time, but what ought they to do with
16 their journal at the time?
17 A. I have given the answer to that there.
18 Q. You didn't know. Mrs Kennedy didn't know. How was
19 an officer serving at the time to know what they ought
20 to have done with the journal?
21 A. I retired some four years ago. I still have my
22 journals, because I require those journals in the event
23 of being called to give evidence at cases that I have
24 dealt with in the past.
25 Q. Just moving on --
65
1 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr O'Connor, it is going to be very
2 difficult, isn't it, for anyone to criticise an officer
3 who had a journal for keeping it after his retirement in
4 the light of what, in fact, was the practice?
5 MR O'CONNOR: I accept that. I am moving on, actually, to
6 practice and procedure versus -- very briefly,
7 Mr Chairman -- what this witness has said ought to have
8 been done at a certain time by, in fact, in this case,
9 Inspector McCrum. I was laying the ground for that
10 question.
11 The question I am moving on to is: you have given
12 evidence that when Inspector McCrum authorised the use
13 of a riot gun, he then became the investigating officer
14 in this case, in your view. Is that right?
15 A. He didn't authorise the use of the FRG. He authorised
16 the FRG be got from the police station and brought to
17 the scene. That's two distinct ...
18 Q. To be absolutely clear --
19 A. In hindsight -- and I said I answered the question in
20 hindsight -- once that order was given, the situation
21 has moved up from more than a common assault to a very
22 volatile situation.
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. The senior officer on the ground is then the person in
25 charge.
66
1 Q. Yes. It is the investigating officer of the crime that
2 I am interested in. Your evidence is that, when he
3 authorised the issue of the riot gun, he became the
4 investigating officer in this case?
5 A. Someone must accept the responsibility of dealing with
6 or taking charge of the situation. So at that point, if
7 we are dividing -- maybe if I am wrong -- words of
8 investigating officer or person in charge, and I think
9 I used person in charge at the scene, the inspector was
10 the person in charge at the scene and giving the
11 direction.
12 Now, at that point, he would have been telling his
13 constables what to do. The constables wouldn't be
14 telling him what to do. Now, if we are sort of going
15 into the situation, was he investigating officer or was
16 he in charge, respectfully I need guidance on where the
17 words are divided down.
18 Q. You don't know the difference?
19 A. Well, there's a difference between being in charge of
20 the scene, because he can give directions as to what he
21 does. Then he makes a statement after it or goes to
22 a court or Tribunal and says, "Look, I gave that
23 direction. I gave that order. That's why I gave it",
24 but, as I say, respectfully, I mean, "in charge",
25 "investigating officer" or "in control", I think we
67
1 could talk all day. I mean, I am not being
2 disrespectful, but ...
3 Q. Just finally, at page 53 of the transcript at line 12
4 you agreed with the Chairman that Inspector --
5 Inspector McCrum is the -- he was the investigator until
6 the detective branch took over. Is that fair? You
7 agreed with that question. That was put to you and you
8 agreed with that.
9 A. He would have been in control of the situation there
10 until such times as he debriefed or briefed the
11 detective who was coming on as to what happened and
12 handed things over.
13 Q. Then from that stage on, the detective was in charge of
14 the investigation. Is that your evidence?
15 A. Well, you are talking two detectives that came on duty
16 here. You are talking P39 came on duty at or about
17 7.00 am. I think P39 directed the scene be sealed at
18 7.20 am. There was a detective constable. From
19 recollection, I think it was 5.30 am he came on. The
20 person still in charge at that stage was the inspector,
21 in my view.
22 Q. Can I suggest to you that he was telephoned in or around
23 4.30?
24 A. I accept that, but he had to travel from his home to
25 Portadown Police Station.
68
1 Q. Can I suggest to you that he is a member of the
2 detective branch you were talking about when you
3 answered the Chairman's question?
4 A. Sorry. I am not with you.
5 Q. The point I am making is that you gave evidence, and you
6 agreed with the Chairman's question, that
7 Inspector McCrum was the investigator until the
8 detective branch took over. Now you are drawing
9 a distinction between the level of detective branch. Is
10 that right?
11 A. A detective constable can't tell an inspector what to
12 do. He can suggest. Right? The detective constable,
13 as outlined in the report, was called in to offer
14 expertise on the situation that was being dealt with.
15 Now, again, at that point in time the detective has
16 to be briefed and he has to ring his superior. The
17 person who remains in control at that time would have
18 been the uniformed inspector, in my view.
19 Q. In relation to the expertise that DC Keys would have
20 brought to it, does that include crime scene management?
21 A. It would, but again, if we go down that, I will have to
22 refer to the report. Nobody could point him out to
23 where the scene was.
24 MR O'CONNOR: Thank you.
25
69
1 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD
2 MR UNDERWOOD: One other matter arising out of that. You
3 were asked about the legal advice. Can we have a look
4 at page [10907]? It is a memorandum. The date at the
5 bottom is 17th September 2001. It is to an unnamed
6 superintendent:
7 "Your memo of 7th September refers.
8 "Since it is a requirement of the Code and/or Manual
9 that officers make notebook entries, or keep journals as
10 appropriate, and that the said documents are a record of
11 police duties, it seems to me that there is a valid
12 argument that the documents remain the property of the
13 Chief Constable even after the officer has retired. The
14 question of access to them would therefore, in my view,
15 be established, although there is the difficulty in that
16 any retired officer who chooses to destroy his notebook
17 or journal is not susceptible to disciplinary process
18 for doing it. Accordingly, many officers may well
19 routinely destroy as soon as they retire."
20 Is that the legal advice you got?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much. Unless there is
23 anything else arising out of that, that concludes my
24 re-examination.
25 THE CHAIRMAN: No. Thank you.
70
1 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Jackson.
2 That's your evidence then.
3 (The witness withdrew)
4 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, as I say, it will be a bit of stop/start
5 while we rejig the schedule after the anonymity
6 applications.
7 The position for tomorrow is we have the officer we
8 are calling G, who was due to give evidence last Friday,
9 starting in the morning. Then we have Richard Bradley
10 and then John Johnson. I apprehend that we will get
11 through all those with a 10.30 start. So although
12 I floated the idea on Friday of a 10 o'clock start,
13 I would not now recommend it
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Johnson was the witness who you thought
15 you were not going to be able to question?
16 MR UNDERWOOD: He was the witness from Bulgaria, who has, in
17 fact, flown out today.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: 10.30 tomorrow.
19 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much.
20 (12.35 pm)
21 (The hearing adjourned until 10.30 tomorrow morning)
22
23 --ooOoo--
24
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1 I N D E X
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MS LYNNE KAREN KENNEDY (sworn) ................... 1
4 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 1
Questions from MR O'HARE .................. 33
5 Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 38
Questions from MS DINSMORE ................ 43
6
MR DESMOND GEORGE JACKSON (sworn) ............... 46
7 Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 60
Questions from MR O'CONNOR ................ 62
8 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD ....... 70
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13
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