- - - - - - - - - - PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF ROBERT HAMILL - - - - - - - - - - Held at: Interpoint 20-24 York Street Belfast on Monday, 5th May 2009 commencing at 10.30 am Day 44 1 Tuesday, 5th May 2009 2 (10.30 am) 3 THE CHAIRMAN: It is nice to see you back, Mr Ferguson. 4 MR FERGUSON: Thank you very much indeed. Thank you. 5 MR ADAIR: Good morning. I think just before the 6 proceedings start, sir, you are probably aware, but 7 I think I should formally say, that I regret to have to 8 inform the Panel of the death of Mr McBurney, who died, 9 unfortunately, this morning. 10 As you know, sir, I had indicated a very short time 11 ago his desire and his instructions, even when seriously 12 ill, to come to this Panel and to answer and deal with 13 the allegations, which are widespread, which were made 14 against him. Unfortunately, that will not be able now 15 to happen. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. May we express our sympathies and 17 extend our condolences to his family? 18 MR ADAIR: Thank you, sir. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Underwood? 20 MR UNDERWOOD: May I call Karen Kennedy, please. 21 MS LYNNE KAREN KENNEDY (sworn) 22 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD 23 MR UNDERWOOD: Morning, Ms Kennedy. 24 A. Thank you very much. 25 Q. Noise comes from all over the place here. 1 1 My name is Underwood. I am Counsel to the Inquiry. 2 It is my task, firstly, to ask you questions of you. 3 When we are finished, it may well be that others have 4 some supplemental questions. 5 May I ask your full names, please? 6 A. Lynne Karen Kennedy. 7 Q. I want you to look on the screen, please, at 8 page [80586]. There is a document there that runs 9 through to page [80594]. If we scroll through it 10 quickly, I wonder if you would just keep your eyes on 11 the screen. 12 Is that your witness statement? 13 A. It is, yes. 14 Q. Are the contents of it true? 15 A. I would like to make one amendment at paragraph 18 of 16 it, please. 17 Q. Please. We see that at page [80589] going over to 18 [80590]. Perhaps we could split the screen and have it 19 on both pages? 20 A. Two things I would just like to clarify. The very first 21 part of paragraph 18: 22 "All the interviews were recorded on tape." 23 That is true, but for one of the officers, 24 Detective Constable Keys, it started off on tape but 25 then the tape was switched off. 2 1 Q. That's contained in your report, I think. 2 A. Yes, it is. 3 The second part I would just like to point out, it 4 says we interviewed nine serving police officers. In 5 fact, that should be ten serving police officers. 6 Q. Okay. Thank you very much. 7 Again, they are all listed in your report? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. I want to ask you, if I may, about the actual practical 10 applied standards in respect of the various matters you 11 were investigating -- 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. -- because your report, of course, clearly gives, as it 14 were, the black letter version of what was expected of 15 officers. 16 What I want to investigate is whether, in your 17 experience, that was in every case the standard to be 18 applied. That's just by way of introduction. 19 A. Right. Okay. 20 Q. Before I do that, though, can I ask your experience, as 21 of 1997, in investigatory work in relation to police 22 officers? 23 A. I came to Complaints and Discipline Branch, I think it 24 was 1st April 2001. Prior to that, I had been 25 a subdivisional commander for just over two and a half 3 1 years. During that time, I had carried out one 2 discipline investigation and assisted an assistant chief 3 constable on another. 4 Whenever I arrived into Complaints and Discipline, 5 I inherited a number of investigations because 6 I replaced four superintendents. For my eight and 7 a half months in Complaints and Discipline, I then 8 worked full-time in relation to being either an SIO or 9 assisting assistant chief constables and, of course, all 10 other administrative duties associated with the rank and 11 post. 12 Q. As of 1997, had you conducted any of those 13 investigations that you had conducted before your 14 arrival in 2001? 15 A. Prior to 1997, no. 16 Q. Can you help us with whether your approach to the 17 matters you were investigating in 2001 was influenced by 18 any standard changes that had happened since 1997? 19 A. Could you elaborate or could you clarify exactly what 20 you mean, please? 21 Q. You were looking back four years. 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Of course, you had the benefit of hindsight, the 24 disadvantage that some evidence was not available to 25 you. The thing I am also interested in is whether 4 1 standards had in practical terms changed over those four 2 years? 3 A. I think it would be fair to say that standards possibly 4 had, insofar as there was certainly additional service 5 instructions and guidance about a number of areas we 6 looked at since 1997 and that were there in 2001. 7 Q. Again, to be fair, where that had happened, you noted in 8 your report -- 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. -- that there had been, for example, changes in force 11 orders in 1999, for example? 12 A. That's correct, yes. 13 Q. In practical terms, were you aware of any change in 14 culture or shift in the way in which people approached 15 force orders and so on between 1997 and 2001? 16 A. Not especially, no. 17 Q. Right. Can I move on, then, to some of the actual 18 standards that you were applying to people? 19 First of all, I want to deal with scene 20 preservation. Now, of course, we have seen your report. 21 We have seen the way in which scene preservation was the 22 responsibility of all officers and, as it were, it was 23 the second thing to do after preserving life. 24 In real terms, was that what happened? I don't mean 25 in this investigation. I mean in respect of constables 5 1 in the RUC. Did constables in the RUC adhere to that? 2 A. If a scene was sealed, then, yes, I would suggest that 3 they would. 4 Q. Which may beg a question about sealing the scene. We 5 will come to that. 6 Take an ordinary case where a constable may see 7 a mugging on the street or something, or a bit of 8 disturbance. The first thing he does is to make sure 9 people are safe. Would that constable then, never mind 10 sealing the scene, be expected to go round searching for 11 forensic evidence? 12 A. It is always a judgment call. I think it is very easy 13 if it is quite obviously a very serious incident. Then 14 the scene, I would suggest, would always be sealed and 15 examination take place. 16 In terms of other crimes that may not initially be 17 regarded perhaps as serious, it is really a judgment 18 call on the part of police officers, but I think it is 19 fair to say in practical terms that not every crime 20 would result in a scene preservation. 21 Q. Let me go on to sealing the scene. Here you have 22 a crossroads where there has been what has variously 23 been described as a riot, an affray, pandemonium. There 24 is no vehicle traffic through there apart from police 25 vehicles between the time of the assault and the early 6 1 morning when detectives turned up. 2 Would you regard the fact that no vehicles were 3 allowed through as a sufficient sealing? 4 A. Personally, no. There would have been other vehicles 5 forbye police vehicles. Ambulances would have also been 6 presumably vehicles at the screen. 7 Proper scene preservation is in relation to sealing 8 off the scene properly with tape and setting up a scene 9 log and very tightly controlling people who would then 10 enter the scene. 11 Q. Again, to come back to your assessment that these were 12 sometimes a judgment call, but in very serious crimes it 13 was natural you would seal the scene by way of tape, but 14 in others you may have to exercise judgment, here you 15 have two people taken away by ambulance, one of whom is 16 at the time unconscious. 17 Was that sufficient in itself, would you have said, 18 in the ordinary course, to have triggered a sealing of 19 the scene? 20 A. With the benefit of hindsight, one would have to say 21 yes, but at the time, it would seem that certainly the 22 police officers at the scene did not realise the 23 seriousness of Mr Hamill's injuries and were regarding 24 it, I think, as probably a Saturday night fracas. 25 But certainly with the benefit of hindsight, I would 7 1 suggest, yes, but at that time, I believe the officers 2 did not realise the seriousness of Mr Hamill's injuries. 3 Q. What I am getting at really is: assuming for the moment 4 that officers at the scene thought it was a normal 5 Saturday night punch-up in which a couple of people were 6 stretchered away, and it was no worse than was quite 7 commonplace, in your experience that wouldn't have 8 justified a scene seal. Would that be fair? 9 A. To be honest, you are asking me a hypothetical 10 situation. The way you have described it, it would be 11 a judgment call, I would suggest. 12 Q. Again, I am really not asking for your value judgment on 13 what people did here. What I am attempting to get from 14 you is what the general standards were and to tease out, 15 if I may, other experience of similar situations? 16 A. All I would say in response to that is it is very 17 difficult for me to answer in general terms. 18 Q. Okay. I want to ask you also about the interplay 19 between uniformed officers and detectives where you have 20 something like an assault which has uniformed officers 21 at the scene and then there is a translation over to the 22 CID. 23 At this scene, to take an example, you have 24 a number of police vehicles, each of which has at least 25 one full-time constable in. You have a sergeant and 8 1 an inspector, both uniformed. We know that some hours 2 later a detective and then a senior detective come on 3 the scene. 4 Can you just help us with what the relative 5 obligations and powers were of these various people? 6 For a start, in your report you single out 7 Constable A -- I hope you know who we are talking about 8 there -- 9 A. Yes, I do. 10 Q. -- as being an officer who would have been responsible 11 for taking charge -- 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. -- because she was an observer in an important back-up 14 vehicle. 15 Can I just ask, first of all, why single her out for 16 that role? Why not, for example, Constable Neill, who 17 was the full-time constable in the Land Rover or one of 18 the observers in the other back-up cars? 19 A. We were never able to determine who was regarded as the 20 investigating officer for the initial assault. 21 What I said in my report is that, based certainly on 22 normal police procedure, the observer in 7-0, which is 23 the main lead response vehicle, would be the person that 24 I would expect to have been investigating officer for 25 the initial assault. 9 1 Q. Would they be self-appointing or would -- 2 A. No, that would come with the task, the fact they are 3 observer in 7-0. That would be assumed as part of the 4 role. 5 Q. Because that's the first back-up car on the scene? 6 A. 7-0 is the main response vehicle. 7 Q. What makes you say it was the main response vehicle? 8 A. Because the designated call sign suggests that. 7-0 was 9 the call sign given to all main vehicles that were 10 regarded as the main response vehicles in any turn of 11 duty. 12 Q. Would the presence at a scene of a uniformed sergeant or 13 uniformed inspector change your view about that? 14 A. No. It still would be the constable as observer in 7-0 15 that would be expected to be the investigating officer. 16 Q. And an observer in a car designated 7-0 then would have 17 been expected to know that, I take it? 18 A. Yes. That would be the vehicle that would be tasked to 19 most crimes or most incidents as the first vehicle, 20 first vehicle choice. 21 Q. Just taking it through serially, you would have expected 22 that officer to brief or debrief senior officers 23 arriving, would you? 24 A. Potentially yes, but I think the situation was such it 25 was described as a violent situation. So I think 10 1 probably at the time that senior officers arrived, there 2 was quite a hectic situation in place. So that may have 3 been actually quite practically difficult. 4 Q. In practical terms where you have the officer who is the 5 observer in the 7-0 car at an incident where all hell is 6 breaking loose, if I can put it that way, what would be 7 their first investigative task? 8 A. Well, in many ways similar to the first response at the 9 scene of a crime. Obviously they would be 10 ascertaining -- I mean, in this particular situation it 11 was slightly difficult, of course, because you had 12 a riot situation forbye the assault. 13 But if you are talking about an officer in the main 14 response vehicle going out to the scene of a crime, then 15 obviously they would be ascertaining if a crime has been 16 committed, who the injured party is, if there are any 17 suspects, any evidence, usual normal investigative 18 process. 19 Q. We know, in fact, that Constable A opened the log. 20 A. She opened a log at 7.27 am after the scene had been 21 sealed by CID officers. 22 Q. The normal expectation would be that that observer in 23 that car would be opening the log ordinarily. Is that 24 right? 25 A. Possibly. Possibly. Well, not necessarily, actually. 11 1 Some other officer could be appointed as scene log. The 2 purpose of a scene log officer is to tightly control 3 people and ensure that only authorised people enter, and 4 that their names are put on the log sheets for 5 statements and so on to be put in the log at a later 6 date. 7 It may or may not be someone necessarily from the 8 main response vehicle. As it happens, in this case it 9 was this particular constable, yes. 10 Q. I am still on the point about translation from uniformed 11 over to detectives. Take a different scene. Take a 7-0 12 response vehicle being called to the aftermath of 13 an incident where everything has quietened down and that 14 observer then ascertains whether a crime has been 15 committed, who the victim was, whether there were any 16 witnesses. 17 Then what? What does that officer do in relation to 18 the CID? 19 A. Well, if it is a crime that CID would be deemed to be 20 the most appropriate people to investigate, then they 21 would be tasked and CID would then presumably come out 22 to the scene and would probably take over the 23 investigation. 24 Q. And being briefed by the uniformed officer in charge? 25 A. I would expect so, yes. 12 1 Q. Of course, that's in an ideal world where that uniformed 2 officer has not been sent off to do a drink drive by 3 somebody else, I take it, because presumably they don't 4 have autonomy. 5 If a senior officer to them sends them off to do, as 6 we know here, a drink drive between the incident and 7 7.27 sealing, they have no power to say, "No, I am the 8 senior officer in charge here", do they? 9 A. Not as such, but there were supervisors at the scene as 10 well in this particular incident, so there were other 11 people who were aware as to what was happening. 12 Q. It is clear, is it, that despite the fact that 13 an observer in the JD70 car is expected to be the senior 14 investigating officer at the scene, nonetheless if there 15 is a sergeant or inspector there to tells them to go off 16 and do something else, they can't say "No". Is that 17 fair? 18 A. I am sure if they felt for some reason it really 19 required their presence at a particular crime, they 20 would put that point of view to their supervisor, but, 21 ultimately, it would be up to the supervisor to direct 22 as appropriate. 23 Q. Again, you would expect the supervisor, would you, to 24 know that the observer in the JD70 car was supposed to 25 be there running the investigation until the detectives 13 1 came? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Again, take an ideal world. You have the observer in 4 the JD70, who comes to the aftermath of a scene, takes 5 command, finds out what he or she should be finding out, 6 detectives are called in. 7 Does that investigating officer stay at the scene 8 until the detective comes along and then brief the 9 detective? 10 A. Well, you would expect the detective would need to be 11 briefed and that would seem the obvious person, yes. 12 Q. Presumably that uniformed officer would back out of it, 13 would he or she? 14 A. They may assist the detective. It really depends -- the 15 responsibility for investigation would pass to the 16 detective at that stage, so it depends whether the 17 continued assistance of the uniformed officer would be 18 required. Quite possibly it would be. That would be, 19 again, a judgment call for the officers at the time. 20 Q. You make the point, I think, in your report that DC Keys 21 was able to ask for officers to be recalled, but had no 22 power to order their recall. 23 Just help with us the command structure here. 24 Once the detective is on the ground, assuming it is 25 a detective constable, and he or she wants constables or 14 1 reservists to be recalled to give statements, did 2 a detective have power to order a uniformed constable or 3 reserve constable? 4 A. It is a bit difficult to answer that. I think in this 5 particular situation the authority to bring back 6 officers, recall them to duty, properly did rest with 7 the supervisor. 8 If a detective made an approach to the supervisor 9 because of the seriousness of an investigation and asked 10 for officers to be recalled to duty, I would expect that 11 that would be adhered to. 12 But it is simply an authority decision by 13 supervisory officers for them to be recalled. 14 Q. Now, I want to ask about debriefing. 15 We know, because we have heard quite a bit of 16 evidence about this, that there is the public order 17 manual, which you have set out in your report, which has 18 clear statements about briefing and debriefing, the 19 importance and what's supposed to happen in particular 20 about debriefing. 21 What we have been hearing is that in practical 22 terms, officers, at the end of a shift, or after 23 a scene, were often not debriefed in any real sense at 24 all. They might have a quick chat with somebody. They 25 might be told to make a list of things to put in their 15 1 notebooks once they have had a sleep. They might just 2 be let go, basically. 3 Now, again, can you help us on the actual practical 4 application of standards of debriefing in 1997? 5 A. Well, to be quite honest, the instructions are actually 6 fairly clear about this. The first thing I would say on 7 a normal turn of duty is there was always, like, 8 15 minutes overtime built into the end of a turn of duty 9 for debriefing to take place. 10 Q. Can I stop you there? 11 Again, we have heard discussion about this between 12 witnesses about whether that was applied in 1997. Can 13 you tell us that, in 1997, officers were paid for 14 fifteen minutes worth of debrief? 15 A. To the best of my recollection, yes. 16 Q. Again, presumably the degree of debriefing would depend 17 on the degree of excitement, as it were, the degree of 18 activity there had been during the shift? 19 A. Yes, yes. If there was little or no activity during the 20 shift, then the debriefing would have been a brief 21 discussion about it and primarily then just a completing 22 of situation records in relation to incidents that were 23 attended to, but if it was more serious, then you would 24 expect a deeper debrief. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: If the debriefing took longer than 16 1 15 minutes, would you expect the officers to be paid for 2 that additional time as well? 3 A. I think if a debrief needed to be a longer period of 4 time, that would be acceptable. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: To be paid for it? 6 A. I believe so. I'll be honest, I am not sure if there is 7 a requirement for a minimum amount of time for officers 8 to work; if it is a 15-minute slot, for example, before 9 they are paid for it, I am honestly just not sure. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Underwood, the matter has been raised 11 earlier. It may be that we shall be hearing clear 12 evidence about this. 13 MR UNDERWOOD: Yes. I will make a note to try to track 14 somebody down who had purse strings. 15 Can I ask next about notebooks? Again, we have 16 heard some evidence which goes more than one way on 17 completion of notebook entries. 18 What's your position on what was the standard 19 procedure for constables compiling notebook entries at 20 the end of an incident or the end of a shift? 21 A. Well, there would be an expectation that an officer 22 would complete his or her notebook at the end of the 23 shift, or at least immediately as soon thereafter. 24 Q. So if there had been a particular incident on a shift, 25 would that not merit an entry until the end of the 17 1 shift? 2 A. It might be -- I mean, I certainly have known officers 3 that would complete a notebook as they go through their 4 tour of duty. It just simply depends what sort of time 5 they have or if they complete it more at the end of the 6 tour of duty. It is possible, even, it would be 7 completed at the start of the next tour of duty. 8 Q. It wouldn't be a cause for criticism if an officer went 9 through an entire shift without making a note? 10 A. I would say it would be a cause for criticism if there 11 were events or incidents which he/she attended which had 12 a significant -- in other words, there should have been 13 an entry made if it was a significant call. 14 Q. Take a riot, however it has been described. You have, 15 I think, a clear impression of the sort of event that 16 took place in the early hours of 27th April here. 17 Given your understanding of what officers actually 18 saw and were caught up in, would your expectation of the 19 normal standard have been that these officers should 20 have made notebook entries before they went off duty? 21 A. I would have expected that, yes. 22 Q. There seems to have been a lively debate about the 23 merits and demerits of officers pooling their 24 recollections before they either made notebook entries 25 or statements. 18 1 What was your position on that as of 1997? 2 A. Sorry. In relation to this particular investigation? 3 Q. Generally. Would it have been regarded as permissible 4 or wrong for officers to pool recollections if they had 5 been at a scene? 6 A. It would generally be regarded as probably wrong that 7 they would pool together a list of suspects at a scene. 8 It would have been individual recollections by officers 9 themselves. 10 Q. Next, I want to deal with statements. If you got 11 a situation where a number of uniformed officers are 12 present at the scene of a crime and detectives come on 13 board later and wish to collect from those officers all 14 the detail they could get about who was present so they 15 could conduct interviews, etc, how would the statements 16 be taken in the ordinary course in 1997? 17 A. Individual officers would probably be asked to make 18 their duty statements there and then by CID. 19 Q. Would there be any other process by which information 20 was teased out of the officer? 21 A. Well, a proper debrief, of course, would have gathered 22 certain information. 23 Q. In practical terms, how would that have worked then? 24 You would have expected the officers to make statements 25 and then detectives to go through and debrief individual 19 1 officers on the basis of the statements? 2 A. No. I probably would have expected uniformed 3 supervisors to have carried out an initial debrief in 4 relation to the incident. As a result of that, officers 5 then would be asked to make duty statements to CID. 6 CID may even have been present during a debrief, for 7 example, as well. 8 Q. Would CID have then had any further role in that. Would 9 they have teased out more information or not? 10 A. Possibly. Certainly in this inquiry there were further 11 statements taken by CID. So it is possible. It is 12 possible that further evidence came to light that they 13 may need to re-interview officers. 14 Q. You see, we know, for example, that at least one of the 15 officers who was on the scene here thought that 16 Mr Hamill was very seriously injured. He thought he had 17 been stabbed, because of his breathing. 18 Would that have been the sort of thing you would 19 have expected to emerge from a debriefing from 20 a supervisor? 21 A. Yes, I would. 22 Q. I want to move into the investigative phase proper now. 23 Assume this: there is an event at which uniformed 24 officers attend. They are then debriefed by 25 a supervisor. They make statements. The CID then go 20 1 through those statements and perhaps do some further 2 teasing out. 3 How would a witness strategy emerge from that 4 process in practical terms? 5 A. Do you mean witnesses to the incident? 6 Q. Yes. 7 A. Well, again, that would be identified in the police 8 officers' statements, any witnesses they had come 9 across, the injured parties, and I would assume then 10 that CID would actually then draw up a list of witnesses 11 to be interviewed. 12 Q. We know here questionnaires were administered and in 13 some cases statements then followed from that 14 questionnaire process. 15 Was a questionnaire strategy a commonplace one in 16 1997? 17 A. Not in my experience. 18 Q. So you would have expected, as it were, full-blown 19 interviews, would you? 20 A. I mean, I can't explain why there was a decision to use 21 questionnaires. I would find it unusual. 22 Q. Were they regarded as less satisfactory than full-blown 23 interviews? 24 A. Well, a duty statement or a statement of evidence would 25 obviously have much more evidential quality than 21 1 a questionnaire, I would suggest, but it may be 2 a preliminary way to gather information. I don't know 3 what the rationale was for using it. 4 Q. We know, of course, that where HOLMES is in use, there 5 is a HOLMES reader, receiver, who collects information 6 that comes in from a process like that and raises 7 actions so that further interviews could be conducted 8 off the back of what's learned. 9 Where you don't have a HOLMES system or a MIRIAM 10 system, what would have happened? Sorry. I am making 11 this a long question. 12 Assume there are three or four detectives going out 13 questioning witnesses and those witnesses themselves 14 come up with other names of witnesses, without a MIRIAM 15 or HOLMES system, how is that put into practical effect? 16 A. Well, again, I would have assumed that would have been 17 done either through conferencing or debriefing by the 18 CID officer who either was in charge or the detective 19 sergeant. 20 Q. Right. 21 THE CHAIRMAN: Just going back to the questionnaires, I can 22 see, if the questions are quite rigid, then you may not 23 discover information which is there to be had. 24 If you have open questions, not necessarily all, but 25 if you do have open questions, would that remove the 22 1 reservations about the questionnaires? 2 A. Well, I think if there was open questions, there would 3 be a natural inclination to supply more information, but 4 personally, I think that a duty statement, a statement 5 of evidence, would be preferable, but in the initial 6 instances, certainly the use of open questions I think 7 would assist. 8 SIR JOHN EVANS: I am sorry to interrupt your chain of 9 thought, Mr Underwood, and if I am getting ahead of you, 10 please correct me. 11 Did the officers themselves complete questionnaires? 12 MR UNDERWOOD: The officers didn't. As best we understand 13 it, all the officers made -- I think all the constables 14 made statements on the 27th. The sergeant and the 15 inspector made their statements, I think, on 2nd May. 16 A. 7th May. 17 Q. Thank you. I think the four officers in the Land Rover 18 were then questioned on the 28th by Detective 19 Sergeant Bradley to get some more information out of 20 them, but as far as we can ascertain -- perhaps you can 21 put me wrong or right on this: as far as we can 22 ascertain, no other officers were asked follow-up 23 questions to tease out information. 24 A. Not that I'm aware. 25 SIR JOHN EVANS: Yes. I think it is important to 23 1 distinguish that questionnaires were not made to 2 officers. The witness is talking about the use of 3 a questionnaire, but that relates only to witnesses 4 other than police. 5 MR UNDERWOOD: That's correct, isn't it? 6 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes. 7 SIR JOHN EVANS: Thank you. 8 MR UNDERWOOD: So again, take a different inquiry, 9 an inquiry where you have a number of officers who give 10 their statements. As a result of that, witnesses are 11 interviewed. Those witnesses are then seen and either 12 questionnaires administered or statements taken. 13 How would an arrest strategy evolve from that? 14 A. Well, that would obviously be -- all the statements 15 would be looked at, the evidence ascertained, and 16 obviously the identification of any suspects, and then 17 it would be looked at, the evidence to be put to those 18 suspects, and then presumably dates and times would be 19 set up as to carry out any arrests -- 20 Q. And -- I am so sorry. Please carry on. 21 A. -- and anything else that may go with that. 22 Q. Again, unless you have a MIRIAM or HOLMES system, would 23 this be conducted by way of conferencing? 24 A. I would suggest so, yes. 25 Q. In terms of -- I am so sorry. 24 1 I am going to ask you a hypothetical question again 2 and see if you can help. 3 Where you have, as a result of what we have just 4 been talking about, enough information to arrest, say, 5 three people, but you have reason to believe that if you 6 do some more investigation you may make a better case 7 against them before you arrest them, how would the 8 competing imperatives work here? 9 Would you arrest and search in order to get forensic 10 information and perhaps something out of interviews or 11 would you try to build the best case you can in 12 the short-term before you can arrest? 13 A. I think that's a very unfair question, to be honest. It 14 is a judgment call at the time. It may be that there is 15 some benefit to seeing evidence or whatever for further 16 forensic examination, but it is a judgment call at the 17 time. It is very difficult for me to answer. 18 Q. Can we take from that that there was no overriding 19 imperative in all circumstances to seize forensic 20 materials at all costs? 21 A. I can't say that, because we were not made aware of any 22 strategy that there may have been to seize clothing. 23 Q. No, no -- 24 A. But some of -- sorry? 25 Q. I am trying to keep this in the general rather than this 25 1 particular investigation, you see. What I am interested 2 in is what general standards were. 3 Can you help us on this, whether the seizure of 4 scientifically important clothing, for example, was such 5 an overriding matter that it would tend to overshadow 6 the possibility of building a better case before you 7 arrest someone? 8 A. Again, that's a judgment call dependent on any 9 investigation. 10 Q. Can I talk about recording for a moment? We have heard 11 that as soon as an officer reached inspector rank, and 12 certainly above inspector rank, they kept journals 13 rather than notebooks. Is that your experience? 14 A. Yes, it is. 15 Q. Where you have an investigator of, say, chief inspector 16 rank who is running a non-MIRIAM, non-HOLMES 17 investigation, conducting conferences that you have just 18 been discussing, would you expect what might be regarded 19 as policy decisions to be recorded in the journals? 20 A. In the journals or by means of a conferencing book or 21 policy book. 22 Q. We have heard evidence that, certainly in 1997, journals 23 were regarded as the personal property of the officer 24 and, when they retired, they took them with them. Was 25 that your understanding? 26 1 A. Journals are the property of the chief constable. They 2 are not the property of individuals who complete them. 3 Q. You made a recommendation about this, didn't you? 4 A. I did, yes. 5 Q. Before that recommendation was implemented, what was the 6 position? 7 A. Well, that would always have been the legal position. 8 Q. Right. 9 A. What I would have to say is I don't believe that was 10 necessarily ever communicated to the service. 11 Q. For example, there was a question raised on Friday about 12 what would happen if somebody retired with their 13 journals and then destroyed them, despite the fact there 14 may be a continuing criminal investigation. 15 Was that something about which one would be 16 critical? 17 A. Yes, I would suggest so. In 1997, there were not the 18 accounting procedures for journals. There were for 19 notebooks, but not for journals. 20 I think the difficulty is that many officers, 21 whether it be CID or senior police officers, regarded 22 journals as containing probably a lot of information, 23 everything from even management decisions, personnel 24 matters, as well as crimes and so on that had been 25 attended. 27 1 I think there was a mindset that, when people 2 retired, they took their journals with them for 3 safekeeping and looking after, but the reality is that 4 journals are the property of the chief constable and not 5 an individual person's property, but I don't think the 6 organisation made steps, in 1997, to stop retired 7 members from bringing journals -- from taking them with 8 them when they retired. 9 Q. Thank you. 10 Now, your investigation in essence covered the 11 period from 27th April until about 6th May, I think. Is 12 that right? 13 A. That's correct. 14 Q. So it did not cover the allegation or the treatment of 15 the allegation against Mr Atkinson that only emerged on 16 9th or 10th May? 17 A. That was a completely separate investigation from mine. 18 Q. But I think you know, don't you, what the allegation 19 was? 20 A. Only in broad terms. 21 Q. Can I just ask your help on this? Again, it is a matter 22 of standards to be expected rather than what happened in 23 practical terms here. 24 Where, in the course of a criminal investigation, 25 an allegation emerged against a police officer of 28 1 a serious crime, how would it be treated? In practical 2 terms, what would happen to it? 3 A. Well, obviously that would be criminally investigated, 4 obviously by CID. 5 Q. How? 6 A. Well, in the way that any other criminal 7 investigation -- I mean, it could be even that the 8 officer would be arrested and interviewed. A decision 9 then is made, obviously, when it is as serious as that, 10 whether or not the officer should be suspended, for 11 example, and the investigation would be carried out in 12 the normal context. 13 Q. Assume you are the SIO of a murder investigation and in 14 the course of your investigation you uncover a piece of 15 information that amounts to an allegation against 16 a serving officer? 17 A. A criminal allegation? 18 Q. A criminal -- it is not an allegation as such. It is 19 information which amounts, if true, to a crime, 20 a serious crime by a serving officer. 21 As an SIO, what do you do with that? Do you take it 22 higher to report it? Do you ask for another SIO to be 23 appointed on that? 24 A. Quite possibly. But I would like to emphasise that this 25 investigation of mine was purely an internal discipline 29 1 investigation, and this was not an area I had to face. 2 I would like to emphasise that. 3 Q. Of course. Because you were a senior officer in 4 Complaints and Discipline, you would presumably have 5 an understanding of how complaints against officers went 6 through the system. Is that fair? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. So, for example, where in the course of an investigation 9 something emerged that might point to a serious crime by 10 a serving officer, that's something that you might in 11 the ordinary course of your work have encountered? 12 A. I didn't, but -- I didn't encounter that. 13 Q. Can you help us on the interplay between Complaints and 14 Discipline and the criminal side of it? Where you got, 15 as I say, information which might point to a serious 16 crime, that is presumably also a breach of Complaints 17 and Discipline, is it? 18 A. It is, yes. The criminal investigation into an officer 19 would take precedence over the disciplinary 20 investigation. 21 Q. But at what point in the revelation about a potential 22 serious crime would you expect Complaints and Discipline 23 to be informed of it? 24 A. Complaints and Discipline would be informed at a very 25 early stage, because a 17-3 would be served on the 30 1 officer, but Complaints and Discipline would take no 2 further role until the criminal proceedings were 3 concluded. 4 Q. Would they be kept informed about the way in which the 5 investigation was going? 6 A. I would expect so, yes. 7 Q. Can I ask you about the dissemination of manuals and 8 Codes of Practice? As I understand it from your report 9 and statement, and Mr Jackson's statement, individual 10 officers had loose-leaf manuals. Is that right? 11 A. That's correct. The manual -- the police manual is 12 issued to recruits, but throughout one's service updates 13 are received. Therefore, they are sort of in large 14 folders that you can just open and insert new amendments 15 and then you mark when those amendments were inserted. 16 So it is a live document, so to speak, in that officers 17 are kept up-to-date with amendments to that manual. 18 Q. Dare I say so, like lawyers, there will be a variable 19 quality of updating. Is that fair? 20 A. I would agree with that. 21 Q. I just want to ask you a little about your 22 investigation, not very much. 23 In particular, a number of retired officers didn't 24 cooperate. What I want to ask about is, in the case of 25 each of them, what effect that might have had on your 31 1 investigation. 2 Firstly, Reserve Constable Cornett I think didn't 3 engage with the process. 4 A. That's correct. 5 Q. Can you give us any impression of how much that hampered 6 your process? 7 A. I truthfully can't, because we didn't have the 8 opportunity to interview her. 9 Q. Would that be the same of another officer we are calling 10 P40, who was in the Land Rover? 11 A. Yes, I would agree. 12 MR UNDERWOOD: That's all I want to ask you. 13 Thank you very much indeed. As I said, other people 14 may have more questions for you. 15 A. Of course. 16 MR FERGUSON: No questions. Thank you. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you give me a moment and just help us 18 about this? Suppose there is evidence which may 19 implicate a police officer in some wrongdoing, but also 20 that evidence may go against a defendant who is 21 suspected of committing a serious crime and be relevant 22 to the investigation of his case. 23 Can you see any warrant then for separating the 24 investigation, the criminal investigation, of the police 25 officer from the further criminal investigation of the 32 1 suspect? 2 A. I think there could be a case for that. Yes, I think 3 there could be a case for that. 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Of separating? 5 A. Yes, of separating them. I think there could be, 6 although, again, it is a little bit of a judgment call 7 and would depend on the circumstances, which sounds as 8 if I am sitting on the fence, but it would probably 9 ultimately depend on the circumstances, but there may 10 well be a situation where you would want to separate 11 them. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr O'Hare? 13 Questions from MR O'HARE 14 MR O'HARE: Ms Kennedy, I appear on behalf of a number of 15 serving and retired police officers. 16 Mr Underwood was asking you about officers who 17 didn't attend to cooperate with your investigation. 18 Isn't it correct to say that those serving officers, the 19 ten that you mentioned in paragraph 18 of your Inquiry 20 statement, did cooperate with this investigation? 21 A. That's correct. 22 Q. Now, generally, this investigation of yours, it actually 23 commenced before you became involved in it. Isn't that 24 right -- 25 A. That's correct. 33 1 Q. -- under Superintendent xxxxxxxxxx. It was 2 an investigation that was being supervised by the Police 3 Ombudsman's Office -- 4 A. That's correct. 5 Q. -- and in particular under the direction of Mr Mahaffey? 6 A. That's correct. 7 Q. During the currency of your investigation, in fact, you 8 really had to seek the prior approval of the Ombudsman's 9 Office before you could really do anything. Is that 10 correct? 11 A. The Ombudsman's Office had to actually approve my 12 appointment. 13 Q. Your initial appointment had to be approved. It was 14 done verbally, first of all, and then subsequently in 15 writing? 16 A. That's correct. 17 Q. Then, for example, in terms of the 17-3s that were 18 served on the individual officers, drafts of those had 19 to be submitted to Mr Mahaffey for his approval -- 20 A. That's correct. 21 Q. -- as to the content of those -- 22 A. Yes, that is correct. 23 Q. -- of those 17-3s? Indeed, when it came to the stage of 24 interviewing the officers, in fact, the actual questions 25 that the officers were going to be asked during those 34 1 interviews, those questions had to be supplied to 2 Mr Mahaffey? 3 A. That's correct. They were forwarded down to the Police 4 Ombudsman's Office, yes. 5 Q. Throughout the currency of your investigation, in fact, 6 it was being supervised by the Police Ombudsman's 7 Office? 8 A. That's correct. 9 Q. Now, Detective Inspector Jackson, I believe, was really 10 your right-hand man in this investigation? 11 A. That is correct. 12 Q. In connection with -- sorry. At the time you undertook 13 or took over this investigation, obviously you were 14 aware of the media interest in the events surrounding 15 the death of Robert Hamill and the subsequent police 16 investigations into it? 17 A. Yes, I was aware of the media interest. 18 Q. Also, would it be fair to say that the Ombudsman's 19 Office, at this stage, whenever you took over this 20 investigation, they would have been under some pressure, 21 along with Internal Investigations Branch, to carry out 22 this investigation that you were involved in? 23 A. I can't comment on any pressure that the Ombudsman's 24 Office may or may not have felt. 25 Q. But, certainly, you were conscious of the fact that it 35 1 was -- your investigation would be looked at closely as 2 well. Isn't that correct? 3 A. Yes, I was aware it probably would. 4 Q. In the terms of the -- you were asked generally by 5 Mr Underwood about debriefing. If I understand you 6 correctly, initially that responsibility should be -- 7 I am talking about uniformed police officers now -- the 8 initial responsibility for that would be uniformed 9 supervisor? 10 A. That's correct. 11 Q. Am I correct in saying that your view would be that 12 statements should have been taken; for example, the 13 night in question -- we will deal with this -- 14 statements should have been taken from officers who were 15 at the scene -- 16 A. Yes, I would agree. 17 Q. -- before they left, before they went home? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. And in that context, a debriefing by the uniformed 20 supervisor? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. In practical terms, where you have four occupants of 23 a Land Rover, two back-up vehicles and DMSU arriving on 24 the screen, in practical terms, would that have been 25 feasible on the night in question? 36 1 A. I believe a debrief would have been feasible on the 2 night in question, yes. 3 Q. In terms of all of those police officers, for example -- 4 we are talking about 10, 12 officers -- having to make 5 their statements of evidence. 6 A. Well, a debrief would ascertain those who had evidence 7 to put into a statement. 8 Q. But in terms of actually making their statements before 9 they end their duty? 10 A. I still contend that statements should have been made by 11 the key people at the scene before they terminated duty 12 on that day. 13 Q. That includes those in the back-up vehicles? 14 A. Well, again, I mean, that's for a debrief to determine, 15 those officers who have evidence to give and then 16 a direction that they complete their statements before 17 the end of a turn of duty. 18 Q. How long would that take if you have 10 or 12 officers? 19 A. Well, they would all be making them presumably at the 20 same time. It is as long as a statement takes. 21 Q. It certainly wouldn't be 15 minutes? 22 A. It is as long as a statement takes. 23 Q. In fact, it would be a couple of hours. Isn't that 24 correct? 25 A. It is as long as a statement takes. 37 1 Q. In terms of the arrest strategy you were being asked 2 about in terms of witnesses, that really is a judgment 3 call, depending on the individual circumstances in every 4 case? 5 A. An arrest strategy? 6 Q. Yes. 7 A. Yes, it's dependent on the evidence that is available, 8 yes. 9 Q. For example, if it is purely information that somebody 10 was involved in something without hard evidence to be 11 put to that suspect, an officer would be justified in 12 waiting until such times as hard evidence could be 13 gathered to put to that suspect when interviewed? 14 A. Again, that's a judgment call. 15 Q. In terms of your report, eventually that again was 16 approved by the Ombudsman's Office. Isn't that correct? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Your recommendations really concentrated on policy and 19 procedural issues? 20 A. Yes. 21 MR O'HARE: Thank you, Ms Kennedy. 22 Questions from MR McGRORY 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory. 24 MR McGRORY: I am obliged, sir. 25 My name is McGrory and I represent the family of 38 1 Robert Hamill. 2 There are a few things I would just like you to 3 expand upon briefly, please. 4 The first one is this issue of the judgment call. 5 I would suggest there are really two questions arising 6 from that. 7 One is whose responsibility it is to make the 8 judgment call that the scene needs to be immediately 9 preserved and further investigative action taken, and 10 then, secondly, whether or not that judgment call should 11 have been taken at an early stage in this case. 12 So let me deal with the first of those two 13 propositions. In terms of whose responsibility it was, 14 in this case we have a number of officers in the 15 Land Rover and then we have the support vehicles. You 16 have given evidence about the main vehicle and we know 17 there was another vehicle. Then on the scene, within 18 a reasonably short period of time, comes a sergeant and 19 then, a little later, an inspector. 20 Whose responsibility is it to make the call that 21 this is a serious incident and there needs to be, 22 firstly, scene preservation measures put in place? 23 A. In this particular incident, given the involvement of 24 two supervisory officers, I would contend that it would 25 be one of the two supervisory officers. 39 1 Q. Of course, in order to make that judgment call, one or 2 other of them needs to get sufficient information? 3 A. That is correct. 4 Q. Now, if I could just perhaps visit briefly -- the first 5 written information we have about what did happen 6 emerges from the statements that are made on 27th April, 7 later on that morning or that day. 8 You have read those statements and are very familiar 9 with them, I know. Mr Underwood has already mentioned 10 the evidence of Constable Silcock to you in terms of his 11 concern that Mr Hamill might have been stabbed because 12 of his breathing. 13 In fact, other officers give evidence which I would 14 suggest reveals this was a serious incident. For 15 example, Reserve Constable Atkinson himself says in his 16 statement that he could see out of the corner of his eye 17 a number of youths jumping on the head of one of the 18 males. I think Silcock says something similar in terms 19 of he had information that someone had jumped on the 20 head. 21 Would information that there had been someone whose 22 head had been jumped on not suggest to you that this was 23 a serious matter? 24 A. Which is why I think if a debrief had been held shortly 25 after the incident, I think that's the sort of 40 1 information that would have become apparent. 2 Q. Yes, yes. I need not go on, but there are statements 3 from Constable Neill, Constable Cooke and so forth, all 4 of whom make it clear that they were aware on the scene 5 that Mr Hamill was: (a) unconscious when he was taken 6 away; and (b) that he was attacked violently while lying 7 on the ground. 8 What I am suggesting to you is that that information 9 alone was enough to trigger those serious investigative 10 steps. 11 A. I would agree and if a proper debriefing had taken 12 place, I think that may have become apparent at a much 13 earlier stage. 14 Q. Thank you. Now, we heard evidence from P39 -- do you 15 know who that is -- 16 A. I do, yes. 17 Q. -- on Friday about the official label that might be put 18 on the nature of this investigation, whether or not it 19 was HOLMES or MIRIAM or whatever now? 20 She said it wasn't quite a MIRIAM. She called it 21 a mini-MIRIAM. Have you ever heard of a mini-MIRIAM? 22 A. Personally, no. I would have thought -- certainly the 23 information we were given is that it was initially 24 conducted as a MIRIAM, under the MIRIAM system. 25 Q. Indeed, the Chairman raised on Friday afternoon the 41 1 point that -- are there any guidelines within MIRIAM as 2 to suggest when a MIRIAM is started as opposed to some 3 lesser type of investigation? 4 A. Without checking the relevant general order, I can't say 5 with any certainty. There was certainly a general order 6 out identifying the differences in MIRIAM and HOLMES 7 I think back in 1994 possibly, but I would need to check 8 the exact wording in relation to that general order. 9 THE CHAIRMAN: Presumably, Mr McGrory, when P39 spoke of 10 a mini-MIRIAM investigation, she was speaking of 11 adopting certain aspects of a MIRIAM investigation but 12 not all. 13 MR McGRORY: Indeed. 14 THE CHAIRMAN: In other words, using it as a helpful 15 guideline. 16 MR McGRORY: Indeed. The purpose of these questions is to 17 try to establish whether or not a full MIRIAM, as 18 described in the MIRIAM document, should have been 19 commenced on 27th April. 20 A. To be honest, I can't comment on that. 21 Q. By the early part -- by, say, the middle of the day, in 22 any event it had been established that Mr Hamill had 23 been moved to the Royal Victoria Hospital and that this 24 was a serious matter? 25 A. Yes. What I would say in relation to this and P39, is 42 1 that we never had the benefit of cooperation from P39 in 2 our investigation. So it is difficult to really pass 3 any comment or judgment in relation to activities that 4 she may have outlined on Friday. 5 Q. If I could maybe ask you in the abstract in terms of 6 a situation where there has been an assault, which was 7 clearly a serious assault emerging, where the victim was 8 unconscious and has been brought to the Royal Victoria 9 Hospital, so we are in the realms of a GBH -- do you 10 agree? 11 A. Yes. In fact, I think at 4.00 am the duty inspector was 12 made aware it could be life-threatening. 13 Q. We could have had an attempted murder on our hands? 14 A. I would agree, yes. 15 Q. Is that not the sort of case that would have merited 16 a full MIRIAM? 17 A. I would assume so, but I have never been a senior 18 detective, and I cannot comment on what P39 -- the 19 rationale for using a mini-MIRIAM. I really just can't 20 comment on that. 21 MR McGRORY: Thank you. 22 Questions from MS DINSMORE 23 MS DINSMORE: Chief Superintendent, I appear on behalf of 24 Reserve Constable Atkinson and I understand from your 25 evidence-in-chief that, really, investigating matters 43 1 pertaining to Mr Atkinson was no part of your remit? 2 A. That's correct. 3 Q. And that that was, in fact, carried out by way of 4 entirely separate investigation? 5 A. Yes, that's correct. 6 Q. By Detective Chief Inspector K? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. And subsequently taken over by Superintendent Stewart? 9 A. Yes, that's correct. 10 Q. Really, the only dealings that you would have had in 11 relation to that was one general meeting with Stewart 12 where that was just one aspect of a number of matters 13 that were being considered, and that you had some input 14 into the form 17-3? 15 A. That's correct. The 17-3 on Reserve Constable Atkinson 16 was served by myself, but that was in conjunction with 17 the investigating officer in terms of the wording and 18 when it could be served. That was my only involvement 19 with R/Con Atkinson. 20 Q. Apart from that, apart from essentially a courtesy 21 letter from the Department of the Director of Public 22 Prosecutions in December 2002 by way of information to 23 inform you that there had been a decision to prosecute 24 charges, there were no other dealings really you had 25 with the issue regarding Reserve Constable Atkinson? 44 1 A. That's correct. No other dealings. 2 Can I just clarify that letter? I left Complaints and 3 Discipline in 2001 on promotion and took up a post as 4 head of C2 branch, which was a different branch than the 5 current C2 branch. So that letter in December 2002 came 6 to me in my capacity as head of C2 branch, not in my 7 capacity as the investigating officer of this 8 investigation. 9 MS DINSMORE: Thank you very much. 10 MR UNDERWOOD: No questions arising out of that. Thank you. 11 SIR JOHN EVANS: Forgive me, Chairman. It is just a small 12 matter of clarification. 13 If I could take you back to what you said about 14 Constable A -- 15 A. Yes. 16 SIR JOHN EVANS: -- and her responsibility as the lead 17 investigator, if you like, because of the role she was 18 in on that night? 19 A. Yes. 20 SIR JOHN EVANS: Is that despite the fact that a Land Rover 21 with four officers had been present earlier? Is that 22 still the case? 23 A. Yes. I would agree. That is my assessment. The 24 Land Rover crew was a dedicated public order crew, which 25 would have been there for an entirely different reason. 45 1 As I said earlier, the observer in 7-0 was the main 2 response vehicle and there would be an expectation that 3 that would be the officer that would carry out any 4 investigations. 5 I mean, if there was to be a change to that, that's 6 something that should have been identified by one of the 7 supervisory officers. 8 This is part of the problem. It was never entirely 9 clear who actually had been appointed to investigate the 10 initial assault on Mr Hamill. 11 SIR JOHN EVANS: Thank you. 12 MR UNDERWOOD: Unless there is anything else arising? 13 Thank you. 14 (The witness withdrew) 15 We have Mr Jackson next, who I suspect will be quite 16 short, but I suspect the shorthand writer would benefit 17 from a break. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: We will have our break now. Fifteen minutes. 19 (11.35 am) 20 (A short break) 21 (11.50 am) 22 MR UNDERWOOD: Desmond Jackson, please. 23 MR DESMOND GEORGE JACKSON (sworn) 24 A. Desmond George Jackson. 25 MR UNDERWOOD: Please sit down, Mr Jackson. My name is 46 1 Underwood and I am Counsel to the Inquiry. I have some 2 questions for you. It may be, after that, there will be 3 some supplemental questions from other lawyers here. 4 Can I ask you to look, please, at a statement which 5 we should see on screen at page [80542]? 6 This runs through to [80552]. If you wouldn't mind 7 having a look as we scroll through it and I will ask at 8 the end whether it is your statement. 9 Is that your statement? 10 A. It is fairly quick, but, yes. 11 Q. Can I just ask you, before I ask you to confirm its 12 contents, to look at paragraph 30, which we will find on 13 page [80551]? You say there: 14 "The first real point of concern I identified was 15 the delay before the scene was secured. Furthermore, we 16 found no evidence of any debrief." 17 Then there is another sentence. Then you say: 18 "During my time in IIB, I had not come across other 19 complaints of failing to be brief." 20 Should that say "debrief", by any chance? 21 A. Correct, sir. 22 Q. Apart from that correction, are the contents of this 23 statement true? 24 A. Yes, sir. 25 Q. Thank you very much. 47 1 I just want to ask you some questions about matters 2 that have emerged which touch on your evidence. In 3 practical terms, if an observer in a back-up car 4 designated JD70 arrived at a scene of a crime, would 5 that observer be, in practical terms, the investigating 6 officer or senior officer for investigative purposes? 7 A. Depending on what the case would be, the observer would 8 be the normal person who would respond to and deal with 9 the incident, but depending on the gravity of the 10 offence. 11 Q. Would that be influenced at all if more senior officers 12 were also present? 13 A. In practical terms, if you had a road traffic accident 14 that happened and the observer was a constable and the 15 inspector was in the back of the police vehicle, a road 16 traffic accident, I am not saying it is not serious, but 17 the observer would deal with the road traffic accident 18 irrespective of the fact that the inspector was in the 19 back of the car. 20 Q. If it were a more serious incident, say a GBH, GBH with 21 intent, would the fact of an inspector's presence alter 22 the situation? 23 A. The senior officer would be given the role of guiding, 24 allocating resources, making decisions in relation to 25 who would deal with it, and possibly directing if, for 48 1 example, it was a GBH or serious assault, that the 2 constable not deal with it and somebody else deal with 3 it. 4 Q. Again, dealing with the prospect that fairly senior 5 uniformed officers were on the scene of a crime, we have 6 obviously just touched on paragraph 30 of your 7 statement, which deals with debriefing. 8 Where you have senior officers at the scene of 9 a crime, at what point would they organise a debrief? 10 Could they do it at the scene? 11 A. A debriefing could take place at the scene, yes, but you 12 mean, in terms of a debriefing at the scene, you would 13 surmise there were questions being asked of what in 14 actual fact happened, who saw what, who did what, what 15 had to be done in terms of follow-up. So in terms of 16 a debrief at the scene, yes, a debrief could take place 17 to get essential information to allow something to be 18 developed or acted on. So a debriefing, yes, could take 19 place at the scene. 20 In terms of a full debrief, one would imagine that 21 a full debrief would take place in a room with officers 22 present where directions are given, questions are asked 23 and directions are given on how to further the matter. 24 Q. What the Panel may be very assisted by is your 25 experience of the practical application of the policies 49 1 that we are dealing with here. 2 We know that in the immediate aftermath of the 3 assault here there were a dozen or so officers who had 4 either been at the scene in the first place or arrived 5 as back-up, and may have seen witnesses, may have seen 6 how serious the assault was, may have seen how seriously 7 injured Mr Hamill was. 8 Would you, in your experience, have expected 9 a senior officer to have taken advantage of the presence 10 of everybody there to get some sort of debrief or not? 11 A. I mean, I'm answering this question with the benefit of 12 hindsight. 13 Q. Of course. 14 A. Going back and looking at the situation there, at 15 a stage during this incident there was call for an FRG 16 or a Federal riot gun. That is a situation where 17 calling for that item to be signed out and taken on to 18 the street is evidence or an indication that it was 19 a very volatile situation. So somebody had to give that 20 direction to have that done. 21 That's an area then, as a senior officer, I feel 22 that you would have had to ask the question, "What 23 happened here, or what was the extent of what happened, 24 that we arrived at a situation of asking for a Federal 25 riot gun to be brought to the scene?". 50 1 Q. In a sense, there were two aspects here, weren't there? 2 There was the seriousness of the disorder to which that 3 FRG question goes -- 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. -- and there was the seriousness of the injury, which, 6 so far as we can tell, went unchecked until about 7 4 o'clock. 8 Do you see a distinction between those two in terms 9 of debriefing? 10 A. From investigation, what this inquiry established was 11 that nobody really knew the extent of the injury at the 12 initial stages. I think there is evidence of a reserve 13 constable actually leaning over Mr Hamill, protecting 14 Mr Hamill from further events. I think his statement 15 will say he did remove a piece of glass, but the inquiry 16 established that nobody really was aware of the extent 17 of the injury. 18 Q. Yes. 19 A. So in relation to a debrief about the injury, I can't 20 really answer that, because I don't know what the senior 21 officer would have been told. 22 Q. This is what I am getting at. Of course, as you say, we 23 have the benefit of hindsight, and we know that some of 24 the constables at the scene, and reserve constables at 25 the scene, thought this was a serious injury. We also 51 1 know that they weren't asked about that. 2 What I am asking you about is: never mind hindsight, 3 would you expect, where there is a serious disorder and 4 two people taken away by ambulance, the senior officer 5 at the scene to get everybody round and say, "What 6 happened there? How serious is that?" 7 A. I wouldn't expect him to get everybody round, but, yes, 8 I would expect him to ask the question, "What happened 9 and how serious? Where has he gone?" 10 Q. There is also this problem, isn't there, for the senior 11 officer at the scene: that he has his dozen or so 12 constables who have perhaps witnessed the events, and 13 they are about to go off and do all sorts of other 14 things. It may be quite difficult for a senior officer 15 to gather them all within a reasonable time after they 16 have gone. Is that fair? 17 A. To gather them all, yes, is a fair comment. To gather 18 some would have been realistic. 19 Q. Right. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: Can I just go back to see if I have followed? 21 I will be corrected if I am wrong. The officers who 22 were going to the police station to get a riot gun saw 23 on their way there -- I think it was Inspector McCrum, 24 wasn't it, and the sergeant? 25 MR UNDERWOOD: That's right, Sergeant P89. 52 1 THE CHAIRMAN: The inspector was told what they were going 2 for and he gave his approval. 3 Now, would that fact put him in the position, as 4 events later transpired, of, really, the senior 5 investigator or the investigating officer; in other 6 words, would he supplant the observer from the back-up 7 car as a result of that? 8 A. He would have been in charge at that time of the scene, 9 but as events developed, other -- another officer of 10 another similar rank or with expertise would have been 11 called in and allocated to investigate the matter. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: But once he had authorised obtaining a riot 13 gun, would that put him in the position of the 14 investigator until the detective branch took over, 15 rather than the observer from the back-up car? 16 A. He would have been taking control. He would have been 17 in charge, yes. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Is that the same thing as saying he then 19 became, until the CID took over, the investigating 20 officer -- 21 A. Yes. 22 THE CHAIRMAN: -- rather than the observer from the back-up 23 car? 24 A. I would accept that, yes. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Just a moment. Thank you. 53 1 MR UNDERWOOD: I want to get the best picture we can for the 2 Panel of the roles of the uniformed and detective 3 branches here. 4 You say that a senior officer on the scene would 5 have been able to collect at least some of the officers 6 within a reasonable time to debrief them. That, 7 I think, was your last answer to me. Was that fair? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. So what would you have expected a senior officer, 10 an inspector or sergeant attending a scene like this to 11 do, in terms of making arrangements for the officers who 12 had been present to tell their side of it? 13 A. Again, I'm answering this, you know, with hindsight and 14 not being there. The facts that were established was 15 that there was a very volatile, violent situation had 16 happened. Police responded to that. There was 17 a direction given to move one faction from the scene, if 18 I can say, left towards St Mark's Church. There was 19 an ambulance called for. There were two people taken in 20 the ambulance. One would surmise as to what would have 21 been asked. "What happened there? How serious are the 22 injuries? Do we need to send somebody to the hospital 23 to check up on the injuries?" 24 Q. Again, you prefaced that with another comment about 25 hindsight, and we all bear that in mind. 54 1 What I am interested in is your experience relevant 2 to the way people actually worked in practice in 1997. 3 In practice, in 1997, would the ordinary course have 4 been for the senior officer at the scene to say, "What 5 happened? How serious was this?" 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Then what would they do? Would they actually ensure 8 people did not go off shift, for example, before they 9 had made statements? 10 A. If there was a necessity to collect the best evidence in 11 terms of recording statements or having a statement 12 recorded from what individual officers saw, yes, you 13 would instruct or instructions would have been given to 14 make those statements. 15 Q. Again, I am going to be asking you hypothetical 16 questions, I am afraid, but again not in order to try to 17 demonstrate what you think people here might have done 18 wrong, purely in order to try to get from you your 19 expertise about what was expected of people. 20 If, on asking, "What has gone on here?" a senior 21 officer learns, "I think he got stabbed", or, "I think 22 he got kicked in the head. I think somebody jumped on 23 his head. It is serious", would that have injected 24 a sense of urgency into a senior officer about getting 25 statements from people? 55 1 A. It would have injected a whole lot of -- not only 2 getting statements; preserving scenes, getting somebody 3 to the hospital, getting CID called in, possibly 4 arranging for a debrief to take place. 5 Q. Again, trying to avoid all the benefits of hindsight, in 6 1997, would a senior uniformed officer, a sergeant or 7 inspector, have appreciated the advantage of seizing 8 clothing quickly to get DNA evidence? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. I have left hanging in the air two answers you gave 11 about debriefing. One is that you might do a sort of 12 debrief at the scene, but you would do a proper debrief 13 later. 14 Can you help us with what would you have expected 15 about a proper debrief of officers who had been present 16 at a scene that we are talking about here? 17 A. Well, it would have been the basic routine questions. 18 "What happened?". From, "What happened?" to, "What did 19 you see? Can you identify any persons that were there? 20 Can you draw up a duty statement? Can you make 21 a comprehensive notebook entry?" 22 In other words, "Can you start the evidential trail 23 of what happened to allow whoever was going to take the 24 role on to further it?" 25 Q. Just to be clear, you would have expected a uniformed 56 1 officer to undertake that debriefing process, would you? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. When it comes to making statements in a situation like 4 that, was it your experience that officers would, after 5 that, be allowed to make their own statements or would 6 they have statements taken from them by detectives? 7 A. At the initial stages, they would have either written 8 a comprehensive notebook entry, which could have been 9 photocopied and left, written their own statement in 10 terms of what they saw or who they identified, and then 11 yes, certainly, at a further stage, as things developed, 12 it would not have been uncommon -- in fact, it would 13 have been common for a CID officer to be appointed to go 14 through the statement, go through the notebook and ask 15 further questions. 16 Q. There is just one other matter I want to ask you about. 17 You, in drafting the report that Superintendent Kennedy 18 signed off, recommended admonishment for 19 Inspector McCrum. Is that right? 20 A. That's correct. 21 Q. You didn't have the advantage, of course, in drafting 22 your report, of what the lady we are calling P39 did or 23 may have done. 24 Do you know who we are talking about? 25 A. Yes. 57 1 Q. Because her journal has gone missing, I think. 2 A. Sorry. Would you ask the question again? 3 Q. Let me break it down into bite-sized questions. 4 P39 did not cooperate with your investigation. Is 5 that right? 6 A. That's correct. 7 Q. You were unable to get her journal, because she told you 8 that she had destroyed her journals. Is that right? 9 A. Journal or policy book. 10 Q. Did the absence of her assistance or her journals have 11 any bearing on your ability to take a view about 12 Inspector McCrum's actions? 13 A. No. 14 Q. So as far as you are concerned, his role was discrete 15 from P39's. Is that fair? 16 A. Had P39 assisted, then obviously there could have been 17 further questions asked of the inspector. In relation 18 to the recommendation that was made against the 19 inspector, the inquiry and the facts that were there 20 allowed that recommendation to be made. 21 REV. BARONESS KATHLEEN RICHARDSON: Mr Underwood, may I ask 22 the question about the policy book? 23 MR UNDERWOOD: Please. 24 REV. BARONESS KATHLEEN RICHARDSON: Because we have seen the 25 policy book, but it appears it wasn't available to this 58 1 team. Is there a reason for that? 2 MR UNDERWOOD: Can I break this down into two things? 3 First of all, I think your investigation stopped 4 short as of 6th May, did it not? 5 A. That's correct. 6 Q. That's because the terms of reference for it were 7 limited to the events which had all occurred by then. 8 Is that right? 9 A. The immediate aftermath of the scene, yes. 10 Q. Also, it is true to say, isn't it, you were unable to 11 locate a policy book? 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. In fact, we have seen it and we know it didn't start 14 until 8th May. So that presumably would not have 15 influenced your outcome anyway, would it? 16 A. I think the policy book that the Inquiry team sought to 17 get was in relation to the events after 7.20 am on the 18 date of the assault. That was the policy book that we 19 were looking for. 20 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much. Those are the only 21 questions I have for you. As I said, it may well be 22 that others have some more. Thank you very much. 23 MR FERGUSON: No questions. 24 MR ADAIR: No questions. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGrory? 59 1 Questions from MR McGRORY 2 MR McGRORY: Just one matter, sir. I am obliged. I could 3 not resist asking at least a couple of questions, sir. 4 Just one matter you can perhaps assist us with, 5 Mr Jackson. This is the issue as to whether or not 6 steps should have been taken to perhaps investigate in 7 a deeper form whether or not Reserve Constable Atkinson 8 was involved in the crime of assisting offenders. 9 As I asked the question, sir, I realise, if you 10 finished on 6th May, that information does not become 11 available until the 9th. I don't know if you can help 12 us specifically in regard to this investigation, but if 13 I might just ask you in a general form, if you have 14 a situation where a crime is committed, either attempted 15 murder or murder, or even grievous bodily harm, and 16 there is evidence emerging or being sought as to who 17 perpetrated the crime, that, as an investigator, as 18 an experienced detective, if evidence emerges that 19 ex post facto the crime someone might have given 20 assistance to those who committed the crime, whether or 21 not that suspect should be treated as part of the 22 original investigation? 23 A. That's quite a good question there. If I can answer it 24 by saying this, in relation to Reserve 25 Constable Atkinson and our inquiry, the directions that 60 1 Mrs Kennedy got, which I got, were very, very clear; 2 that Reserve Constable Atkinson was being dealt with by 3 others who were enquiring into him. 4 So, therefore, we were not allowed to look at 5 Reserve Constable Atkinson, because others were 6 investigating. The only thing that we did do was ensure 7 that there was a 17-3, as the form is known, served on 8 him, to put him under notice that he was the subject of 9 a misconduct/disciplinary investigation. 10 Our inquiry was a disciplinary investigation, not 11 a criminal investigation. The remit was that others 12 would be dealing with Reserve Constable Atkinson, and 13 they may be able to answer that question, sir. 14 Q. Yes. Just getting away from this case and Reserve 15 Constable Atkinson and the personalities, just as 16 an investigating detective, if you came across any crime 17 in which there is evidence of both -- as to both who 18 committed the crime and who might have assisted those 19 afterwards, in general terms, as an investigator, would 20 you regard it as part and parcel of the same 21 investigation? 22 A. You would investigate it, but I am answering that by 23 saying, yes, you would investigate it there, but I can't 24 fully comment on Reserve Constable Atkinson, because 25 I don't know then and I don't know now -- and I am very, 61 1 very genuine in what I say. I don't know what the 2 extent of the investigation against Reserve 3 Constable Atkinson specifically was. I have heard 4 innuendos and bits and pieces. So I have difficulty in 5 answering that there, because our remit was very, very 6 clear: there is another team investigating Reserve 7 Constable Atkinson. 8 MR McGRORY: I am talking about a hypothetical situation 9 away from this case, but I think you have given me the 10 answer, which is that it would be investigated. 11 I don't think I can take this issue any further. 12 Thank you. 13 A. I will accept that. 14 MR MALLON: No questions. 15 Questions from MR O'CONNOR 16 MR O'CONNOR: Just a couple of questions, Mr Chairman, sir. 17 In relation to the keeping of journals, do you 18 remember what the procedure was about journals when you 19 left the force in 1997? 20 A. Again, you would have to go through the papers here, but 21 we sought a legal direction in relation to who owns 22 a journal; is it the individual member's or is it the 23 Chief Constable's? 24 Q. Yes. 25 A. I am happy to say -- I have not got it in front of me -- 62 1 there was a legal directive came back in relation to 2 those journals. 3 THE CHAIRMAN: But do you know what the practice was? 4 A. Prior to that, in reality the practice was that you kept 5 your journal. As senior officer, you kept your journal. 6 MR O'CONNOR: Was that procedure written anywhere at that 7 time? 8 A. I can't genuinely, honestly answer that. I don't know. 9 You have asked the question there, and the answer to it 10 was that senior officers normally kept their own 11 journals. 12 I am not saying there may have been a few asked that 13 they be secured, you know, in police stations. The 14 general direction was you took your journal with you. 15 Q. You were aware at that stage that P39 hadn't kept their 16 journal -- is that right -- when you were investigating? 17 A. In relation to P39, at the commencement of our 18 investigation, the Ombudsman -- I don't know if he has 19 anonymity or not -- 20 Q. You can say Mr Mahaffey. You can say that name. 21 A. Mr Chris Mahaffey had indicated he had talked to P39 22 along with another person. They, at that stage, and 23 again from recall, were satisfied that P39 would come in 24 and speak with them, corroborate whatever it is. They 25 were seeking P39's journal. 63 1 P39 did not come in and speak with Mr Mahaffey. 2 Somewhere along the line there was a complaint made by 3 P39. From recollection, Mr Mahaffey or his office had 4 sent that person a letter which had been delivered to 5 the wrong address and a complaint was made. 6 At that stage, we came in and wrote to P39 asking 7 her for her journal and policy book. There was a reply 8 that came back. I am satisfied it is on the papers 9 somewhere. It is covered in my statement there, the 10 reply to it. 11 So that's the extent of all I know about P39. There 12 was a further letter written to P39 after that, but 13 there was no response made to that letter. 14 Q. What I am trying to explore briefly is the difference in 15 procedure, what was done, and what constables -- or what 16 officers knew ought to be done -- 17 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we have had evidence from more than 18 one witness, have we not, that the practice was that you 19 kept your journals? 20 MR O'CONNOR: I understand that, Mr Chairman. 21 You were involved in this investigation with 22 Mrs Kennedy. Isn't that right? You were tasked 23 specifically to look at a certain area? 24 A. Correct. 25 Q. In relation to that, you had to go and seek legal advice 64 1 as to whether someone ought to -- not what their 2 practice was, but what they were supposed to do. 3 Do you see my point? 4 A. I see the point, but the legal advice -- again, I am 5 corrected by what's in the papers -- the legal advice 6 that was sought was "Who owns the journal?" 7 For example, "Does my journal belong to me or is it 8 the property of the Chief Constable?" 9 Q. I understand that point, but my point is that you, as 10 the investigator at this time, had to go and seek that 11 legal advice. 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. How was a person with a journal supposed to know what 14 they were supposed to do with the journal; not what was 15 the practice at the time, but what ought they to do with 16 their journal at the time? 17 A. I have given the answer to that there. 18 Q. You didn't know. Mrs Kennedy didn't know. How was 19 an officer serving at the time to know what they ought 20 to have done with the journal? 21 A. I retired some four years ago. I still have my 22 journals, because I require those journals in the event 23 of being called to give evidence at cases that I have 24 dealt with in the past. 25 Q. Just moving on -- 65 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr O'Connor, it is going to be very 2 difficult, isn't it, for anyone to criticise an officer 3 who had a journal for keeping it after his retirement in 4 the light of what, in fact, was the practice? 5 MR O'CONNOR: I accept that. I am moving on, actually, to 6 practice and procedure versus -- very briefly, 7 Mr Chairman -- what this witness has said ought to have 8 been done at a certain time by, in fact, in this case, 9 Inspector McCrum. I was laying the ground for that 10 question. 11 The question I am moving on to is: you have given 12 evidence that when Inspector McCrum authorised the use 13 of a riot gun, he then became the investigating officer 14 in this case, in your view. Is that right? 15 A. He didn't authorise the use of the FRG. He authorised 16 the FRG be got from the police station and brought to 17 the scene. That's two distinct ... 18 Q. To be absolutely clear -- 19 A. In hindsight -- and I said I answered the question in 20 hindsight -- once that order was given, the situation 21 has moved up from more than a common assault to a very 22 volatile situation. 23 Q. Yes. 24 A. The senior officer on the ground is then the person in 25 charge. 66 1 Q. Yes. It is the investigating officer of the crime that 2 I am interested in. Your evidence is that, when he 3 authorised the issue of the riot gun, he became the 4 investigating officer in this case? 5 A. Someone must accept the responsibility of dealing with 6 or taking charge of the situation. So at that point, if 7 we are dividing -- maybe if I am wrong -- words of 8 investigating officer or person in charge, and I think 9 I used person in charge at the scene, the inspector was 10 the person in charge at the scene and giving the 11 direction. 12 Now, at that point, he would have been telling his 13 constables what to do. The constables wouldn't be 14 telling him what to do. Now, if we are sort of going 15 into the situation, was he investigating officer or was 16 he in charge, respectfully I need guidance on where the 17 words are divided down. 18 Q. You don't know the difference? 19 A. Well, there's a difference between being in charge of 20 the scene, because he can give directions as to what he 21 does. Then he makes a statement after it or goes to 22 a court or Tribunal and says, "Look, I gave that 23 direction. I gave that order. That's why I gave it", 24 but, as I say, respectfully, I mean, "in charge", 25 "investigating officer" or "in control", I think we 67 1 could talk all day. I mean, I am not being 2 disrespectful, but ... 3 Q. Just finally, at page 53 of the transcript at line 12 4 you agreed with the Chairman that Inspector -- 5 Inspector McCrum is the -- he was the investigator until 6 the detective branch took over. Is that fair? You 7 agreed with that question. That was put to you and you 8 agreed with that. 9 A. He would have been in control of the situation there 10 until such times as he debriefed or briefed the 11 detective who was coming on as to what happened and 12 handed things over. 13 Q. Then from that stage on, the detective was in charge of 14 the investigation. Is that your evidence? 15 A. Well, you are talking two detectives that came on duty 16 here. You are talking P39 came on duty at or about 17 7.00 am. I think P39 directed the scene be sealed at 18 7.20 am. There was a detective constable. From 19 recollection, I think it was 5.30 am he came on. The 20 person still in charge at that stage was the inspector, 21 in my view. 22 Q. Can I suggest to you that he was telephoned in or around 23 4.30? 24 A. I accept that, but he had to travel from his home to 25 Portadown Police Station. 68 1 Q. Can I suggest to you that he is a member of the 2 detective branch you were talking about when you 3 answered the Chairman's question? 4 A. Sorry. I am not with you. 5 Q. The point I am making is that you gave evidence, and you 6 agreed with the Chairman's question, that 7 Inspector McCrum was the investigator until the 8 detective branch took over. Now you are drawing 9 a distinction between the level of detective branch. Is 10 that right? 11 A. A detective constable can't tell an inspector what to 12 do. He can suggest. Right? The detective constable, 13 as outlined in the report, was called in to offer 14 expertise on the situation that was being dealt with. 15 Now, again, at that point in time the detective has 16 to be briefed and he has to ring his superior. The 17 person who remains in control at that time would have 18 been the uniformed inspector, in my view. 19 Q. In relation to the expertise that DC Keys would have 20 brought to it, does that include crime scene management? 21 A. It would, but again, if we go down that, I will have to 22 refer to the report. Nobody could point him out to 23 where the scene was. 24 MR O'CONNOR: Thank you. 25 69 1 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD 2 MR UNDERWOOD: One other matter arising out of that. You 3 were asked about the legal advice. Can we have a look 4 at page [10907]? It is a memorandum. The date at the 5 bottom is 17th September 2001. It is to an unnamed 6 superintendent: 7 "Your memo of 7th September refers. 8 "Since it is a requirement of the Code and/or Manual 9 that officers make notebook entries, or keep journals as 10 appropriate, and that the said documents are a record of 11 police duties, it seems to me that there is a valid 12 argument that the documents remain the property of the 13 Chief Constable even after the officer has retired. The 14 question of access to them would therefore, in my view, 15 be established, although there is the difficulty in that 16 any retired officer who chooses to destroy his notebook 17 or journal is not susceptible to disciplinary process 18 for doing it. Accordingly, many officers may well 19 routinely destroy as soon as they retire." 20 Is that the legal advice you got? 21 A. Yes, sir. 22 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much. Unless there is 23 anything else arising out of that, that concludes my 24 re-examination. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: No. Thank you. 70 1 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Jackson. 2 That's your evidence then. 3 (The witness withdrew) 4 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, as I say, it will be a bit of stop/start 5 while we rejig the schedule after the anonymity 6 applications. 7 The position for tomorrow is we have the officer we 8 are calling G, who was due to give evidence last Friday, 9 starting in the morning. Then we have Richard Bradley 10 and then John Johnson. I apprehend that we will get 11 through all those with a 10.30 start. So although 12 I floated the idea on Friday of a 10 o'clock start, 13 I would not now recommend it 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Johnson was the witness who you thought 15 you were not going to be able to question? 16 MR UNDERWOOD: He was the witness from Bulgaria, who has, in 17 fact, flown out today. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: 10.30 tomorrow. 19 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much. 20 (12.35 pm) 21 (The hearing adjourned until 10.30 tomorrow morning) 22 23 --ooOoo-- 24 25 71 1 I N D E X 2 3 MS LYNNE KAREN KENNEDY (sworn) ................... 1 4 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 1 Questions from MR O'HARE .................. 33 5 Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 38 Questions from MS DINSMORE ................ 43 6 MR DESMOND GEORGE JACKSON (sworn) ............... 46 7 Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 60 Questions from MR O'CONNOR ................ 62 8 Further questions from MR UNDERWOOD ....... 70 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 72