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Hearing: 9th September 2009, day 60
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PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF
ROBERT HAMILL
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Held at:
Interpoint
20-24 York Street
Belfast
on Wednesday, 9th September 2009
commencing at 10.30 am
Day 60
1 Wednesday, 9th September 2009
2 (10.30 am)
3 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Underwood, I can see that we may be
4 receiving some sensitive material today. Accordingly,
5 it will be appropriate for you to edit what goes on to
6 the website from today's proceedings.
7 MR UNDERWOOD: I shall take care. Thank you very much, sir.
8 THE CHAIRMAN: I hope all involved will be careful not to
9 ask questions which will identify sources.
10 MR UNDERWOOD: That's kind. Thank you.
11 Mr Irwin then, please.
12 MR PHILIP MICHAEL IRWIN (sworn)
13 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD
14 MR UNDERWOOD: Morning, Mr Irwin.
15 A. Morning, sir.
16 Q. My name is Underwood. I am Counsel to the Inquiry.
17 I have a number of questions for you, I am afraid, after
18 which other people may have a number more.
19 A. That's okay.
20 Q. Can I get you to tell us your full name, please?
21 A. Philip Michael Irwin.
22 Q. You have drafted a statement for us which I hope we can
23 pick up at page [81418]. I will not ask you to watch
24 while we scroll through all of it. It is 68 pages long.
25 Is that your statement?
1
1 A. That is my statement, sir, yes.
2 Q. Are the contents true?
3 A. The contents are true, yes.
4 Q. Thank you very much. I want to ask some general
5 questions to start with about the position as at
6 April 1997, when you first became involved in the GBH,
7 as it then was.
8 What experience as an investigating officer had you
9 had on serious investigations such as murder at that
10 point
11 A. Well, I was in the CID from 1985. So right through that
12 up until I was promoted inspector, I was involved in
13 a large number of terrorist and non-terrorist murders in
14 a detective constable role and detective sergeant role.
15 Q. You tell us at page 23 of your statement, which we find
16 at page [81440], about your initial assessment of the
17 incident. On that page, and on the following page, you
18 go from (a) to (h) on a number of factors that you have
19 regard to.
20 Are all those factors that you identified for
21 yourself in April 1997?
22 A. Yes. When I started reading the statements and as
23 I moved through the initial night of the 28th, I think
24 it was, and the 29th, you know, these issues were coming
25 into my head. Because there had been no early arrests
2
1 made at the scene, then, you know, as I was looking at
2 it, you could see that there was going to be
3 difficulties with the investigation.
4 Q. If we go over to [81441] at (e) --
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. -- the first sentence of that is, as it were, historic:
7 "There were only minor external injuries to
8 Robert Hamill and D, therefore limiting the
9 possibilities of obtaining a forensic link through blood
10 transfer between victim and assailants."
11 Then you go on to say how that's actually made good
12 by events that took place much later, like, for example,
13 Lawrence Marshall's report and so on. This is a sort of
14 running view, is it?
15 A. I got a briefing -- I already had a briefing on the
16 Monday morning from the officers that were at the scene.
17 They would have given us a run-down of what information
18 they had regarding the injuries.
19 Q. But specifically on that paragraph where you are dealing
20 with the difficulty of obtaining a forensic link through
21 blood transfer, and, indeed, you deal with contamination
22 of the scene and so on further on, there are no actions
23 in the first 64 which you refer to in your statement
24 dealing with the liaison with the FSANI, for example.
25 Can you explain why, if you understood these things
3
1 as problems at the time, there is no record of that?
2 A. In what respect, sir, sorry?
3 Q. You say:
4 "There were only minor external injuries ...
5 therefore limiting the possibilities of obtaining
6 a forensic link ..."
7 You tell us in your witness statement, and orally,
8 that this was a factor you took into account at the time
9 as material to how this investigation would go.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Is that something that should have been recorded
12 somewhere?
13 A. I wouldn't think so, sir. If you look at the actions,
14 how I started the initial 64 actions was that I was
15 reading the documents, and, as I was reading those
16 documents that had already been recorded, I was raising
17 actions that I felt were priority at that particular
18 time. So that was my focus in those first 64 actions.
19 Q. Let me be more specific. Who decided which items would
20 be sent to the FSANI?
21 A. I am not sure if that was decided on the Monday morning,
22 sir, or if that was decided later on, but it would have
23 been discussed between the Scenes of Crimes Officer,
24 myself and the Chief Inspector.
25 Q. But there is no record of a decision made about that.
4
1 Can you explain that?
2 A. Where would the record be made, sir?
3 Q. In an action sheet, "Decision to send following"?
4 A. We wouldn't raise an action. It wouldn't have been
5 usual for me to raise an action in that manner. What we
6 would use would be the FSANI forms, the forensic forms.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. What you would do there is use those sheets as the
9 material that were being sent to forensic.
10 Q. So if somebody is looking back on it afterwards in order
11 to ascertain whether there were things which could have
12 been sent but weren't, and looking back to see why they
13 were not sent, they are going to be grappling, aren't
14 they?
15 A. They possibly were at that stage, yes, sir. This was
16 a grievous bodily harm and we were running with it.
17 What I was trying to do was run as fast as I could,
18 catch up with it, run with it and see if we could get
19 a positive outcome very early on.
20 Q. Right. In this paragraph we have up on the screen in
21 the second half of the paragraph you say:
22 "Although the forensic scientist, Lawrence Marshall,
23 initially thought there was heavy bloodstaining on
24 Robert Hamill's clothing, he later confirmed that the
25 vast majority of this was, in fact, wine stains."
5
1 A. That's right, sir.
2 Q. You talk about a broken wine bottle being located close
3 to Robert Hamill's head. As far as I am aware, there is
4 no record of a discussion like that.
5 A. No.
6 Q. Would you have expected in the ordinary course
7 a discussion between you and the forensic scientist
8 about what it was he was looking at and what sort of
9 thing he is finding to be recorded somewhere?
10 A. Well, it is like anything. In hindsight, yes, it would
11 be nice to have it recorded, sir, but it wasn't
12 recorded. It was a phone call between himself and
13 myself and we were discussing the clothes that were
14 submitted to forensic, and we were discussing actually
15 in what manner the examination would take place, because
16 we had submitted the clothes and we had asked for hair,
17 fibres and blood, and Mr Marshall was explaining from
18 his point of view he would rather go for blood first and
19 then move back.
20 Q. You say in that that he later confirmed that the vast
21 majority of this was, in fact, wine stains. Was that
22 after Robert Hamill had died?
23 A. I am not sure, sir. It could well have been, yes.
24 I believe there was a message sheet put in by
25 Detective Constable McDowell, where he had made contact
6
1 with Lawrence Marshall, and then, as a result of that,
2 I had contact with Lawrence Marshall.
3 Q. But again, isn't it significant enough to have required
4 a HOLMES message, for example?
5 A. Well, at that stage I believe we did expect the report
6 from Mr Marshall to be submitted quite soon, and in
7 those circumstances, although you have initial thoughts
8 and you are talking over the phone, there is nothing
9 concrete, and until the forensic officer completes his
10 report, I don't know -- it would be difficult or it
11 could -- it might not be the most sensible to put in
12 a message at that particular stage.
13 Q. Apart from these discussions that you or Mr McDowell
14 might have had with Mr Marshall, was there any formal
15 system of discussing with Mr Marshall or anybody at
16 FSANI prior to receipt of the report what was going on?
17 A. 1997, I don't think there was a formal position in
18 relation to that, sir. The majority of it was done
19 through the submission of forensic forms and then it
20 would be on phone calls.
21 Q. So you have -- let's take the end points of this. The
22 start point is you submit the forensic forms with the
23 material. The end point is a report.
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. In between that you are reliant, are you, on Mr Marshall
7
1 ringing you up or was --
2 A. Or us ringing Mr Marshall up, or, if we had sat for
3 a meeting, if a meeting had been agreed, then we would
4 have went to a meeting, but there were no set procedures
5 at that particular time.
6 Q. Does it follow there was nobody appointed liaison
7 officer formally between -- on the part of the RUC to
8 deal with the FSANI?
9 A. I am not -- there was a forensic liaison officer for the
10 RUC at that time, but his role was more a policy role
11 rather than each particular case.
12 Q. But so far as the murder team is concerned, once it
13 became a murder, sometimes it might be you talking to
14 Mr Marshall, sometimes it might be Mr McDowell. It
15 could be anybody in the team, could it?
16 A. It wouldn't be anybody in the team, no, sir.
17 Mr McDowell must have been -- an action must have been
18 raised for him to do that and then I would have followed
19 it up when that message came in.
20 Q. Okay. Did any one person in the team, either at GBH or
21 at murder stage, have an overview of what evidence there
22 was in terms of what had been recovered from victims,
23 what had been recovered from the scene in terms of
24 forensic material?
25 A. In what respect, sir? Sorry.
8
1 Q. We know that a detective goes to the scene at 8 o'clock
2 or whatever it is in the morning and with a SOCO, gets
3 the SOCO to pick up all sorts of things at the scene.
4 They are bagged up. In due course, after discussion,
5 some or all of that is sent off to FSANI. At other
6 points people are arrested and DNA is taken from them
7 and samples are submitted to FSANI.
8 You tell me there is no liaison officer in the team
9 between the RUC team and the FSANI. Was there anybody
10 in the team who took responsibility for knowing what
11 there was in terms of scientific materials?
12 A. Yes. Well, I wouldn't say there was no liaison officer
13 on the team. What I would say is that there were
14 conferences every morning and conferences at night and
15 SOCO would have been there, and Mr McBurney and the
16 chief would have been there. So those matters would
17 have been discussed at the conferences, so they would.
18 So, in saying that, those issues would have been
19 discussed at the conference, and, as a result of that,
20 you had an overview of what was being submitted to the
21 scene -- or what was being submitted to forensic.
22 Q. Okay. We know -- we can look at your statement on it,
23 if you like -- on 12th May 1997 Mr Marshall contacted
24 you, as it turned out, to talk about Mr Bridgett's blood
25 being found on Mr Hamill's trousers.
9
1 A. When was that, sir? 12th May? Yes.
2 Q. 12th May. Again, we can look at the paragraph in your
3 statement, if you want?
4 A. No. That's okay.
5 Q. You go on in that -- let's have a look at it. It would
6 be fair to set the context of what I am going to ask.
7 It is page 48, page [81465]. It is the major
8 paragraph at the bottom. The first sentence deals with
9 the contact. The second sentence is:
10 "This information was received after Stacey Bridgett
11 had been charged and had been placed on remand and in
12 custody. The information received was to the effect
13 that Stacey Bridgett's blood had been located at the
14 bottom of Robert Hamill's trouser leg. The initial
15 findings placed Bridgett close to Robert Hamill's feet
16 and the initial forensic scientist's opinion was that
17 this was a blood drop. His opinion was that this
18 initial finding would not support the possibility that
19 Stacey Bridgett was actually assaulting Robert Hamill at
20 the precise time his blood dripped on to Robert Hamill's
21 trousers."
22 Now, the first thing I want to ask about that is:
23 what exchange of information was there between you and
24 him? Because at that point you had got the information
25 that Stacey Bridgett had been standing kicking
10
1 Mr Hamill.
2 A. That's right.
3 Q. Did you pass that on to --
4 A. Oh, I did surely, sir, yes.
5 Q. What was Mr Marshall's response to that?
6 A. Mr Marshall's response was simply he would deal with the
7 forensic end of it. If I think it was like a tear drip
8 or teardrop mark on the trousers, it would indicate
9 a moving, but his view was that the crop indicated that
10 Stacey Bridgett was actually standing over Robert Hamill
11 and it had dripped straight down onto his trousers.
12 Q. Did you discuss whether that was consistent with him
13 standing over and kicking him?
14 A. Yes, that's right. It didn't support that. His view
15 was that it did not support --
16 Q. It did not support him standing over him kicking him?
17 A. He could not say that. What he could simply say was
18 Stacey Bridgett was standing over Robert Hamill when the
19 blood dropped on to his trousers.
20 Q. Let me get this clear. He would not go so far as to say
21 it also followed he was kicking him?
22 A. Absolutely not.
23 Q. But it was his view that it was consistent with him
24 standing over him, whether he was kicking him or not?
25 A. Yes. What he could say simply was that Stacey Bridgett
11
1 was located close to Robert Hamill's trouser leg at that
2 particular time.
3 Q. Well, he ruled out that this had flown through the air
4 and dropped on him from a distance. Is that what you
5 are getting at?
6 A. He would simply say, and he would look at the forensic
7 evidence from a forensic point of view, and he simply
8 said this was a drop of blood. This put Stacey Bridgett
9 in the area of Robert Hamill's trouser leg and that the
10 indication was it was a drop of blood and it wasn't
11 a movement -- Stacey Bridgett wasn't moving at the time.
12 He couldn't say that.
13 Q. Fine. Still on this point, we know that there were
14 other bloodstains on Mr Hamill's clothes that weren't
15 examined at that stage by Mr Marshall.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. We know that now. Were you conscious of that at the
18 time?
19 A. What -- yes. He was still in the process of examining
20 the clothes. So what he had done was he had given me
21 an earlier indication of his finding, but the clothes
22 were still being examined.
23 Q. So?
24 A. It was an ongoing process.
25 Q. So as far as you were concerned, he might, for example,
12
1 as at 12th May, still have had more of Mr Bridgett's
2 blood to find on Mr Hamill 's clothes?
3 A. That's right.
4 Q. As far as you were concerned, this was a heads-up from
5 him and he was carrying on?
6 A. That's correct, yes.
7 Q. Thank you. At page 49 of your statement, [81466], there
8 is a set of lettered paragraphs (a) to (c), and we can
9 look at them in detail, if you want, but the outcome
10 really of all of that is there were discussions about
11 whether to re-interview Bridgett and it was decided not
12 to. Is that a fair precis?
13 A. It was decided that we had no power to get
14 Stacey Bridgett back into police custody.
15 Q. This was a view taken between you and P39 and
16 Mr McBurney. Is that right?
17 A. That's correct. Under the Police Powers Act, if he had
18 been a convicted prisoner, we could have got him under
19 a production order. If he was still in police custody,
20 we could deal with him under PACE, but because he was
21 a charged prisoner, we had to deal with him under the
22 Magistrates' Courts (Northern Ireland) Order, and
23 Article 47(4)(a) and I think it's (4)(e) specifically
24 states that you cannot get -- the only reason that you
25 can get a charged person back into custody is to
13
1 interview him about other offences and not about the
2 offence for which he has been charged.
3 THE CHAIRMAN: Would you have been allowed to go and see him
4 in prison where he was detained?
5 A. You could have went to the prison, sir. Yes, you could
6 have. He didn't have to see you.
7 THE CHAIRMAN: No, I follow.
8 A. And he would have had a solicitor present.
9 MR UNDERWOOD: So is this right: in order to compel him to
10 a police station to be interviewed, you had to go under
11 the order?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. You could have gone to the prison and presumably PACE
14 would have applied?
15 A. No, PACE wouldn't have applied. He wasn't under police
16 detention at that stage.
17 Q. Right.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: But you would need to caution him, wouldn't
19 you?
20 A. Sir, yes, you would have. One, he would have to agree
21 to see you, and, if he didn't want to see you, then you
22 had to walk away again.
23 MR UNDERWOOD: Was any consideration given to asking him to?
24 A. At that time, sir, the examination was still going on.
25 Forensic examinations were still going on. So at that
14
1 time, it wasn't considered -- you know, at that
2 particular time it wouldn't have been a relevant time to
3 go.
4 Q. So it was, as it were, parked, was it?
5 A. That's right, yes.
6 Q. Let's jump ahead. We know that Mr Marshall's report
7 came through eventually in October. Was consideration
8 then given to re-interviewing him?
9 A. At that stage then, the DPP had actually interviewed
10 Mr Marshall or spoken to Mr Marshall as well, and
11 I don't believe it was, because again, what we had is we
12 had Stacey Bridgett located in the vicinity. We knew
13 that he was in the vicinity of Robert Hamill.
14 Constable Neill or somebody had placed him close to
15 Robert Hamill. Reserve Constable Silcock had been over
16 at Robert Hamill when somebody shouted the word,
17 "Stacey", and he looked round and seen a person with
18 blood coming from his nose, I think it was, and one of
19 the females that was with Robert Hamill said, "That's
20 the one that done it".
21 What we did do is we went back to that person and
22 that person denied making that comment to the police
23 officer.
24 Q. So all the more reason to ask Mr Bridgett why he had
25 lied about being miles away from Mr Hamill, isn't it?
15
1 A. Well, sir, we could put him in the vicinity.
2 Q. Sorry, I am not following your answers. I am asking you
3 whether consideration was given to interviewing him, to
4 put to him the disparity between his denial he was near
5 Mr Hamill and Mr Hamill's jeans having his blood on.
6 You tell me that a reason for not doing that is that
7 you had got what we call res gestae evidence, that
8 somebody shouted out the name, "Stacey", and he answered
9 to it, but you followed that up and it went nowhere.
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. Why then, because that went nowhere, is that relevant to
12 the question whether you should re-interview
13 Mr Bridgett?
14 A. I think what we could do, sir, was we could put
15 Stacey Bridgett -- we knew he was telling lies -- at the
16 location, in the vicinity of Mr Hamill.
17 Q. You still have -- I am so sorry. Go on?
18 A. So really -- what we would be saying to him again was,
19 "The blood is putting you in the vicinity of
20 Robert Hamill".
21 THE CHAIRMAN: Might not his answers have been of use?
22 A. Pardon, sir?
23 THE CHAIRMAN: Might not his answers have been of use?
24 A. That's an area, sir -- yes. I am not sure I could
25 answer that, sir. You know, at that particular stage it
16
1 had went to the DPP and we had looked at it and that was
2 at that stage then.
3 MR UNDERWOOD: Let me ask you about that. The crime file --
4 you completed the crime file on 22nd July?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. It had wended its way up to the DPP by early August, so
7 by the time Mr Marshall's report came in a couple of
8 months later.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. The DPP had the file. Would the question of whether to
11 re-interview Mr Bridgett after that have been the
12 subject of a direction from the DPP or at least
13 consideration by the DPP?
14 A. I am not sure whether it would have been, sir.
15 Certainly, at that stage, we had been in consultation
16 with the DPP regarding it. We were waiting on the
17 forensic report, and I think --
18 Q. I am dealing with the position after the forensic report
19 came in.
20 A. Uh-huh, yes. I don't think it would have been
21 a discussion with the DPP, sir. I can't honestly recall
22 having a discussion with them regarding it.
23 Q. Let's just try to get some understanding of the
24 allocation of responsibilities here.
25 As at 1997 -- take this case as an instance -- you
17
1 send a crime file up. A forensic report is awaited. It
2 comes in. So the DPP has the crime file and it has the
3 forensic report?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Assume, for the moment, there was a good reason to
6 re-interview Mr Bridgett as a result of the crime file
7 and the forensic report.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Whose responsibility would it have been to take the
10 decision to re-interview him? Would it have been the
11 responsibility of the RUC undirected or would it have
12 been the responsibility of the DPP to direct it?
13 A. I think in all honesty what we would have done is went
14 to the DPP and spoken to them about it. We wouldn't
15 have interviewed or asked for a further interview or
16 went to the prison to speak to that individual without
17 speaking to the DPP first.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 Going back to the decision that you refer to in
20 page 49, [81466], which is around 15th May 1997, this
21 discussion where you conclude that the time is not right
22 to interview Bridgett, should that have been, in your
23 view, the subject of a policy decision?
24 A. In normal circumstances, yes, it should have been.
25 Q. At that stage, as we understand it, DCI P39 was keeping
18
1 a policy file which ran from 9th to 30th May?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Do I understand your evidence that you didn't know about
4 that policy file until she gave it to you on the 30th?
5 A. No. I would have been aware that a policy file probably
6 was being kept. I wouldn't have been aware of the
7 entries in it, sir.
8 Q. Right. On the question of the forensic science report,
9 we know you were getting these heads-up in May 1997, in
10 particular the one about that blood spot, and the report
11 does not come in, I think, until 24th October 1997.
12 What was done to chase it up?
13 A. I believe in the DPP file, when I submitted it in July,
14 it was highlighted that the forensic report was
15 outstanding. Because the individuals were charged, one
16 of the reasons for continuing whether they were in
17 custody or whatever, it would have been highlighted that
18 the DPP file -- or the forensic report was outstanding.
19 So usually in those circumstances what we would do
20 from the police point of view is ring in -- also
21 a police liaison point within the forensic department.
22 We would be looking to get it chased up, and the DPP
23 would actually be on to the forensic as well. There
24 would be a system where the DPP would be looking the
25 forensic report as well.
19
1 Q. Right.
2 A. I am saying that there was a history at that particular
3 time of late forensic reports. Forensics were late.
4 They had a lot of work on and it was acknowledged or
5 certainly known within the Police Service that forensics
6 were late with their reports.
7 Q. Okay. Can we have a look at page [02336]? This is
8 a message 37. It is dated 12th November 1997. It is
9 yours, I think. Is that right?
10 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.
11 Q. What it records is:
12 "On 12th November I spoke with Mr Marshall, FSANI,
13 reference his forensic report dated 24th October 1997.
14 As a result he tested the items marked unknown A,
15 a sample of blood ..."
16 He goes on about profiles that's checked against:
17 "This examination proved negative with the unknown A
18 remaining outstanding."
19 Now, there is a delay then between 24th November
20 (sic)[October] and 12th November, on the face of it, before
21 anybody does anything about checking unknown A -- and
22 there is an unknown B that is referred to below --
23 against people.
24 Can you tell us about that? What was the response
25 to the report and to this revelation that there was some
20
1 unknown blood?
2 A. What was the response, sir? Well, what I would have
3 done was I would have went through the forensic report.
4 I think it was at that stage it was the first time I had
5 realised that forensic samples had not been taken from
6 a number of individuals that had been in custody. Their
7 DNA samples had been taken.
8 Q. Did you say they had or had not been taken?
9 A. The evidential forensic samples hadn't been taken, but
10 DNA samples had been taken.
11 Q. Uh-huh.
12 A. So, in other words, to assess if the outstanding blood
13 was related to any of those three individuals, I asked
14 him to put it through the DNA database. So he checked
15 the DNA database with those samples and that eliminated
16 it wasn't those three individuals' blood.
17 Q. We know that at about the same time enquiries were made
18 of Ms McCoy and Mr Prunty to establish whether
19 Mr Prunty --
20 THE CHAIRMAN: I am sorry, do you mind if I just ask
21 a question to clear my own mind before you move on?
22 MR UNDERWOOD: Of course.
23 THE CHAIRMAN: If you try to see a man in prison, he can
24 refuse to see you --
25 A. That's correct, sir.
21
1 THE CHAIRMAN: -- or he can see you and refuse to answer
2 questions.
3 A. That is correct, sir.
4 THE CHAIRMAN: If you can have him in a police station, you
5 can interview him, but, equally, he can refuse to answer
6 questions.
7 A. That's correct, sir.
8 THE CHAIRMAN: At that time, no adverse comment could be
9 made in a trial against that refusal.
10 A. That's correct, sir.
11 THE CHAIRMAN: It strikes me that there is no particular
12 advantage of, one, seeing him in prison, as between that
13 and seeing him at the police station. They both pose
14 the same difficulties. He may not cooperate. Is that
15 right?
16 A. That's correct, sir. In the prison he may not even see
17 you.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. But if he doesn't want to talk to you,
19 that's the likely outcome --
20 A. That's right.
21 THE CHAIRMAN: -- whether you see him in prison or in
22 a police station.
23 A. But in the police station you can put questions to him
24 and they are recorded.
25 THE CHAIRMAN: I dare say, but the failure to answer is of
22
1 no value.
2 A. No. That's right, sir.
3 THE CHAIRMAN: I am just wondering, in those circumstances,
4 why, because you could not interview him in a police
5 station, the idea of seeing him or trying to see him in
6 prison was not pursued?
7 A. Well, I think, sir, if you look --
8 THE CHAIRMAN: As though seeing him in the police station
9 had some advantage over the other.
10 A. I think if you look probably at his questions in the
11 police station as well, sir, and his attitude, I don't
12 believe his attitude would have changed much when he had
13 been in prison to his attitude when he was in the police
14 station.
15 THE CHAIRMAN: Is the position really this then: that
16 whether it would have been in prison or would have been
17 at the police station, there seemed to be no purpose in
18 re-interviewing him? Is that really the long and short
19 of it?
20 A. I think it's a case of what would be the value of
21 re-interviewing him again? What evidence are you likely
22 to get?
23 THE CHAIRMAN: Whether it was in prison or in a police
24 station?
25 A. Yes.
23
1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Sorry, Mr Underwood.
2 MR UNDERWOOD: Not at all.
3 While we are still on this document, under "Action"
4 at the bottom, take the last third of it, is that:
5 "Further connected ..."
6 A. "Further corrected".
7 Q. "Page 8 to be forwarded by L Marshall - (also page 7).
8 "2. Re-interview first Colin Prunty and
9 Maureen McCoy to establish if:
10 "(a) Colin Prunty was bleeding.
11 "(b) Maureen McCoy can ID source of blood.
12 "(c) Obtain necessary Buccal swab DNA profile to
13 compare against A."
14 What you are there doing in response to this
15 unknown A blood is checking to see whether Mr Prunty was
16 the possible source of it.
17 Did you consider whether there were any others, for
18 example, the other Catholics you knew of at the scene,
19 Colin Hull, Vincent McNeice, people like that?
20 A. I would strongly believe that it was the blood belonging
21 to Colin Hull. If you look at Colin Hull, Colin Hull
22 came running out of Woodhouse Street the evidence is.
23 He is put in the same ambulance as Robert Hamill. He is
24 bleeding and he is at the hospital and he has blood. So
25 Colin Hull was a very strong candidate for the source of
24
1 the blood. He was located in the right area and there
2 were spots of blood that would have linked him to the
3 incident.
4 Q. Did you try to get his DNA?
5 A. He would not speak to us, Sir. We tried to get him and
6 tried to get him through the solicitor.
7 Q. You can use the name. Rosemary Nelson.
8 A. Can I use the word Rosemary?
9 Rosemary would not answer any of my calls or
10 wouldn't assist me in any particular way, sir.
11 Q. There are references in your statement to her not
12 returning your calls.
13 A. That's correct, sir.
14 Q. Did you consider going round and knocking on her door?
15 A. Sir, I don't think, if Rosemary didn't want to speak to
16 me, she wouldn't speak to me, sir. All you can do is
17 try. I think we tried in letter format as well, sent
18 a letter.
19 I can't answer why she didn't want to speak to me.
20 All I know is I tried to speak to her. There were
21 benefits for everybody in getting the solicitor to talk
22 with us. There was benefits from an investigation point
23 of view and there was benefits from Robert Hamill's
24 family's point of view regarding the flow of
25 information, to the benefit of everybody. It didn't
25
1 happen and it did affect the investigation.
2 Q. Right. From what you have told me about five minutes
3 ago, this message came about because there was
4 a realisation that you had not checked the DNA before.
5 Are you suggesting that there was any lapse of
6 checking DNA before Mr Marshall's report came out?
7 A. Sorry, no. It is not that we had not checked it. What
8 had happened was there had been six or eight individuals
9 that were arrested and evidential samples had been taken
10 from a number of them of them. DNA had been taken from
11 them all. When Mr Marshall then did his report, he
12 would have checked the evidential samples against the
13 outstanding marks.
14 When I saw it, then I realised there were three
15 individuals that had been arrested that had not been
16 checked off with his evidential samples. So I asked him
17 to put the blood against the DNA database. So until
18 that report came through, I wouldn't have been aware of
19 that.
20 Q. Right.
21 In terms of -- again, I am now dealing with the
22 position after Mr Marshall's report came in -- the
23 Bridgett blood on Mr Hamill's trousers, you have dealt
24 with the question of the possibility of re-interviewing
25 Bridgett. I want to ask you now whether there was any
26
1 consideration given to getting any further or better
2 forensic science evidence on the value to be given to
3 the blood spatter itself?
4 A. From another forensic scientist, sir?
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. Well, certainly I hadn't considered it, sir, and I know
7 Mr Davison from the DPP spoke directly to Mr Marshall.
8 No, I had not considered it.
9 Q. That was a matter for Mr Davison, as far as you were
10 concerned anyway?
11 A. Well, he had spoken to Mr Marshall and went through it
12 in great detail at that particular stage, sir.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 I want to move on to the topic of getting the
15 identity of suspects at the scene now.
16 At page 26 of your statement, [81443], you set out
17 actions. At the bottom there under (a):
18 "Action 24, dated 29th April 1997, to identify
19 possible witnesses/persons in the vicinity", etc.
20 At that stage, 29th April, had you any views about
21 the likelihood of people coming forward and being
22 witnesses at court?
23 A. No, sir. I think from an early stage like that you are
24 hunting -- you know, at the end of the day you are
25 hunting the evidence. You are looking to get what
27
1 evidence you can place before a court. So really, at
2 that stage, what I was doing, my initial thought process
3 and those actions was: what are the opportunities to get
4 witnesses here?
5 That simply related in those actions. I was not
6 thinking about court at that particular stage. I was
7 thinking, "Let's get the evidence here. Let's see what
8 witnesses there are. Let's try to manipulate as much
9 information. What's out there? What are the
10 possibilities?"
11 Q. You didn't have a gloomy view, at that stage. You were
12 just doing it with an open mind?
13 A. What I done on the 28th, as I say, when I started to
14 read through it, you start to try to get as much
15 evidence as you possibly can. You look at the positive
16 at that particular time and you run with it.
17 Q. We know a lot of people were at the scene, of course.
18 Did you appreciate that at that point?
19 A. Pardon?
20 Q. Did you appreciate that, at that point, this was a crowd
21 scene we were talking about?
22 A. Oh, yes. Uh-huh.
23 Q. Of course, this was a couple of weeks before HOLMES was
24 brought on to it.
25 A. That's right, yes.
28
1 Q. Was anybody, as it were, put in the position of
2 a statement reader or HOLMES receiver to deal with the
3 information coming in?
4 A. Sir, I had eight people in the office, myself and seven
5 others. I was out running round trying to get
6 witnesses. I was the statement reader. I had taken it
7 on board and I had started what some people refer to as
8 a mini MIRIAM system. I referred to it as an action
9 sheet mini MIRIAM system where what I was doing I was
10 reading the statements, looking at the documents and
11 raising actions to try to get the evidence.
12 So if anybody was doing it, it was me, sir.
13 Unfortunately, I hadn't the luxury of detailing somebody
14 there besides that. We were all not only dealing with
15 this incident, but dealing with everyday incidents that
16 were coming into the CID office as well.
17 Q. Okay. We know, of course, that statements were taken
18 and dated 10th May from Mr Timothy Jameson and
19 Tracey Clarke --
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. -- as part of this process, and that in due course those
22 two were interviewed by the DPP.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. I want to jump ahead to this point. Once statements
25 have been taken from those two, what was your impression
29
1 of the likelihood of them giving evidence?
2 A. I think in my DPP file, sir, I indicated that they would
3 be under pressure to withdraw.
4 Q. Tell us your impression, though, of how they might or
5 might not respond to that pressure? How did you feel?
6 A. How did I feel?
7 Q. You told us you identified to the DPP they might be put
8 under pressure. What I am asking about is what you
9 thought they would do.
10 A. Well, sir, it was common in Northern Ireland for many
11 witnesses to withdraw their evidence and not give
12 evidence at court. It was a regular occurrence that
13 I had seen many, many times before.
14 Q. So is this the fairest analysis of your state of mind
15 then, that you thought it was a risk they would not give
16 evidence?
17 A. I identified there was a risk. There was a strong risk.
18 Here they were living in a community where they had
19 friends, relatives and they had to give evidence against
20 a certain number of individuals. They were young people
21 as well. There would be a lot of pressure on those
22 individuals to withdraw their evidence.
23 Q. We have heard from Mr McBurney through the recording of
24 his interview by the Inquiry that he dealt with
25 Timothy Jameson and Tracey Clarke quite separately on
30
1 this, that, so far as Tracey Clarke was concerned, he
2 thought she was vulnerable, living where she did. He
3 couldn't properly offer her protection that would
4 guarantee that she was going to turn up, whereas with
5 Timothy Jameson, he thought that, because of who
6 Timothy Jameson's family were, there was much less risk
7 that anybody would be able to impress him.
8 Were you party to that thinking?
9 A. I wasn't, sir, no, I wasn't.
10 Q. Were you aware of any efforts that were made to, as it
11 were, keep these witnesses on board?
12 A. I know in relation to Tracey Clarke, sir, Mr McBurney
13 and the chief were liaising, or the chief in particular
14 was liaising with that individual.
15 Q. By "chief" do you mean P39, as we call her?
16 A. Sorry. Yes. Chief Inspector P39. So I know she was
17 liaising mostly with that individual and the family.
18 Q. Are you aware of any steps that were taken with
19 Timothy Jameson or his family?
20 A. No, I wasn't, sir. The first contact I had with
21 Timothy Jameson was when we asked him to go on
22 an identity parade. He declined that offer.
23 Q. I wanted to ask you about that. Let's deal with it now.
24 In your murder file you deal with Mr Allen, "Fonzy" --
25 or rather, let's make this clear, you deal with the
31
1 allegation he made that "Fonzy" was party to the
2 kicking.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You set out in the report that you had identified
5 "Fonzy" at least potentially as Andrew Allen?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. There were two reasons for releasing Mr Allen when you
8 did. The first was there turned out to be a typo about
9 his nickname and, secondly, the need for an identity
10 parade.
11 A. Yes. Was it a typo, or was it in the handwritten
12 statement it looked like either "Fonzy" or "Gonzy"?
13 That was in the handwritten statement, but -- and he was
14 released on bail as such, that, to me, it is
15 irrelevant -- not irrelevant, but certainly, now he, if
16 there had to be an ID parade arranged, it couldn't have
17 been held that day anyway. It had to be organised.
18 Q. So -- so -- I am so sorry. Go on.
19 A. That was a case of you had to release him anyway.
20 Q. So this was all in May 1997?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. It is probably my fault, but I have been unable to find
23 any record of the offer of an identity parade and its
24 refusal, except in your crime file?
25 A. Right-o.
32
1 Q. Can you help us with this? Can you recall how quickly
2 after releasing Mr Allen on bail the identity parade was
3 sought and rejected by Mr Jameson?
4 A. Yes. What happened was that Mr Allen would have been
5 released to a certain date. So I got Detective
6 Constable Honeyford to contact Jameson and to ask him to
7 go on an ID parade, and he declined. So that would have
8 been before the individual had come back on bail.
9 Q. Can you give us any idea of timescales? Would you have
10 done this within days of releasing him?
11 A. Yes, it would have been done.
12 Q. So the chances are still in May 1997, then?
13 A. He was released to come back for bail. I can't remember
14 if he was released for 7 days or 14 days. So it would
15 have been within that period.
16 Q. So there you are with an indication in May that Jameson
17 is now not cooperating. Would that be fair?
18 A. Well, he wouldn't go on an ID parade.
19 Q. Did that raise any alarm bells?
20 A. Yes. That's yes, you know, it certainly had concerns
21 for me that the individuals may not stand up.
22 Q. Did anybody take any steps as a result of that to go
23 round and find out what was going on with him?
24 A. No, not at that stage, sir. I think what you do,
25 unless -- well, it is difficult to go round there and
33
1 take any steps. I think there is very little steps you
2 can take. If a person doesn't want to go on an identity
3 parade, then there is very little steps you can take
4 about that.
5 Q. But here you have got one of only two witnesses who
6 could make the murder charges stick, and within weeks
7 certainly of him giving his statement, he is telling you
8 he is not going to help you. Why is nothing done?
9 A. Sir, he is not saying he is not going to help me. He is
10 saying he is not prepared to go on an identity parade.
11 My personal belief was that he probably did know --
12 although he only knew -- only related "Fonzy" as
13 "Fonzy", he probably did know his -- this individual,
14 and he didn't want to give evidence against him.
15 Q. If we look at page [18096], this is a note of
16 Mr Davison's of 10th October 1997. It may or may not be
17 familiar to you. Let's just take the first few lines:
18 "I spoke today by telephone with DI Irwin at
19 4.00 pm. He informed me that, since Drumcree '97, the
20 attitude of Protestants towards Roman Catholics had
21 hardened and it could not be guaranteed that Witnesses A
22 and B would now be willing to give evidence."
23 As I say, that's 10th October. Quite apart from
24 your heads-up in the crime file, which you sign off on
25 22nd July to the effect that witnesses may be
34
1 intimidated, here you are underlining in October that
2 you have reason to believe there may be even more
3 hardening of the attitude.
4 Was that a fair analysis of your view?
5 A. Yes. I think Drumcree hardened both sides of the
6 community in Portadown.
7 Q. So when it was revealed to you that at the consultation
8 which took place later in October both Tracey Clarke and
9 Timothy Jameson declined to go any further with this,
10 was that any surprise?
11 A. Well, it is not that it wasn't any surprise, sir. It is
12 one of these things that happened, and what can I say
13 about it, sir? You know, these people go in and see the
14 DPP and they don't want to give evidence.
15 Q. Can I ask you about the provision -- I think it is
16 referred to as Article 3 -- by which a witness statement
17 could have been put in in a criminal case if there was
18 reason to believe that the witness wouldn't attend to
19 give evidence because of fear.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Can you help us with how that was used in 1997 or so?
22 A. I think it was in very select cases that it was used and
23 I think the intimidation in relation to this particular
24 aspect could have been people not talking to them or
25 calling them names, things like that. So I have to say
35
1 my knowledge of it is very limited, but I have to say
2 I think it was used very selectively.
3 Q. Have you any experience of it being used?
4 A. I recall it being used, I believe, in Armagh in one
5 incident, but it wasn't on -- it was to prove a contact
6 between a vehicle and a link. It wasn't used in a prima
7 facie that this person had seen an individual doing
8 actually this. It was used to prove a link in a series
9 of cases of a car, seen a car going somewhere else.
10 I think that's the only time I can recall it being
11 used. It wasn't used as such where an individual was
12 witnessing anybody ...
13 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you know if any applications had been made
14 that had been in cases where a witness could speak about
15 an individual --
16 A. No.
17 THE CHAIRMAN: -- but were tried and rejected by the judge?
18 A. No, I can't recall any, sir.
19 MR UNDERWOOD: We know that the consultations that took
20 place with the DPP with both Clarke and Jameson took
21 place with the respective detectives who had taken the
22 statements. That's Mr McAteer and Mr Honeyford.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Did you get any feedback from either of those?
25 A. Sir, I was down at the consultations and I know some
36
1 people have referred that they thought I was in the
2 consultation. I can't recall being in, actually in the
3 consultation. I certainly was down and spoke
4 beforehand. So, yes, they would have come out and said
5 exactly, you know, what that individual said.
6 Q. Was there any consideration given to discussing with
7 these witnesses whether they had actually been warned
8 off by anybody?
9 A. No. As I say, I think senior counsel was at those
10 consultations really, sir. So that would be an area
11 that I certainly wasn't familiar with and even having
12 a discussion with the DPP on.
13 Q. Right. I want to move on to events of 9th May -- move
14 back, rather, to the events of 9th May 1997. Quite
15 a lot happened on that date.
16 One of the things that happened was that two
17 officers came into the police station at a point where
18 you tell us you were pretty much on your way out to go
19 and visit somebody. Your evidence on that is that these
20 two officers came in and you had no substantive
21 discussion with them.
22 A. Actually, I can only recall one of the officers, sir.
23 Q. Right?
24 A. My recollection was that it was -- I was heading out of
25 my office and going down the stairs, or intending to go
37
1 down the stairs, to go to a pre-arranged meeting, and
2 one of the officers told me that he had information
3 regarding an individual who had witnessed the incident,
4 and I can't recall really what he exactly said, sir.
5 I was probably aware that the individual he named,
6 which was Timothy Jameson, had been interviewed that
7 previous day. So I brought him round to Mr McBurney and
8 the Chief Inspector and introduced them to him and left
9 them with those two officers, sir.
10 Q. Right. I want to move on now to what happened then.
11 Can we have a look at page [02203], message 15,
12 dated 9th May 1997? The substance of it is:
13 "Spoke with P38 between 2.05 pm and 2.45 pm
14 accompanied by [P23]."
15 A. I think that should be P23.
16 Q. Right:
17 "He related that he had heard that the persons
18 responsible for the murder in Portadown centre were
19 a person called Rory, a Dean Forbes and a person called
20 Stacey."
21 Then if we go further down to "Action: yes/no", you
22 have written:
23 "No further action."
24 Is that your form?
25 A. That's my message sheet. That went in and that is
38
1 Detective Sergeant Bradley's comment as receiver, "No
2 further action."
3 Q. How would that action, ie," No further action", have
4 come about?
5 A. Detective Sergeant Bradley at that stage was probably
6 aware that Stacey Bridgett, Dean Forbes and
7 Rory Robinson had been arrested, interviewed and charged
8 with the murder and that's why he wrote, "No further
9 action".
10 Q. Because by the time this message gets to him --
11 A. It is through the system.
12 Q. -- it is the 11th or 12th or whatever?
13 A. Yes. Uh-huh.
14 Q. Did you do anything as a result of this information?
15 A. The information could not be brought any further, sir.
16 It was hearsay. The person that gave me that
17 information couldn't tell me, or he wouldn't tell me,
18 where he got it from or on what grounds he had got it.
19 All he heard was at that Rory, Dean Forbes and a person
20 called Stacey were responsible for the murder.
21 Q. Are you aware that this gentleman we are calling P38
22 denies he had this conversation at all?
23 A. Well, if I was P38 now in the same position, I would
24 probably deny it, sir.
25 Q. You maintain you had the conversation, do you?
39
1 A. Yes, sir. I definitely had the conversation.
2 Q. We have a picture, of course, of how busy the GBH and
3 the murder investigation was and how busy individual
4 members of the teams were, and your role both initially
5 and once the matter became a murder investigation.
6 Is this fair: you managed the liaison with the
7 HOLMES unit after the murder, after it became a murder?
8 A. Yes, sir, yes.
9 Q. Managed the investigation team?
10 A. Yes, sir, yes.
11 Q. Ran the conferences?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. That Mr McBurney and P39 were responsible for strategy,
14 policy and decision-making. Is that your --
15 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
16 Q. Give us an impression of how a conference would have
17 gone then, if you are managing the conferences but they
18 have this function.
19 A. What would happen, sir, was -- you have to realise that
20 the HOLMES team were located in Armagh. So you would
21 have had the office manager, the HOLMES office manager
22 who was responsible for all the murders in south region,
23 he would have attended -- sorry, I have taken cramp --
24 he would have attended the Portadown station and the
25 conferences would be in the morning time and probably in
40
1 the afternoon.
2 What would happen is that we would go through the
3 actions and Mr McBurney and the Chief Inspector would be
4 there and they would be asking questions. As I'd go
5 through the actions and the processes of what we were
6 doing that particular day, then Mr McBurney or the Chief
7 Inspector would raise further actions or suggestions or
8 make directions on how it was going. Now that --
9 Q. And that -- sorry. Go on.
10 A. Now that only lasted I would say for two, three weeks,
11 sir, at that process, because, at that stage, officers
12 that were attached to my team had to go back to other
13 investigations and I was left running the investigation
14 with the staff from the Portadown office, the majority
15 of staff from the Portadown office.
16 Q. Would this be fair then, that things that would
17 ordinarily be the subject of entries in a policy book
18 were the subject of discussion and decision-making at
19 these conferences?
20 A. Well, Mr McBurney and the Chief Inspector could have
21 made policy entries in the book that weren't discussed
22 at the conferences. What they were getting was a feel
23 from the team of how the witnesses, how their actions
24 were progressing. So that's what they were getting
25 a feel for at those conferences. It was really the
41
1 working relationship between the team on the ground
2 doing their enquiries and Mr McBurney and the Chief
3 Inspector keeping an overview on the situation.
4 Q. But it was a two-way street, though, was it? They would
5 be understanding what was going on and they would say,
6 "Right. Now go and do this"?
7 A. That's right, sir.
8 Q. You tell us at page 32 of your witness statement, which
9 is at page [81449], if we look to the third entry:
10 "1st May 1997 spoke to Robert's sister Diane ref
11 progress of investigation."
12 Are you aware that two of the Hamill sisters have
13 given evidence that they had a conversation with you in
14 which you told them that the video material that had
15 been seized showed the Land Rover?
16 A. That's correct. I am aware of that, sir, yes.
17 Q. What do you say about that?
18 A. Well, first of all, I would say that conversation
19 I believe took place on 30th October 1997.
20 Q. Right.
21 A. Maybe if somebody could pull up my notebook entry for
22 that day?
23 Q. I am sure they can. I confess I don't have it at my
24 fingertips.
25 A. Let me see. Well -- yes. It might be -- oh, sorry.
42
1 I can't get my notebook entry. What happened as
2 a result of that, sir, was actually the, "See no evil,
3 hear no evil", book reference 41231, and page 32 of it
4 I think Diane mentions that on 30th October that I had
5 told her that the Land Rover had been seen on the
6 incident or had been seen on the video.
7 Then Mo Mowlam was involved in November, and there
8 is correspondence as well around that time which
9 indicates it was that particular stage in which she
10 suggested the family had heard that the Land Rover was
11 on the video. Again, we responded to that by saying,
12 "No, the Land Rover wasn't on the video."
13 What actually happened on that particular date was
14 the charges had been withdrawn from a number of
15 individuals in October, and Diane and her two sisters
16 had called at the police station and I think my notebook
17 would reflect that they were distressed, and rightly so,
18 and they were aggravated. We had a discussion, and we
19 talked about the video evidence again, sir, because
20 I had spoken to Diane on a number of occasions about it.
21 What I was trying to --
22 Q. Sorry. Just pause there. This was not the first time
23 you had spoken to her about the video evidence then?
24 A. No, absolutely not. I had spoken to Diane before and
25 said there was no video evidence. So we are now on
43
1 30th October. What I was trying to explain to them was
2 the Land Rover was located outside the First Trust Bank.
3 It had moved from there and it had moved down to the
4 junction outside the Alliance & Leicester, I think it
5 is. The only chance that ever the video -- of any video
6 recording ever getting the Land Rover would have been
7 outside the First Trust Bank, and all it possibly would
8 have seen was the side of the Land Rover, if it had got
9 it. But there was no video in the First Trust Bank, so
10 we would have never got the Land Rover on it.
11 Now, whether I didn't explain myself properly or, in
12 the circumstances, it was taken up wrongly, but there
13 was never any police Land Rover there I was aware that
14 was on any police video -- or any video. It may have
15 been my fault. I can't honestly say what happened, but
16 I can assure you I never saw any police Land Rover on
17 any video and it was never on any video.
18 Q. Why was there more than one discussion about the video
19 then?
20 A. Diane came in on 1st May. She was raising those issues.
21 Q. That's why I was asking about 1st May. That was their
22 evidence; that it was about that stage that you told
23 them that the Land Rover was visible on the video.
24 A. No, I didn't, because if you look at the action sheet
25 regarding the video, what happened was DC Keys had went
44
1 and checked the videos. He had done that on the Monday
2 morning of the 28th I think it was, when I was in
3 Banbridge.
4 As a result of that meeting with Diane on 1st May
5 I went back and checked with the Chief Inspector and
6 with DC Keys -- and I think it's on the action sheet --
7 checked with them again that there was no video
8 evidence.
9 Q. But at that point, there was no complaint against the
10 police, was there?
11 A. I'm not sure when the complaint ...
12 Q. It came in on 8th May.
13 A. Right-o. Okay.
14 Q. The proposition is, you see, as of 28th April and
15 1st May, you were not worrying whether the video showed
16 the Land Rover, because you had no interest in what the
17 Land Rover was doing, because at that stage you were
18 looking for the murder.
19 A. That's right.
20 Q. Or you were looking for the GBH, more accurately.
21 A. But when Diane came in to speak me on 1st May, she
22 was -- and again rightly so -- in a distressed state,
23 very aggravated, was very concerned regarding why she
24 believed the police had sat in the Land Rover and had
25 not got out until the ambulance persons had arrived.
45
1 She was annoyed at the police making no arrests,
2 immediate arrests at the scene, and the fact also of the
3 press report as well.
4 So Diane was very focused on the police issue.
5 I was investigating -- yes, I was investigating the
6 murder, but Diane at that stage was very -- and properly
7 so -- she was very focused on the police, how they
8 operated at the scene
9 Q. We know that although there was the complaint by
10 Rosemary Nelson that I think was logged on 8th May,
11 there also seems to have been a self-referral, or at the
12 chief constable's instigation, at about the same time.
13 Did you pass up to anybody else the concerns that
14 were being expressed to you by the family about
15 inactivity on the part of the Land Rover officers?
16 A. Yes, sir. We were very aware of it, sir, yes. The
17 Chief Inspector was very aware of it as well.
18 Q. From the family or from other reports?
19 A. No. I think early on what happened was that we had been
20 speaking with xxxxxxxxxxx, I think it's
21 xxxxxxxxxxx, the common law partner of Robert,
22 and she was over in Lurgan. We had been speaking to her
23 and I had certainly been down with Robert's mother and
24 I know that the Chief Inspector had also been down with
25 Robert's mother. So at that particular stage we were
46
1 briefing them on the investigation. So at that stage,
2 no, there was no strong views coming back through the
3 family at that particular time.
4 Q. Sorry. I am not getting this clear. Certainly by
5 1st May Diane is concerned --
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. -- that there is inactivity at this time on the part of
8 the four in the Land Rover.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. You are saying that the Chief Inspector, P39 as we are
11 calling her, was aware of that concern?
12 A. She would have been, yes.
13 Q. She was picking that up from the family herself, was
14 she?
15 A. I'd say she was, yes.
16 Q. You touched earlier on the HOLMES account being run from
17 Gough Barracks?
18 A. That's right.
19 Q. Practically speaking, how did this work?
20 A. Well, I think if you look -- practically speaking,
21 because of the amount of murders in Northern Ireland and
22 in south region, we had one HOLMES team in south region,
23 and they had I think it was six full-time operators, and
24 in order to -- every murder investigation has demands on
25 it, and for those officers to work the HOLMES system it
47
1 was better for them that all the murder accounts were
2 run from Gough so that they could work at those
3 accounts.
4 In some cases, murders -- the HOLMES team did work
5 from certain stations. In Portadown, unfortunately, we
6 hadn't the facilities and we didn't get those facilities
7 until 1998. I believe there would be a report there,
8 sir, about an inch thick, where we had been applying to
9 get a HOLMES room in Portadown, and we fought and we
10 fought for it, and we got one I think it was in 1998.
11 Q. You obviously feel strongly about this, but this was not
12 what I was asking you about.
13 A. Just to bring it on then, sir, what happened was then
14 that in Gough what we would do at the conferences we'd
15 put in the action sheets, put in the messages. Those
16 would be taken away by the HOLMES office manager. They
17 would be brought over to Armagh and then new actions
18 come back for the conference later on that night.
19 What happened then would be that the SIO and that
20 would travel over at some stage to Armagh and then look
21 at the actions and sign them off.
22 Q. And if you wanted to interrogate the system, you would
23 have to go to Gough to do it?
24 A. Yes. I wasn't -- I was self-trained on HOLMES, so
25 I would have to ask the office manager or somebody to
48
1 assist me in interrogating the system.
2 THE CHAIRMAN: Could you telephone?
3 A. Yes, sir, you could telephone. You would regularly be
4 on the telephone as well, sir. It was a process of the
5 office manager working with us at the conferences and
6 then telephones throughout the day, if we needed
7 telephones or telephone conversations to confirm or deny
8 such.
9 MR UNDERWOOD: Have you now had experience of operating
10 a HOLMES account without the added distance?
11 A. I have, sir, yes.
12 Q. In the light of that experience, can you tell us whether
13 having a satellite use, as it were, had an impact on the
14 way the investigation went?
15 A. Yes. I think actually the HOLMES team still work from
16 Armagh now and it seems to work quite well, but the
17 structures are different, in that the murder
18 investigation teams are probably located in
19 Gough Barracks in Armagh as well.
20 So the structures are different now than what they
21 were back in 1997. So yes, it certainly had his
22 disadvantages. It would have been more advantageous to
23 have a HOLMES team beside you working with you as a unit
24 in Portadown. There were many advantages for it. There
25 were lots of disadvantages, I found, from not having
49
1 a HOLMES team beside me.
2 Q. Presumably the whole purpose of HOLMES is that you can
3 interrogate and, whenever you want, get a snapshot of
4 where things are --
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. -- to help your thinking? Having an office manager who
7 is coming and going and not continually part of your
8 murder team --
9 A. That's right, sir.
10 Q. -- presumably was a disadvantage. Is that fair?
11 A. Oh, that's correct, sir. I think that was highlighted
12 very much, too, in the Blakeley Report in 2003, the
13 difficulties with HOLMES and murder investigations.
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Are you moving on now?
15 MR UNDERWOOD: I am.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: We will break off until 12.10 pm.
17 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you.
18 (11.57 am)
19 (A short break)
20 (12.10 pm)
21 MR UNDERWOOD: More than halfway there I think, Mr Irwin.
22 A. Okay, sir.
23 Q. I want to ask about identity parades and similar.
24 We know that Marc Hobson had a confrontation with
25 Constable Neill. That, as far as I am aware, is the
50
1 only form of identity parade or similar that was
2 conducted in the entire murder investigation. Is that
3 right?
4 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
5 Q. What thought was given as to whether identity parades
6 should be held?
7 A. I think we went through the process as dictated under
8 PACE regarding identity parades. Each one of the
9 individuals in interview were asked did they want to go
10 on an identity parade, and they refused. So I think,
11 yes, we complained about PACE, the regulations
12 regarding, not only the whole identity process under
13 PACE, if you look at -- we have the photographs, and the
14 identity parade, and then you move to confrontation.
15 You can't show photographs if you have suspects, and
16 then you go -- so we could not show photographs in this
17 particular case.
18 So then you had to move to the identity parade
19 process, and what you would do is you would look at each
20 individual case and consider it and make a judgment
21 decision whether it was beneficial or what it would
22 achieve.
23 Q. Right.
24 A. I think in this particular case we went through the
25 process.
51
1 Q. Let me put some particular possibilities to you. You
2 had Mr Lunt charged because of Mr Prunty's evidence.
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Can you help us whether consideration was given to
5 having any sort of confrontation or any other form of
6 identification exercise between those two?
7 A. Could I see Mr Prunty's statement, please?
8 Q. I am sure you can. Again, I don't have it at my
9 fingertips. While that's being looked at, can I move on
10 to others and then we can come back to it?
11 A. Yes, certainly.
12 Q. You also told us earlier on about officers who had been
13 at the scene and while there was at least talk of what
14 might have been Stacey Bridgett, and I think Mr Cooke
15 and Mr Silcock. It does not matter who they were, but
16 I am referring back to the evidence you gave 20 minutes
17 ago of someone being pointed out as Stacey with the
18 nosebleed.
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Again, was consideration given to officers being given
21 the opportunity to confront Stacey Bridgett?
22 A. I would have to check the details on that, sir. I think
23 in addition to that particular case, Mr McBurney --
24 there was a policy log decision regarding confrontations
25 or police officers going on identity parades. I'm not
52
1 sure. I would need to check or somebody would need to
2 check the policy book as well, if they could, regarding
3 other police going on identity parades.
4 Q. If that's the subject of a policy book, then necessarily
5 that's before 30th May, isn't it?
6 A. That's right.
7 Q. Then we can check that. Thank you. Apart from
8 an inkling you have that there might have been a policy
9 decision about that --
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. -- that's the only evidence you can give, is it?
12 A. That's correct. Again, sir, you would have to look at
13 each individual statement and make the judgment decision
14 whether it was appropriate to put them on an identity
15 parade, so it would be, and I would have to look at each
16 individual statement and see what the thought process
17 was behind.
18 Q. You appreciate I am asking a lot of questions of you --
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. -- that I would otherwise have asked of Mr McBurney?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. If you can't answer, that's fine.
23 A. I know. Certainly my view on Mr Hull was that he
24 couldn't identify the individual -- not Mr Hull;
25 Mr Prunty.
53
1 Q. Mr Prunty.
2 A. He identified the individual as wearing a red, white and
3 blue scarf that was put into a Land Rover and taken out
4 of a Land Rover, and I think -- I believe in my DPP file
5 I made reference to that fact --
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. -- that the identification of Lunt wasn't identification
8 of the individual, but the identification of the
9 circumstances that linked Lunt to the case, in that
10 a person was arrested wearing a red, white and blue
11 scarf, he was placed in the Land Rover and taken out.
12 Mr Prunty was saying, "The individual that was
13 placed in the Land Rover wearing a red, white and blue
14 scarf was the individual that I saw assaulting
15 Robert Hamill". In those circumstances, if that is the
16 case, then --
17 Q. It is the case.
18 A. It is the case? Then I would consider not holding
19 an identity parade on those circumstances, because he
20 was giving us a set of circumstances.
21 THE CHAIRMAN: In other words, Prunty could say what the man
22 had done --
23 A. That's correct.
24 THE CHAIRMAN: -- where he went --
25 A. That's correct.
54
1 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and what he saw happen to him there?
2 A. Yes.
3 THE CHAIRMAN: An officer who could say, "Yes, that was
4 a man who came, and he was so and so"?
5 A. That's correct, sir.
6 THE CHAIRMAN: So you get the identification in that way?
7 A. It's a sequence of events, sir. In those circumstances,
8 I would not consider -- he was not saying, "I identified
9 the actual individual, and, if I see him again, I would
10 know him again". He identified an individual wearing
11 a particular scarf, a red, white and blue scarf, that
12 went into a police Land Rover, came back out of it
13 again. He said, "That individual there was the
14 individual that assaulted Robert Hamill".
15 Q. That's very helpful. We can look at Mr Prunty's
16 statement, if you want --
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. -- but I am happy with that answer, as long as you are
19 happy.
20 A. I believe in the DPP file I actually made reference to
21 that fact.
22 Q. Again, we can look at that, but you are right --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. -- and I don't need to take you to that unless you want
25 to.
55
1 A. Okay.
2 Q. The only other one I want to ask you about in terms of
3 a possible confrontation is Hobson, because you heard
4 from Tracey Clarke only the description that he was
5 called "Muck", or rather that a person was called
6 "Muck".
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. You then got, as it were, 2 and 2 together and worked
9 out that was Marc Hobson. Is that fair?
10 A. Yes. I believe in interview we put that he was referred
11 to as "Muck", and did he confirm that?
12 Q. He did. Of course, you also then have the confrontation
13 carried out with PC Neill and him.
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. Again -- I sense the answer to this may be it wasn't
16 your job -- can you help us about whether there was
17 consideration given to a confrontation between
18 Tracey Clarke and him?
19 A. I'm sure there was, sir, but again, I would say that the
20 solicitors were objecting on the grounds of recognition.
21 This was a recognition case, and they found it pointless
22 to put on an ID parade where there is recognition.
23 So I think it was a case then that the police
24 officer that actually saw him assaulting or kicking at
25 Robert Hamill was put on the confrontation, and again,
56
1 a judgment decision, sir.
2 Q. Fine. If we look at page 30 of your statement, [81447],
3 you deal with interviewing Allister Hanvey. It is in
4 the first paragraph.
5 A. That's correct, sir.
6 Q. If I can pick up the second sentence:
7 "In addition, I was mindful that in speaking to
8 these witnesses we could be potentially be speaking to
9 one of the assailants. An example of such was the
10 interview of Allister Hanvey by detective
11 Sergeant Bradley and myself on 7th May 1997 in which
12 a witness statement was recorded. My notebook entry
13 states, 'Spoke with an Allister Hanvey [address blanked
14 out], Portadown, ref movements in Portadown town centre.
15 D Sergeant Bradley recorded witness statement after
16 initial conversation'. If, during that interview
17 process, I had established reasonable grounds to conduct
18 an arrest for the assaults, then this course of action
19 would have been pursued. In conducting this interview,
20 I was able to assess and make a reasoned judgment on the
21 benefits of possible arrest and interview process at
22 that stage or to continue with enquiries, in order to
23 gather further evidence."
24 What I want to ask about that is, did you have any
25 particular reason, as of 7th May, to think that
57
1 Allister Hanvey might have been one of the assailants
2 other than the mere fact that anybody there might have
3 been?
4 A. No, sir. What I am trying to show there is that, when
5 I was briefing the officers, we were very aware when you
6 are speaking to these individuals here, we were
7 continually assessing, getting vibes from them, if you
8 could feel -- police work, and if there was
9 an opportunity that I felt that could be used or there
10 was a weakness in one individual that you thought there
11 was something more to say his involvement, then we would
12 take appropriate action.
13 So what you were doing at that stage, you were
14 assessing them all. So Allister Hanvey was one of those
15 individuals. As you moved in the interview process, you
16 got a feel for individuals that were closer to the scene
17 than other individuals. You were eliminating or you
18 were assessing and some number of individuals you would
19 say, "Well, they were probably outside the immediate
++
20 area of the attack. Here's individuals that were closer
21 to the attack", and you were trying to assess those
22 individuals.
23 Q. So you were far from accepting at face value anything
24 that these witnesses told you during these processes?
25 A. Well, you had to -- you know, they gave you an account.
58
1 You had to take what they said, but at the same time you
2 were continually assessing these individuals. You were
3 looking for any opportunity to progress the
4 investigation.
5 Q. Okay. Can I ask you to look at page [16048]? Can we
6 have this and [16049] up on screen together, please?
7 Thank you. You can see, if you can read the text, this
8 is a document D40. It is dated 9th May 1997. On the
9 right-hand side "Text" and "Comment" is what I am after:
10 "Source states that Allister Hanvey from Portadown
11 was responsible for the beating of Robert Hamill,
12 Portadown.
13 "Comment: this refers to the beating and subsequent
14 death of Robert Hamill who died on 8.5.97 as a result of
15 an assault on 27.4.97."
16 Then it says some more about Robert Hamill and
17 Allister Hanvey. Then:
18 "CID Portadown informed.
19 "End of text."
20 There is an update then on 2nd June 1997:
21 "Allister Hanvey has been arrested and charged re
22 murder of Robert Hamill. Charged on 10 May 1997."
23 That's signed off by you as the update. What I want
24 to ask you about that is: were you conscious of this
25 information on 9th May?
59
1 A. Oh, dear! I couldn't honestly tell you that, sir.
2 I may have been.
3 Q. We see what type of document it is. We see that it
4 was -- that CID Portadown informed presumably on
5 9th May.
6 A. Yes. Uh-huh.
7 Q. In the ordinary course, if something like this had come
8 in ...
9 A. You would usually be informed of it. Mr McBurney, the
10 Chief Inspector or myself would have been informed of
11 it. Then I would have thought it would have somehow
12 been brought into the HOLMES system. I'm not sure.
13 Q. What, the fact that it's marked D40 suggests that it was
14 brought into the HOLMES system?
15 A. That's right.
16 Q. As far as we can tell, nothing was done to follow this
17 up. Have you any comment on that?
18 A. All I can -- Allister Hanvey has been arrested and
19 charged with the murder of Robert Hamill.
20 Q. No. What I mean is you have a source stating that
21 Allister Hanvey --
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, it may well be that sources are not going to talk
24 to detectives. It may well be that they might. What
25 I am asking is for you to comment on the apparent fact
60
1 that nobody did anything by way of, for example, asking
2 whether the source would be prepared to talk to
3 detectives?
4 A. Certainly I didn't, sir, no. I can't answer for
5 Mr McBurney or the Chief Inspector, but, you know,
6 I wouldn't have expected myself to be asking to speak to
7 the source. It would have been at a higher level.
8 Q. That would ideally have been something I would ask
9 Mr McBurney about?
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. Can we look at page 42 of your statement, please, which
12 is at page [81459]? You are dealing here with the
13 arrests on 10th May 1997, and at (c) you say:
14 "The Hanvey search team would not have been briefed
15 on the Atkinson/Hanvey issue, although
16 Detective Constable McAteer was obviously aware of the
17 full circumstances. Nor was the search team briefed
18 about a potential 'burn site' as the investigation team
19 was not aware of any allegation that clothes were
20 burnt."
21 Of course, Mr Atkinson is not involved. We can look
22 at (a) for this as well, if we may:
23 "Detective Chief Superintendent McBurney directed
24 that the arrest and search operation would not include
25 the individual Reserve Constable Robert Atkinson."
61
1 What I want to ask about that is, bearing in mind
2 thought was obviously given to Mr Atkinson during the
3 arrest stages, was thought given to arresting
4 Mr Atkinson?
5 A. I am sure it was. Mr McBurney was in charge of that
6 whole operation, in that he was directing me on the
7 number of people that were being arrested. I was trying
8 to get arrest -- or search teams from outside the
9 division, and he was saying, "I need six", or, "I need
10 seven". I can't recall. So what I was doing at that
11 particular time was trying to organise those things.
12 So yes, I'm sure Mr McBurney had considered
13 arresting Reserve Constable Atkinson. I can't
14 honestly -- really I can't answer whether he had or not.
15 Q. You told us earlier on about the way in which
16 conferences worked.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. A two-way street where Mr McBurney and P39 would soak up
19 information about how the investigation was going and
20 would also give directions.
21 We know also that by the early morning of 10th May
22 you had statements from Timothy Jameson and
23 Tracey Clarke which name the individuals whom you are
24 setting about arresting.
25 A. Yes.
62
1 Q. Can you help us with whether there was a conference
2 about the consequences of those statements and the
3 direction given to arrest?
4 A. No. What happened, those statements were taken late at
5 night, so there was an immediate arrest the next
6 morning. So there was no conferences between the
7 statements and these individuals -- the searches being
8 organised and the arrests being made. The next morning
9 after that would have been a conference in relation to
10 the interview process and the debriefing from the
11 searches --
12 Q. Right.
13 A. -- and other actions that were still continuing in
14 relation to that. So Mr McBurney made the direction,
15 you know, obviously not to include Reserve Constable
16 Atkinson.
17 Q. At item (d) on this page you say:
18 "Each search team would have been provided with the
19 details of relevant footwear and clothing of each of the
20 individuals concerned and the grounds for their
21 arrests."
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. Can you help us about the breadth of the expected
24 searches for footwear and clothing?
25 A. Sir, everything. Again, it's a judgment decision.
63
1 I think most police officers would agree there is no
2 point in going into a house and bringing every item of
3 clothing and every item of footwear to forensic, because
4 you would simply be asked to come down to forensic and
5 remove items and try to be more specific, because they
6 have not got the capability of doing that.
7 So what would have happened was that we would have
8 been looking at the statements and the evidence -- the
9 statements from witnesses and police officers to try and
10 identify what items they actually were wearing, and
11 I think Reserve Constable Warnock -- obviously we had
12 Hanvey's own statement at that time, but I think Reserve
13 Constable Warnock had given an account of what the
14 individual was wearing.
15 Q. Uh-huh.
16 A. So you would have been trying to be specific. At the
17 same time, they are judgment decisions. If you see
18 coats in a room, or whatever, where this individual is,
19 you would expect them to be lifted as well if there was
20 some coat similar to what the exact, specific ...
21 Q. You see, we know that the search of Allister Hanvey's
22 home was curtailed once they had found clothes that were
23 consistent with what he had described in his exculpatory
24 statement of 7th May. Can you explain why that
25 happened?
64
1 A. I would think you would need to look at Reserve
2 Constable Warnock's statement.
3 Q. Well, we know what Reserve Constable Warnock said.
4 A. Did he not --
5 Q. I will tell you now. He said there was a black jacket
6 with grey sleeves involved. Hanvey said he had a black
7 CAT jacket, and the search was stopped after they found
8 the black CAT jacket. It was not extended to look for
9 anything else?
10 A. Right-o.
11 Q. Can you comment on that?
12 A. All I can comment on, sir, if you look at my notebook
13 entry for that morning, was that the individuals -- the
14 search team or the search teams and the CID officers
15 attached to the search teams would have all been briefed
16 together at Portadown station. They would all have been
17 briefed, and I think if you look at all the other
18 searches as well to check everywhere, and attics were
19 checked, clothes lines were checked, sheds were checked.
20 So they were all briefed together. They were all
21 briefed to seize clothing and footwear believed to be
22 relevant.
23 I can't say what happened at the search teams, sir,
24 or what judgment decisions were made at that particular
25 time. All I can tell you is, from my briefing,
65
1 I believed they were thorough -- you know, the briefing
2 was thorough on what to search for.
3 Now, on saying that, what did happen was that we
4 searched Allister Hanvey's house, and during the
5 interview of Allister Hanvey he had said that he was at
6 his uncle's house, Thomas Hanvey's house. So then we
7 went and searched that house.
8 What then happened is that an individual,
9 Jonathan Wright, he came in and made a statement on the
10 11th, after those two searches had been conducted, and
11 he said that Allister Hanvey was wearing a casual top,
12 an orange casual top
13 Q. Silver with orange stripes?
14 A. Silver with orange stripes. So then we went back again
15 and looked for that coat, both in Allister Hanvey's
16 house and in Thomas Hanvey's house.
17 Q. Was that the sole reason for the re-searches on the 13th?
18 A. That was the reason. New evidence had come in that he
19 was wearing a different type of jacket than described by
20 Reserve Constable Warnock.
21 Q. Very well. I want to move on from the searches to
22 Mr Atkinson.
23 We know that Mr McBurney considered himself as
24 running two investigations that were inextricably
25 linked. The first was the murder and the other was the
66
1 neglect complaint --
2 A. That's correct, sir.
3 Q. -- which was apparently supervised by the ICPC. We also
4 know that the tip-off allegation contained in
5 Tracey Clarke's statement about Mr Atkinson talking to
6 Mr Hanvey was treated by Mr McBurney as part of the
7 complaint.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Were you given to understand why it was treated that way
10 rather than as part of the murder?
11 A. No. I just thought that -- personally, I thought it was
12 all being supervised by the ICPC, sir, because of the
13 allegation, and it was closely linked to that.
14 I thought it was all being supervised by the ICPC.
15 Q. Can you help us with why you thought that?
16 A. I can't, sir. I was running the murder investigation.
17 Mr McBurney certainly had the initial meeting with the
18 ICPC and that, and I just believed that they were taking
19 over that whole area, dealing with the whole area.
20 Q. You have, as of 10th May 1997, the allegation contained
21 in Tracey Clarke's witness statement about the tip-off,
22 and yet Mr Atkinson was not interviewed about that until
23 9th September 1997. Can you help us with why that was?
24 A. No, sir. That would have been -- you know, that would
25 have been linked with the ICPC investigation that
67
1 Mr McBurney was liaising with the ICPC on.
2 Q. Were you conscious that telephone analysis which showed
3 a telephone call from the Hanvey household to the
4 Atkinson household in the early hours, at 8.30 or so, on
5 27th April, became available in May?
6 A. I know [name redacted] had an intelligence document.
7 Q. Can you help us with -- I bear in mind what the Chairman
8 said about redaction -- how telephone records were made
9 available and made usable in those days?
10 A. In those early days there were -- different companies
11 had different attitudes to producing evidential
12 material. If they produced it -- when you applied for
13 it, it was usually supplied as an intelligence document
14 and that couldn't be used in evidence.
15 Q. Or to put to suspects?
16 A. No. You wouldn't show the document. No, you wouldn't
17 show the document. You could maybe suggest that we had
18 intelligence that a telephone call was made.
19 Q. What steps would you have to make if you wanted to turn
20 that into evidential material?
21 A. You would have to apply for evidential steps or you
22 could get the individual, as Mr McBurney done, to supply
23 the phone call -- or the phone billing, apply for
24 billing.
25 Q. How unwieldy was it to get a phone company to make it
68
1 evidential?
2 A. Different companies acted differently. Some of them
3 wouldn't respond to you at all. Others had a large
4 backlog of material. So it was different companies,
5 different policies, different attitudes. They had no
6 legal reason to respond, I don't believe, at that stage.
7 Q. Right. I have a few random issues, as if these
8 questions have not been random enough.
9 One is about a gentleman called John Lynne. If we
10 look at page [09281], you will see -- this is
11 a statement of yours of 10th June 1997 -- from the
12 second sentence of it:
13 "On 10th June '97 between 12.20 am and 2.45 am I was
14 at the scene of the resiting of a police Land Rover ...
15 at Market Street, Portadown. During that time a person
16 who I now know to be" and take it from me it is
17 John Lynne, "introduced himself to me. He had enquired
18 what we were doing and I explained this to him. He then
19 entered his flat. A short time later, he returned and
20 stated he wanted to talk to me off the record reference
21 the attack on 27th April 1997. He stated he had thought
22 about this in the flat. He related he had witnessed the
23 incident and outlined his recollection of events. He
24 indicated points in Thomas Street where he saw two
25 persons being assaulted. He related he was disgusted at
69
1 the media coverage and in particular that the RUC had
2 received unfair criticism. He believed the police had
3 done an excellent job. He related that originally, on
4 seeing the incident, that he didn't see any police. He
5 then saw about 3 police and there was a crowd of about
6 30 to 40 persons. He related that they were helpless.
7 However, when other police arrived, they quickly moved
8 the crowd."
9 We get from that he didn't want to make
10 a statement --
11 A. That's right.
12 Q. -- and, if you need to be refreshed about that, the rest
13 of this statement tells us that.
14 Tell us about the position in 1997 where you get
15 people like that coming and saying, "I want to talk to
16 you off the record. I have got some useful information
17 but I am blowed if I am going to help you by giving
18 a statement".
19 Was that at all common?
20 A. You would always have casual contacts who would contact
21 you, but wouldn't want it to be known that they
22 contacted you or they wouldn't want to be involved in
23 the process of law. So probably in a certain way they
24 felt within themselves they had done what they could
25 reasonably, but they were not prepared to go and give
70
1 evidence to that effect.
2 Q. With him, did you just write that off then, or did you
3 take --
4 A. Yes, sir. He made it, you know, abundantly clear that
5 he wasn't going to give evidence. He wasn't going to
6 make a statement. He just wanted to say what he said
7 and that he didn't want to give evidence.
8 Q. Then I want to move on to the coroner. We know that --
9 again, I can refresh your memory from documents if you
10 like -- you were instrumental in arranging for the
11 coroner, Mr Leckey, to talk to, in particular,
12 Tracey Clarke.
13 A. That's correct, sir.
14 Q. Did you have to talk to her to do this or was that done
15 by letter, can you recall?
16 A. I think -- I don't believe I talked to her, sir.
17 I can't have any recollection. If there's a document
18 there that I did talk to her, I did. I think it was
19 done by letter, so I do. I believe that the coroner
20 pursued that line. If I assisted him by calling out at
21 her house to get her address or where she was living at
22 that particular time, I would accept that, sir, but
23 I can't have any recollection of specifically talking to
24 her.
25 Q. Let me try you with this. We know that, having given
71
1 her witness statement in the early hours of 10th May,
2 the next time she was talked to, as far as we can tell,
3 about her evidence was at the consultation on
4 17th October 1997, and she said, according to Mr Davison
5 and Mr Kerr, she related the events consistently with
6 her police statement, but then said she would not give
7 evidence, because she loved Allister Hanvey and because
8 she knew the others she had named, but at no stage in
9 that did she deny that what she said in her police
10 statement was true. Do you follow?
11 A. Okay, sir.
12 Q. Likewise, when she spoke to Mr Leckey, she did not deny
13 that what was in the police statement was true.
14 Did you have any dealings with her at any stage in
15 which to you she denied the truth of the police
16 statement?
17 A. No, I don't believe I had any dealings with
18 Tracey Clarke. If I had, it was on a minor issue, sir.
19 Q. Right.
20 A. But I can't recall ever having any discussion with her
21 at all regarding her statement.
22 Q. Fine. I want to move on to Andrea McKee and the meeting
23 you had with Andrea McKee on 8th May 1997.
24 We can look at it if you need to, but you were
25 interviewed by several people about this over the years?
72
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. When you were interviewed by the Police Ombudsman's
3 service about this, you said that you thought at that
4 meeting she was frightened or scared; in fact, scared
5 for her life.
6 A. That's correct, sir.
7 Q. Tell us about that meeting. Tell us about the
8 impression you got of her.
9 A. Well, how it happened, sir, was that the Reserve
10 Constable had come in and given the information about
11 Tracey Clarke being involved. Mr McBurney had then
12 directed that the officers go out and talk to
13 Tracey Clarke. Tracey Clarke denied seeing anything,
14 witnessing anything, and Mr McBurney then -- when the
15 officers came back and seen that, Mr McBurney says,
16 "Let's go and talk to the source of the information".
17 So arrangements were made then to talk to the person who
18 came to be known as Andrea McKee.
19 I had never met her before, knew nothing about her,
20 and we met her up at the Seagoe cemetery I believe it
21 was. Certainly to me, sir, she appeared very
22 frightened, and although she wanted to give the
23 information, she certainly didn't want her name released
24 or let it be known that she had given this information
25 to us.
73
1 Q. There is a suggestion that she was somehow aggrandising
2 herself by doing this. Can you help us with whether she
3 appeared to you to be -- I don't know -- looking for
4 glory or trying to make trouble for anybody?
5 A. Sir, to be honest with you, it was a five or ten-minute
6 interview in the dark, as I say. I didn't know her
7 before, and all -- she seemed to be telling us the
8 truth, what we got from her, and at the same time she
9 seemed to be helpful. So I can't say about the
10 glorifying, certainly at that stage.
11 Q. We know from your statement as well as from her that one
12 of the things she told you was about the alleged tip-off
13 from Atkinson to Hanvey.
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. We also know that on 9th May the telephone records were
16 sought --
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. -- before Tracey Clarke was re-interviewed.
19 A. Right.
20 Q. You are not the only one to have been surprised by that.
21 Can I ask you whether you can help on whether the reason
22 why the telephone records were sought was because of
23 Andrea McKee's revelation?
24 A. I think the allegation being made, you know, that would
25 be a natural progression. It would be a high profile
74
1 action to get.
2 Q. How did it strike you when she told you about this
3 tip-off?
4 A. Well, sir, it is like anything. You know, you get
5 an allegation like that. It's a dirty police officer
6 doing that sort of action. All I have to say is they
7 need rooted out and I would love to have been able to
8 make Mr Atkinson amenable for that crime. So, yes,
9 disgusted and brought to the attention of Mr McBurney.
10 Q. You appear not to have made an notebook entry about
11 that.
12 A. That's correct, sir.
13 Q. Why is that?
14 A. It is like everything in relation to casual sources or
15 casual contacts, I went back and spoke to Mr McBurney
16 about it, and under disclosure and all the rest of it,
17 sir, in those particular days we had no intelligence
18 cells that were linked to HOLMES or to the murder
19 investigation, and we did things differently, and
20 I think I made a notebook entry simply -- there is
21 a notebook entry, "Spoke to witness", or something like
22 that and it was as bland as that. That's for protection
23 of those individuals and that was a judgment decision
24 made at that time.
25 Q. Okay. You have been asked endlessly about why you took
75
1 an alibi statement in October --
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. -- of 1997 from her and your witness statement deals
4 with that. Can I just be clear on this? As far as you
5 were concerned, in October 1997, she was lying, was she?
6 A. Well, sir, until -- if you look at Tracey Clarke's
7 statement, and you have to accept that I didn't know
8 Andrea McKee, before I went out to see her in that
9 graveyard. I knew nothing about her. I didn't know she
10 was a friend of Atkinson. I knew nothing absolutely
11 about her background.
12 Then, if you look at Tracey Clarke's statement,
13 Tracey Clarke says that Allister said that he was
14 personally contacted by her on the next morning and told
15 to get rid of the clothes and that he had been
16 continually getting calls from Robbie Atkinson.
17 Now, in that respect, Atkinson could have made those
18 calls from a public phone box, he could have made them
19 from a mobile phone, he could have made them to a mobile
20 phone. He could have made them from different
21 locations.
22 Then what we had was we had a phone call from the
23 house to Hanvey's house. So they were given a different
24 hypothesis, and until that hypothesis is challenged,
25 that could have happened. Andrea McKee could --
76
1 Michael McKee could have made that call from the house
2 to Hanvey's house. At the same time, Atkinson could
3 have made other calls from other mobiles to Hanvey's
4 mobile. Those two hypotheses. If you look at the
5 murder investigation manual, it says you keep an open
6 mind. Until that's tested, you can't rule it out. So
7 you have to rule it in at that particular time, then
8 what you try to do is you challenge that.
9 When you challenge it is a judgment decision. When
10 you do the investigation is a judgment decision
11 Q. You were expecting the alibi to be challenged, I take
12 it, as a result?
13 A. That's correct. I had been back to Mr McBurney after
14 that statement was recorded and he asked me my view on
15 it. I said that Andrea was strong in her delivery at
16 that particular time, but he would need to get a team
17 together and do the background work to then try and
18 break that particular alibi.
19 His time view on that was he went away and he came
20 back to me some time later and he said he wasn't going
21 to challenge it at that particular time, because that
22 wasn't the right time, and he went through that process
23 to a certain degree and he says -- and he was quite
24 strong in it, that he said, if he got a team together,
25 a HOLMES team together, it would have to continue.
77
1 Locally, parochially, the investigation would have to
2 move at that particular time, or information would get
3 out on what was happening.
4 He felt that at that particular time he would get
5 Andrea, but he wouldn't -- potentially, he would get
6 Andrea McKee, but he wouldn't get the Reserve Constable.
7 Q. When you eventually did get Andrea -- because you went
8 to Wales to interview her in June 2000 --
9 A. That's right.
10 Q. -- I get from your witness statement that you had
11 reservations about treating her as a witness at that
12 stage.
13 A. Not reservations, sir. I had dealt with another case
14 similar where a person was involved in a murder and was
15 then convicted and it was after the conviction that
16 I then took a witness statement from the individual.
17 Here we were going to an individual who had -- who
18 was now telling us a different account. So under the
19 criminal law, in reasonable circumstances -- in all
20 circumstances, you would be obliged to caution that
21 individual. Mr McBurney's view was that Andrea had
22 helped the police before, that she, to a certain extent,
23 had been forced into a peripheral role and he wanted to
24 use her as a witness.
25 Q. Right.
78
1 A. In that respect, I said, well, we would cover certain
2 areas. However, any details -- what we would do, we'd
3 cover a certain area, we would then go back, get
4 an investigation -- my belief was get an investigation
5 team together, look at those areas in the statement and
6 then pursue it, and following consultations with crime
7 branch and the rest of them.
8 Q. Just a few more matters. I have five or ten minutes
9 left, sir.
10 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
11 MR UNDERWOOD: I apologise for jumping about on topics. We
12 spoke earlier about Mr Prunty and his identification of
13 the person that might have been Mr Lunt --
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. -- by way of what he was wearing and so on. That, in
16 due course, all unravelled, because at a consultation
17 with the DPP he was shown a photograph which apparently
18 was of another person.
19 Can you help us with where the photograph or
20 photographs came from?
21 A. Yes. They would have came after those individuals were
22 charged. You would have had photographs of those
23 individuals.
24 Q. You also told us earlier that you couldn't show
25 photographs to a witness where you had got somebody
79
1 charged.
2 A. You couldn't show photographs if you had suspects.
3 Q. If you had suspects?
4 A. That's right.
5 Q. So how could it be that photographs could be shown to
6 Mr Prunty in these circumstances?
7 A. Well, that was a DPP decision, sir, and obviously his --
8 because he had made no identification of Dean Forbes in
9 his statement, he had made no reference to that, and he
10 then had went -- we had identified Lunt from the
11 statement. Then obviously the only way for them to
12 identify this -- he said he had seen it on video in
13 a house. So he had seen the video of the individuals
14 leaving the court house. So here we were, an individual
15 not -- you know, shown a photograph after seeing the
16 video really was immaterial, because he had already seen
17 the video on TV.
18 Q. But he was also shown a photograph of Mr Lunt, wasn't
19 he? That's the problem.
20 A. He could well have been, yes, sir.
21 Q. But he shouldn't have been, should he?
22 A. I couldn't really say, sir. I think his identification
23 at that stage had moved on.
24 Q. Right.
25 A. His identification, I would say, was flawed at that
80
1 stage, and what the DPP were then trying to identify was
2 Lunt and Forbes.
3 You know, that was a decision by the DPP to show
4 that, but, at the same time, I would say his evidence
5 had been severely weakened at that stage.
6 Q. You say it was flawed and severely weakened. Can I ask
7 you to consider in the light of that what you told us
8 ten minutes ago, which was: this was an identification
9 which relied on, not an identification of the person,
10 but -- and you actually said in terms of somebody whom
11 he would recognise if he saw again.
12 A. Uh-huh. Yes, he -- sorry, sir?
13 Q. You told us about ten minutes ago he was not identifying
14 Lunt as someone he would recognise again.
15 A. That's right.
16 Q. So how could the fact he didn't recognise him again
17 possibly flaw his evidence?
18 A. Because he was saying it was the individual -- what he
19 was saying was that the individual that he saw
20 assaulting Robert Hamill was actually Forbes. We were
21 proving that it wasn't Forbes that was put into the
22 police Land Rover that was wearing the scarf. So ...
23 THE CHAIRMAN: He still remained firm. He was saying "I saw
24 a man do this and I saw that man go there and that was
25 done to him there"?
81
1 A. Uh-huh. Yes, sir.
2 THE CHAIRMAN: And someone else was able to say, "That man
3 is Wayne Lunt"?
4 A. Uh-huh.
5 THE CHAIRMAN: So the criticism of him is in a sense
6 academic?
7 A. That's right, sir.
8 THE CHAIRMAN: He kept his eye on the ball. One of those
9 kind of situations.
10 A. Yes, sir, but what happened then he said, "Yous have
11 charged the wrong man on my evidence".
12 THE CHAIRMAN: But he didn't say -- he never resiled from
13 saying, "I saw the man do this and I saw him go there
14 and I saw what happened to him there". He didn't resile
15 from any of that, did he?
16 A. Well, sir, I have to say I wasn't in the consultation
17 from that point, but simply what he was -- from -- what
18 I was establishing was he had -- the person that he
19 initially said had committed the offence was the
20 individual wearing the red, white and blue scarf that
21 got into the Land Rover. He was now saying, "Listen,
22 yous have charged the wrong man", or, "You let the wrong
23 man out". So --
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I follow.
25 MR UNDERWOOD: Sorry to interrupt. To pick up on the
82
1 Chairman's analysis, he never resiled from saying the
2 person he saw do this had the red, white and blue scarf,
3 did he?
4 A. No, he kept saying that individual Forbes was the person
5 wearing the red, white and blue scarf.
6 Q. Okay. Thank you.
7 A. But we proved that it wasn't.
8 Q. Two other matters. Firstly, on a couple of documents,
9 one of which certainly is yours, the name
10 xxxxxxxxx appears. You have told us before you
11 did a report in response to the, "See no evil, hear no
12 evil", CHA report and it comes up in there.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. It also comes up because DCI P39 sought telephone
15 billing which included "xxxxxxxxxx's number.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Can you help us with why it was people were interested
18 in "xxxxxxxxxxx in this investigation?
19 A. I couldn't tell you early on why the phone calls was
20 sought for "xxxxxxxxx, sir, no.
21 Q. Then Mr Atkinson was used as a witness at the trial of
22 Mr Hobson, wasn't he?
23 A. That's correct, sir.
24 Q. I think you sat through that.
25 A. I would have, yes, sir.
83
1 Q. In the light of what you told us a few minutes ago about
2 keeping an open mind on allegations, at that stage did
3 you have an open mind to the possibility that
4 Mr Atkinson might indeed have tipped off Mr Hanvey?
5 A. Yes, sir. That was the allegation. It was still
6 ongoing at that particular stage.
7 Q. Did that strike you as relevant to the evidence he was
8 giving?
9 A. In relation to against what he had seen at the scene?
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. Yes, it has to be relevant, sir.
12 Q. I want to ask you if you can help us about the file that
13 Mr McBurney submitted in due course on the complaint,
14 the neglect complaint?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. If we can have a look at page [09079] -- this is my
17 final topic -- we see at the start of what is about four
18 pages of analysis of the tip-off allegation and the way
19 that unravelled.
20 What I want to ask you about is the degree, if any,
21 you contributed to this
22 A. Okay, sir.
23 Q. Can you help us with that?
24 A. Yes. My recollection of it is, sir, that my file --
25 I had brought my file over to Mr McBurney as well, and
84
1 that I was preparing the parts II, III and IV of the DPP
2 file, and doing all the transcripts from the interviews
3 and exhibiting all those and putting them into order.
4 Then Mr McBurney would then say, "Well, I need this,
5 and I need this, and I need this" and then I would go
6 and put those in order and bring them to him, sir.
7 Q. So you didn't compile this?
8 A. No, sir. Some of it, I have to say, is similar to my
9 DPP file and possibly Mr McBurney has cut and pasted
10 some of it from that.
11 MR UNDERWOOD: Right. Very well. Thank you very much.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: I see the time. We will break off until
13 1.10 pm.
14 MR UNDERWOOD: 2.10 pm?
15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Yes. 2.10 pm.
16 (1.10 pm)
17 (The luncheon adjournment)
18 (2.10 pm)
19 (Hearing in camera)
20 (2.35 pm)
21 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, before any further questions are
22 addressed to Mr Irwin, I need to correct something
23 I said this morning, which was that Mr Wright had given
24 detectives information that there was a silver jacket.
25 It was a grey jacket, according to his statement.
85
1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
2 Yes, Mr Wolfe?
3 Questions from MR WOLFE
4 MR WOLFE: Good afternoon, Mr Irwin. Just one brief area
5 I want to look at. I am asking questions on behalf of
6 the Police Service.
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. Could we have [81424] up on the screen, please? Yes,
9 Mr Irwin. The second main paragraph on the page, if
10 that could be highlighted, beginning:
11 "It is under ..."
12 In that portion of your statement, Mr Irwin, you
13 comment on the resource issues which you, as
14 a detective, and your colleagues were facing at that
15 time.
16 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.
17 Q. Not to be unfair to you, I think you spend some time
18 detailing that before you reach that section of your
19 statement.
20 A. That's correct, sir.
21 Q. Now, you make it clear in that passage at that
22 paragraph that your remarks were not intended as
23 a criticism of the organisation.
24 A. Definitely not, sir, no.
25 Q. The difficulties which you speak of in terms of
86
1 resources and associated difficulties, that was not
2 unique to the Hamill investigation. Is that correct?
3 A. That's correct. That was regular occurrences, and
4 I think that has been highlighted in the Blakeley Report
5 in 2003, even going to back to 2001 after the pressures
6 we were under at that particular time.
7 Q. Yes. We have heard evidence in this Inquiry -- I can't
8 quite remember who it was; it may well have been P39,
9 but my memory fails me on this. But somebody gave
10 evidence in these terms, that, once it became a murder
11 investigation, there was a noticeable changing of gear.
12 Now, that's not to suggest -- I don't think the
13 witness who said that was meaning to suggest that the
14 GBH investigation wasn't being taken seriously, but
15 there were extra resources in terms of manpower --
16 A. That's correct, sir.
17 Q. -- being poured into it once it became a murder
18 investigation.
19 A. That is correct, sir.
20 Q. Is that a fair approach?
21 A. That is a fair comment. What happened was that in the
22 subdivision, ordinary crime, as we referred to it was
23 investigated by the personnel that were attached to that
24 subdivision. Usually, to get personnel from other
25 subdivisions was difficult because they were fully
87
1 committed as well. However, when a murder happened, you
2 would have got additional resources from the Regional
3 Crime Squad, who were personnel who were attached to
4 Gough Barracks, Armagh, and which were used to
5 supplement us in murder investigations or in terrorist
6 interviews.
7 Q. Just to be clear, you are not saying in your statement
8 that any major operational decision or any tactical
9 decision was affected by a want of manpower?
10 A. No, we did what we could with the manpower that we had.
11 That's simply as best I could put it. I had seven
12 individuals, counting myself eight, and we were doing
13 the best that we could in the circumstances.
14 MR WOLFE: Very well. Thank you very much.
15 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Adair?
16 Questions from MR ADAIR
17 MR ADAIR: Mr Irwin, I want to ask you just a brief
18 number of questions on a various number of topics.
19 A. Okay, sir.
20 Q. Just going to the phone records situation back in 1997,
21 my understanding of your evidence is that some companies
22 would provide the evidence and some companies would not.
23 Is that right?
24 A. That's correct, sir.
25 Q. Was there also an unspoken agreement with some companies
88
1 that they would provide the information in the form of
2 intelligence, but the understanding was it was not to be
3 revealed that they had provided it?
4 A. That's correct, sir.
5 Q. Amongst the reasons you have given for that was one of
6 the more obvious reasons back then, the fear that one of
7 their employees might be subjected to either injury or
8 death?
9 A. That would be correct, sir, yes.
10 Q. Was there any way of forcing a company who had records
11 back in 1997 to provide those records?
12 A. No, not from my understanding, there wasn't, sir, and in
13 fact, at times they threatened to remove the facility
14 from us because we were maybe making too many demands in
15 certain circumstances. So I don't believe there was any
16 facility that we could demand evidential telephone
17 material from those people.
18 Q. Of course, it may be self-evident, but if you have
19 information in the form of intelligence from a service
20 provider, if you inform the suspect of that, you are
21 immediately making it clear to him that a service
22 provider has given the police that information?
23 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
24 Q. Now, the second issue I want to ask you about is in
25 relation to your briefing of the search teams --
89
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. -- on the morning of 10th May.
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Am I right in summarising your evidence that on receipt
5 of the statements from Timothy Jameson and
6 Tracey Clarke, which were on the night of 9th going into
7 the early morning of the 10th --
8 A. The 109, yes, sir.
9 Q. -- that you would have read those statements?
10 A. I am not sure if I had read them, sir, or not at
11 night-time, at that night-time one, sir. I would have
12 been getting the information from probably the chief or
13 Mr McBurney.
14 Q. Would you have head them before the briefing for the
15 search teams?
16 A. Yes, I would have had to have read them before the
17 briefing. In fact, what I was doing at that particular
18 time was researching a lot of documents to find out what
19 we were actually searching for in the clothes and that.
20 Q. So you conducted that part of the investigation in
21 relation to ascertaining what should be briefed to the
22 search teams --
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. -- before they went out to search?
25 A. That's correct, sir.
90
1 Q. My understanding is that between the breakthrough of
2 Tracey Clarke and Jameson and your briefing of the
3 search teams, there is no conference held with McBurney
4 or P39?
5 A. No. What would have happened was I would have been in
6 contact with Mr McBurney and P39, but there was no open
7 conference. I think the conference that morning
8 probably did not start until 9.30 or something.
9 Q. One of the matters that we have discussed in this
10 Inquiry from time to time is why an instruction was not
11 given, for example, to look for a burn site.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, we know from your statement that your explanation
14 is that Tracey Clarke, the information was that he had
15 been told to get rid of as opposed to burn his clothes.
16 A. That's correct, sir.
17 Q. Was any instruction given to any of the search teams in
18 relation to that, in relation to either getting rid of
19 or --
20 A. Sir, yes, there would have been. What we said or what
21 I believe -- I can't remember the exact words that
22 I would have used in that, sir, but what we said,
23 "Listen, check the front gardens. Check the sheds.
24 Check the attic. Check everywhere for any indication of
25 clothing".
91
1 Now that, to me, if a person saw a burn site in
2 a garden or in a shed, you would certainly want them to
3 be checking that area.
4 Q. Yes. I think the problem -- I mean, I am not
5 necessarily getting at you, Mr Irwin. I am just trying
6 to find out what the reality was then. We know that,
7 for example, in Hanvey's house, there was only one
8 bedroom actually searched and it looks like the
9 outhouses weren't searched and the garden wasn't
10 searched and so on. Can you reconcile what you are
11 saying about what you told the search teams with what we
12 know they did? I am just trying to figure out what
13 happened here.
14 A. I honestly don't know what happened in the Hanvey one,
15 sir. I think if you look at the other search records,
16 and they were all briefed together, and they were all
17 briefed in relation to the searches, and you check and
18 people have checked washing machines, they have checked
19 clothes lines, they have checked sheds, they have
20 checked the attic, they have checked the back garden,
21 they have checked the front garden. So everybody was
22 briefed accordingly in these circumstances.
23 If you look at Mr Hanvey's search record, they
24 certainly took details of his cars that were outside the
25 house. There may have been people conducting searches
92
1 outside the house while the search was conducted inside
2 the house --
3 Q. Well, I don't think there is --
4 A. -- and I can't --
5 Q. I think we would have heard about that, Mr Irwin, if
6 that had happened.
7 A. I can't say, sir. It is obviously judgment decisions
8 made by those officers out at that particular time.
9 Q. Can you remember, did you specify any particular item?
10 In relation to Hanvey, did you specify any particular
11 coat, for example, or coats to look for?
12 A. Yes. What I believe was that there was a whiteboard in
13 the CID office and I would have used that as
14 an aide-memoire when I was briefing the individuals. So
15 what was happening, we were going through statements and
16 we were listing the clothes that we were looking for up
17 on the whiteboard, I do believe. So I would have been
18 going through and that's why, like, Reserve Constable
19 Warnock's statement, whatever description he had in
20 that, it would have been up on the whiteboard, sir.
21 Q. We know by this stage I think there would have been two
22 or three different descriptions of the possible coat
23 that Hanvey was wearing.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. If you don't remember, say so, but can you remember,
93
1 were all those descriptions on your whiteboard or was it
2 restricted to what Hanvey had said or what --
3 A. No. I think all the descriptions -- what we would have
4 had was a list of -- I had officers going through the
5 statements to identify the clothing from HOLMES, the
6 clothing that each individual was wearing. That would
7 have been up on the board, sir. That would have focused
8 the teams. In addition to that, sir, it is the usual
9 case: if in doubt, you seize the items, additional
10 items.
11 Q. I understand that. I am just, for the assistance of the
12 Panel, trying to ascertain, were these search teams
13 directed towards specific items and, if so, which?
14 A. Yes. In certain circumstances the items would have been
15 identified from statements, the specific clothes, and
16 those search teams would have been directed to look for
17 those clothes, sir, yes.
18 Q. All right.
19 Now, I want to turn to a different topic again, and
20 that's in relation to the Forensic Science Laboratory,
21 the Northern Ireland Forensic Science Laboratory, as it
22 was then.
23 Now, I think it was tentatively suggested to you at
24 one stage that perhaps you could have engaged in another
25 forensic scientist to look at the blood?
94
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Did that ever happen in Northern Ireland?
3 A. Not to my knowledge in 1997, sir, no.
4 Q. The Forensic Science Laboratory was an independent
5 laboratory. It wasn't paid for or part of the police
6 machinery?
7 A. No. It was independent, sir, yes.
8 Q. Was it relied upon by the RUC as being its source of
9 forensic investigation?
10 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
11 Q. Mr Marshall had been around for a very substantial
12 number of years. Is that right?
13 A. A long time, sir, yes.
14 Q. And had been used in hundreds, if not thousands, of
15 cases?
16 A. That's correct, sir.
17 Q. Now, while that's right, am I right in saying that in
18 and around that time not only had the police and the DPP
19 difficulty in getting reports from the Forensic Science
20 Laboratory; very often they didn't even arrive until
21 after the committal proceedings?
22 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
23 Q. So although, just to put it in simple terms, the DPP and
24 the police were screaming for these reports, because of
25 the workload in the Forensic Science Laboratory, they
95
1 were not forthcoming in the timescale that either you or
2 the DPP wanted?
3 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
4 Q. Of course, the Forensic Science Laboratory, they equally
5 were giving off about the lack of resources that they
6 had and their lack of finance?
7 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
8 Q. They were saying they couldn't provide them any quicker,
9 because they haven't got the staff?
10 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
11 Q. That was going on for years?
12 A. That was going on for years, sir, yes.
13 Q. In fact, Mr Irwin, am I right in saying that very often
14 counsel would arrive for a trial 18 months after
15 an incident and were served the forensic report on the
16 morning of the trial?
17 A. That is correct, sir. That has happened.
18 Q. There is nothing unusual about that?
19 A. No, there is nothing unusual.
20 Q. It would be served as additional evidence on the morning
21 or the week before, but there was nothing -- it nearly
22 became the norm?
23 A. That's correct, sir.
24 Q. Unfortunately, very often, because of that, trials then
25 had to be adjourned to let the defence investigate the
96
1 forensic aspects of the case?
2 A. There was always knock-on effects, sir, yes.
3 Q. Just finally on this, what the police had to resort to,
4 because they knew of the delays there would be in
5 receiving the formal report, was an informal contact by
6 telephone or by going to the lab and talking to the
7 scientists to try to find out have they even got
8 a preliminary view about what the evidence might be?
9 A. That's correct, sir, and trying to establish -- at
10 times, the forensic examination would have started, but
11 then it would have to be terminated because of other,
12 more pressing cases, and then you would have to go and
13 find out when the potential was to look at your case
14 again as well, sir.
15 Q. Now, I want to turn to another, separate issue,
16 and that's the issue of how Andrea McKee was dealt with
17 in relation to the taking of -- can we call it -- well,
18 it is clearly a false alibi statement.
19 A. That's okay, sir, yes.
20 Q. Well, have you any doubt that it is a false alibi
21 statement now?
22 A. No, I have no doubt now, sir.
23 Q. Now, you will understand that one of the matters that is
24 important is trying to get into the mind of
25 Mr McBurney --
97
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. -- as to what strategy or tactic he was engaging in in
3 relation to Andrea McKee.
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. Am I right in saying he wasn't a man for telling others
6 really very much about his strategy?
7 A. No. He would have given you an indication what he
8 wanted, and, yes, you certainly could question him on
9 points and he would give you indications and that, but
10 he would move on very quickly, sir, and he wouldn't
11 dwell on it that much.
12 Q. Now, if we have page [81486], please. I was actually
13 looking for page 59 of this witness statement. Is there
14 another page [81486] on the system?
15 THE CHAIRMAN: What we have up is the alibi statement, is
16 it?
17 MR ADAIR: Yes. It was actually this witness' statement
18 I wanted up. [81418]. Well, I will deal with it
19 without the statement.
20 A. Okay, sir.
21 Q. Mr McBurney directed you to go and take the statement
22 from Andrea McKee.
23 A. That's correct, sir.
24 Q. You discussed with Mr McBurney as to whether you should
25 confront her with her earlier actions, ie being present
98
1 when Tracey Clarke made the allegations --
2 A. That's right.
3 Q. -- whether she should be confronted with this or whether
4 you should simply take a witness statement from her?
5 A. That's correct, sir.
6 Q. So it was obviously something that was tasking the mind
7 of Mr McBurney at that stage?
8 A. Is certainly was, sir, yes.
9 Q. He directed you that you should not confront her, but
10 you should, in fact, just take the witness statement?
11 A. That's correct.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: What, draw her attention to the declaration?
13 MR ADAIR: Yes.
14 THE CHAIRMAN: If she backed out at that, leave it; if she
15 didn't, take a statement?
16 MR ADAIR: That's right, sir.
17 Now, I don't think you have said it in so many
18 words, but is this proposition a reasonable one as to
19 what Mr McBurney was doing? Did he see this, in other
20 words, Andrea McKee making a false alibi statement, as
21 the potential way to break into the conspiracy?
22 A. Sir, when Michael McKee was interviewed in Lurgan police
23 station and I had a brief word with Mr McBurney after
24 that, he was delighted that the Atkinsons had introduced
25 other people into the conspiracy, because he saw here we
99
1 have a one-minute phone call between one house and
2 another house and what he had to prove -- here we were,
3 two families, both of interest, not to tell the truth.
4 What he had to prove was not only who made the phone
5 call, but what was actually said on that phone call, and
6 for any investigator that is a massive task in relation
7 to a phone call.
8 You can prove a phone contact, but who made it and
9 what was said on it -- and he saw the introduction of
10 people outside those family units as a real bonus to the
11 investigation. He believed at that stage this was
12 a bonus and an opportunity.
13 Q. Now, we all know, as lawyers, the dreaded alibi
14 witnesses --
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. -- and what they are usually like. Did he see, just to
17 put it in a nutshell, the making of a witness statement
18 by Andrea McKee, this false alibi statement, as the
19 potential breakthrough eventually --
20 A. He did indeed, sir.
21 Q. -- into Atkinson?
22 A. That's correct, sir.
23 Q. Have you any doubt whatsoever that his strategy at that
24 stage was to get this false alibi statement and, when
25 the time was right, break the alibi statement?
100
1 A. I have no doubt whatsoever, sir. What I would say is,
2 after I took the witness statement off Andrea McKee and
3 we spoke about it, he certainly gave me his view at that
4 stage that now the timing wasn't right to move on,
5 because what you would simply get was Andrea McKee and
6 a statement after caution from her potentially, which
7 then could not be used against Robbie Atkinson.
8 Q. In relation to the McKees, Michael McKee and
9 Andrea McKee --
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. -- was there any discussion between you and Mr McBurney
12 as to whether he thought he might be able to break
13 Andrea McKee eventually?
14 A. Because of probably her relationship, that she'd come to
15 the police at the start, and underneath it all
16 Mr McBurney was of the view that she had been used and
17 forced into this situation and that she was the weak
18 link in the whole conspiracy.
19 Q. What about your knowledge of whether the marriage was
20 a solid one or otherwise between Michael and Andrea?
21 A. Yes. Mr McBurney had certain views on this as well. He
22 believed that it wouldn't last, so he did, sir.
23 Q. Again, I think I have used this expression before, was
24 his strategy at that stage then to get this statement
25 taken and wait in the long grass?
101
1 A. That's right, sir. That was his strategy. On saying
2 that, he had to move at some stage. Obviously, with the
3 trial going on, and then the inquest, time was on his
4 side, but he had to move at some particular stage, and
5 when he moved was, you know, a choice, a judgment
6 decision for him.
7 Q. Yes.
8 THE CHAIRMAN: You say he thought Andrea McKee had been
9 forced into the conspiracy. Did he say by whom?
10 A. No. He believed that they had been introduced by the
11 Atkinsons into the whole conspiracy issue, sir.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: But you used the word attributing it to
13 Mr McBurney's view that she had been forced.
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 THE CHAIRMAN: Did he say who or what had forced her?
16 A. I think it was the case of the relationship with the
17 Atkinsons. Obviously he believed that the Atkinsons had
18 went to the McKees to help him and, because of that
19 relationship, they had certainly been forced into
20 assisting the Atkinsons.
21 MR ADAIR: Again, lest there be any doubt about it, what was
22 your impression as to whether Mr McBurney was determined
23 to try to nail Atkinson?
24 A. He was very determined, sir. The difficulty was the
25 timing of the move. He was very firm that he would
102
1 move, but the timing was vitally important to that move.
2 Q. Now, I want to turn to a separate issue again. That's
3 in relation to the files that were sent to the DPP, both
4 by yourself --
5 A. Uh-huh.
6 Q. -- and both in relation to the murder investigation and
7 in relation to the neglect allegation which incorporated
8 the tip-off allegation.
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. You were involved?
11 A. That's correct, sir.
12 Q. You compiled the murder file?
13 A. That's correct, sir.
14 Q. You were substantially involved in the preparation of
15 the neglect file, which incorporated the tip-off?
16 A. I was indeed, sir, yes.
17 Q. Now, in neither of those files is there any reference,
18 apart from, I think, the words -- there is mention of
19 being sceptical about the story --
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. -- but there is no mention in those files to the DPP
22 that, for example, Andrea McKee's statement should be
23 looked at in the light of the fact that she was present
24 with Tracey Clarke when she made the allegations
25 concerning the tip-off. Do you understand?
103
1 A. That is correct, sir.
2 Q. It is not mentioned in either of the files.
3 A. No, sir.
4 Q. Can you help us as to why that was?
5 A. I think that was -- well, Mr McBurney's certain style,
6 sir, that the investigation, as far as he seen it, was
7 still to be investigated and he certainly wasn't -- to
8 a certain degree he became paranoid about the
9 information and he certainly wouldn't want to disrupt
10 his chances of making the progress in the investigation
11 later on.
12 Q. Well, I suppose the question might be asked: how would
13 it disrupt the progress by simply informing the DPP,
14 alerting them to this issue?
15 A. Intelligence in those days, sir, everybody dealt with
16 intelligence differently. Mr McBurney had his own style
17 in dealing with intelligence. You know, that was his
18 style. I can't really say the method of how he done it
19 or why he done it, but that was his way.
20 Q. Okay. I want to turn to another separate issue and
21 that's the questions you were asked in relation to
22 potential identification parades or confrontations.
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. Now, you were involved in the day-to-day running of the
25 case --
104
1 A. That's correct, sir.
2 Q. -- in the early days?
3 Can I ask you this: in your view at that time --
4 A. Uh-huh.
5 Q. -- was there anybody not confronted or put on
6 an identification parade that should have been?
7 A. No, I believed we had looked at the process, sir, and
8 pursued the identification as it should have been
9 pursued.
10 Q. Presumably you were part of the decision-making process?
11 A. I was indeed, sir, yes.
12 Q. I think at one stage it was said to you it was not your
13 job, but you were part of the whole process --
14 A. I was indeed, sir.
15 Q. -- as to who should be put on an identification parade?
16 Would it be proper to? Whom should we confront and so
17 on?
18 A. That is correct, sir.
19 Q. Whomever you thought should be confronted and
20 identified, that was done --
21 A. That was done.
22 Q. -- particularly in relation to Hobson?
23 A. That's correct, sir.
24 Q. Now, having been asked about it and reflected upon it,
25 have you changed your view or are you still of the view
105
1 that everything was done in relation to identification
2 and confrontation that could have been done?
3 A. Sir, I believe it was, but I would have to look again at
4 the statements of the individuals and the circumstances
5 to see again and review that whole area, but I know the
6 murder itself was reviewed and I don't know if anybody
7 else was put on ID parades later, so it seems to be that
8 it was.
9 Q. The final thing I want to ask you about is in relation
10 to this -- particularly Tracey Clarke, for example, who,
11 as we know, did not give evidence, and counsel
12 considered it would not be appropriate to attempt to
13 apply to a judge to read her statement through fear.
14 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
15 Q. Now, we know she told Mr Kerr and Mr Davison that the
16 reason she was not prepared to give evidence inter alia
17 was because she loved Hanvey.
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. Am I right in saying, in those days -- tell us from your
20 own experience -- witnesses who did not want to give
21 evidence, but who had made statements, were savvy enough
22 either by being told by whomever that when they
23 consulted with counsel, they didn't say, "Oh, I am not
24 going to give evidence, because I am frightened". They
25 made up some other story as to why they weren't going to
106
1 give evidence?
2 A. That did occur, sir, yes.
3 Q. It occurred regularly, am I right in saying, in
4 Northern Ireland? They were savvy enough to come along
5 and say, "It is not because I am frightened, it is
6 because of X, Y and Z."
7 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
8 Q. Very often it is patently obvious they had been advised
9 to say that by one with "a wiser head"?
10 A. That's correct, sir. In fact, I think, sir, I have
11 a notebook entry where Tracey Clarke's mother said to me
12 that if she went to Billy Wright, he could tell her
13 about not giving evidence. I am not sure. There was
14 a notebook entry that I had made and it should be in the
15 papers, sir, where Tracey Clarke's mother had mentioned
16 about her going to Billy Wright for advice.
17 Q. Is it Billy Wright or xxxxxxxxxxx?
18 A. It could be "xxxxxxxxxxxxx. I thought it was
19 Billy Wright, but it could be "xxxxxxxxxxxx sir.
20 There is a notebook entry in the papers.
21 Q. Going for advice as to what to --
22 A. The mother had said to me, yes.
23 MR ADAIR: Yes. Thanks very much.
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory?
25
107
1 Questions from MR McGRORY
2 MR McGRORY: I have some questions. Thank you.
3 It has been a long day, I know. My name is McGrory.
4 I represent the family of Robert Hamill. I will try not
5 to keep you too long.
6 Once again, like some others, I am going to have to
7 jump about from subject from subject, I am afraid such
8 is the nature of your all-encompassing involvement in
9 this case.
10 A. All right, sir.
11 Q. Can I begin with some issues that are of particular
12 concern to the family of Robert Hamill, starting with
13 something that has been touched upon already, and that
14 is the evidence of Mr Lynne?
15 Now, Mr Lynne was one of three people who resided in
16 or about the Thomas Street area in respect of whom there
17 was some information. Isn't that correct?
18 A. That's correct, sir.
19 Q. The other two were a Mr Johnson and there is P42?
20 A. Right, sir.
21 Q. Now, do you know who I am talking about when I say P42?
22 A. I don't know them, sir, no.
23 Q. Perhaps you can be given the name on a bit of paper?
24 A. I have got the name, sir.
25 Q. Don't say it. Do you recognise the name?
108
1 A. No, I don't recognise the name.
2 Q. So you know nothing about that, about him?
3 A. It means nothing to me at the minute, sir.
4 Q. If I were to tell you that P42 is an individual who
5 claims to have witnessed the commencement of the
6 incident and wrote down an account of it, typed out
7 an account of it and handed it anonymously, through
8 a relative, to the police back in 1997?
9 A. Okay, sir. Right.
10 Q. Does that jog your memory?
11 A. Vaguely, sir, yes. Vaguely.
12 Q. Well, the point I am making here is that there are --
13 Thomas Street would have been a street from which those
14 who resided there --
15 A. That is correct, sir.
16 Q. -- might have had a view of what happened.
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. Indeed, in respect of Messrs Johnson and Lynne, you have
19 already been shown the statement that you made about
20 your conversation with Mr Lynne on 10th June.
21 Now, I want just to take to you that again briefly,
22 if I may. It is [09281]. Perhaps the -- "On
23 10th June", from there, if it could be highlighted,
24 please. That's helpful:
25 "On 10th June '97 between 12.20 am and 2.45 am I was
109
1 at the scene of the resiting of a police Land Rover at
2 Market Street."
3 Now, this is the reenactment of the event, isn't it,
4 in terms of the siting of the Land Rover?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. At which Chief Superintendent McBurney was also present?
7 A. Yes, he was indeed.
8 Q. This --
9 A. And Mr Murnaghan was present as well.
10 Q. Yes, I believe he was too, yes. This chap comes up and
11 introduces himself, and then he returned --
12 A. That's correct, sir.
13 Q. -- and stated that he wanted to talk to you off the
14 record --
15 A. That's right.
16 Q. -- about the attack on 27th April:
17 "He stated he had thought about this in the flat.
18 He related he had witnessed the incident and outlined
19 his recollection of events. He indicated points in
20 Thomas Street where he saw two persons being assaulted.
21 He related he was disgusted at the media coverage and in
22 particular that the RUC had received unfair criticism."
23 A. That's correct, sir.
24 Q. "He believed the police had done an excellent job. He
25 related that originally on seeing the incident, that he
110
1 didn't see any police. He then saw about 3 police and
2 there was a crowd of about 30 to 40 persons. He related
3 that they were helpless. However, when other police
4 arrive, they quickly moved the crowd", and so forth.
5 Now, Mr McBurney says in his interview, and we
6 listened to this the other day, that his recollection
7 was that this chap was a barman in St Patrick's or
8 something. Does that mean anything to you?
9 A. No, it doesn't, sir, no.
10 Q. Your memory is that he was just a reluctant witness?
11 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
12 Q. Now, if I could have on the screen, please, [09899].
13 The bottom long paragraph, please. This is dated
14 15/5/97, this entry. Sorry, a little bit above that
15 would reveal that, I think. I am not 100% sure but
16 I think it is more contemporaneous with the incident
17 than the 10th June. It says:
18 "John Robert Lynne", and it gives the date of birth.
19 The name "D/Con Williamson" is there. There may be
20 a date of August. I am not sure.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Do you recognise this entry? Can you tell us what this
23 is, first of all?
24 A. That's an action sheet, sir.
25 Q. That's an action sheet?
111
1 A. Yes. Sorry.
2 Q. Let's just have a look at what he says about
3 John Robert Lynne:
4 "Does not wish to make a statement but outlines that
5 at the time of the incident he was alone in his home
6 which is in a second floor flat, which is only slightly
7 up Thomas Street ... He was watching TV at the time of
8 the incident when he heard a fracas outside. States he
9 looked out through his window which he had to open.
10 States he saw a fight at the end of Thomas Street
11 involving about 40 people. He describes the fight as
12 involving two crowds which came together fighting, then
13 stepped back momentarily ... he recalls seeing a police
14 Land Rover near Clarke's shop but does not recall seeing
15 police on the ground."
16 Now, do you see that?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. "At the time, Lynne thought this fight had spilled out
19 of a pub. He only observed what was going on for a few
20 second and closed the window because the light was on.
21 He describes the crowd as being made up of males and
22 females, mostly male.
23 "He does not want to make a statement because he is
24 involved socially with both sides ..."
25 Most of that is consistent with what he told you on
112
1 10th June?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. But for the fact I would suggest that what he said
4 initially to D Con Williamson was he did not see police
5 on the ground or recall seeing police on the ground. So
6 he appears to have changed what he had to say about it
7 between then and 10th June. Do you agree with me?
8 A. Yes, sir, yes.
9 Q. Indeed, by the time 10th June came along, he is
10 introducing to you the whole subject of the rights and
11 wrongs of what the police did.
12 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
13 Q. But that's not something he had said initially at all?
14 A. No, it doesn't seem to be, sir, no.
15 Q. In fact, he said he didn't see the police at all?
16 A. He seems to have, yes, sir.
17 Q. Just in terms of the -- I know that this man has said
18 twice, once to Williamson and secondly to you
19 personally, that he didn't want to get involved. Was
20 there anything more that could have been done in terms
21 of following up on what he had to say in terms of
22 revisiting him a few months later to see if he had
23 changed his mind?
24 A. Sir, you could do that on every inquiry. You could keep
25 going and keep going, but when people have been saying
113
1 they are not going to make a statement, they are usually
2 very strong in that situation. A lot of people don't
3 want to be involved in the process, and they are very
4 adamant that they don't want to make statements.
5 When somebody says they don't want to make
6 a statement, I think police are subject to their wishes
7 and I don't see what you can do further to ...
8 Q. Well, would you have considered a door-to-door sort of
9 search, or knocking on doors to see who had seen what
10 right up the whole street?
11 A. Yes, we could have, sir, yes.
12 Q. You see, that doesn't appear to have been done. Do you
13 agree?
14 A. I am not sure, sir. Most of the premises in
15 Thomas Street are commercial premises. There was
16 a number of flats.
17 Q. Yes. Would you agree that it would have been best
18 practice to have knocked on every single flat?
19 A. Oh, it would, sir, yes. Uh-huh.
20 Q. Indeed, had that been done -- well, you don't know about
21 P42, but I am going to suggest to you that P42 submitted
22 an anonymous account that, had there been a door-to-door
23 exercise carried out by the police, he and maybe others
24 might have been uncovered as eye-witnesses?
25 A. There is the potential, sir. What you do is you can do
114
1 door-to-door, but if people don't open, and if they are
2 from flats, if they don't open the front door, you are
3 very limited. You can keep calling and keep calling,
4 sir, but, yes, I would agree in general with your ...
5 Q. What I am suggesting to you is that it wasn't done.
6 A. Okay, sir. I accept that. Was there an action sheet
7 raised to do door-to-door in Thomas Street?
8 Q. If there was, I can't find it. That's maybe a matter
9 for another day.
10 A. That's okay.
11 Q. I want to move on to a different subject. If I can
12 turn, please, to your own statement that was submitted
13 to the Inquiry through your lawyers at [81463], now the
14 entry at 5th June 1997. This is where you quote,
15 I think, a notebook entry concerning your contact with
16 Diane Hamill.
17 What you say is this:
18 "Liaised with ICPC ref witnesses ... and
19 Diane Hamill - no word from either ref meeting tonight.
20 Contacted [blank] office again and left message to
21 confirm attendance tonight."
22 A. That would have been the solicitor's office, I think.
23 Q. I presume it is Rosemary Nelson.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. "Phoned ICPC ref no acknowledgment ... contacted by
115
1 phone by Diane Hamill ref murder of her brother ...
2 asked if police officers had been suspended. I related
3 they hadn't, and, on asking to make contact with the
4 chief constable, I gave police network number and told
5 to inform them of her request. Asked if she was
6 attending tonight for ICPC meeting. She asked if I had
7 letter from [the solicitor]. Informed her that I hadn't
8 received any letters and, despite numerous phone calls,
9 I received no return calls. I explained the present
10 state of investigation and outlined court procedure ...
11 I explained I was willing to speak to her at any
12 time ..."
13 Then over the page [81464], you said:
14 "A number of vital enquiries had been directed by
15 witnesses to [Rosemary Nelson's] office who refused to
16 acknowledge my enquiries. She asked if I had received
17 notification from [Rosemary Nelson] ref the witnesses
18 regarding the murder which was in result of
19 correspondence sent by Detective Chief Inspector P39."
20 Now, doesn't that reveal that Diane Hamill, firstly,
21 had understood that you would have been informed that
22 she was not attending the ICPC meeting and perhaps why?
23 A. That is correct, yes, sir.
24 Q. Then, secondly, that she expected that any witnesses
25 that had come forward, and the information from those
116
1 witnesses, would be forwarded on to you?
2 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE CHAIRMAN: You say you had not received anything from
5 Rosemary Nelson?
6 A. No, sir. Immediately after that then we did get a fax,
7 I believe, from Rosemary Nelson's office to say that
8 Diane wouldn't be attending.
9 What I believe happened was Diane obviously rang
10 Rosemary Nelson's office and the next thing a fax
11 arrived at the police station to say that Diane wouldn't
12 be arriving.
13 MR McGRORY: But it is clear from her conversation with you,
14 Inspector Irwin, that she was not holding anything back.
15 She was expecting that people would cooperate and that
16 the information would be given to the police.
17 A. Yes, and I was explaining to her that we weren't getting
18 that cooperation and we weren't getting it from
19 Rosemary.
20 I was making it very plain to Diane that Rosemary
21 was not answering any of my calls and wasn't prepared --
22 or didn't appear to be prepared to meet me or talk to me
23 on the matter, and I was saying, you know, I think there
24 was another entry where, you know, we were going to
25 witnesses. The witnesses were saying "I refer you to my
117
1 solicitor, Rosemary Nelson". We would then phone
2 Rosemary Nelson and Rosemary Nelson was not answering
3 her phone calls. That's the circle we were going in.
4 Q. But, of course, you don't know what the witnesses were
5 saying to Rosemary Nelson in terms of their attitude
6 about going to the police. Let's not put the blame on
7 Rosemary Nelson.
8 All I am asking you to confirm, insofar as
9 Diane Hamill is concerned, she felt that was being dealt
10 with and, if people were going to come forward, that's
11 what she wanted them to do?
12 A. That is correct, sir, but in saying that, Rosemary could
13 have contacted me. She was aware I was making phone
14 calls. Rosemary could have contacted me to even let me
15 know she was not prepared to meet me or on the advice of
16 her clients she was not prepared to meet me.
17 Q. But it obviously wasn't on Diane Hamill's instructions?
18 A. No, I can't say that, sir.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 Two other minor matters in terms of your contact
21 with Diane Hamill. I have to say to you that
22 Diane Hamill, her recollection and the recollection of
23 her sister Fiona agree, as recounted to the Inquiry, is
24 very clear --
25 A. Right.
118
1 Q. -- about the conversation in respect of the Land Rover,
2 and that, as far as they can recollect, that meeting was
3 in May, but my understanding is they are prepared to
4 accept it may have been later.
5 A. Okay.
6 Q. But that during the course of a meeting with you in
7 Portadown Police Station, you gave a clear indication
8 that you understood that there was in existence CCTV
9 material which revealed the presence of the Land Rover?
10 A. Yes. No, I didn't, sir, no. What I can say, sir, and
11 if you look at the book and I refer to that book, "See
12 no evil, hear no evil", where Diane specifically says
13 the meeting happened on 30th October, and where they
14 then wrote to Mo Mowlam and had a meeting with Mo Mowlam
15 in November and this issue arose regarding the CCTV and
16 we responded to Mo Mowlam's letter by saying, "No, there
17 was no coverage of the Land Rover on the CCTV."
18 Now, in saying that, I accept on me trying to
19 provide a suggestion or give a sequence of events, it
20 may have been interpreted wrong, but what I was trying
21 to say was that the Land Rover had been parked outside
22 the First Trust Bank. It had then moved to the
23 junction, and at that junction -- and the only chance of
24 getting it covered on CCTV was from the
25 First Trust Bank, and the only coverage it would have
119
1 possibly given was the side of a Land Rover
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. That may have been misinterpreted, sir, and I can't
4 answer that.
5 Q. Moving on now to another topic, you were asked for some
6 information about the progress of this case in December
7 of 1997. If you could turn, please, to page [16500],
8 this is a document from Detective -- it is to Detective
9 Superintendent Hooke, and I suggest it is from you. If
10 we go to the back page of it, it is [16502]. That's
11 your signature, isn't that correct?
12 A. That's correct, yes.
13 Q. Do you remember this document?
14 A. I can't say I do, sir, no.
15 Q. The document gives some information about this case
16 under a number of headings. There are various points.
17 The point that I am interested in is point 5, which is
18 on the last page. If it could be highlighted, please.
19 Have you no recollection as to the circumstances in
20 which you authored this document?
21 A. There must have been queries come down, sir, and then
22 I would have responded to those queries.
23 Q. Yes. Indeed, on 24th November there was a meeting
24 between the Hamill family and the Secretary of State,
25 Dr Mowlam.
120
1 A. That's what come out of -- that's right, sir, yes.
2 Q. You recall that?
3 A. I recall that, yes.
4 Q. Following on from that, the Northern Ireland Office, on
5 the direction of Dr Mowlam, asked for detailed
6 information about this case from the chief constable's
7 office?
8 A. Okay, sir, yes.
9 Q. You accept that?
10 A. Yes, sir, yes.
11 Q. I am suggesting to you that that request for information
12 filtered through to you --
13 A. Yes, indeed, sir.
14 Q. -- and that this document that I have shown you is your
15 response.
16 A. That is correct, sir.
17 Q. What the Hamill family raised with Dr Mowlam at the
18 meeting was the fact that there were rumours that there
19 was some connection between police in the Land Rover and
20 those who were suspected of the murder.
21 Are you aware that that issue was raised?
22 A. I may have been at the time, sir. I am not sure.
23 Q. If you look at this point 5 that's on the screen, this
24 is your answer to a point 5 --
25 A. Okay, sir.
121
1 Q. -- in which you say:
2 "A DPP file is being submitted which relates to
3 an allegation of a link between one of the accused and
4 one police officer."
5 A. That's correct, sir.
6 Q. Indeed, that is absolutely accurate, isn't it?
7 A. It is, sir.
8 Q. So one can presume that you were asked "What have you
9 got on this? Is there anything on this allegation of
10 contact?"
11 A. Right. Okay, sir, yes.
12 Q. Now, if I could turn, please, to page [15376] -- perhaps
13 the previous page would help put this in context,
14 [15375]. This is the reply from the chief constable to
15 Dr Mowlam in respect of all that information.
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. The last page reveals that at page [15377]. There is
18 his signature.
19 Now, if we go to point 5 on page [15376], here is
20 the answer that the Secretary of State was given,
21 Mr Irwin.
22 First of all, the heading is:
23 "Relationship between some officers and some of the
24 defendants."
25 Do you see that?
122
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. The answer is:
3 "This allegation has been included in the criminal
4 investigation and will be considered by the Director of
5 Public Prosecutions."
6 Now, that's not quite what you said in your answer,
7 sure it is not?
8 A. No, it is not, sir.
9 Q. Indeed, you were at pains to point out to
10 Superintendent Hooke that there was a specific
11 allegation in respect of a specific officer and one of
12 the suspects?
13 A. That's correct, sir.
14 Q. I presume you have no explanation as to how it
15 translated into what we have before us sir?
16 A. No, unless someone has been speaking to Mr McBurney or
17 someone like that on it, as well, sir. I honestly don't
18 know.
19 THE CHAIRMAN: You just sent your report to Mr Hooke and it
20 was out of your hands then?
21 A. Yes.
22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
23 MR McGRORY: I want to turn to the issue of the whole
24 investigation into Reserve Constable Atkinson and in
25 particular the taking of the statement from Andrea McKee
123
1 which supported his contention that he did not make the
2 phone call, Inspector Irwin.
3 First of all, in answer to Mr Adair in respect of
4 how you handled the information from the phone company
5 that, in fact, some calls had been made between the two
6 households on the night in question, it is my
7 recollection that what you said was that there was no
8 way of attaining that by force or by law, that you
9 depended upon the goodwill of the phone company.
10 A. I do believe that's correct, sir, yes.
11 Q. I have to contradict you on that. Are you not aware of
12 the special procedure contained within PACE of 1989
13 which is designed to obtain confidential information
14 which comes into existence by way of application to
15 a county court judge?
16 A. Right, sir. I am not, no.
17 Q. Well, you are an experienced police officer now. Surely
18 you are aware, for example, in the many video
19 identification cases of riots, for example, where
20 television footage comes into existence --
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. -- of people engaged in a riot --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. -- and say, for example, Drumcree --
25 A. Uh-huh. Yes, sir.
124
1 Q. -- that the evidential basis for any potential
2 prosecution is the television footage --
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. -- and that it is a matter of course that what the
5 police does is makes an application under schedule 1 of
6 PACE 1989 to the television company for production of
7 the video footage?
8 A. Yes, sir, yes, yes.
9 Q. Do you agree with me?
10 A. That's correct, yes.
11 Q. I am suggesting to you that the telephone records are in
12 exactly the same position as television footage?
13 A. I can't answer that, sir. In 1997, that wasn't the
14 process that we went down.
15 Q. You see, what I am suggesting to you existed was
16 a convenient relationship between the police and the
17 telephone companies in terms of the quick and speedy
18 gathering of intelligence, in that they would hand over
19 the information on request on certain conditions.
20 A. Yes, sir, yes.
21 Q. They didn't want you running willy nilly to suspects
22 revealing the fact that you had easy access to their
23 telephone records.
24 A. I am not sure, sir, of the circumstances, to be honest
25 with you. All I know, in 1997, there was difficulties
125
1 with certain phone companies. I can't explain which
2 ones they were, sir.
3 Q. But if you required, I am suggesting to you, information
4 about anyone's telephone records in the context of the
5 investigation of a serious crime, all you had to do was
6 make an allocation?
7 A. Sir, what I am saying to you is that was Mr McBurney's
8 field. He had the telephone enquiry and he was dealing
9 with it in his manner. I actually hadn't addressed my
10 mind to that situation at all, sir.
11 Q. Well, I am asking to you address it simply, Mr Irwin,
12 because it has been put forward before this Inquiry that
13 there was some obstacle to confronting Mr Atkinson with
14 the telephone records because of the manner in which the
15 information was communicated from the telephone
16 companies, and I am suggesting to you that that is
17 neither here nor there. If the police wanted the
18 information to be used in an evidential way, all they
19 had to do was make the application.
20 A. I believe, to be honest, in this circumstance, I thought
21 Mr McBurney was going to raise the telephone enquiry in
22 interview, and he could do it that, "We have information
23 or intelligence that a phone call was made", or
24 whatever.
25 However, I think the response from Mr Atkinson
126
1 prevented him from doing that, or he changed his mind
2 but it was my belief that that was going to be addressed
3 in interview.
4 Q. Well, let's come to the interview and the strategy for
5 interviewing and the strategy developed after the
6 interviews took place.
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. First of all, the interview didn't take place until
9 September?
10 A. That's correct, sir.
11 Q. And you had the information about the telephone billing
12 since May?
13 A. I hadn't -- I don't think I had the intelligence -- the
14 telephone information from May, sir.
15 Q. Well, the information, you accept, was in the system
16 from May?
17 A. Or was it with the Chief Inspector?
18 Q. Okay. Well, it may have been with the Chief Inspector.
19 So you are not able to help us then --
20 A. No, sir.
21 Q. -- with the reason for the delay between May and
22 September?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Did you expect to be involved in September?
25 A. No, I didn't, sir.
127
1 Q. Indeed, you told Diane Hamill that you wouldn't be
2 involved?
3 A. That is correct, sir, I did.
4 Q. So how did you end up being involved in September?
5 A. I think it was a process that the chief had moved on.
6 She wasn't -- the Chief Inspector wasn't available, and
7 it was a case of I was there to do the introductions and
8 Mr Murnaghan and Mr McBurney were to proceed with ICPC
9 investigation and I was there as previously agreed in
10 a sort of back-up capacity for the investigation.
11 Both gentlemen were well aware that I had told Diane
12 that I wouldn't be involved in the investigation.
13 Q. But in any event, you were involved in September?
14 A. That's correct, sir.
15 Q. Before you went into that interview in September, was
16 a strategy outlined to you?
17 A. Yes. Mr McBurney and Mr Murnaghan had -- I believe that
18 there were questions arranged between the ICPC and
19 Mr McBurney. There was a list of questions that they
20 had agreed to cover, a list of areas that they had
21 agreed to cover in interview, sir.
22 Q. We know that most part of the interview dealt with the
23 Land Rover issue --
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. -- but a significant enough section of it addressed the
128
1 issue of some contact or knowledge by people in the
2 Land Rover of those who conducted the murder. Isn't
3 that correct?
4 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
5 Q. Was it outlined to you that, "Look, here is what we are
6 going to do about this information we have about the
7 phone call"?
8 A. Mr McBurney said I was to caution him for -- that he
9 would be covering the allegation of the contact between
10 Atkinson and Hanvey, and, at the start of the interview,
11 I actually cautioned him for assisting offenders and
12 withholding information regarding the murder. So that
13 was to cover that aspect of it, sir, yes.
14 Q. Then, of course, there is a second interview on
15 October 9th.
16 A. That's correct, sir.
17 Q. You attended that one as well?
18 A. I did indeed, sir, yes.
19 Q. Did you expect that on October 9th he would be fully
20 confronted with the information that there was indeed
21 telephone contact between his household and the Hanvey
22 household?
23 A. Had he not produced the telephone billing by that second
24 interview, sir?
25 Q. Yes.
129
1 A. He had? So, yes, I would.
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. He said he wasn't aware of it. His wife could tell us
4 about it.
5 Q. Yes. Whom else did he involve?
6 A. Michael McKee.
7 Q. And who else?
8 A. Well, Michael McKee -- he didn't involve anybody,
9 because he said his wife could tell us about it. So
10 Michael McKee and Andrea McKee became involved in it.
11 Q. But you knew then, at that stage, from the moment he
12 introduced the McKees on 9th October, that he was almost
13 certainly giving you a fake alibi?
14 A. That's correct, sir, yes. It was a potential. Until
15 you made the enquiries. Until you made the enquiries to
16 confirm that, yes, sir.
17 Q. You were sufficiently concerned about this to raise it
18 with Mr McBurney?
19 A. When I was going into the interview with Andrea McKee?
20 Q. Yes.
21 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
22 Q. And --
23 A. I wanted to satisfy myself to his strategy and how we'd
24 approach the interview. It wouldn't be an interview
25 I would want to go into every day of the week, sir. You
130
1 needed a bit of advice and guidance from the
2 investigating officer.
3 Q. But you were uncomfortable, were you not,
4 Inspector Irwin?
5 A. I was uncomfortable at the start, yes, sir, until I got
6 a line from where Mr McBurney was coming from.
7 Q. Because you knew what you were doing in allowing
8 Andrea McKee to make the statement, and indeed drawing
9 your attention to the declaration of truth and signing
10 that statement, was the commission of a crime.
11 A. A potential commission. As I said, if you look at
12 Tracey Clarke's statement, sir, and if you want to put
13 it up on the screen there, Tracey Clarke gave us the
14 hearsay information that Robert Atkinson was phoning --
15 had phoned Hanvey on the morning of the incident and was
16 continually phoning him on a regular basis.
17 Now, that could have been made from a telephone box,
18 from a mobile phone, even from the police station, sir.
19 The potential was also that a phone call had been made
20 from Atkinson's house to Hanvey's house and that the two
21 cases could run together, sir.
22 Q. But the fact was you did not believe her.
23 A. No, sir, I was sceptical about that, and until the
24 enquiries were conducted regarding that whole area, then
25 I agree I was sceptical to it.
131
1 Q. I am going to suggest you were more than sceptical. You
2 did not believe her.
3 A. Sir, sceptical or I didn't believe her, sir, you know,
4 you have to do the enquiries to confirm you are
5 sceptical or you didn't believe her, sir.
6 What I did was I made sure when I was speaking to
7 Andrea that, if I ever had to speak to Andrea again, she
8 was aware that I would give her every opportunity to
9 tell the truth in that interview. I could certainly say
10 to anybody in a court later on that she was given every
11 opportunity to give the truth that day and if she was
12 subsequently convicted of a criminal offence, it was
13 because of her own doing, sir.
14 Q. At this point, after Andrea McKee has made the
15 statement, did Mr McBurney then explain he had
16 a strategy as to what he would do, having put you in the
17 uncomfortable position of taking the statement?
18 A. When I came out of that interview, sir, I believe I met
19 Mr McBurney a few days later and explained to him what
20 had occurred in taking the statement, and I said, "You
21 need to get a team with another investigating officer
22 and investigate that area of it". He said, "Leave it
23 with me", and he came back, because, at that stage, the
24 Hanveys hadn't been interviewed, sir, and he came back
25 to me some time later.
132
1 He says, "Now is not the right time to jump. What
2 we would get at the minute is we would get Andrea McKee,
3 potentially get Andrea McKee, but we wouldn't get
4 Atkinson", because Andrea McKee at that stage was
5 closely linked to Michael and closely linked to the
6 Atkinsons and his belief was she would not give evidence
7 against Atkinson. That was his belief at that time,
8 sir.
9 Q. Did he say to you at that time that he had a hunch that
10 this union between the McKees wouldn't last?
11 A. What he said was he was delighted that -- not
12 delighted -- he was pleased that two individuals that
13 weren't attached to the family units had become involved
14 in the investigation and he saw that as the opportunity
15 to get to the truth.
16 As I said earlier, sir, we are talking about
17 a one-minute phone call. We are talking about not only
18 what was said or who made the phone calls, but what was
19 actually said in that phone call. That was the only way
20 he was going to convict Mr Atkinson, because Mr Atkinson
21 had said he had went home, had gone to bed, and had no
22 dealings -- and wasn't aware of the phone call. The
23 only way to break that was to get direct evidence from
24 somebody involved in that alibi issue.
25 Q. See, the problem with all of this is, I have suggested
133
1 to you, Inspector Irwin, it is the best part of another
2 three years before anything does happen.
3 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
4 Q. I am suggesting to you that it stretches the imagination
5 far too far that something as important as this, in
6 terms of an investigative strategy, would be let sit for
7 three years.
8 A. But, sir, what is the point in jumping too early and
9 losing the opportunity?
10 Q. Well, what if the opportunity never comes?
11 A. Yes. Put it this way, sir. Andrea McKee was going to
12 be arrested -- I am in no doubt about that -- at some
13 stage, and be interviewed about it.
14 I know you don't want to accept that, sir, but if
15 you look at the message sheet that I also put in, in
16 '99, or whatever it was, that Andrea McKee and her
17 husband had separated, there is a message sheet in the
18 system and that Mr McBurney intends to interview these
19 witnesses again.
20 Q. But what if they had not separated?
21 A. Sir, they were going to be arrested then. That's what
22 I am saying.
23 Q. How long did Mr McBurney say he was going to wait for
24 this separation before he would then arrest her?
25 A. The trial had went on, sir, and then he was very keen to
134
1 get an inquest.
2 As you are aware, the inquest process went on for
3 longer than we anticipated. You were objecting to the
4 inquest and Mr McBurney wanted an inquest for all the
5 information to come out.
6 Q. So this was discussed between you then, that, "This may
7 take us years before we get a break"?
8 A. No, it wasn't discussed, sir. What he said at that time
9 after the interview of Andrea McKee was the time was not
10 right to jump.
11 Q. What I am saying to you is, what would have happened --
12 well, I have asked you what would have happened had they
13 never split up. You are saying, "Then we would have
14 moved to arrest her", but when?
15 A. Mr McBurney would have had to make that choice, sir. If
16 after the process -- if we had not got the information
17 that the two of them had separated, Mr McBurney was
18 waiting then for the coroner's inquest to move forward.
19 Now, I don't know what conversations Mr McBurney had
20 with other individuals or senior officers regarding it,
21 sir. All I can say from my point of view is that
22 Mr McBurney, to me, was keeping it under review, and
23 I was briefing him regularly during the coroner's
24 inquest of how the process was going.
25 Q. Well, you have been shown the report that Mr McBurney
135
1 put in that you assisted him with.
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. On page [09082], which is the last page of that report,
4 at the bottom of it, if I could have it on the screen,
5 please, he says:
6 "Having found no evidence other than the telephone
7 billing to substantiate the allegation of Witness A, one
8 can remain sceptical but there is absolutely no other
9 evidence to substantiate the allegation by Witness A.
10 I therefore recommend no prosecution."
11 A. That is correct, sir.
12 Q. Isn't he saying that is the end of the matter?
13 A. Not to me, sir, he wasn't, no.
14 Q. He recommended no prosecution. He did not say,
15 Mr Irwin --
16 A. No, sir.
17 Q. -- "This is an ongoing investigation. There may be
18 further developments."
19 A. No, sir, and I wouldn't put that in any of my murder
20 files that investigations were ongoing, sir.
21 Q. You wouldn't?
22 A. No, sir, no.
23 Q. Is that not the conclusion of this?
24 A. No, I wouldn't put it that was the conclusion. What he
25 had to do, sir, was that four officers had to be
136
1 interviewed about inactivity. He had to put a file in
2 in relation to that. Included in that was the
3 allegation against Mr Atkinson. So he had to conclude
4 them all on the DPP file, but as far as I was concerned,
5 it wasn't the end of the matter, sir.
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Just give us the date of this report again,
7 will you, please?
8 MR McGRORY: I am sorry, sir. I have the front page. I am
9 going to have to ask the Inquiry for assistance in terms
10 of the date of it.
11 A. It was December 1997.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
13 MR McGRORY: I have to suggest to you, Inspector Irwin, that
14 it is simply unbelievable that this strategy which
15 Mr McBurney and you have outlined actually existed.
16 A. Sir, it happened.
17 Q. What happened was, Inspector Irwin, that the prosecution
18 or any prospect of a prosecution of Reserve Constable
19 Atkinson was buried in this report.
20 A. No, I don't accept that, sir. Sure, put it this way,
21 sir, I put in an action sheet or a message sheet to say
22 that the two individuals had separated and that it was
23 Mr McBurney's intention to interview them as witnesses.
24 Q. Indeed. You put that in in October 1999.
25 A. And they separated in ...
137
1 Q. You put in the information that they had separated in or
2 about October 1999.
3 A. That's right, and that's the time they had separated,
4 I believe.
5 Q. Indeed, but Mr McBurney does not visit Andrea McKee
6 until 20th June 2000 --
7 A. That's correct, sir.
8 Q. -- eight months later.
9 A. One person was living in the south of Ireland at that
10 time, sir, so you could not interview one and not the
11 other, sir.
12 Q. Why didn't he interview them both?
13 A. He couldn't go down to the south of Ireland and
14 interview a witness down there, sir. He didn't even
15 know where he was living in the south of Ireland.
16 Q. First of all, let me put it to you that it's not correct
17 that he couldn't have them interviewed in the south of
18 Ireland.
19 A. He couldn't have them interviewed, or he couldn't
20 interview them, sir?
21 Q. That's not correct, is it. Haven't the RUC for years
22 used the cooperation of the Garda Siochana to interview
23 people on their behalf when they have the energy and
24 interest in doing so?
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGrory, I think you have only listened to
138
1 a part of the answer. He said:
2 "How can you interview them when you don't know
3 where they are?"
4 MR McGRORY: Couldn't you have used the good offices of the
5 Garda Siochana to find out where he was?
6 A. Sir, if you look at the message, it was Mr McBurney's
7 decision to interview them at some stage. That's what
8 I done. I put in the message. I spoke to Mr McBurney.
9 He said it is his intention to interview these persons.
10 Q. "At some stage"? This is how you investigate the
11 wrongdoing of a police officer, "at some stage"?
12 A. He did interview them, sir.
13 Q. Eight months later.
14 A. Sir, he was making inroads into the investigation.
15 Q. We will come to the reasons for that with some other
16 witnesses, I can tell you, Mr Irwin, but in terms of
17 locating Mr McKee, if it was necessary, you knew he was
18 in Cork?
19 A. At that stage, sir?
20 Q. Yes.
21 A. Did I? I am not sure, sir.
22 Q. Mr McBurney knew he was in Cork.
23 A. Right. I can't -- it may have been so, sir.
24 Q. So what if Mr McKee is not available? If Andrea McKee
25 and Michael McKee have split up and you think, as part
139
1 of your long-term strategy, that she might now talk,
2 what is the problem with talking to her on her own?
3 A. Sir, I think in any investigation, when you move, you
4 would want to move as a complete investigation.
5 Q. I am suggesting to you there would have been absolutely
6 no difficulty in talking to her on her own. You didn't
7 need Michael McKee.
8 A. Sir, again, what I done was I found out that they had
9 been separated. I went to Mr McBurney and I told him
10 they were separated. He told me it was his intention
11 again to interview them as witnesses and to try to get
12 their addresses actually at that particular stage.
13 I put in a message sheet.
14 As far as I was concerned, Mr McBurney was in charge
15 of the investigation. He was continuing to review it
16 and he moved as soon as he thought it was appropriate,
17 sir.
18 Q. And you think waiting around for another eight months is
19 a reasonable proposition?
20 A. Sir, at that stage, we were still going through the
21 coroner's inquest process.
22 Q. Indeed, at that point in October 1999 the Hamill family
23 still did not know anything about the allegation of the
24 tipping-off, sure it didn't?
25 A. I would well believe that, sir, yes.
140
1 Q. Are you aware that the first time the Hamill family
2 learned of it was in January 2000, when the coroner told
3 them?
4 A. That could be correct, sir, yes.
5 Q. Then things started to move, didn't they?
6 A. When, sir?
7 Q. In terms of the implementation of this so-called
8 strategy?
9 A. No. I think, sir, as you are aware, the coroner was
10 intending to hold an inquest, and you, on behalf of the
11 family, was objecting to the holding of an inquest.
12 That prolonged the whole process.
13 Q. You knew very well --
14 A. The coroner then said he was going to hold an inquest
15 and then he said, no, he wasn't. He turned round and
16 said, no, he wasn't going to hold an inquest. As soon
17 as that inquest process came to an end, Mr McBurney
18 moved.
19 Q. On what conceivable basis do you suggest,
20 Inspector Irwin, that the debate over whether or not
21 there should have been an inquest had anything to do
22 with when Inspector McBurney interviews Andrea McKee?
23 A. Mr McBurney, it was his strategy, sir. I was operating
24 with Mr McBurney. It was him that was dictating when to
25 move.
141
1 Q. Is it not the case that, once the coroner blew the gaff
2 in early 2000 about the tipping-off allegation,
3 Inspector McBurney, Chief Inspector McBurney had no
4 choice but to go and interview Andrea McKee?
5 A. But, sir, my message sheet is before January 2000 --
6 Q. Exactly.
7 A. -- and it indicates that it is Mr McBurney's intention
8 to interview these witnesses. So that was before
9 January 2000, sir.
10 Q. But he didn't.
11 A. But he was going to, sir. That was the intention. It
12 was already in the system, and I am not sure -- was that
13 in October '99 that was put in, sir?
14 Q. Yes, but he didn't do it, did he?
15 A. He did, sir, at the appropriate stage.
16 Q. Once he had no option, I suggest to you,
17 Inspector Irwin.
18 A. Sir, the information, when I went to him in October '99,
19 he was going to move at an appropriate stage, and I put
20 in the message sheet to say that it was Mr McBurney's
21 intention to interview these two witnesses again.
22 That's all I can say about it, sir.
23 Q. I suggest to you this strategy is a fiction.
24 A. Well, sir, it's in writing there.
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGrory, you said a few minutes ago that
142
1 Mr McBurney knew that Michael McKee was in Cork. Can
2 you give us the reference in his interview to that,
3 please?
4 MR McGRORY: Can I undertake to do that, sir?
5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
6 MR McGRORY: If I am wrong about it, I will let the Inquiry
7 know.
8 THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. Thank you.
9 MR McCOMB: Thank you, sir. I will be about ten to
10 fifteen minutes, sir.
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
12 MR McCOMB: Is it convenient for me to continue at this
13 stage?
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
15 Questions from MR McCOMB
16 MR McCOMB: Mr Irwin, my name is McComb. I represent
17 a number of people who were charged with the murder,
18 those apart from Mr Hobson and some others. I just want
19 to ask you a few questions.
20 I make it clear at the outset that we do not in any
21 way challenge the fact that you and your colleagues
22 worked diligently on this inquiry and this investigation
23 and did your very best. Certainly that appears to be
24 what you were at. I am sure you would agree with that.
25 A. I would, sir, yes.
143
1 Q. Now, were you hampered in a number of ways? First of
2 all, that there was a silence from really both
3 communities?
4 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
5 Q. You have referred to that in your statements and I don't
6 intend to go over that.
7 There were also items, snippets of information which
8 came in I think quite early on from various sources,
9 some of varying value when one looked into them?
10 A. That would be correct, sir, yes.
11 Q. I don't propose to go through all of them, but could we
12 have [02185] flagged up, please? Really, I am just
13 taking this as perhaps an example.
14 Would you care to look at -- that's message 12 -- is
15 that right -- M12?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. It seems to be dated 9th May 1997, 12.45. Would that
18 have been brought to your attention? Would you have had
19 a look at that? I will maybe just read it out. It
20 says:
21 "From a sister of deceased Hamill. States that
22 a female friend of hers whose boyfriend has already made
23 a statement to the police told her that a male with
24 a ponytail was the ringleader in the assault on
25 Robert Hamill.
144
1 "Sister is ..."
2 Then it gives her name.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. That is one of the sisters, as we know.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Can you assist the Inquiry at all first of all with what
7 enquiries, if any, were made to follow that up or what
8 assistance might have been given from Ryanne.
9 A. That probably was one of the enquiries we had to make
10 with the solicitor, sir, regarding that individual. Can
11 I see the action underneath that, sir?
12 Q. Please do. Yes, indeed.
13 A. There is no action note on it.
14 Q. On some we see, "No further action" and things like
15 that. Is that a blank there just?
16 A. I do see that, yes, sir.
17 Q. Was that perhaps because it was left in abeyance for a
18 while and then it may have died a death --
19 A. It may have, sir.
20 Q. -- because of non-cooperation?
21 A. That's correct, sir. That may have been one of the
22 areas that -- I can't honestly give a reason for that,
23 sir, at all.
24 Q. That may be no fault of yours. Just in relation to even
25 the quality of that information as it came to you as you
145
1 were trying to sort out at this early stage and get
2 a picture of things --
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. -- was there anybody with a ponytail who appeared on
5 your radar, as it were, when you were investigating
6 this?
7 A. Had Marc Hobson a ponytail, sir? I am thinking off the
8 top of my head here. I know that would have been one of
9 the Witnesses D, E or F that we are probably talking
10 about there.
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. I wonder, was Marc Hobson -- the description of
13 Marc Hobson, did he -- he may have had a ponytail, sir.
14 Q. I don't know. In any event, whoever it was?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. That clearly was from somebody, we assume, from the
17 Nationalist community?
18 A. It would have been E, F or Maureen McCoy, sir.
19 Q. Well, it says:
20 "... whose boyfriend has already made a statement to
21 the police ..."
22 A. That's right.
23 Q. This is was what was exercising me. I wonder if you can
24 help us at all about --
25 A. That would either be D -- D, probably it is. I would
146
1 only be suggesting that, sir. Eliminating the
2 individuals that were there that night, it was either D
3 or the girlfriend. It could have been Maureen McCoy,
4 sir.
5 Q. Again, just in relation to the quality of the
6 information you were getting, even from those who might
7 have been willing to help, I think in your statement to
8 the Inquiry you said that there was difficulty even with
9 the conflicting accounts?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. Even amongst police people who were there as well as
12 civilians?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. Indeed, that's understandable. Is that because in
15 a situation like this each person has a very limited
16 scope really to see what's going on?
17 A. That's right, sir. People are frightened and scared,
18 and sequences of events, even though they believe what
19 happened in the sequence is not correct, sir, and it
20 happens regularly, particularly where there is a public
21 order situation like that. Terrifying for everybody
22 involved.
23 Q. Absolutely. Indeed, we heard just the words of the late
24 Mr McBurney there the other afternoon, where he said he
25 spent quite a while stepping back from all the
147
1 paperwork. He said he would lie on his bed and try to
2 figure out what had happened that night and try to get
3 a picture in his own mind.
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. I am sure you yourself tried to sit back and figure out
6 what had happened?
7 A. I think, sir, in fact, we done a document out,
8 a sequence of events --
9 Q. Yes, indeed, you did a sequence of events.
10 A. -- to try to establish what happened, and the movements
11 of individuals at the incident.
12 Q. That was a sequence of events. Was that actually drawn
13 up by yourself?
14 A. D9. Yes, I think it was. Sorry, which page number is it?
15 Q. Is starts off in the 17000s, I think, 17022, and goes on
16 for quite a -- and that sets out all the different
17 stages during that night.
18 A. I was trying to put some sort of system into place, sir,
19 of what happened.
20 Q. Indeed. I will not take through it now. It will be
21 a matter for observation later on. That was a very
22 thorough sequence of events, trying to get to grips with
23 what had happened?
24 A. That's correct, sir.
25 Q. I was not sure. When was that sequence of events
148
1 prepared?
2 A. I am not sure, sir. Is it document 9? So it must have
3 been into that -- not into the investigation that long,
4 sir.
5 Q. Yes, indeed. Did you ever have a picture in your own
6 mind of what might have happened in terms of time? We
7 have so many conflicting accounts, but just very briefly
8 when one hears, as I say, that the Hamill group, if I
9 may put it that way, once they had got on to the
10 junction, they had come out of Thomas Street, things
11 happened very, very quickly?
12 A. Yes, sir, yes.
13 Q. That within, it must seem, a very short time, the two
14 males were down on the ground?
15 A. It seemed to be -- my impression was that there was
16 a spontaneous assault or incident and then it progressed
17 for a period, sir, but it was very hard to really put
18 any sort of time limit on it.
19 Q. I understand that, but would it be -- is this consistent
20 with your understanding of it as best one can, that the
21 serious damage was done at a very early stage?
22 A. Yes. That would be one potential. There was potential
23 for that.
24 On saying that, if a person is lying on the ground
25 and has been knocked unconscious and somebody runs over,
149
1 and I suggest, like Stacey Bridgett, who was at the
2 police Land Rover, and had four police officers as
3 an alibi when the incident occurred, he could then have
4 ran over and put the boot in and inflicted serious
5 damage at that particular time. So putting times on it,
6 sir, is very difficult in the circumstances.
7 Q. Indeed, but I am sure again you thought -- this is
8 ultimately a matter for the Inquiry. It does appear
9 that the two women were with their male relations at
10 an early stage. They made their way over to them and
11 they would be quite close to them.
12 A. That's correct, sir.
13 Q. It appears also, that, once they were with them, the
14 kicking had stopped. There was still an awful lot of
15 melee going on and people running in and out when the
16 police were there, trying to get -- charging at them.
17 A. It seemed to be a serious situation, sir. Certainly
18 those female witnesses must have been terribly, terribly
19 frightened being subjected to that round them, sir.
20 Q. There is no doubt about that, but just doing the best
21 one can to form a picture -- and again, one may not be
22 able to -- would you agree that it is at least
23 a reasonable scenario that the attack happened quickly,
24 that the womenfolk were with their men and that, after
25 that, there may well have been -- and there was -- a lot
150
1 of fighting going on peripherally and that numbers of
2 people were charging in and out, but by that stage they
3 were no longer actually kicking?
4 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McComb, you are asking these questions of
5 someone who was not himself a witness.
6 MR McCOMB: I understand that, yes.
7 THE CHAIRMAN: Are you not really asking him to make
8 findings of fact which it is our responsibility to make
9 on our view of the evidence?
10 MR McCOMB: I tried to preface it, and I may have wandered
11 away from my preface, by saying it is a matter for
12 yourselves, sir.
13 THE CHAIRMAN: I think you are trespassing on our province
14 or --
15 MR McCOMB: I will just say, perhaps in self defence, that
16 I was wondering whether having heard what Mr McBurney
17 had said, if he was trying to form a picture or his
18 colleague himself had ever arrived at a picture, but
19 I will move on.
20 May I ask you just about a thing which I am sure you
21 have addressed your mind to, and that is what we might
22 call the leakage of information to Mr Atkinson? It is
23 in the context of Tracey Clarke's statement, which I am
24 sure you are familiar with.
25 A. Yes. Uh-huh.
151
1 Q. Indeed. She had said when she made her statement at the
2 late 9th or early 10th May that Allister Hanvey had told
3 her that Mr Atkinson was being kept up-to-date -- was
4 keeping him up-to-date with information --
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. -- about the progress of the police information.
7 Now, try to break that down a tiny bit.
8 Robert Atkinson was no part of the police investigation?
9 A. Absolutely not, sir, no.
10 Q. Did that concern you, how this -- if it is true -- could
11 have come about?
12 A. It obviously did, sir. I have to say, on saying that,
13 I had full trust in my team in the CID in Portadown,
14 sir, full trust in them, and I don't believe any of them
15 would ever have even went down that road, sir, to be
16 honest with you.
17 Q. You certainly can't think of any basis on which that
18 could have happened?
19 A. No, sir. It is like any incident, sir. There would be
20 talk around the police station --
21 Q. Oh, yes.
22 A. -- of the investigation. If an investigation is
23 running, there would be talk around the police station.
24 It would be chit-chat, sir, and so I don't know in what
25 terms that was being kept up-to-date, sir.
152
1 Q. But nothing of any use to somebody --
2 A. No, sir.
3 Q. -- who might be a potential suspect on a murder charge?
4 A. Oh, definitely not, sir. We were going back to
5 individuals and asking them on evidence and things like
6 that, sir, so, you know, certain amounts of information
7 has to go out, because you are making the enquiries.
8 Q. Yes. Just a matter which arose this morning in relation
9 to Stacey Bridgett, just to come back to him. It was
10 suggested that perhaps -- I think there were two
11 officers who saw him -- that they should have been
12 afforded the opportunity either to confront him or
13 whatever. I think your answer to that was that, in
14 fact, that was in relation to an allegation which may
15 have been made to them at the time by one of the ladies?
16 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
17 Q. Did you then pursue that yourself --
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. -- and check that out?
20 A. That is correct, sir.
21 Q. Was she firm in saying that that was not what she had
22 ever said?
23 A. That's right. She said she didn't mention that, sir.
24 Q. Did you accept that and then just move on?
25 A. Well, I think, sir, that was probably one of the other
153
1 areas that you would have wanted to talk to
2 Rosemary Nelson about, sir.
3 Q. But again, you never really had an opportunity to do
4 that?
5 A. No, sir.
6 Q. May I just ask you briefly about -- I think it is still
7 redacted -- is it G and Mr McCaw? Did you know either
8 of those reservists?
9 A. No, I don't believe so. I think the first time I met
10 Mr McCaw was that first day, sir, and then -- when he
11 had given the intelligence or information regarding
12 Andrea McKee, and then he came in the second day.
13 I didn't know [G] at all, sir, no.
14 Q. You got the information in relation to the Tae Kwon Do
15 club and Andrea McKee and so on in the morning, I think.
16 Is that right?
17 A. It possibly could have been, sir, yes.
18 Q. Then I think you went out --
19 A. What happened is DC McAteer went out to interview
20 Tracey Clarke, and she gave an account that she did not
21 see anything.
22 Q. That's quite right.
23 A. Then Mr McAteer came back in and it was a case of,
24 "Let's go and see the individual that has given this
25 information".
154
1 Q. I will come to that. Just before you did that, there
2 was -- again they came back with information -- some
3 information about a Timothy Jameson?
4 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
5 Q. Now, both those names had appeared I think when one
6 looks at your statement -- I don't intend to go through
7 it -- there was reference to somebody called Tracey
8 I think on 29th April. Can you comment on that at all?
9 A. Yes. I think there is a number of Traceys. Was there
10 a Tracy McAlpine?
11 Q. There was a Tracy McAlpine. Yes.
12 The question is whether, in fact, she was actually
13 in the town that night at all. There is reference also
14 to Timothy Jameson, I think, if one goes to your
15 statement -- sorry to hesitate -- again on the 29th.
16 Were there a whole lot of names which had come into your
17 possession just as --
18 A. What happened, sir, was, as I said, I was running the
19 actual management and I was going through the statements
20 and then going through the questionnaires that were
21 being submitted and other individuals' names were being
22 raised in those conversations, then I was raising
23 actions to go and interview those people. So it was
24 a case of managing the actions and trying to see as many
25 witnesses as we could, as quickly as we possibly could,
155
1 sir.
2 Q. May we just -- I don't know if you can assist us.
3 [81436], please. It is the fourth entry down:
4 "Action 25. 29.04.97."
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. There is a reference to:
7 "P51", I don't want you to say who he is, "and
8 Jameson re movements Portadown town centre."
9 That is logged, of course -- isn't that right -- and
10 that was negative?
11 A. That's correct, sir.
12 Q. Can you say how that name came on to your list?
13 A. It would have been one of the documents that was --
14 rather, it was a statement or a questionnaire, but it
15 was one of those documents that was being put back into
16 the system.
17 In fact, that must have been put in on the 28th,
18 27th/28th, because it was the 28th night that I started
19 to go through all the documents, sir, and all the
20 statements. So that name must have been there at that
21 particular time
22 Q. Then just over the page, the next page, at the bottom,
23 four up from the bottom:
24 "A55. 30.04.97."
25 Would that be the 29th or 30th:
156
1 "ID unknown Tracey re presence in town."
2 We don't know who that is.
3 A. If you looked at the action, if you looked at action 55,
4 sir, it might say at the top of the action where is that
5 from.
6 Q. Those actions don't, of course, show the source of --
7 A. It doesn't, does it not?
8 Q. You can't, I am sure, assist us now with how those names
9 came into being actioned, as it were?
10 A. As such, sir, I was raising those actions as a priority.
11 What I was doing was, as I was saying, I was looking at
12 the statements from the police officers that had made
13 statements at the scene and that. So, as I was coming
14 across a name, I was raising an action, ID, take
15 statement from these individuals.
16 Q. Just in relation to Timothy Jameson then, when Mr McCaw
17 and G came in to give some information about that, are
18 you absolutely certain that there was no mention to you
19 of the fact that he had taken a kick at one or put in
20 the boot?
21 A. I am absolutely certain, sir. If that had been
22 mentioned, sir, I am in no doubt, if I had not said,
23 "Arrest Timothy Jameson", Mr McBurney and the Chief
24 Inspector would have been down there to arrest
25 Timothy Jameson.
157
1 My recollection of the incident, and I have to say,
2 sir, it is similar to the entry of Detective Sergeant --
3 when he spoke to G some years later, and that initial
4 notebook entry, G said that the individual had witnessed
5 the incident. That was the same information that I had
6 got.
7 Q. He had been a witness but not a participant or
8 a potential suspect?
9 A. A witness to the incident, yes.
10 Q. Clearly, of course, did you ever have a chance to
11 discuss that with Mr McBurney in the intervening period?
12 A. No, sir, no, no.
13 Q. Timothy Jameson was never, so far as we have heard --
14 never had any subsequent conversation with G or P20 in
15 relation to this incident. I think that was the
16 evidence of G.
17 A. Right-o.
18 Q. As far as you were concerned, he was not brought into
19 the station ever again, was he --
20 A. After he made --
21 Q. -- after he made the statement?
22 A. No, sir, no.
23 Q. Or interviewed anywhere else --
24 A. No, sir, no.
25 Q. -- certainly to your knowledge?
158
1 A. No, not to my knowledge.
2 Q. Albeit in 2002 he was arrested, but I think that was
3 after your involvement had ceased in Portadown?
4 A. I think so, yes.
5 MR McCOMB: Thank you very much.
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Now, can I just see how much more
7 cross-examination there is of the witness? I suspect we
8 are not going to be able to finish him today.
9 MS DINSMORE: My estimation -- and I am always loathe to do
10 this -- would be in the region of fifteen minutes, but,
11 of course, it can be a moveable feast, Mr Chairman.
12 MR EMMERSON: Less than ten, sir.
13 MR O'CONNOR: Mr Chairman, I have only five minutes at the
14 very most. I do know that the witness is keen to get
15 finished today.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Then there is only re-examination. We can't
17 sit after 4.45 pm in any event. So really I think the
18 best thing is to finish now. What do we have tomorrow,
19 Mr Underwood?
20 MR UNDERWOOD: We have Christine Smith, Sir Ronnie, who has
21 flown from Saudi Arabia for the purpose, and
22 Mr Mahaffey. So a fairly full day.
23 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we had better sit then at 10 o'clock
24 tomorrow morning.
25 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, Mr Irwin?
159
1 A. Thank you, sir.
2 (4.30 pm)
3 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 tomorrow morning)
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