- - - - - - - - - - PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF ROBERT HAMILL - - - - - - - - - - Held at: Interpoint 20-24 York Street Belfast on Wednesday, 9th September 2009 commencing at 10.30 am Day 60 1 Wednesday, 9th September 2009 2 (10.30 am) 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Underwood, I can see that we may be 4 receiving some sensitive material today. Accordingly, 5 it will be appropriate for you to edit what goes on to 6 the website from today's proceedings. 7 MR UNDERWOOD: I shall take care. Thank you very much, sir. 8 THE CHAIRMAN: I hope all involved will be careful not to 9 ask questions which will identify sources. 10 MR UNDERWOOD: That's kind. Thank you. 11 Mr Irwin then, please. 12 MR PHILIP MICHAEL IRWIN (sworn) 13 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD 14 MR UNDERWOOD: Morning, Mr Irwin. 15 A. Morning, sir. 16 Q. My name is Underwood. I am Counsel to the Inquiry. 17 I have a number of questions for you, I am afraid, after 18 which other people may have a number more. 19 A. That's okay. 20 Q. Can I get you to tell us your full name, please? 21 A. Philip Michael Irwin. 22 Q. You have drafted a statement for us which I hope we can 23 pick up at page [81418]. I will not ask you to watch 24 while we scroll through all of it. It is 68 pages long. 25 Is that your statement? 1 1 A. That is my statement, sir, yes. 2 Q. Are the contents true? 3 A. The contents are true, yes. 4 Q. Thank you very much. I want to ask some general 5 questions to start with about the position as at 6 April 1997, when you first became involved in the GBH, 7 as it then was. 8 What experience as an investigating officer had you 9 had on serious investigations such as murder at that 10 point 11 A. Well, I was in the CID from 1985. So right through that 12 up until I was promoted inspector, I was involved in 13 a large number of terrorist and non-terrorist murders in 14 a detective constable role and detective sergeant role. 15 Q. You tell us at page 23 of your statement, which we find 16 at page [81440], about your initial assessment of the 17 incident. On that page, and on the following page, you 18 go from (a) to (h) on a number of factors that you have 19 regard to. 20 Are all those factors that you identified for 21 yourself in April 1997? 22 A. Yes. When I started reading the statements and as 23 I moved through the initial night of the 28th, I think 24 it was, and the 29th, you know, these issues were coming 25 into my head. Because there had been no early arrests 2 1 made at the scene, then, you know, as I was looking at 2 it, you could see that there was going to be 3 difficulties with the investigation. 4 Q. If we go over to [81441] at (e) -- 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. -- the first sentence of that is, as it were, historic: 7 "There were only minor external injuries to 8 Robert Hamill and D, therefore limiting the 9 possibilities of obtaining a forensic link through blood 10 transfer between victim and assailants." 11 Then you go on to say how that's actually made good 12 by events that took place much later, like, for example, 13 Lawrence Marshall's report and so on. This is a sort of 14 running view, is it? 15 A. I got a briefing -- I already had a briefing on the 16 Monday morning from the officers that were at the scene. 17 They would have given us a run-down of what information 18 they had regarding the injuries. 19 Q. But specifically on that paragraph where you are dealing 20 with the difficulty of obtaining a forensic link through 21 blood transfer, and, indeed, you deal with contamination 22 of the scene and so on further on, there are no actions 23 in the first 64 which you refer to in your statement 24 dealing with the liaison with the FSANI, for example. 25 Can you explain why, if you understood these things 3 1 as problems at the time, there is no record of that? 2 A. In what respect, sir, sorry? 3 Q. You say: 4 "There were only minor external injuries ... 5 therefore limiting the possibilities of obtaining 6 a forensic link ..." 7 You tell us in your witness statement, and orally, 8 that this was a factor you took into account at the time 9 as material to how this investigation would go. 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Is that something that should have been recorded 12 somewhere? 13 A. I wouldn't think so, sir. If you look at the actions, 14 how I started the initial 64 actions was that I was 15 reading the documents, and, as I was reading those 16 documents that had already been recorded, I was raising 17 actions that I felt were priority at that particular 18 time. So that was my focus in those first 64 actions. 19 Q. Let me be more specific. Who decided which items would 20 be sent to the FSANI? 21 A. I am not sure if that was decided on the Monday morning, 22 sir, or if that was decided later on, but it would have 23 been discussed between the Scenes of Crimes Officer, 24 myself and the Chief Inspector. 25 Q. But there is no record of a decision made about that. 4 1 Can you explain that? 2 A. Where would the record be made, sir? 3 Q. In an action sheet, "Decision to send following"? 4 A. We wouldn't raise an action. It wouldn't have been 5 usual for me to raise an action in that manner. What we 6 would use would be the FSANI forms, the forensic forms. 7 Q. Okay. 8 A. What you would do there is use those sheets as the 9 material that were being sent to forensic. 10 Q. So if somebody is looking back on it afterwards in order 11 to ascertain whether there were things which could have 12 been sent but weren't, and looking back to see why they 13 were not sent, they are going to be grappling, aren't 14 they? 15 A. They possibly were at that stage, yes, sir. This was 16 a grievous bodily harm and we were running with it. 17 What I was trying to do was run as fast as I could, 18 catch up with it, run with it and see if we could get 19 a positive outcome very early on. 20 Q. Right. In this paragraph we have up on the screen in 21 the second half of the paragraph you say: 22 "Although the forensic scientist, Lawrence Marshall, 23 initially thought there was heavy bloodstaining on 24 Robert Hamill's clothing, he later confirmed that the 25 vast majority of this was, in fact, wine stains." 5 1 A. That's right, sir. 2 Q. You talk about a broken wine bottle being located close 3 to Robert Hamill's head. As far as I am aware, there is 4 no record of a discussion like that. 5 A. No. 6 Q. Would you have expected in the ordinary course 7 a discussion between you and the forensic scientist 8 about what it was he was looking at and what sort of 9 thing he is finding to be recorded somewhere? 10 A. Well, it is like anything. In hindsight, yes, it would 11 be nice to have it recorded, sir, but it wasn't 12 recorded. It was a phone call between himself and 13 myself and we were discussing the clothes that were 14 submitted to forensic, and we were discussing actually 15 in what manner the examination would take place, because 16 we had submitted the clothes and we had asked for hair, 17 fibres and blood, and Mr Marshall was explaining from 18 his point of view he would rather go for blood first and 19 then move back. 20 Q. You say in that that he later confirmed that the vast 21 majority of this was, in fact, wine stains. Was that 22 after Robert Hamill had died? 23 A. I am not sure, sir. It could well have been, yes. 24 I believe there was a message sheet put in by 25 Detective Constable McDowell, where he had made contact 6 1 with Lawrence Marshall, and then, as a result of that, 2 I had contact with Lawrence Marshall. 3 Q. But again, isn't it significant enough to have required 4 a HOLMES message, for example? 5 A. Well, at that stage I believe we did expect the report 6 from Mr Marshall to be submitted quite soon, and in 7 those circumstances, although you have initial thoughts 8 and you are talking over the phone, there is nothing 9 concrete, and until the forensic officer completes his 10 report, I don't know -- it would be difficult or it 11 could -- it might not be the most sensible to put in 12 a message at that particular stage. 13 Q. Apart from these discussions that you or Mr McDowell 14 might have had with Mr Marshall, was there any formal 15 system of discussing with Mr Marshall or anybody at 16 FSANI prior to receipt of the report what was going on? 17 A. 1997, I don't think there was a formal position in 18 relation to that, sir. The majority of it was done 19 through the submission of forensic forms and then it 20 would be on phone calls. 21 Q. So you have -- let's take the end points of this. The 22 start point is you submit the forensic forms with the 23 material. The end point is a report. 24 A. That's correct. 25 Q. In between that you are reliant, are you, on Mr Marshall 7 1 ringing you up or was -- 2 A. Or us ringing Mr Marshall up, or, if we had sat for 3 a meeting, if a meeting had been agreed, then we would 4 have went to a meeting, but there were no set procedures 5 at that particular time. 6 Q. Does it follow there was nobody appointed liaison 7 officer formally between -- on the part of the RUC to 8 deal with the FSANI? 9 A. I am not -- there was a forensic liaison officer for the 10 RUC at that time, but his role was more a policy role 11 rather than each particular case. 12 Q. But so far as the murder team is concerned, once it 13 became a murder, sometimes it might be you talking to 14 Mr Marshall, sometimes it might be Mr McDowell. It 15 could be anybody in the team, could it? 16 A. It wouldn't be anybody in the team, no, sir. 17 Mr McDowell must have been -- an action must have been 18 raised for him to do that and then I would have followed 19 it up when that message came in. 20 Q. Okay. Did any one person in the team, either at GBH or 21 at murder stage, have an overview of what evidence there 22 was in terms of what had been recovered from victims, 23 what had been recovered from the scene in terms of 24 forensic material? 25 A. In what respect, sir? Sorry. 8 1 Q. We know that a detective goes to the scene at 8 o'clock 2 or whatever it is in the morning and with a SOCO, gets 3 the SOCO to pick up all sorts of things at the scene. 4 They are bagged up. In due course, after discussion, 5 some or all of that is sent off to FSANI. At other 6 points people are arrested and DNA is taken from them 7 and samples are submitted to FSANI. 8 You tell me there is no liaison officer in the team 9 between the RUC team and the FSANI. Was there anybody 10 in the team who took responsibility for knowing what 11 there was in terms of scientific materials? 12 A. Yes. Well, I wouldn't say there was no liaison officer 13 on the team. What I would say is that there were 14 conferences every morning and conferences at night and 15 SOCO would have been there, and Mr McBurney and the 16 chief would have been there. So those matters would 17 have been discussed at the conferences, so they would. 18 So, in saying that, those issues would have been 19 discussed at the conference, and, as a result of that, 20 you had an overview of what was being submitted to the 21 scene -- or what was being submitted to forensic. 22 Q. Okay. We know -- we can look at your statement on it, 23 if you like -- on 12th May 1997 Mr Marshall contacted 24 you, as it turned out, to talk about Mr Bridgett's blood 25 being found on Mr Hamill's trousers. 9 1 A. When was that, sir? 12th May? Yes. 2 Q. 12th May. Again, we can look at the paragraph in your 3 statement, if you want? 4 A. No. That's okay. 5 Q. You go on in that -- let's have a look at it. It would 6 be fair to set the context of what I am going to ask. 7 It is page 48, page [81465]. It is the major 8 paragraph at the bottom. The first sentence deals with 9 the contact. The second sentence is: 10 "This information was received after Stacey Bridgett 11 had been charged and had been placed on remand and in 12 custody. The information received was to the effect 13 that Stacey Bridgett's blood had been located at the 14 bottom of Robert Hamill's trouser leg. The initial 15 findings placed Bridgett close to Robert Hamill's feet 16 and the initial forensic scientist's opinion was that 17 this was a blood drop. His opinion was that this 18 initial finding would not support the possibility that 19 Stacey Bridgett was actually assaulting Robert Hamill at 20 the precise time his blood dripped on to Robert Hamill's 21 trousers." 22 Now, the first thing I want to ask about that is: 23 what exchange of information was there between you and 24 him? Because at that point you had got the information 25 that Stacey Bridgett had been standing kicking 10 1 Mr Hamill. 2 A. That's right. 3 Q. Did you pass that on to -- 4 A. Oh, I did surely, sir, yes. 5 Q. What was Mr Marshall's response to that? 6 A. Mr Marshall's response was simply he would deal with the 7 forensic end of it. If I think it was like a tear drip 8 or teardrop mark on the trousers, it would indicate 9 a moving, but his view was that the crop indicated that 10 Stacey Bridgett was actually standing over Robert Hamill 11 and it had dripped straight down onto his trousers. 12 Q. Did you discuss whether that was consistent with him 13 standing over and kicking him? 14 A. Yes, that's right. It didn't support that. His view 15 was that it did not support -- 16 Q. It did not support him standing over him kicking him? 17 A. He could not say that. What he could simply say was 18 Stacey Bridgett was standing over Robert Hamill when the 19 blood dropped on to his trousers. 20 Q. Let me get this clear. He would not go so far as to say 21 it also followed he was kicking him? 22 A. Absolutely not. 23 Q. But it was his view that it was consistent with him 24 standing over him, whether he was kicking him or not? 25 A. Yes. What he could say simply was that Stacey Bridgett 11 1 was located close to Robert Hamill's trouser leg at that 2 particular time. 3 Q. Well, he ruled out that this had flown through the air 4 and dropped on him from a distance. Is that what you 5 are getting at? 6 A. He would simply say, and he would look at the forensic 7 evidence from a forensic point of view, and he simply 8 said this was a drop of blood. This put Stacey Bridgett 9 in the area of Robert Hamill's trouser leg and that the 10 indication was it was a drop of blood and it wasn't 11 a movement -- Stacey Bridgett wasn't moving at the time. 12 He couldn't say that. 13 Q. Fine. Still on this point, we know that there were 14 other bloodstains on Mr Hamill's clothes that weren't 15 examined at that stage by Mr Marshall. 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. We know that now. Were you conscious of that at the 18 time? 19 A. What -- yes. He was still in the process of examining 20 the clothes. So what he had done was he had given me 21 an earlier indication of his finding, but the clothes 22 were still being examined. 23 Q. So? 24 A. It was an ongoing process. 25 Q. So as far as you were concerned, he might, for example, 12 1 as at 12th May, still have had more of Mr Bridgett's 2 blood to find on Mr Hamill 's clothes? 3 A. That's right. 4 Q. As far as you were concerned, this was a heads-up from 5 him and he was carrying on? 6 A. That's correct, yes. 7 Q. Thank you. At page 49 of your statement, [81466], there 8 is a set of lettered paragraphs (a) to (c), and we can 9 look at them in detail, if you want, but the outcome 10 really of all of that is there were discussions about 11 whether to re-interview Bridgett and it was decided not 12 to. Is that a fair precis? 13 A. It was decided that we had no power to get 14 Stacey Bridgett back into police custody. 15 Q. This was a view taken between you and P39 and 16 Mr McBurney. Is that right? 17 A. That's correct. Under the Police Powers Act, if he had 18 been a convicted prisoner, we could have got him under 19 a production order. If he was still in police custody, 20 we could deal with him under PACE, but because he was 21 a charged prisoner, we had to deal with him under the 22 Magistrates' Courts (Northern Ireland) Order, and 23 Article 47(4)(a) and I think it's (4)(e) specifically 24 states that you cannot get -- the only reason that you 25 can get a charged person back into custody is to 13 1 interview him about other offences and not about the 2 offence for which he has been charged. 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Would you have been allowed to go and see him 4 in prison where he was detained? 5 A. You could have went to the prison, sir. Yes, you could 6 have. He didn't have to see you. 7 THE CHAIRMAN: No, I follow. 8 A. And he would have had a solicitor present. 9 MR UNDERWOOD: So is this right: in order to compel him to 10 a police station to be interviewed, you had to go under 11 the order? 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. You could have gone to the prison and presumably PACE 14 would have applied? 15 A. No, PACE wouldn't have applied. He wasn't under police 16 detention at that stage. 17 Q. Right. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: But you would need to caution him, wouldn't 19 you? 20 A. Sir, yes, you would have. One, he would have to agree 21 to see you, and, if he didn't want to see you, then you 22 had to walk away again. 23 MR UNDERWOOD: Was any consideration given to asking him to? 24 A. At that time, sir, the examination was still going on. 25 Forensic examinations were still going on. So at that 14 1 time, it wasn't considered -- you know, at that 2 particular time it wouldn't have been a relevant time to 3 go. 4 Q. So it was, as it were, parked, was it? 5 A. That's right, yes. 6 Q. Let's jump ahead. We know that Mr Marshall's report 7 came through eventually in October. Was consideration 8 then given to re-interviewing him? 9 A. At that stage then, the DPP had actually interviewed 10 Mr Marshall or spoken to Mr Marshall as well, and 11 I don't believe it was, because again, what we had is we 12 had Stacey Bridgett located in the vicinity. We knew 13 that he was in the vicinity of Robert Hamill. 14 Constable Neill or somebody had placed him close to 15 Robert Hamill. Reserve Constable Silcock had been over 16 at Robert Hamill when somebody shouted the word, 17 "Stacey", and he looked round and seen a person with 18 blood coming from his nose, I think it was, and one of 19 the females that was with Robert Hamill said, "That's 20 the one that done it". 21 What we did do is we went back to that person and 22 that person denied making that comment to the police 23 officer. 24 Q. So all the more reason to ask Mr Bridgett why he had 25 lied about being miles away from Mr Hamill, isn't it? 15 1 A. Well, sir, we could put him in the vicinity. 2 Q. Sorry, I am not following your answers. I am asking you 3 whether consideration was given to interviewing him, to 4 put to him the disparity between his denial he was near 5 Mr Hamill and Mr Hamill's jeans having his blood on. 6 You tell me that a reason for not doing that is that 7 you had got what we call res gestae evidence, that 8 somebody shouted out the name, "Stacey", and he answered 9 to it, but you followed that up and it went nowhere. 10 A. That's right. 11 Q. Why then, because that went nowhere, is that relevant to 12 the question whether you should re-interview 13 Mr Bridgett? 14 A. I think what we could do, sir, was we could put 15 Stacey Bridgett -- we knew he was telling lies -- at the 16 location, in the vicinity of Mr Hamill. 17 Q. You still have -- I am so sorry. Go on? 18 A. So really -- what we would be saying to him again was, 19 "The blood is putting you in the vicinity of 20 Robert Hamill". 21 THE CHAIRMAN: Might not his answers have been of use? 22 A. Pardon, sir? 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Might not his answers have been of use? 24 A. That's an area, sir -- yes. I am not sure I could 25 answer that, sir. You know, at that particular stage it 16 1 had went to the DPP and we had looked at it and that was 2 at that stage then. 3 MR UNDERWOOD: Let me ask you about that. The crime file -- 4 you completed the crime file on 22nd July? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. It had wended its way up to the DPP by early August, so 7 by the time Mr Marshall's report came in a couple of 8 months later. 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. The DPP had the file. Would the question of whether to 11 re-interview Mr Bridgett after that have been the 12 subject of a direction from the DPP or at least 13 consideration by the DPP? 14 A. I am not sure whether it would have been, sir. 15 Certainly, at that stage, we had been in consultation 16 with the DPP regarding it. We were waiting on the 17 forensic report, and I think -- 18 Q. I am dealing with the position after the forensic report 19 came in. 20 A. Uh-huh, yes. I don't think it would have been 21 a discussion with the DPP, sir. I can't honestly recall 22 having a discussion with them regarding it. 23 Q. Let's just try to get some understanding of the 24 allocation of responsibilities here. 25 As at 1997 -- take this case as an instance -- you 17 1 send a crime file up. A forensic report is awaited. It 2 comes in. So the DPP has the crime file and it has the 3 forensic report? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Assume, for the moment, there was a good reason to 6 re-interview Mr Bridgett as a result of the crime file 7 and the forensic report. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Whose responsibility would it have been to take the 10 decision to re-interview him? Would it have been the 11 responsibility of the RUC undirected or would it have 12 been the responsibility of the DPP to direct it? 13 A. I think in all honesty what we would have done is went 14 to the DPP and spoken to them about it. We wouldn't 15 have interviewed or asked for a further interview or 16 went to the prison to speak to that individual without 17 speaking to the DPP first. 18 Q. Thank you. 19 Going back to the decision that you refer to in 20 page 49, [81466], which is around 15th May 1997, this 21 discussion where you conclude that the time is not right 22 to interview Bridgett, should that have been, in your 23 view, the subject of a policy decision? 24 A. In normal circumstances, yes, it should have been. 25 Q. At that stage, as we understand it, DCI P39 was keeping 18 1 a policy file which ran from 9th to 30th May? 2 A. That's correct. 3 Q. Do I understand your evidence that you didn't know about 4 that policy file until she gave it to you on the 30th? 5 A. No. I would have been aware that a policy file probably 6 was being kept. I wouldn't have been aware of the 7 entries in it, sir. 8 Q. Right. On the question of the forensic science report, 9 we know you were getting these heads-up in May 1997, in 10 particular the one about that blood spot, and the report 11 does not come in, I think, until 24th October 1997. 12 What was done to chase it up? 13 A. I believe in the DPP file, when I submitted it in July, 14 it was highlighted that the forensic report was 15 outstanding. Because the individuals were charged, one 16 of the reasons for continuing whether they were in 17 custody or whatever, it would have been highlighted that 18 the DPP file -- or the forensic report was outstanding. 19 So usually in those circumstances what we would do 20 from the police point of view is ring in -- also 21 a police liaison point within the forensic department. 22 We would be looking to get it chased up, and the DPP 23 would actually be on to the forensic as well. There 24 would be a system where the DPP would be looking the 25 forensic report as well. 19 1 Q. Right. 2 A. I am saying that there was a history at that particular 3 time of late forensic reports. Forensics were late. 4 They had a lot of work on and it was acknowledged or 5 certainly known within the Police Service that forensics 6 were late with their reports. 7 Q. Okay. Can we have a look at page [02336]? This is 8 a message 37. It is dated 12th November 1997. It is 9 yours, I think. Is that right? 10 A. It is indeed, sir, yes. 11 Q. What it records is: 12 "On 12th November I spoke with Mr Marshall, FSANI, 13 reference his forensic report dated 24th October 1997. 14 As a result he tested the items marked unknown A, 15 a sample of blood ..." 16 He goes on about profiles that's checked against: 17 "This examination proved negative with the unknown A 18 remaining outstanding." 19 Now, there is a delay then between 24th November 20 (sic)[October] and 12th November, on the face of it, before 21 anybody does anything about checking unknown A -- and 22 there is an unknown B that is referred to below -- 23 against people. 24 Can you tell us about that? What was the response 25 to the report and to this revelation that there was some 20 1 unknown blood? 2 A. What was the response, sir? Well, what I would have 3 done was I would have went through the forensic report. 4 I think it was at that stage it was the first time I had 5 realised that forensic samples had not been taken from 6 a number of individuals that had been in custody. Their 7 DNA samples had been taken. 8 Q. Did you say they had or had not been taken? 9 A. The evidential forensic samples hadn't been taken, but 10 DNA samples had been taken. 11 Q. Uh-huh. 12 A. So, in other words, to assess if the outstanding blood 13 was related to any of those three individuals, I asked 14 him to put it through the DNA database. So he checked 15 the DNA database with those samples and that eliminated 16 it wasn't those three individuals' blood. 17 Q. We know that at about the same time enquiries were made 18 of Ms McCoy and Mr Prunty to establish whether 19 Mr Prunty -- 20 THE CHAIRMAN: I am sorry, do you mind if I just ask 21 a question to clear my own mind before you move on? 22 MR UNDERWOOD: Of course. 23 THE CHAIRMAN: If you try to see a man in prison, he can 24 refuse to see you -- 25 A. That's correct, sir. 21 1 THE CHAIRMAN: -- or he can see you and refuse to answer 2 questions. 3 A. That is correct, sir. 4 THE CHAIRMAN: If you can have him in a police station, you 5 can interview him, but, equally, he can refuse to answer 6 questions. 7 A. That's correct, sir. 8 THE CHAIRMAN: At that time, no adverse comment could be 9 made in a trial against that refusal. 10 A. That's correct, sir. 11 THE CHAIRMAN: It strikes me that there is no particular 12 advantage of, one, seeing him in prison, as between that 13 and seeing him at the police station. They both pose 14 the same difficulties. He may not cooperate. Is that 15 right? 16 A. That's correct, sir. In the prison he may not even see 17 you. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. But if he doesn't want to talk to you, 19 that's the likely outcome -- 20 A. That's right. 21 THE CHAIRMAN: -- whether you see him in prison or in 22 a police station. 23 A. But in the police station you can put questions to him 24 and they are recorded. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: I dare say, but the failure to answer is of 22 1 no value. 2 A. No. That's right, sir. 3 THE CHAIRMAN: I am just wondering, in those circumstances, 4 why, because you could not interview him in a police 5 station, the idea of seeing him or trying to see him in 6 prison was not pursued? 7 A. Well, I think, sir, if you look -- 8 THE CHAIRMAN: As though seeing him in the police station 9 had some advantage over the other. 10 A. I think if you look probably at his questions in the 11 police station as well, sir, and his attitude, I don't 12 believe his attitude would have changed much when he had 13 been in prison to his attitude when he was in the police 14 station. 15 THE CHAIRMAN: Is the position really this then: that 16 whether it would have been in prison or would have been 17 at the police station, there seemed to be no purpose in 18 re-interviewing him? Is that really the long and short 19 of it? 20 A. I think it's a case of what would be the value of 21 re-interviewing him again? What evidence are you likely 22 to get? 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Whether it was in prison or in a police 24 station? 25 A. Yes. 23 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Sorry, Mr Underwood. 2 MR UNDERWOOD: Not at all. 3 While we are still on this document, under "Action" 4 at the bottom, take the last third of it, is that: 5 "Further connected ..." 6 A. "Further corrected". 7 Q. "Page 8 to be forwarded by L Marshall - (also page 7). 8 "2. Re-interview first Colin Prunty and 9 Maureen McCoy to establish if: 10 "(a) Colin Prunty was bleeding. 11 "(b) Maureen McCoy can ID source of blood. 12 "(c) Obtain necessary Buccal swab DNA profile to 13 compare against A." 14 What you are there doing in response to this 15 unknown A blood is checking to see whether Mr Prunty was 16 the possible source of it. 17 Did you consider whether there were any others, for 18 example, the other Catholics you knew of at the scene, 19 Colin Hull, Vincent McNeice, people like that? 20 A. I would strongly believe that it was the blood belonging 21 to Colin Hull. If you look at Colin Hull, Colin Hull 22 came running out of Woodhouse Street the evidence is. 23 He is put in the same ambulance as Robert Hamill. He is 24 bleeding and he is at the hospital and he has blood. So 25 Colin Hull was a very strong candidate for the source of 24 1 the blood. He was located in the right area and there 2 were spots of blood that would have linked him to the 3 incident. 4 Q. Did you try to get his DNA? 5 A. He would not speak to us, Sir. We tried to get him and 6 tried to get him through the solicitor. 7 Q. You can use the name. Rosemary Nelson. 8 A. Can I use the word Rosemary? 9 Rosemary would not answer any of my calls or 10 wouldn't assist me in any particular way, sir. 11 Q. There are references in your statement to her not 12 returning your calls. 13 A. That's correct, sir. 14 Q. Did you consider going round and knocking on her door? 15 A. Sir, I don't think, if Rosemary didn't want to speak to 16 me, she wouldn't speak to me, sir. All you can do is 17 try. I think we tried in letter format as well, sent 18 a letter. 19 I can't answer why she didn't want to speak to me. 20 All I know is I tried to speak to her. There were 21 benefits for everybody in getting the solicitor to talk 22 with us. There was benefits from an investigation point 23 of view and there was benefits from Robert Hamill's 24 family's point of view regarding the flow of 25 information, to the benefit of everybody. It didn't 25 1 happen and it did affect the investigation. 2 Q. Right. From what you have told me about five minutes 3 ago, this message came about because there was 4 a realisation that you had not checked the DNA before. 5 Are you suggesting that there was any lapse of 6 checking DNA before Mr Marshall's report came out? 7 A. Sorry, no. It is not that we had not checked it. What 8 had happened was there had been six or eight individuals 9 that were arrested and evidential samples had been taken 10 from a number of them of them. DNA had been taken from 11 them all. When Mr Marshall then did his report, he 12 would have checked the evidential samples against the 13 outstanding marks. 14 When I saw it, then I realised there were three 15 individuals that had been arrested that had not been 16 checked off with his evidential samples. So I asked him 17 to put the blood against the DNA database. So until 18 that report came through, I wouldn't have been aware of 19 that. 20 Q. Right. 21 In terms of -- again, I am now dealing with the 22 position after Mr Marshall's report came in -- the 23 Bridgett blood on Mr Hamill's trousers, you have dealt 24 with the question of the possibility of re-interviewing 25 Bridgett. I want to ask you now whether there was any 26 1 consideration given to getting any further or better 2 forensic science evidence on the value to be given to 3 the blood spatter itself? 4 A. From another forensic scientist, sir? 5 Q. Yes. 6 A. Well, certainly I hadn't considered it, sir, and I know 7 Mr Davison from the DPP spoke directly to Mr Marshall. 8 No, I had not considered it. 9 Q. That was a matter for Mr Davison, as far as you were 10 concerned anyway? 11 A. Well, he had spoken to Mr Marshall and went through it 12 in great detail at that particular stage, sir. 13 Q. Thank you. 14 I want to move on to the topic of getting the 15 identity of suspects at the scene now. 16 At page 26 of your statement, [81443], you set out 17 actions. At the bottom there under (a): 18 "Action 24, dated 29th April 1997, to identify 19 possible witnesses/persons in the vicinity", etc. 20 At that stage, 29th April, had you any views about 21 the likelihood of people coming forward and being 22 witnesses at court? 23 A. No, sir. I think from an early stage like that you are 24 hunting -- you know, at the end of the day you are 25 hunting the evidence. You are looking to get what 27 1 evidence you can place before a court. So really, at 2 that stage, what I was doing, my initial thought process 3 and those actions was: what are the opportunities to get 4 witnesses here? 5 That simply related in those actions. I was not 6 thinking about court at that particular stage. I was 7 thinking, "Let's get the evidence here. Let's see what 8 witnesses there are. Let's try to manipulate as much 9 information. What's out there? What are the 10 possibilities?" 11 Q. You didn't have a gloomy view, at that stage. You were 12 just doing it with an open mind? 13 A. What I done on the 28th, as I say, when I started to 14 read through it, you start to try to get as much 15 evidence as you possibly can. You look at the positive 16 at that particular time and you run with it. 17 Q. We know a lot of people were at the scene, of course. 18 Did you appreciate that at that point? 19 A. Pardon? 20 Q. Did you appreciate that, at that point, this was a crowd 21 scene we were talking about? 22 A. Oh, yes. Uh-huh. 23 Q. Of course, this was a couple of weeks before HOLMES was 24 brought on to it. 25 A. That's right, yes. 28 1 Q. Was anybody, as it were, put in the position of 2 a statement reader or HOLMES receiver to deal with the 3 information coming in? 4 A. Sir, I had eight people in the office, myself and seven 5 others. I was out running round trying to get 6 witnesses. I was the statement reader. I had taken it 7 on board and I had started what some people refer to as 8 a mini MIRIAM system. I referred to it as an action 9 sheet mini MIRIAM system where what I was doing I was 10 reading the statements, looking at the documents and 11 raising actions to try to get the evidence. 12 So if anybody was doing it, it was me, sir. 13 Unfortunately, I hadn't the luxury of detailing somebody 14 there besides that. We were all not only dealing with 15 this incident, but dealing with everyday incidents that 16 were coming into the CID office as well. 17 Q. Okay. We know, of course, that statements were taken 18 and dated 10th May from Mr Timothy Jameson and 19 Tracey Clarke -- 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. -- as part of this process, and that in due course those 22 two were interviewed by the DPP. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. I want to jump ahead to this point. Once statements 25 have been taken from those two, what was your impression 29 1 of the likelihood of them giving evidence? 2 A. I think in my DPP file, sir, I indicated that they would 3 be under pressure to withdraw. 4 Q. Tell us your impression, though, of how they might or 5 might not respond to that pressure? How did you feel? 6 A. How did I feel? 7 Q. You told us you identified to the DPP they might be put 8 under pressure. What I am asking about is what you 9 thought they would do. 10 A. Well, sir, it was common in Northern Ireland for many 11 witnesses to withdraw their evidence and not give 12 evidence at court. It was a regular occurrence that 13 I had seen many, many times before. 14 Q. So is this the fairest analysis of your state of mind 15 then, that you thought it was a risk they would not give 16 evidence? 17 A. I identified there was a risk. There was a strong risk. 18 Here they were living in a community where they had 19 friends, relatives and they had to give evidence against 20 a certain number of individuals. They were young people 21 as well. There would be a lot of pressure on those 22 individuals to withdraw their evidence. 23 Q. We have heard from Mr McBurney through the recording of 24 his interview by the Inquiry that he dealt with 25 Timothy Jameson and Tracey Clarke quite separately on 30 1 this, that, so far as Tracey Clarke was concerned, he 2 thought she was vulnerable, living where she did. He 3 couldn't properly offer her protection that would 4 guarantee that she was going to turn up, whereas with 5 Timothy Jameson, he thought that, because of who 6 Timothy Jameson's family were, there was much less risk 7 that anybody would be able to impress him. 8 Were you party to that thinking? 9 A. I wasn't, sir, no, I wasn't. 10 Q. Were you aware of any efforts that were made to, as it 11 were, keep these witnesses on board? 12 A. I know in relation to Tracey Clarke, sir, Mr McBurney 13 and the chief were liaising, or the chief in particular 14 was liaising with that individual. 15 Q. By "chief" do you mean P39, as we call her? 16 A. Sorry. Yes. Chief Inspector P39. So I know she was 17 liaising mostly with that individual and the family. 18 Q. Are you aware of any steps that were taken with 19 Timothy Jameson or his family? 20 A. No, I wasn't, sir. The first contact I had with 21 Timothy Jameson was when we asked him to go on 22 an identity parade. He declined that offer. 23 Q. I wanted to ask you about that. Let's deal with it now. 24 In your murder file you deal with Mr Allen, "Fonzy" -- 25 or rather, let's make this clear, you deal with the 31 1 allegation he made that "Fonzy" was party to the 2 kicking. 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. You set out in the report that you had identified 5 "Fonzy" at least potentially as Andrew Allen? 6 A. That's correct. 7 Q. There were two reasons for releasing Mr Allen when you 8 did. The first was there turned out to be a typo about 9 his nickname and, secondly, the need for an identity 10 parade. 11 A. Yes. Was it a typo, or was it in the handwritten 12 statement it looked like either "Fonzy" or "Gonzy"? 13 That was in the handwritten statement, but -- and he was 14 released on bail as such, that, to me, it is 15 irrelevant -- not irrelevant, but certainly, now he, if 16 there had to be an ID parade arranged, it couldn't have 17 been held that day anyway. It had to be organised. 18 Q. So -- so -- I am so sorry. Go on. 19 A. That was a case of you had to release him anyway. 20 Q. So this was all in May 1997? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. It is probably my fault, but I have been unable to find 23 any record of the offer of an identity parade and its 24 refusal, except in your crime file? 25 A. Right-o. 32 1 Q. Can you help us with this? Can you recall how quickly 2 after releasing Mr Allen on bail the identity parade was 3 sought and rejected by Mr Jameson? 4 A. Yes. What happened was that Mr Allen would have been 5 released to a certain date. So I got Detective 6 Constable Honeyford to contact Jameson and to ask him to 7 go on an ID parade, and he declined. So that would have 8 been before the individual had come back on bail. 9 Q. Can you give us any idea of timescales? Would you have 10 done this within days of releasing him? 11 A. Yes, it would have been done. 12 Q. So the chances are still in May 1997, then? 13 A. He was released to come back for bail. I can't remember 14 if he was released for 7 days or 14 days. So it would 15 have been within that period. 16 Q. So there you are with an indication in May that Jameson 17 is now not cooperating. Would that be fair? 18 A. Well, he wouldn't go on an ID parade. 19 Q. Did that raise any alarm bells? 20 A. Yes. That's yes, you know, it certainly had concerns 21 for me that the individuals may not stand up. 22 Q. Did anybody take any steps as a result of that to go 23 round and find out what was going on with him? 24 A. No, not at that stage, sir. I think what you do, 25 unless -- well, it is difficult to go round there and 33 1 take any steps. I think there is very little steps you 2 can take. If a person doesn't want to go on an identity 3 parade, then there is very little steps you can take 4 about that. 5 Q. But here you have got one of only two witnesses who 6 could make the murder charges stick, and within weeks 7 certainly of him giving his statement, he is telling you 8 he is not going to help you. Why is nothing done? 9 A. Sir, he is not saying he is not going to help me. He is 10 saying he is not prepared to go on an identity parade. 11 My personal belief was that he probably did know -- 12 although he only knew -- only related "Fonzy" as 13 "Fonzy", he probably did know his -- this individual, 14 and he didn't want to give evidence against him. 15 Q. If we look at page [18096], this is a note of 16 Mr Davison's of 10th October 1997. It may or may not be 17 familiar to you. Let's just take the first few lines: 18 "I spoke today by telephone with DI Irwin at 19 4.00 pm. He informed me that, since Drumcree '97, the 20 attitude of Protestants towards Roman Catholics had 21 hardened and it could not be guaranteed that Witnesses A 22 and B would now be willing to give evidence." 23 As I say, that's 10th October. Quite apart from 24 your heads-up in the crime file, which you sign off on 25 22nd July to the effect that witnesses may be 34 1 intimidated, here you are underlining in October that 2 you have reason to believe there may be even more 3 hardening of the attitude. 4 Was that a fair analysis of your view? 5 A. Yes. I think Drumcree hardened both sides of the 6 community in Portadown. 7 Q. So when it was revealed to you that at the consultation 8 which took place later in October both Tracey Clarke and 9 Timothy Jameson declined to go any further with this, 10 was that any surprise? 11 A. Well, it is not that it wasn't any surprise, sir. It is 12 one of these things that happened, and what can I say 13 about it, sir? You know, these people go in and see the 14 DPP and they don't want to give evidence. 15 Q. Can I ask you about the provision -- I think it is 16 referred to as Article 3 -- by which a witness statement 17 could have been put in in a criminal case if there was 18 reason to believe that the witness wouldn't attend to 19 give evidence because of fear. 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Can you help us with how that was used in 1997 or so? 22 A. I think it was in very select cases that it was used and 23 I think the intimidation in relation to this particular 24 aspect could have been people not talking to them or 25 calling them names, things like that. So I have to say 35 1 my knowledge of it is very limited, but I have to say 2 I think it was used very selectively. 3 Q. Have you any experience of it being used? 4 A. I recall it being used, I believe, in Armagh in one 5 incident, but it wasn't on -- it was to prove a contact 6 between a vehicle and a link. It wasn't used in a prima 7 facie that this person had seen an individual doing 8 actually this. It was used to prove a link in a series 9 of cases of a car, seen a car going somewhere else. 10 I think that's the only time I can recall it being 11 used. It wasn't used as such where an individual was 12 witnessing anybody ... 13 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you know if any applications had been made 14 that had been in cases where a witness could speak about 15 an individual -- 16 A. No. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: -- but were tried and rejected by the judge? 18 A. No, I can't recall any, sir. 19 MR UNDERWOOD: We know that the consultations that took 20 place with the DPP with both Clarke and Jameson took 21 place with the respective detectives who had taken the 22 statements. That's Mr McAteer and Mr Honeyford. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Did you get any feedback from either of those? 25 A. Sir, I was down at the consultations and I know some 36 1 people have referred that they thought I was in the 2 consultation. I can't recall being in, actually in the 3 consultation. I certainly was down and spoke 4 beforehand. So, yes, they would have come out and said 5 exactly, you know, what that individual said. 6 Q. Was there any consideration given to discussing with 7 these witnesses whether they had actually been warned 8 off by anybody? 9 A. No. As I say, I think senior counsel was at those 10 consultations really, sir. So that would be an area 11 that I certainly wasn't familiar with and even having 12 a discussion with the DPP on. 13 Q. Right. I want to move on to events of 9th May -- move 14 back, rather, to the events of 9th May 1997. Quite 15 a lot happened on that date. 16 One of the things that happened was that two 17 officers came into the police station at a point where 18 you tell us you were pretty much on your way out to go 19 and visit somebody. Your evidence on that is that these 20 two officers came in and you had no substantive 21 discussion with them. 22 A. Actually, I can only recall one of the officers, sir. 23 Q. Right? 24 A. My recollection was that it was -- I was heading out of 25 my office and going down the stairs, or intending to go 37 1 down the stairs, to go to a pre-arranged meeting, and 2 one of the officers told me that he had information 3 regarding an individual who had witnessed the incident, 4 and I can't recall really what he exactly said, sir. 5 I was probably aware that the individual he named, 6 which was Timothy Jameson, had been interviewed that 7 previous day. So I brought him round to Mr McBurney and 8 the Chief Inspector and introduced them to him and left 9 them with those two officers, sir. 10 Q. Right. I want to move on now to what happened then. 11 Can we have a look at page [02203], message 15, 12 dated 9th May 1997? The substance of it is: 13 "Spoke with P38 between 2.05 pm and 2.45 pm 14 accompanied by [P23]." 15 A. I think that should be P23. 16 Q. Right: 17 "He related that he had heard that the persons 18 responsible for the murder in Portadown centre were 19 a person called Rory, a Dean Forbes and a person called 20 Stacey." 21 Then if we go further down to "Action: yes/no", you 22 have written: 23 "No further action." 24 Is that your form? 25 A. That's my message sheet. That went in and that is 38 1 Detective Sergeant Bradley's comment as receiver, "No 2 further action." 3 Q. How would that action, ie," No further action", have 4 come about? 5 A. Detective Sergeant Bradley at that stage was probably 6 aware that Stacey Bridgett, Dean Forbes and 7 Rory Robinson had been arrested, interviewed and charged 8 with the murder and that's why he wrote, "No further 9 action". 10 Q. Because by the time this message gets to him -- 11 A. It is through the system. 12 Q. -- it is the 11th or 12th or whatever? 13 A. Yes. Uh-huh. 14 Q. Did you do anything as a result of this information? 15 A. The information could not be brought any further, sir. 16 It was hearsay. The person that gave me that 17 information couldn't tell me, or he wouldn't tell me, 18 where he got it from or on what grounds he had got it. 19 All he heard was at that Rory, Dean Forbes and a person 20 called Stacey were responsible for the murder. 21 Q. Are you aware that this gentleman we are calling P38 22 denies he had this conversation at all? 23 A. Well, if I was P38 now in the same position, I would 24 probably deny it, sir. 25 Q. You maintain you had the conversation, do you? 39 1 A. Yes, sir. I definitely had the conversation. 2 Q. We have a picture, of course, of how busy the GBH and 3 the murder investigation was and how busy individual 4 members of the teams were, and your role both initially 5 and once the matter became a murder investigation. 6 Is this fair: you managed the liaison with the 7 HOLMES unit after the murder, after it became a murder? 8 A. Yes, sir, yes. 9 Q. Managed the investigation team? 10 A. Yes, sir, yes. 11 Q. Ran the conferences? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. That Mr McBurney and P39 were responsible for strategy, 14 policy and decision-making. Is that your -- 15 A. That's correct, sir, yes. 16 Q. Give us an impression of how a conference would have 17 gone then, if you are managing the conferences but they 18 have this function. 19 A. What would happen, sir, was -- you have to realise that 20 the HOLMES team were located in Armagh. So you would 21 have had the office manager, the HOLMES office manager 22 who was responsible for all the murders in south region, 23 he would have attended -- sorry, I have taken cramp -- 24 he would have attended the Portadown station and the 25 conferences would be in the morning time and probably in 40 1 the afternoon. 2 What would happen is that we would go through the 3 actions and Mr McBurney and the Chief Inspector would be 4 there and they would be asking questions. As I'd go 5 through the actions and the processes of what we were 6 doing that particular day, then Mr McBurney or the Chief 7 Inspector would raise further actions or suggestions or 8 make directions on how it was going. Now that -- 9 Q. And that -- sorry. Go on. 10 A. Now that only lasted I would say for two, three weeks, 11 sir, at that process, because, at that stage, officers 12 that were attached to my team had to go back to other 13 investigations and I was left running the investigation 14 with the staff from the Portadown office, the majority 15 of staff from the Portadown office. 16 Q. Would this be fair then, that things that would 17 ordinarily be the subject of entries in a policy book 18 were the subject of discussion and decision-making at 19 these conferences? 20 A. Well, Mr McBurney and the Chief Inspector could have 21 made policy entries in the book that weren't discussed 22 at the conferences. What they were getting was a feel 23 from the team of how the witnesses, how their actions 24 were progressing. So that's what they were getting 25 a feel for at those conferences. It was really the 41 1 working relationship between the team on the ground 2 doing their enquiries and Mr McBurney and the Chief 3 Inspector keeping an overview on the situation. 4 Q. But it was a two-way street, though, was it? They would 5 be understanding what was going on and they would say, 6 "Right. Now go and do this"? 7 A. That's right, sir. 8 Q. You tell us at page 32 of your witness statement, which 9 is at page [81449], if we look to the third entry: 10 "1st May 1997 spoke to Robert's sister Diane ref 11 progress of investigation." 12 Are you aware that two of the Hamill sisters have 13 given evidence that they had a conversation with you in 14 which you told them that the video material that had 15 been seized showed the Land Rover? 16 A. That's correct. I am aware of that, sir, yes. 17 Q. What do you say about that? 18 A. Well, first of all, I would say that conversation 19 I believe took place on 30th October 1997. 20 Q. Right. 21 A. Maybe if somebody could pull up my notebook entry for 22 that day? 23 Q. I am sure they can. I confess I don't have it at my 24 fingertips. 25 A. Let me see. Well -- yes. It might be -- oh, sorry. 42 1 I can't get my notebook entry. What happened as 2 a result of that, sir, was actually the, "See no evil, 3 hear no evil", book reference 41231, and page 32 of it 4 I think Diane mentions that on 30th October that I had 5 told her that the Land Rover had been seen on the 6 incident or had been seen on the video. 7 Then Mo Mowlam was involved in November, and there 8 is correspondence as well around that time which 9 indicates it was that particular stage in which she 10 suggested the family had heard that the Land Rover was 11 on the video. Again, we responded to that by saying, 12 "No, the Land Rover wasn't on the video." 13 What actually happened on that particular date was 14 the charges had been withdrawn from a number of 15 individuals in October, and Diane and her two sisters 16 had called at the police station and I think my notebook 17 would reflect that they were distressed, and rightly so, 18 and they were aggravated. We had a discussion, and we 19 talked about the video evidence again, sir, because 20 I had spoken to Diane on a number of occasions about it. 21 What I was trying to -- 22 Q. Sorry. Just pause there. This was not the first time 23 you had spoken to her about the video evidence then? 24 A. No, absolutely not. I had spoken to Diane before and 25 said there was no video evidence. So we are now on 43 1 30th October. What I was trying to explain to them was 2 the Land Rover was located outside the First Trust Bank. 3 It had moved from there and it had moved down to the 4 junction outside the Alliance & Leicester, I think it 5 is. The only chance that ever the video -- of any video 6 recording ever getting the Land Rover would have been 7 outside the First Trust Bank, and all it possibly would 8 have seen was the side of the Land Rover, if it had got 9 it. But there was no video in the First Trust Bank, so 10 we would have never got the Land Rover on it. 11 Now, whether I didn't explain myself properly or, in 12 the circumstances, it was taken up wrongly, but there 13 was never any police Land Rover there I was aware that 14 was on any police video -- or any video. It may have 15 been my fault. I can't honestly say what happened, but 16 I can assure you I never saw any police Land Rover on 17 any video and it was never on any video. 18 Q. Why was there more than one discussion about the video 19 then? 20 A. Diane came in on 1st May. She was raising those issues. 21 Q. That's why I was asking about 1st May. That was their 22 evidence; that it was about that stage that you told 23 them that the Land Rover was visible on the video. 24 A. No, I didn't, because if you look at the action sheet 25 regarding the video, what happened was DC Keys had went 44 1 and checked the videos. He had done that on the Monday 2 morning of the 28th I think it was, when I was in 3 Banbridge. 4 As a result of that meeting with Diane on 1st May 5 I went back and checked with the Chief Inspector and 6 with DC Keys -- and I think it's on the action sheet -- 7 checked with them again that there was no video 8 evidence. 9 Q. But at that point, there was no complaint against the 10 police, was there? 11 A. I'm not sure when the complaint ... 12 Q. It came in on 8th May. 13 A. Right-o. Okay. 14 Q. The proposition is, you see, as of 28th April and 15 1st May, you were not worrying whether the video showed 16 the Land Rover, because you had no interest in what the 17 Land Rover was doing, because at that stage you were 18 looking for the murder. 19 A. That's right. 20 Q. Or you were looking for the GBH, more accurately. 21 A. But when Diane came in to speak me on 1st May, she 22 was -- and again rightly so -- in a distressed state, 23 very aggravated, was very concerned regarding why she 24 believed the police had sat in the Land Rover and had 25 not got out until the ambulance persons had arrived. 45 1 She was annoyed at the police making no arrests, 2 immediate arrests at the scene, and the fact also of the 3 press report as well. 4 So Diane was very focused on the police issue. 5 I was investigating -- yes, I was investigating the 6 murder, but Diane at that stage was very -- and properly 7 so -- she was very focused on the police, how they 8 operated at the scene 9 Q. We know that although there was the complaint by 10 Rosemary Nelson that I think was logged on 8th May, 11 there also seems to have been a self-referral, or at the 12 chief constable's instigation, at about the same time. 13 Did you pass up to anybody else the concerns that 14 were being expressed to you by the family about 15 inactivity on the part of the Land Rover officers? 16 A. Yes, sir. We were very aware of it, sir, yes. The 17 Chief Inspector was very aware of it as well. 18 Q. From the family or from other reports? 19 A. No. I think early on what happened was that we had been 20 speaking with xxxxxxxxxx, I think it's 21 xxxxxxxxxx, the common law partner of Robert, 22 and she was over in Lurgan. We had been speaking to her 23 and I had certainly been down with Robert's mother and 24 I know that the Chief Inspector had also been down with 25 Robert's mother. So at that particular stage we were 46 1 briefing them on the investigation. So at that stage, 2 no, there was no strong views coming back through the 3 family at that particular time. 4 Q. Sorry. I am not getting this clear. Certainly by 5 1st May Diane is concerned -- 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. -- that there is inactivity at this time on the part of 8 the four in the Land Rover. 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. You are saying that the Chief Inspector, P39 as we are 11 calling her, was aware of that concern? 12 A. She would have been, yes. 13 Q. She was picking that up from the family herself, was 14 she? 15 A. I'd say she was, yes. 16 Q. You touched earlier on the HOLMES account being run from 17 Gough Barracks? 18 A. That's right. 19 Q. Practically speaking, how did this work? 20 A. Well, I think if you look -- practically speaking, 21 because of the amount of murders in Northern Ireland and 22 in south region, we had one HOLMES team in south region, 23 and they had I think it was six full-time operators, and 24 in order to -- every murder investigation has demands on 25 it, and for those officers to work the HOLMES system it 47 1 was better for them that all the murder accounts were 2 run from Gough so that they could work at those 3 accounts. 4 In some cases, murders -- the HOLMES team did work 5 from certain stations. In Portadown, unfortunately, we 6 hadn't the facilities and we didn't get those facilities 7 until 1998. I believe there would be a report there, 8 sir, about an inch thick, where we had been applying to 9 get a HOLMES room in Portadown, and we fought and we 10 fought for it, and we got one I think it was in 1998. 11 Q. You obviously feel strongly about this, but this was not 12 what I was asking you about. 13 A. Just to bring it on then, sir, what happened was then 14 that in Gough what we would do at the conferences we'd 15 put in the action sheets, put in the messages. Those 16 would be taken away by the HOLMES office manager. They 17 would be brought over to Armagh and then new actions 18 come back for the conference later on that night. 19 What happened then would be that the SIO and that 20 would travel over at some stage to Armagh and then look 21 at the actions and sign them off. 22 Q. And if you wanted to interrogate the system, you would 23 have to go to Gough to do it? 24 A. Yes. I wasn't -- I was self-trained on HOLMES, so 25 I would have to ask the office manager or somebody to 48 1 assist me in interrogating the system. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: Could you telephone? 3 A. Yes, sir, you could telephone. You would regularly be 4 on the telephone as well, sir. It was a process of the 5 office manager working with us at the conferences and 6 then telephones throughout the day, if we needed 7 telephones or telephone conversations to confirm or deny 8 such. 9 MR UNDERWOOD: Have you now had experience of operating 10 a HOLMES account without the added distance? 11 A. I have, sir, yes. 12 Q. In the light of that experience, can you tell us whether 13 having a satellite use, as it were, had an impact on the 14 way the investigation went? 15 A. Yes. I think actually the HOLMES team still work from 16 Armagh now and it seems to work quite well, but the 17 structures are different, in that the murder 18 investigation teams are probably located in 19 Gough Barracks in Armagh as well. 20 So the structures are different now than what they 21 were back in 1997. So yes, it certainly had his 22 disadvantages. It would have been more advantageous to 23 have a HOLMES team beside you working with you as a unit 24 in Portadown. There were many advantages for it. There 25 were lots of disadvantages, I found, from not having 49 1 a HOLMES team beside me. 2 Q. Presumably the whole purpose of HOLMES is that you can 3 interrogate and, whenever you want, get a snapshot of 4 where things are -- 5 A. That's correct. 6 Q. -- to help your thinking? Having an office manager who 7 is coming and going and not continually part of your 8 murder team -- 9 A. That's right, sir. 10 Q. -- presumably was a disadvantage. Is that fair? 11 A. Oh, that's correct, sir. I think that was highlighted 12 very much, too, in the Blakeley Report in 2003, the 13 difficulties with HOLMES and murder investigations. 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Are you moving on now? 15 MR UNDERWOOD: I am. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: We will break off until 12.10 pm. 17 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you. 18 (11.57 am) 19 (A short break) 20 (12.10 pm) 21 MR UNDERWOOD: More than halfway there I think, Mr Irwin. 22 A. Okay, sir. 23 Q. I want to ask about identity parades and similar. 24 We know that Marc Hobson had a confrontation with 25 Constable Neill. That, as far as I am aware, is the 50 1 only form of identity parade or similar that was 2 conducted in the entire murder investigation. Is that 3 right? 4 A. That is correct, sir, yes. 5 Q. What thought was given as to whether identity parades 6 should be held? 7 A. I think we went through the process as dictated under 8 PACE regarding identity parades. Each one of the 9 individuals in interview were asked did they want to go 10 on an identity parade, and they refused. So I think, 11 yes, we complained about PACE, the regulations 12 regarding, not only the whole identity process under 13 PACE, if you look at -- we have the photographs, and the 14 identity parade, and then you move to confrontation. 15 You can't show photographs if you have suspects, and 16 then you go -- so we could not show photographs in this 17 particular case. 18 So then you had to move to the identity parade 19 process, and what you would do is you would look at each 20 individual case and consider it and make a judgment 21 decision whether it was beneficial or what it would 22 achieve. 23 Q. Right. 24 A. I think in this particular case we went through the 25 process. 51 1 Q. Let me put some particular possibilities to you. You 2 had Mr Lunt charged because of Mr Prunty's evidence. 3 A. Yes, sir. 4 Q. Can you help us whether consideration was given to 5 having any sort of confrontation or any other form of 6 identification exercise between those two? 7 A. Could I see Mr Prunty's statement, please? 8 Q. I am sure you can. Again, I don't have it at my 9 fingertips. While that's being looked at, can I move on 10 to others and then we can come back to it? 11 A. Yes, certainly. 12 Q. You also told us earlier on about officers who had been 13 at the scene and while there was at least talk of what 14 might have been Stacey Bridgett, and I think Mr Cooke 15 and Mr Silcock. It does not matter who they were, but 16 I am referring back to the evidence you gave 20 minutes 17 ago of someone being pointed out as Stacey with the 18 nosebleed. 19 A. That's correct. 20 Q. Again, was consideration given to officers being given 21 the opportunity to confront Stacey Bridgett? 22 A. I would have to check the details on that, sir. I think 23 in addition to that particular case, Mr McBurney -- 24 there was a policy log decision regarding confrontations 25 or police officers going on identity parades. I'm not 52 1 sure. I would need to check or somebody would need to 2 check the policy book as well, if they could, regarding 3 other police going on identity parades. 4 Q. If that's the subject of a policy book, then necessarily 5 that's before 30th May, isn't it? 6 A. That's right. 7 Q. Then we can check that. Thank you. Apart from 8 an inkling you have that there might have been a policy 9 decision about that -- 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. -- that's the only evidence you can give, is it? 12 A. That's correct. Again, sir, you would have to look at 13 each individual statement and make the judgment decision 14 whether it was appropriate to put them on an identity 15 parade, so it would be, and I would have to look at each 16 individual statement and see what the thought process 17 was behind. 18 Q. You appreciate I am asking a lot of questions of you -- 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. -- that I would otherwise have asked of Mr McBurney? 21 A. Yes, sir. 22 Q. If you can't answer, that's fine. 23 A. I know. Certainly my view on Mr Hull was that he 24 couldn't identify the individual -- not Mr Hull; 25 Mr Prunty. 53 1 Q. Mr Prunty. 2 A. He identified the individual as wearing a red, white and 3 blue scarf that was put into a Land Rover and taken out 4 of a Land Rover, and I think -- I believe in my DPP file 5 I made reference to that fact -- 6 Q. Yes. 7 A. -- that the identification of Lunt wasn't identification 8 of the individual, but the identification of the 9 circumstances that linked Lunt to the case, in that 10 a person was arrested wearing a red, white and blue 11 scarf, he was placed in the Land Rover and taken out. 12 Mr Prunty was saying, "The individual that was 13 placed in the Land Rover wearing a red, white and blue 14 scarf was the individual that I saw assaulting 15 Robert Hamill". In those circumstances, if that is the 16 case, then -- 17 Q. It is the case. 18 A. It is the case? Then I would consider not holding 19 an identity parade on those circumstances, because he 20 was giving us a set of circumstances. 21 THE CHAIRMAN: In other words, Prunty could say what the man 22 had done -- 23 A. That's correct. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: -- where he went -- 25 A. That's correct. 54 1 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and what he saw happen to him there? 2 A. Yes. 3 THE CHAIRMAN: An officer who could say, "Yes, that was 4 a man who came, and he was so and so"? 5 A. That's correct, sir. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: So you get the identification in that way? 7 A. It's a sequence of events, sir. In those circumstances, 8 I would not consider -- he was not saying, "I identified 9 the actual individual, and, if I see him again, I would 10 know him again". He identified an individual wearing 11 a particular scarf, a red, white and blue scarf, that 12 went into a police Land Rover, came back out of it 13 again. He said, "That individual there was the 14 individual that assaulted Robert Hamill". 15 Q. That's very helpful. We can look at Mr Prunty's 16 statement, if you want -- 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. -- but I am happy with that answer, as long as you are 19 happy. 20 A. I believe in the DPP file I actually made reference to 21 that fact. 22 Q. Again, we can look at that, but you are right -- 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. -- and I don't need to take you to that unless you want 25 to. 55 1 A. Okay. 2 Q. The only other one I want to ask you about in terms of 3 a possible confrontation is Hobson, because you heard 4 from Tracey Clarke only the description that he was 5 called "Muck", or rather that a person was called 6 "Muck". 7 A. That is correct. 8 Q. You then got, as it were, 2 and 2 together and worked 9 out that was Marc Hobson. Is that fair? 10 A. Yes. I believe in interview we put that he was referred 11 to as "Muck", and did he confirm that? 12 Q. He did. Of course, you also then have the confrontation 13 carried out with PC Neill and him. 14 A. That's correct. 15 Q. Again -- I sense the answer to this may be it wasn't 16 your job -- can you help us about whether there was 17 consideration given to a confrontation between 18 Tracey Clarke and him? 19 A. I'm sure there was, sir, but again, I would say that the 20 solicitors were objecting on the grounds of recognition. 21 This was a recognition case, and they found it pointless 22 to put on an ID parade where there is recognition. 23 So I think it was a case then that the police 24 officer that actually saw him assaulting or kicking at 25 Robert Hamill was put on the confrontation, and again, 56 1 a judgment decision, sir. 2 Q. Fine. If we look at page 30 of your statement, [81447], 3 you deal with interviewing Allister Hanvey. It is in 4 the first paragraph. 5 A. That's correct, sir. 6 Q. If I can pick up the second sentence: 7 "In addition, I was mindful that in speaking to 8 these witnesses we could be potentially be speaking to 9 one of the assailants. An example of such was the 10 interview of Allister Hanvey by detective 11 Sergeant Bradley and myself on 7th May 1997 in which 12 a witness statement was recorded. My notebook entry 13 states, 'Spoke with an Allister Hanvey [address blanked 14 out], Portadown, ref movements in Portadown town centre. 15 D Sergeant Bradley recorded witness statement after 16 initial conversation'. If, during that interview 17 process, I had established reasonable grounds to conduct 18 an arrest for the assaults, then this course of action 19 would have been pursued. In conducting this interview, 20 I was able to assess and make a reasoned judgment on the 21 benefits of possible arrest and interview process at 22 that stage or to continue with enquiries, in order to 23 gather further evidence." 24 What I want to ask about that is, did you have any 25 particular reason, as of 7th May, to think that 57 1 Allister Hanvey might have been one of the assailants 2 other than the mere fact that anybody there might have 3 been? 4 A. No, sir. What I am trying to show there is that, when 5 I was briefing the officers, we were very aware when you 6 are speaking to these individuals here, we were 7 continually assessing, getting vibes from them, if you 8 could feel -- police work, and if there was 9 an opportunity that I felt that could be used or there 10 was a weakness in one individual that you thought there 11 was something more to say his involvement, then we would 12 take appropriate action. 13 So what you were doing at that stage, you were 14 assessing them all. So Allister Hanvey was one of those 15 individuals. As you moved in the interview process, you 16 got a feel for individuals that were closer to the scene 17 than other individuals. You were eliminating or you 18 were assessing and some number of individuals you would 19 say, "Well, they were probably outside the immediate ++ 20 area of the attack. Here's individuals that were closer 21 to the attack", and you were trying to assess those 22 individuals. 23 Q. So you were far from accepting at face value anything 24 that these witnesses told you during these processes? 25 A. Well, you had to -- you know, they gave you an account. 58 1 You had to take what they said, but at the same time you 2 were continually assessing these individuals. You were 3 looking for any opportunity to progress the 4 investigation. 5 Q. Okay. Can I ask you to look at page [16048]? Can we 6 have this and [16049] up on screen together, please? 7 Thank you. You can see, if you can read the text, this 8 is a document D40. It is dated 9th May 1997. On the 9 right-hand side "Text" and "Comment" is what I am after: 10 "Source states that Allister Hanvey from Portadown 11 was responsible for the beating of Robert Hamill, 12 Portadown. 13 "Comment: this refers to the beating and subsequent 14 death of Robert Hamill who died on 8.5.97 as a result of 15 an assault on 27.4.97." 16 Then it says some more about Robert Hamill and 17 Allister Hanvey. Then: 18 "CID Portadown informed. 19 "End of text." 20 There is an update then on 2nd June 1997: 21 "Allister Hanvey has been arrested and charged re 22 murder of Robert Hamill. Charged on 10 May 1997." 23 That's signed off by you as the update. What I want 24 to ask you about that is: were you conscious of this 25 information on 9th May? 59 1 A. Oh, dear! I couldn't honestly tell you that, sir. 2 I may have been. 3 Q. We see what type of document it is. We see that it 4 was -- that CID Portadown informed presumably on 5 9th May. 6 A. Yes. Uh-huh. 7 Q. In the ordinary course, if something like this had come 8 in ... 9 A. You would usually be informed of it. Mr McBurney, the 10 Chief Inspector or myself would have been informed of 11 it. Then I would have thought it would have somehow 12 been brought into the HOLMES system. I'm not sure. 13 Q. What, the fact that it's marked D40 suggests that it was 14 brought into the HOLMES system? 15 A. That's right. 16 Q. As far as we can tell, nothing was done to follow this 17 up. Have you any comment on that? 18 A. All I can -- Allister Hanvey has been arrested and 19 charged with the murder of Robert Hamill. 20 Q. No. What I mean is you have a source stating that 21 Allister Hanvey -- 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Now, it may well be that sources are not going to talk 24 to detectives. It may well be that they might. What 25 I am asking is for you to comment on the apparent fact 60 1 that nobody did anything by way of, for example, asking 2 whether the source would be prepared to talk to 3 detectives? 4 A. Certainly I didn't, sir, no. I can't answer for 5 Mr McBurney or the Chief Inspector, but, you know, 6 I wouldn't have expected myself to be asking to speak to 7 the source. It would have been at a higher level. 8 Q. That would ideally have been something I would ask 9 Mr McBurney about? 10 A. Yes, sir. 11 Q. Can we look at page 42 of your statement, please, which 12 is at page [81459]? You are dealing here with the 13 arrests on 10th May 1997, and at (c) you say: 14 "The Hanvey search team would not have been briefed 15 on the Atkinson/Hanvey issue, although 16 Detective Constable McAteer was obviously aware of the 17 full circumstances. Nor was the search team briefed 18 about a potential 'burn site' as the investigation team 19 was not aware of any allegation that clothes were 20 burnt." 21 Of course, Mr Atkinson is not involved. We can look 22 at (a) for this as well, if we may: 23 "Detective Chief Superintendent McBurney directed 24 that the arrest and search operation would not include 25 the individual Reserve Constable Robert Atkinson." 61 1 What I want to ask about that is, bearing in mind 2 thought was obviously given to Mr Atkinson during the 3 arrest stages, was thought given to arresting 4 Mr Atkinson? 5 A. I am sure it was. Mr McBurney was in charge of that 6 whole operation, in that he was directing me on the 7 number of people that were being arrested. I was trying 8 to get arrest -- or search teams from outside the 9 division, and he was saying, "I need six", or, "I need 10 seven". I can't recall. So what I was doing at that 11 particular time was trying to organise those things. 12 So yes, I'm sure Mr McBurney had considered 13 arresting Reserve Constable Atkinson. I can't 14 honestly -- really I can't answer whether he had or not. 15 Q. You told us earlier on about the way in which 16 conferences worked. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. A two-way street where Mr McBurney and P39 would soak up 19 information about how the investigation was going and 20 would also give directions. 21 We know also that by the early morning of 10th May 22 you had statements from Timothy Jameson and 23 Tracey Clarke which name the individuals whom you are 24 setting about arresting. 25 A. Yes. 62 1 Q. Can you help us with whether there was a conference 2 about the consequences of those statements and the 3 direction given to arrest? 4 A. No. What happened, those statements were taken late at 5 night, so there was an immediate arrest the next 6 morning. So there was no conferences between the 7 statements and these individuals -- the searches being 8 organised and the arrests being made. The next morning 9 after that would have been a conference in relation to 10 the interview process and the debriefing from the 11 searches -- 12 Q. Right. 13 A. -- and other actions that were still continuing in 14 relation to that. So Mr McBurney made the direction, 15 you know, obviously not to include Reserve Constable 16 Atkinson. 17 Q. At item (d) on this page you say: 18 "Each search team would have been provided with the 19 details of relevant footwear and clothing of each of the 20 individuals concerned and the grounds for their 21 arrests." 22 A. That's correct. 23 Q. Can you help us about the breadth of the expected 24 searches for footwear and clothing? 25 A. Sir, everything. Again, it's a judgment decision. 63 1 I think most police officers would agree there is no 2 point in going into a house and bringing every item of 3 clothing and every item of footwear to forensic, because 4 you would simply be asked to come down to forensic and 5 remove items and try to be more specific, because they 6 have not got the capability of doing that. 7 So what would have happened was that we would have 8 been looking at the statements and the evidence -- the 9 statements from witnesses and police officers to try and 10 identify what items they actually were wearing, and 11 I think Reserve Constable Warnock -- obviously we had 12 Hanvey's own statement at that time, but I think Reserve 13 Constable Warnock had given an account of what the 14 individual was wearing. 15 Q. Uh-huh. 16 A. So you would have been trying to be specific. At the 17 same time, they are judgment decisions. If you see 18 coats in a room, or whatever, where this individual is, 19 you would expect them to be lifted as well if there was 20 some coat similar to what the exact, specific ... 21 Q. You see, we know that the search of Allister Hanvey's 22 home was curtailed once they had found clothes that were 23 consistent with what he had described in his exculpatory 24 statement of 7th May. Can you explain why that 25 happened? 64 1 A. I would think you would need to look at Reserve 2 Constable Warnock's statement. 3 Q. Well, we know what Reserve Constable Warnock said. 4 A. Did he not -- 5 Q. I will tell you now. He said there was a black jacket 6 with grey sleeves involved. Hanvey said he had a black 7 CAT jacket, and the search was stopped after they found 8 the black CAT jacket. It was not extended to look for 9 anything else? 10 A. Right-o. 11 Q. Can you comment on that? 12 A. All I can comment on, sir, if you look at my notebook 13 entry for that morning, was that the individuals -- the 14 search team or the search teams and the CID officers 15 attached to the search teams would have all been briefed 16 together at Portadown station. They would all have been 17 briefed, and I think if you look at all the other 18 searches as well to check everywhere, and attics were 19 checked, clothes lines were checked, sheds were checked. 20 So they were all briefed together. They were all 21 briefed to seize clothing and footwear believed to be 22 relevant. 23 I can't say what happened at the search teams, sir, 24 or what judgment decisions were made at that particular 25 time. All I can tell you is, from my briefing, 65 1 I believed they were thorough -- you know, the briefing 2 was thorough on what to search for. 3 Now, on saying that, what did happen was that we 4 searched Allister Hanvey's house, and during the 5 interview of Allister Hanvey he had said that he was at 6 his uncle's house, Thomas Hanvey's house. So then we 7 went and searched that house. 8 What then happened is that an individual, 9 Jonathan Wright, he came in and made a statement on the 10 11th, after those two searches had been conducted, and 11 he said that Allister Hanvey was wearing a casual top, 12 an orange casual top 13 Q. Silver with orange stripes? 14 A. Silver with orange stripes. So then we went back again 15 and looked for that coat, both in Allister Hanvey's 16 house and in Thomas Hanvey's house. 17 Q. Was that the sole reason for the re-searches on the 13th? 18 A. That was the reason. New evidence had come in that he 19 was wearing a different type of jacket than described by 20 Reserve Constable Warnock. 21 Q. Very well. I want to move on from the searches to 22 Mr Atkinson. 23 We know that Mr McBurney considered himself as 24 running two investigations that were inextricably 25 linked. The first was the murder and the other was the 66 1 neglect complaint -- 2 A. That's correct, sir. 3 Q. -- which was apparently supervised by the ICPC. We also 4 know that the tip-off allegation contained in 5 Tracey Clarke's statement about Mr Atkinson talking to 6 Mr Hanvey was treated by Mr McBurney as part of the 7 complaint. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Were you given to understand why it was treated that way 10 rather than as part of the murder? 11 A. No. I just thought that -- personally, I thought it was 12 all being supervised by the ICPC, sir, because of the 13 allegation, and it was closely linked to that. 14 I thought it was all being supervised by the ICPC. 15 Q. Can you help us with why you thought that? 16 A. I can't, sir. I was running the murder investigation. 17 Mr McBurney certainly had the initial meeting with the 18 ICPC and that, and I just believed that they were taking 19 over that whole area, dealing with the whole area. 20 Q. You have, as of 10th May 1997, the allegation contained 21 in Tracey Clarke's witness statement about the tip-off, 22 and yet Mr Atkinson was not interviewed about that until 23 9th September 1997. Can you help us with why that was? 24 A. No, sir. That would have been -- you know, that would 25 have been linked with the ICPC investigation that 67 1 Mr McBurney was liaising with the ICPC on. 2 Q. Were you conscious that telephone analysis which showed 3 a telephone call from the Hanvey household to the 4 Atkinson household in the early hours, at 8.30 or so, on 5 27th April, became available in May? 6 A. I know [name redacted] had an intelligence document. 7 Q. Can you help us with -- I bear in mind what the Chairman 8 said about redaction -- how telephone records were made 9 available and made usable in those days? 10 A. In those early days there were -- different companies 11 had different attitudes to producing evidential 12 material. If they produced it -- when you applied for 13 it, it was usually supplied as an intelligence document 14 and that couldn't be used in evidence. 15 Q. Or to put to suspects? 16 A. No. You wouldn't show the document. No, you wouldn't 17 show the document. You could maybe suggest that we had 18 intelligence that a telephone call was made. 19 Q. What steps would you have to make if you wanted to turn 20 that into evidential material? 21 A. You would have to apply for evidential steps or you 22 could get the individual, as Mr McBurney done, to supply 23 the phone call -- or the phone billing, apply for 24 billing. 25 Q. How unwieldy was it to get a phone company to make it 68 1 evidential? 2 A. Different companies acted differently. Some of them 3 wouldn't respond to you at all. Others had a large 4 backlog of material. So it was different companies, 5 different policies, different attitudes. They had no 6 legal reason to respond, I don't believe, at that stage. 7 Q. Right. I have a few random issues, as if these 8 questions have not been random enough. 9 One is about a gentleman called John Lynne. If we 10 look at page [09281], you will see -- this is 11 a statement of yours of 10th June 1997 -- from the 12 second sentence of it: 13 "On 10th June '97 between 12.20 am and 2.45 am I was 14 at the scene of the resiting of a police Land Rover ... 15 at Market Street, Portadown. During that time a person 16 who I now know to be" and take it from me it is 17 John Lynne, "introduced himself to me. He had enquired 18 what we were doing and I explained this to him. He then 19 entered his flat. A short time later, he returned and 20 stated he wanted to talk to me off the record reference 21 the attack on 27th April 1997. He stated he had thought 22 about this in the flat. He related he had witnessed the 23 incident and outlined his recollection of events. He 24 indicated points in Thomas Street where he saw two 25 persons being assaulted. He related he was disgusted at 69 1 the media coverage and in particular that the RUC had 2 received unfair criticism. He believed the police had 3 done an excellent job. He related that originally, on 4 seeing the incident, that he didn't see any police. He 5 then saw about 3 police and there was a crowd of about 6 30 to 40 persons. He related that they were helpless. 7 However, when other police arrived, they quickly moved 8 the crowd." 9 We get from that he didn't want to make 10 a statement -- 11 A. That's right. 12 Q. -- and, if you need to be refreshed about that, the rest 13 of this statement tells us that. 14 Tell us about the position in 1997 where you get 15 people like that coming and saying, "I want to talk to 16 you off the record. I have got some useful information 17 but I am blowed if I am going to help you by giving 18 a statement". 19 Was that at all common? 20 A. You would always have casual contacts who would contact 21 you, but wouldn't want it to be known that they 22 contacted you or they wouldn't want to be involved in 23 the process of law. So probably in a certain way they 24 felt within themselves they had done what they could 25 reasonably, but they were not prepared to go and give 70 1 evidence to that effect. 2 Q. With him, did you just write that off then, or did you 3 take -- 4 A. Yes, sir. He made it, you know, abundantly clear that 5 he wasn't going to give evidence. He wasn't going to 6 make a statement. He just wanted to say what he said 7 and that he didn't want to give evidence. 8 Q. Then I want to move on to the coroner. We know that -- 9 again, I can refresh your memory from documents if you 10 like -- you were instrumental in arranging for the 11 coroner, Mr Leckey, to talk to, in particular, 12 Tracey Clarke. 13 A. That's correct, sir. 14 Q. Did you have to talk to her to do this or was that done 15 by letter, can you recall? 16 A. I think -- I don't believe I talked to her, sir. 17 I can't have any recollection. If there's a document 18 there that I did talk to her, I did. I think it was 19 done by letter, so I do. I believe that the coroner 20 pursued that line. If I assisted him by calling out at 21 her house to get her address or where she was living at 22 that particular time, I would accept that, sir, but 23 I can't have any recollection of specifically talking to 24 her. 25 Q. Let me try you with this. We know that, having given 71 1 her witness statement in the early hours of 10th May, 2 the next time she was talked to, as far as we can tell, 3 about her evidence was at the consultation on 4 17th October 1997, and she said, according to Mr Davison 5 and Mr Kerr, she related the events consistently with 6 her police statement, but then said she would not give 7 evidence, because she loved Allister Hanvey and because 8 she knew the others she had named, but at no stage in 9 that did she deny that what she said in her police 10 statement was true. Do you follow? 11 A. Okay, sir. 12 Q. Likewise, when she spoke to Mr Leckey, she did not deny 13 that what was in the police statement was true. 14 Did you have any dealings with her at any stage in 15 which to you she denied the truth of the police 16 statement? 17 A. No, I don't believe I had any dealings with 18 Tracey Clarke. If I had, it was on a minor issue, sir. 19 Q. Right. 20 A. But I can't recall ever having any discussion with her 21 at all regarding her statement. 22 Q. Fine. I want to move on to Andrea McKee and the meeting 23 you had with Andrea McKee on 8th May 1997. 24 We can look at it if you need to, but you were 25 interviewed by several people about this over the years? 72 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. When you were interviewed by the Police Ombudsman's 3 service about this, you said that you thought at that 4 meeting she was frightened or scared; in fact, scared 5 for her life. 6 A. That's correct, sir. 7 Q. Tell us about that meeting. Tell us about the 8 impression you got of her. 9 A. Well, how it happened, sir, was that the Reserve 10 Constable had come in and given the information about 11 Tracey Clarke being involved. Mr McBurney had then 12 directed that the officers go out and talk to 13 Tracey Clarke. Tracey Clarke denied seeing anything, 14 witnessing anything, and Mr McBurney then -- when the 15 officers came back and seen that, Mr McBurney says, 16 "Let's go and talk to the source of the information". 17 So arrangements were made then to talk to the person who 18 came to be known as Andrea McKee. 19 I had never met her before, knew nothing about her, 20 and we met her up at the Seagoe cemetery I believe it 21 was. Certainly to me, sir, she appeared very 22 frightened, and although she wanted to give the 23 information, she certainly didn't want her name released 24 or let it be known that she had given this information 25 to us. 73 1 Q. There is a suggestion that she was somehow aggrandising 2 herself by doing this. Can you help us with whether she 3 appeared to you to be -- I don't know -- looking for 4 glory or trying to make trouble for anybody? 5 A. Sir, to be honest with you, it was a five or ten-minute 6 interview in the dark, as I say. I didn't know her 7 before, and all -- she seemed to be telling us the 8 truth, what we got from her, and at the same time she 9 seemed to be helpful. So I can't say about the 10 glorifying, certainly at that stage. 11 Q. We know from your statement as well as from her that one 12 of the things she told you was about the alleged tip-off 13 from Atkinson to Hanvey. 14 A. That's correct. 15 Q. We also know that on 9th May the telephone records were 16 sought -- 17 A. Yes, sir. 18 Q. -- before Tracey Clarke was re-interviewed. 19 A. Right. 20 Q. You are not the only one to have been surprised by that. 21 Can I ask you whether you can help on whether the reason 22 why the telephone records were sought was because of 23 Andrea McKee's revelation? 24 A. I think the allegation being made, you know, that would 25 be a natural progression. It would be a high profile 74 1 action to get. 2 Q. How did it strike you when she told you about this 3 tip-off? 4 A. Well, sir, it is like anything. You know, you get 5 an allegation like that. It's a dirty police officer 6 doing that sort of action. All I have to say is they 7 need rooted out and I would love to have been able to 8 make Mr Atkinson amenable for that crime. So, yes, 9 disgusted and brought to the attention of Mr McBurney. 10 Q. You appear not to have made an notebook entry about 11 that. 12 A. That's correct, sir. 13 Q. Why is that? 14 A. It is like everything in relation to casual sources or 15 casual contacts, I went back and spoke to Mr McBurney 16 about it, and under disclosure and all the rest of it, 17 sir, in those particular days we had no intelligence 18 cells that were linked to HOLMES or to the murder 19 investigation, and we did things differently, and 20 I think I made a notebook entry simply -- there is 21 a notebook entry, "Spoke to witness", or something like 22 that and it was as bland as that. That's for protection 23 of those individuals and that was a judgment decision 24 made at that time. 25 Q. Okay. You have been asked endlessly about why you took 75 1 an alibi statement in October -- 2 A. Yes, sir. 3 Q. -- of 1997 from her and your witness statement deals 4 with that. Can I just be clear on this? As far as you 5 were concerned, in October 1997, she was lying, was she? 6 A. Well, sir, until -- if you look at Tracey Clarke's 7 statement, and you have to accept that I didn't know 8 Andrea McKee, before I went out to see her in that 9 graveyard. I knew nothing about her. I didn't know she 10 was a friend of Atkinson. I knew nothing absolutely 11 about her background. 12 Then, if you look at Tracey Clarke's statement, 13 Tracey Clarke says that Allister said that he was 14 personally contacted by her on the next morning and told 15 to get rid of the clothes and that he had been 16 continually getting calls from Robbie Atkinson. 17 Now, in that respect, Atkinson could have made those 18 calls from a public phone box, he could have made them 19 from a mobile phone, he could have made them to a mobile 20 phone. He could have made them from different 21 locations. 22 Then what we had was we had a phone call from the 23 house to Hanvey's house. So they were given a different 24 hypothesis, and until that hypothesis is challenged, 25 that could have happened. Andrea McKee could -- 76 1 Michael McKee could have made that call from the house 2 to Hanvey's house. At the same time, Atkinson could 3 have made other calls from other mobiles to Hanvey's 4 mobile. Those two hypotheses. If you look at the 5 murder investigation manual, it says you keep an open 6 mind. Until that's tested, you can't rule it out. So 7 you have to rule it in at that particular time, then 8 what you try to do is you challenge that. 9 When you challenge it is a judgment decision. When 10 you do the investigation is a judgment decision 11 Q. You were expecting the alibi to be challenged, I take 12 it, as a result? 13 A. That's correct. I had been back to Mr McBurney after 14 that statement was recorded and he asked me my view on 15 it. I said that Andrea was strong in her delivery at 16 that particular time, but he would need to get a team 17 together and do the background work to then try and 18 break that particular alibi. 19 His time view on that was he went away and he came 20 back to me some time later and he said he wasn't going 21 to challenge it at that particular time, because that 22 wasn't the right time, and he went through that process 23 to a certain degree and he says -- and he was quite 24 strong in it, that he said, if he got a team together, 25 a HOLMES team together, it would have to continue. 77 1 Locally, parochially, the investigation would have to 2 move at that particular time, or information would get 3 out on what was happening. 4 He felt that at that particular time he would get 5 Andrea, but he wouldn't -- potentially, he would get 6 Andrea McKee, but he wouldn't get the Reserve Constable. 7 Q. When you eventually did get Andrea -- because you went 8 to Wales to interview her in June 2000 -- 9 A. That's right. 10 Q. -- I get from your witness statement that you had 11 reservations about treating her as a witness at that 12 stage. 13 A. Not reservations, sir. I had dealt with another case 14 similar where a person was involved in a murder and was 15 then convicted and it was after the conviction that 16 I then took a witness statement from the individual. 17 Here we were going to an individual who had -- who 18 was now telling us a different account. So under the 19 criminal law, in reasonable circumstances -- in all 20 circumstances, you would be obliged to caution that 21 individual. Mr McBurney's view was that Andrea had 22 helped the police before, that she, to a certain extent, 23 had been forced into a peripheral role and he wanted to 24 use her as a witness. 25 Q. Right. 78 1 A. In that respect, I said, well, we would cover certain 2 areas. However, any details -- what we would do, we'd 3 cover a certain area, we would then go back, get 4 an investigation -- my belief was get an investigation 5 team together, look at those areas in the statement and 6 then pursue it, and following consultations with crime 7 branch and the rest of them. 8 Q. Just a few more matters. I have five or ten minutes 9 left, sir. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 11 MR UNDERWOOD: I apologise for jumping about on topics. We 12 spoke earlier about Mr Prunty and his identification of 13 the person that might have been Mr Lunt -- 14 A. Yes, sir. 15 Q. -- by way of what he was wearing and so on. That, in 16 due course, all unravelled, because at a consultation 17 with the DPP he was shown a photograph which apparently 18 was of another person. 19 Can you help us with where the photograph or 20 photographs came from? 21 A. Yes. They would have came after those individuals were 22 charged. You would have had photographs of those 23 individuals. 24 Q. You also told us earlier that you couldn't show 25 photographs to a witness where you had got somebody 79 1 charged. 2 A. You couldn't show photographs if you had suspects. 3 Q. If you had suspects? 4 A. That's right. 5 Q. So how could it be that photographs could be shown to 6 Mr Prunty in these circumstances? 7 A. Well, that was a DPP decision, sir, and obviously his -- 8 because he had made no identification of Dean Forbes in 9 his statement, he had made no reference to that, and he 10 then had went -- we had identified Lunt from the 11 statement. Then obviously the only way for them to 12 identify this -- he said he had seen it on video in 13 a house. So he had seen the video of the individuals 14 leaving the court house. So here we were, an individual 15 not -- you know, shown a photograph after seeing the 16 video really was immaterial, because he had already seen 17 the video on TV. 18 Q. But he was also shown a photograph of Mr Lunt, wasn't 19 he? That's the problem. 20 A. He could well have been, yes, sir. 21 Q. But he shouldn't have been, should he? 22 A. I couldn't really say, sir. I think his identification 23 at that stage had moved on. 24 Q. Right. 25 A. His identification, I would say, was flawed at that 80 1 stage, and what the DPP were then trying to identify was 2 Lunt and Forbes. 3 You know, that was a decision by the DPP to show 4 that, but, at the same time, I would say his evidence 5 had been severely weakened at that stage. 6 Q. You say it was flawed and severely weakened. Can I ask 7 you to consider in the light of that what you told us 8 ten minutes ago, which was: this was an identification 9 which relied on, not an identification of the person, 10 but -- and you actually said in terms of somebody whom 11 he would recognise if he saw again. 12 A. Uh-huh. Yes, he -- sorry, sir? 13 Q. You told us about ten minutes ago he was not identifying 14 Lunt as someone he would recognise again. 15 A. That's right. 16 Q. So how could the fact he didn't recognise him again 17 possibly flaw his evidence? 18 A. Because he was saying it was the individual -- what he 19 was saying was that the individual that he saw 20 assaulting Robert Hamill was actually Forbes. We were 21 proving that it wasn't Forbes that was put into the 22 police Land Rover that was wearing the scarf. So ... 23 THE CHAIRMAN: He still remained firm. He was saying "I saw 24 a man do this and I saw that man go there and that was 25 done to him there"? 81 1 A. Uh-huh. Yes, sir. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: And someone else was able to say, "That man 3 is Wayne Lunt"? 4 A. Uh-huh. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: So the criticism of him is in a sense 6 academic? 7 A. That's right, sir. 8 THE CHAIRMAN: He kept his eye on the ball. One of those 9 kind of situations. 10 A. Yes, sir, but what happened then he said, "Yous have 11 charged the wrong man on my evidence". 12 THE CHAIRMAN: But he didn't say -- he never resiled from 13 saying, "I saw the man do this and I saw him go there 14 and I saw what happened to him there". He didn't resile 15 from any of that, did he? 16 A. Well, sir, I have to say I wasn't in the consultation 17 from that point, but simply what he was -- from -- what 18 I was establishing was he had -- the person that he 19 initially said had committed the offence was the 20 individual wearing the red, white and blue scarf that 21 got into the Land Rover. He was now saying, "Listen, 22 yous have charged the wrong man", or, "You let the wrong 23 man out". So -- 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I follow. 25 MR UNDERWOOD: Sorry to interrupt. To pick up on the 82 1 Chairman's analysis, he never resiled from saying the 2 person he saw do this had the red, white and blue scarf, 3 did he? 4 A. No, he kept saying that individual Forbes was the person 5 wearing the red, white and blue scarf. 6 Q. Okay. Thank you. 7 A. But we proved that it wasn't. 8 Q. Two other matters. Firstly, on a couple of documents, 9 one of which certainly is yours, the name 10 xxxxxxxxxxx appears. You have told us before you 11 did a report in response to the, "See no evil, hear no 12 evil", CHA report and it comes up in there. 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. It also comes up because DCI P39 sought telephone 15 billing which included xxxxxxxxxxxx's number. 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Can you help us with why it was people were interested 18 in xxxxxxxxxxxx in this investigation? 19 A. I couldn't tell you early on why the phone calls was 20 sought for xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, sir, no. 21 Q. Then Mr Atkinson was used as a witness at the trial of 22 Mr Hobson, wasn't he? 23 A. That's correct, sir. 24 Q. I think you sat through that. 25 A. I would have, yes, sir. 83 1 Q. In the light of what you told us a few minutes ago about 2 keeping an open mind on allegations, at that stage did 3 you have an open mind to the possibility that 4 Mr Atkinson might indeed have tipped off Mr Hanvey? 5 A. Yes, sir. That was the allegation. It was still 6 ongoing at that particular stage. 7 Q. Did that strike you as relevant to the evidence he was 8 giving? 9 A. In relation to against what he had seen at the scene? 10 Q. Yes. 11 A. Yes, it has to be relevant, sir. 12 Q. I want to ask you if you can help us about the file that 13 Mr McBurney submitted in due course on the complaint, 14 the neglect complaint? 15 A. Yes, sir. 16 Q. If we can have a look at page [09079] -- this is my 17 final topic -- we see at the start of what is about four 18 pages of analysis of the tip-off allegation and the way 19 that unravelled. 20 What I want to ask you about is the degree, if any, 21 you contributed to this 22 A. Okay, sir. 23 Q. Can you help us with that? 24 A. Yes. My recollection of it is, sir, that my file -- 25 I had brought my file over to Mr McBurney as well, and 84 1 that I was preparing the parts II, III and IV of the DPP 2 file, and doing all the transcripts from the interviews 3 and exhibiting all those and putting them into order. 4 Then Mr McBurney would then say, "Well, I need this, 5 and I need this, and I need this" and then I would go 6 and put those in order and bring them to him, sir. 7 Q. So you didn't compile this? 8 A. No, sir. Some of it, I have to say, is similar to my 9 DPP file and possibly Mr McBurney has cut and pasted 10 some of it from that. 11 MR UNDERWOOD: Right. Very well. Thank you very much. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: I see the time. We will break off until 13 1.10 pm. 14 MR UNDERWOOD: 2.10 pm? 15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Yes. 2.10 pm. 16 (1.10 pm) 17 (The luncheon adjournment) 18 (2.10 pm) 19 (Hearing in camera) 20 (2.35 pm) 21 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, before any further questions are 22 addressed to Mr Irwin, I need to correct something 23 I said this morning, which was that Mr Wright had given 24 detectives information that there was a silver jacket. 25 It was a grey jacket, according to his statement. 85 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 2 Yes, Mr Wolfe? 3 Questions from MR WOLFE 4 MR WOLFE: Good afternoon, Mr Irwin. Just one brief area 5 I want to look at. I am asking questions on behalf of 6 the Police Service. 7 A. Yes, sir. 8 Q. Could we have [81424] up on the screen, please? Yes, 9 Mr Irwin. The second main paragraph on the page, if 10 that could be highlighted, beginning: 11 "It is under ..." 12 In that portion of your statement, Mr Irwin, you 13 comment on the resource issues which you, as 14 a detective, and your colleagues were facing at that 15 time. 16 A. Yes, that's correct, sir. 17 Q. Not to be unfair to you, I think you spend some time 18 detailing that before you reach that section of your 19 statement. 20 A. That's correct, sir. 21 Q. Now, you make it clear in that passage at that 22 paragraph that your remarks were not intended as 23 a criticism of the organisation. 24 A. Definitely not, sir, no. 25 Q. The difficulties which you speak of in terms of 86 1 resources and associated difficulties, that was not 2 unique to the Hamill investigation. Is that correct? 3 A. That's correct. That was regular occurrences, and 4 I think that has been highlighted in the Blakeley Report 5 in 2003, even going to back to 2001 after the pressures 6 we were under at that particular time. 7 Q. Yes. We have heard evidence in this Inquiry -- I can't 8 quite remember who it was; it may well have been P39, 9 but my memory fails me on this. But somebody gave 10 evidence in these terms, that, once it became a murder 11 investigation, there was a noticeable changing of gear. 12 Now, that's not to suggest -- I don't think the 13 witness who said that was meaning to suggest that the 14 GBH investigation wasn't being taken seriously, but 15 there were extra resources in terms of manpower -- 16 A. That's correct, sir. 17 Q. -- being poured into it once it became a murder 18 investigation. 19 A. That is correct, sir. 20 Q. Is that a fair approach? 21 A. That is a fair comment. What happened was that in the 22 subdivision, ordinary crime, as we referred to it was 23 investigated by the personnel that were attached to that 24 subdivision. Usually, to get personnel from other 25 subdivisions was difficult because they were fully 87 1 committed as well. However, when a murder happened, you 2 would have got additional resources from the Regional 3 Crime Squad, who were personnel who were attached to 4 Gough Barracks, Armagh, and which were used to 5 supplement us in murder investigations or in terrorist 6 interviews. 7 Q. Just to be clear, you are not saying in your statement 8 that any major operational decision or any tactical 9 decision was affected by a want of manpower? 10 A. No, we did what we could with the manpower that we had. 11 That's simply as best I could put it. I had seven 12 individuals, counting myself eight, and we were doing 13 the best that we could in the circumstances. 14 MR WOLFE: Very well. Thank you very much. 15 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Adair? 16 Questions from MR ADAIR 17 MR ADAIR: Mr Irwin, I want to ask you just a brief 18 number of questions on a various number of topics. 19 A. Okay, sir. 20 Q. Just going to the phone records situation back in 1997, 21 my understanding of your evidence is that some companies 22 would provide the evidence and some companies would not. 23 Is that right? 24 A. That's correct, sir. 25 Q. Was there also an unspoken agreement with some companies 88 1 that they would provide the information in the form of 2 intelligence, but the understanding was it was not to be 3 revealed that they had provided it? 4 A. That's correct, sir. 5 Q. Amongst the reasons you have given for that was one of 6 the more obvious reasons back then, the fear that one of 7 their employees might be subjected to either injury or 8 death? 9 A. That would be correct, sir, yes. 10 Q. Was there any way of forcing a company who had records 11 back in 1997 to provide those records? 12 A. No, not from my understanding, there wasn't, sir, and in 13 fact, at times they threatened to remove the facility 14 from us because we were maybe making too many demands in 15 certain circumstances. So I don't believe there was any 16 facility that we could demand evidential telephone 17 material from those people. 18 Q. Of course, it may be self-evident, but if you have 19 information in the form of intelligence from a service 20 provider, if you inform the suspect of that, you are 21 immediately making it clear to him that a service 22 provider has given the police that information? 23 A. That is correct, sir, yes. 24 Q. Now, the second issue I want to ask you about is in 25 relation to your briefing of the search teams -- 89 1 A. Yes, sir. 2 Q. -- on the morning of 10th May. 3 A. Yes, sir. 4 Q. Am I right in summarising your evidence that on receipt 5 of the statements from Timothy Jameson and 6 Tracey Clarke, which were on the night of 9th going into 7 the early morning of the 10th -- 8 A. The 109, yes, sir. 9 Q. -- that you would have read those statements? 10 A. I am not sure if I had read them, sir, or not at 11 night-time, at that night-time one, sir. I would have 12 been getting the information from probably the chief or 13 Mr McBurney. 14 Q. Would you have head them before the briefing for the 15 search teams? 16 A. Yes, I would have had to have read them before the 17 briefing. In fact, what I was doing at that particular 18 time was researching a lot of documents to find out what 19 we were actually searching for in the clothes and that. 20 Q. So you conducted that part of the investigation in 21 relation to ascertaining what should be briefed to the 22 search teams -- 23 A. That's correct. 24 Q. -- before they went out to search? 25 A. That's correct, sir. 90 1 Q. My understanding is that between the breakthrough of 2 Tracey Clarke and Jameson and your briefing of the 3 search teams, there is no conference held with McBurney 4 or P39? 5 A. No. What would have happened was I would have been in 6 contact with Mr McBurney and P39, but there was no open 7 conference. I think the conference that morning 8 probably did not start until 9.30 or something. 9 Q. One of the matters that we have discussed in this 10 Inquiry from time to time is why an instruction was not 11 given, for example, to look for a burn site. 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Now, we know from your statement that your explanation 14 is that Tracey Clarke, the information was that he had 15 been told to get rid of as opposed to burn his clothes. 16 A. That's correct, sir. 17 Q. Was any instruction given to any of the search teams in 18 relation to that, in relation to either getting rid of 19 or -- 20 A. Sir, yes, there would have been. What we said or what 21 I believe -- I can't remember the exact words that 22 I would have used in that, sir, but what we said, 23 "Listen, check the front gardens. Check the sheds. 24 Check the attic. Check everywhere for any indication of 25 clothing". 91 1 Now that, to me, if a person saw a burn site in 2 a garden or in a shed, you would certainly want them to 3 be checking that area. 4 Q. Yes. I think the problem -- I mean, I am not 5 necessarily getting at you, Mr Irwin. I am just trying 6 to find out what the reality was then. We know that, 7 for example, in Hanvey's house, there was only one 8 bedroom actually searched and it looks like the 9 outhouses weren't searched and the garden wasn't 10 searched and so on. Can you reconcile what you are 11 saying about what you told the search teams with what we 12 know they did? I am just trying to figure out what 13 happened here. 14 A. I honestly don't know what happened in the Hanvey one, 15 sir. I think if you look at the other search records, 16 and they were all briefed together, and they were all 17 briefed in relation to the searches, and you check and 18 people have checked washing machines, they have checked 19 clothes lines, they have checked sheds, they have 20 checked the attic, they have checked the back garden, 21 they have checked the front garden. So everybody was 22 briefed accordingly in these circumstances. 23 If you look at Mr Hanvey's search record, they 24 certainly took details of his cars that were outside the 25 house. There may have been people conducting searches 92 1 outside the house while the search was conducted inside 2 the house -- 3 Q. Well, I don't think there is -- 4 A. -- and I can't -- 5 Q. I think we would have heard about that, Mr Irwin, if 6 that had happened. 7 A. I can't say, sir. It is obviously judgment decisions 8 made by those officers out at that particular time. 9 Q. Can you remember, did you specify any particular item? 10 In relation to Hanvey, did you specify any particular 11 coat, for example, or coats to look for? 12 A. Yes. What I believe was that there was a whiteboard in 13 the CID office and I would have used that as 14 an aide-memoire when I was briefing the individuals. So 15 what was happening, we were going through statements and 16 we were listing the clothes that we were looking for up 17 on the whiteboard, I do believe. So I would have been 18 going through and that's why, like, Reserve Constable 19 Warnock's statement, whatever description he had in 20 that, it would have been up on the whiteboard, sir. 21 Q. We know by this stage I think there would have been two 22 or three different descriptions of the possible coat 23 that Hanvey was wearing. 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. If you don't remember, say so, but can you remember, 93 1 were all those descriptions on your whiteboard or was it 2 restricted to what Hanvey had said or what -- 3 A. No. I think all the descriptions -- what we would have 4 had was a list of -- I had officers going through the 5 statements to identify the clothing from HOLMES, the 6 clothing that each individual was wearing. That would 7 have been up on the board, sir. That would have focused 8 the teams. In addition to that, sir, it is the usual 9 case: if in doubt, you seize the items, additional 10 items. 11 Q. I understand that. I am just, for the assistance of the 12 Panel, trying to ascertain, were these search teams 13 directed towards specific items and, if so, which? 14 A. Yes. In certain circumstances the items would have been 15 identified from statements, the specific clothes, and 16 those search teams would have been directed to look for 17 those clothes, sir, yes. 18 Q. All right. 19 Now, I want to turn to a different topic again, and 20 that's in relation to the Forensic Science Laboratory, 21 the Northern Ireland Forensic Science Laboratory, as it 22 was then. 23 Now, I think it was tentatively suggested to you at 24 one stage that perhaps you could have engaged in another 25 forensic scientist to look at the blood? 94 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Did that ever happen in Northern Ireland? 3 A. Not to my knowledge in 1997, sir, no. 4 Q. The Forensic Science Laboratory was an independent 5 laboratory. It wasn't paid for or part of the police 6 machinery? 7 A. No. It was independent, sir, yes. 8 Q. Was it relied upon by the RUC as being its source of 9 forensic investigation? 10 A. That's correct, sir, yes. 11 Q. Mr Marshall had been around for a very substantial 12 number of years. Is that right? 13 A. A long time, sir, yes. 14 Q. And had been used in hundreds, if not thousands, of 15 cases? 16 A. That's correct, sir. 17 Q. Now, while that's right, am I right in saying that in 18 and around that time not only had the police and the DPP 19 difficulty in getting reports from the Forensic Science 20 Laboratory; very often they didn't even arrive until 21 after the committal proceedings? 22 A. That is correct, sir, yes. 23 Q. So although, just to put it in simple terms, the DPP and 24 the police were screaming for these reports, because of 25 the workload in the Forensic Science Laboratory, they 95 1 were not forthcoming in the timescale that either you or 2 the DPP wanted? 3 A. That is correct, sir, yes. 4 Q. Of course, the Forensic Science Laboratory, they equally 5 were giving off about the lack of resources that they 6 had and their lack of finance? 7 A. That is correct, sir, yes. 8 Q. They were saying they couldn't provide them any quicker, 9 because they haven't got the staff? 10 A. That is correct, sir, yes. 11 Q. That was going on for years? 12 A. That was going on for years, sir, yes. 13 Q. In fact, Mr Irwin, am I right in saying that very often 14 counsel would arrive for a trial 18 months after 15 an incident and were served the forensic report on the 16 morning of the trial? 17 A. That is correct, sir. That has happened. 18 Q. There is nothing unusual about that? 19 A. No, there is nothing unusual. 20 Q. It would be served as additional evidence on the morning 21 or the week before, but there was nothing -- it nearly 22 became the norm? 23 A. That's correct, sir. 24 Q. Unfortunately, very often, because of that, trials then 25 had to be adjourned to let the defence investigate the 96 1 forensic aspects of the case? 2 A. There was always knock-on effects, sir, yes. 3 Q. Just finally on this, what the police had to resort to, 4 because they knew of the delays there would be in 5 receiving the formal report, was an informal contact by 6 telephone or by going to the lab and talking to the 7 scientists to try to find out have they even got 8 a preliminary view about what the evidence might be? 9 A. That's correct, sir, and trying to establish -- at 10 times, the forensic examination would have started, but 11 then it would have to be terminated because of other, 12 more pressing cases, and then you would have to go and 13 find out when the potential was to look at your case 14 again as well, sir. 15 Q. Now, I want to turn to another, separate issue, 16 and that's the issue of how Andrea McKee was dealt with 17 in relation to the taking of -- can we call it -- well, 18 it is clearly a false alibi statement. 19 A. That's okay, sir, yes. 20 Q. Well, have you any doubt that it is a false alibi 21 statement now? 22 A. No, I have no doubt now, sir. 23 Q. Now, you will understand that one of the matters that is 24 important is trying to get into the mind of 25 Mr McBurney -- 97 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. -- as to what strategy or tactic he was engaging in in 3 relation to Andrea McKee. 4 A. Yes, sir. 5 Q. Am I right in saying he wasn't a man for telling others 6 really very much about his strategy? 7 A. No. He would have given you an indication what he 8 wanted, and, yes, you certainly could question him on 9 points and he would give you indications and that, but 10 he would move on very quickly, sir, and he wouldn't 11 dwell on it that much. 12 Q. Now, if we have page [81486], please. I was actually 13 looking for page 59 of this witness statement. Is there 14 another page [81486] on the system? 15 THE CHAIRMAN: What we have up is the alibi statement, is 16 it? 17 MR ADAIR: Yes. It was actually this witness' statement 18 I wanted up. [81418]. Well, I will deal with it 19 without the statement. 20 A. Okay, sir. 21 Q. Mr McBurney directed you to go and take the statement 22 from Andrea McKee. 23 A. That's correct, sir. 24 Q. You discussed with Mr McBurney as to whether you should 25 confront her with her earlier actions, ie being present 98 1 when Tracey Clarke made the allegations -- 2 A. That's right. 3 Q. -- whether she should be confronted with this or whether 4 you should simply take a witness statement from her? 5 A. That's correct, sir. 6 Q. So it was obviously something that was tasking the mind 7 of Mr McBurney at that stage? 8 A. Is certainly was, sir, yes. 9 Q. He directed you that you should not confront her, but 10 you should, in fact, just take the witness statement? 11 A. That's correct. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: What, draw her attention to the declaration? 13 MR ADAIR: Yes. 14 THE CHAIRMAN: If she backed out at that, leave it; if she 15 didn't, take a statement? 16 MR ADAIR: That's right, sir. 17 Now, I don't think you have said it in so many 18 words, but is this proposition a reasonable one as to 19 what Mr McBurney was doing? Did he see this, in other 20 words, Andrea McKee making a false alibi statement, as 21 the potential way to break into the conspiracy? 22 A. Sir, when Michael McKee was interviewed in Lurgan police 23 station and I had a brief word with Mr McBurney after 24 that, he was delighted that the Atkinsons had introduced 25 other people into the conspiracy, because he saw here we 99 1 have a one-minute phone call between one house and 2 another house and what he had to prove -- here we were, 3 two families, both of interest, not to tell the truth. 4 What he had to prove was not only who made the phone 5 call, but what was actually said on that phone call, and 6 for any investigator that is a massive task in relation 7 to a phone call. 8 You can prove a phone contact, but who made it and 9 what was said on it -- and he saw the introduction of 10 people outside those family units as a real bonus to the 11 investigation. He believed at that stage this was 12 a bonus and an opportunity. 13 Q. Now, we all know, as lawyers, the dreaded alibi 14 witnesses -- 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. -- and what they are usually like. Did he see, just to 17 put it in a nutshell, the making of a witness statement 18 by Andrea McKee, this false alibi statement, as the 19 potential breakthrough eventually -- 20 A. He did indeed, sir. 21 Q. -- into Atkinson? 22 A. That's correct, sir. 23 Q. Have you any doubt whatsoever that his strategy at that 24 stage was to get this false alibi statement and, when 25 the time was right, break the alibi statement? 100 1 A. I have no doubt whatsoever, sir. What I would say is, 2 after I took the witness statement off Andrea McKee and 3 we spoke about it, he certainly gave me his view at that 4 stage that now the timing wasn't right to move on, 5 because what you would simply get was Andrea McKee and 6 a statement after caution from her potentially, which 7 then could not be used against Robbie Atkinson. 8 Q. In relation to the McKees, Michael McKee and 9 Andrea McKee -- 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. -- was there any discussion between you and Mr McBurney 12 as to whether he thought he might be able to break 13 Andrea McKee eventually? 14 A. Because of probably her relationship, that she'd come to 15 the police at the start, and underneath it all 16 Mr McBurney was of the view that she had been used and 17 forced into this situation and that she was the weak 18 link in the whole conspiracy. 19 Q. What about your knowledge of whether the marriage was 20 a solid one or otherwise between Michael and Andrea? 21 A. Yes. Mr McBurney had certain views on this as well. He 22 believed that it wouldn't last, so he did, sir. 23 Q. Again, I think I have used this expression before, was 24 his strategy at that stage then to get this statement 25 taken and wait in the long grass? 101 1 A. That's right, sir. That was his strategy. On saying 2 that, he had to move at some stage. Obviously, with the 3 trial going on, and then the inquest, time was on his 4 side, but he had to move at some particular stage, and 5 when he moved was, you know, a choice, a judgment 6 decision for him. 7 Q. Yes. 8 THE CHAIRMAN: You say he thought Andrea McKee had been 9 forced into the conspiracy. Did he say by whom? 10 A. No. He believed that they had been introduced by the 11 Atkinsons into the whole conspiracy issue, sir. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: But you used the word attributing it to 13 Mr McBurney's view that she had been forced. 14 A. Yes, sir. 15 THE CHAIRMAN: Did he say who or what had forced her? 16 A. I think it was the case of the relationship with the 17 Atkinsons. Obviously he believed that the Atkinsons had 18 went to the McKees to help him and, because of that 19 relationship, they had certainly been forced into 20 assisting the Atkinsons. 21 MR ADAIR: Again, lest there be any doubt about it, what was 22 your impression as to whether Mr McBurney was determined 23 to try to nail Atkinson? 24 A. He was very determined, sir. The difficulty was the 25 timing of the move. He was very firm that he would 102 1 move, but the timing was vitally important to that move. 2 Q. Now, I want to turn to a separate issue again. That's 3 in relation to the files that were sent to the DPP, both 4 by yourself -- 5 A. Uh-huh. 6 Q. -- and both in relation to the murder investigation and 7 in relation to the neglect allegation which incorporated 8 the tip-off allegation. 9 A. Yes, sir. 10 Q. You were involved? 11 A. That's correct, sir. 12 Q. You compiled the murder file? 13 A. That's correct, sir. 14 Q. You were substantially involved in the preparation of 15 the neglect file, which incorporated the tip-off? 16 A. I was indeed, sir, yes. 17 Q. Now, in neither of those files is there any reference, 18 apart from, I think, the words -- there is mention of 19 being sceptical about the story -- 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. -- but there is no mention in those files to the DPP 22 that, for example, Andrea McKee's statement should be 23 looked at in the light of the fact that she was present 24 with Tracey Clarke when she made the allegations 25 concerning the tip-off. Do you understand? 103 1 A. That is correct, sir. 2 Q. It is not mentioned in either of the files. 3 A. No, sir. 4 Q. Can you help us as to why that was? 5 A. I think that was -- well, Mr McBurney's certain style, 6 sir, that the investigation, as far as he seen it, was 7 still to be investigated and he certainly wasn't -- to 8 a certain degree he became paranoid about the 9 information and he certainly wouldn't want to disrupt 10 his chances of making the progress in the investigation 11 later on. 12 Q. Well, I suppose the question might be asked: how would 13 it disrupt the progress by simply informing the DPP, 14 alerting them to this issue? 15 A. Intelligence in those days, sir, everybody dealt with 16 intelligence differently. Mr McBurney had his own style 17 in dealing with intelligence. You know, that was his 18 style. I can't really say the method of how he done it 19 or why he done it, but that was his way. 20 Q. Okay. I want to turn to another separate issue and 21 that's the questions you were asked in relation to 22 potential identification parades or confrontations. 23 A. Yes, sir. 24 Q. Now, you were involved in the day-to-day running of the 25 case -- 104 1 A. That's correct, sir. 2 Q. -- in the early days? 3 Can I ask you this: in your view at that time -- 4 A. Uh-huh. 5 Q. -- was there anybody not confronted or put on 6 an identification parade that should have been? 7 A. No, I believed we had looked at the process, sir, and 8 pursued the identification as it should have been 9 pursued. 10 Q. Presumably you were part of the decision-making process? 11 A. I was indeed, sir, yes. 12 Q. I think at one stage it was said to you it was not your 13 job, but you were part of the whole process -- 14 A. I was indeed, sir. 15 Q. -- as to who should be put on an identification parade? 16 Would it be proper to? Whom should we confront and so 17 on? 18 A. That is correct, sir. 19 Q. Whomever you thought should be confronted and 20 identified, that was done -- 21 A. That was done. 22 Q. -- particularly in relation to Hobson? 23 A. That's correct, sir. 24 Q. Now, having been asked about it and reflected upon it, 25 have you changed your view or are you still of the view 105 1 that everything was done in relation to identification 2 and confrontation that could have been done? 3 A. Sir, I believe it was, but I would have to look again at 4 the statements of the individuals and the circumstances 5 to see again and review that whole area, but I know the 6 murder itself was reviewed and I don't know if anybody 7 else was put on ID parades later, so it seems to be that 8 it was. 9 Q. The final thing I want to ask you about is in relation 10 to this -- particularly Tracey Clarke, for example, who, 11 as we know, did not give evidence, and counsel 12 considered it would not be appropriate to attempt to 13 apply to a judge to read her statement through fear. 14 A. That is correct, sir, yes. 15 Q. Now, we know she told Mr Kerr and Mr Davison that the 16 reason she was not prepared to give evidence inter alia 17 was because she loved Hanvey. 18 A. Yes, sir. 19 Q. Am I right in saying, in those days -- tell us from your 20 own experience -- witnesses who did not want to give 21 evidence, but who had made statements, were savvy enough 22 either by being told by whomever that when they 23 consulted with counsel, they didn't say, "Oh, I am not 24 going to give evidence, because I am frightened". They 25 made up some other story as to why they weren't going to 106 1 give evidence? 2 A. That did occur, sir, yes. 3 Q. It occurred regularly, am I right in saying, in 4 Northern Ireland? They were savvy enough to come along 5 and say, "It is not because I am frightened, it is 6 because of X, Y and Z." 7 A. That's correct, sir, yes. 8 Q. Very often it is patently obvious they had been advised 9 to say that by one with "a wiser head"? 10 A. That's correct, sir. In fact, I think, sir, I have 11 a notebook entry where Tracey Clarke's mother said to me 12 that if she went to Billy Wright, he could tell her 13 about not giving evidence. I am not sure. There was 14 a notebook entry that I had made and it should be in the 15 papers, sir, where Tracey Clarke's mother had mentioned 16 about her going to Billy Wright for advice. 17 Q. Is it Billy Wright or xxxxxxxxxxxxxx? 18 A. It could be xxxxxxxxxxxxx. I thought it was 19 Billy Wright, but it could be xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, sir. 20 There is a notebook entry in the papers. 21 Q. Going for advice as to what to -- 22 A. The mother had said to me, yes. 23 MR ADAIR: Yes. Thanks very much. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory? 25 107 1 Questions from MR McGRORY 2 MR McGRORY: I have some questions. Thank you. 3 It has been a long day, I know. My name is McGrory. 4 I represent the family of Robert Hamill. I will try not 5 to keep you too long. 6 Once again, like some others, I am going to have to 7 jump about from subject from subject, I am afraid such 8 is the nature of your all-encompassing involvement in 9 this case. 10 A. All right, sir. 11 Q. Can I begin with some issues that are of particular 12 concern to the family of Robert Hamill, starting with 13 something that has been touched upon already, and that 14 is the evidence of Mr Lynne? 15 Now, Mr Lynne was one of three people who resided in 16 or about the Thomas Street area in respect of whom there 17 was some information. Isn't that correct? 18 A. That's correct, sir. 19 Q. The other two were a Mr Johnson and there is P42? 20 A. Right, sir. 21 Q. Now, do you know who I am talking about when I say P42? 22 A. I don't know them, sir, no. 23 Q. Perhaps you can be given the name on a bit of paper? 24 A. I have got the name, sir. 25 Q. Don't say it. Do you recognise the name? 108 1 A. No, I don't recognise the name. 2 Q. So you know nothing about that, about him? 3 A. It means nothing to me at the minute, sir. 4 Q. If I were to tell you that P42 is an individual who 5 claims to have witnessed the commencement of the 6 incident and wrote down an account of it, typed out 7 an account of it and handed it anonymously, through 8 a relative, to the police back in 1997? 9 A. Okay, sir. Right. 10 Q. Does that jog your memory? 11 A. Vaguely, sir, yes. Vaguely. 12 Q. Well, the point I am making here is that there are -- 13 Thomas Street would have been a street from which those 14 who resided there -- 15 A. That is correct, sir. 16 Q. -- might have had a view of what happened. 17 A. That's correct. 18 Q. Indeed, in respect of Messrs Johnson and Lynne, you have 19 already been shown the statement that you made about 20 your conversation with Mr Lynne on 10th June. 21 Now, I want just to take to you that again briefly, 22 if I may. It is [09281]. Perhaps the -- "On 23 10th June", from there, if it could be highlighted, 24 please. That's helpful: 25 "On 10th June '97 between 12.20 am and 2.45 am I was 109 1 at the scene of the resiting of a police Land Rover at 2 Market Street." 3 Now, this is the reenactment of the event, isn't it, 4 in terms of the siting of the Land Rover? 5 A. That's correct. 6 Q. At which Chief Superintendent McBurney was also present? 7 A. Yes, he was indeed. 8 Q. This -- 9 A. And Mr Murnaghan was present as well. 10 Q. Yes, I believe he was too, yes. This chap comes up and 11 introduces himself, and then he returned -- 12 A. That's correct, sir. 13 Q. -- and stated that he wanted to talk to you off the 14 record -- 15 A. That's right. 16 Q. -- about the attack on 27th April: 17 "He stated he had thought about this in the flat. 18 He related he had witnessed the incident and outlined 19 his recollection of events. He indicated points in 20 Thomas Street where he saw two persons being assaulted. 21 He related he was disgusted at the media coverage and in 22 particular that the RUC had received unfair criticism." 23 A. That's correct, sir. 24 Q. "He believed the police had done an excellent job. He 25 related that originally on seeing the incident, that he 110 1 didn't see any police. He then saw about 3 police and 2 there was a crowd of about 30 to 40 persons. He related 3 that they were helpless. However, when other police 4 arrive, they quickly moved the crowd", and so forth. 5 Now, Mr McBurney says in his interview, and we 6 listened to this the other day, that his recollection 7 was that this chap was a barman in St Patrick's or 8 something. Does that mean anything to you? 9 A. No, it doesn't, sir, no. 10 Q. Your memory is that he was just a reluctant witness? 11 A. That is correct, sir, yes. 12 Q. Now, if I could have on the screen, please, [09899]. 13 The bottom long paragraph, please. This is dated 14 15/5/97, this entry. Sorry, a little bit above that 15 would reveal that, I think. I am not 100% sure but 16 I think it is more contemporaneous with the incident 17 than the 10th June. It says: 18 "John Robert Lynne", and it gives the date of birth. 19 The name "D/Con Williamson" is there. There may be 20 a date of August. I am not sure. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Do you recognise this entry? Can you tell us what this 23 is, first of all? 24 A. That's an action sheet, sir. 25 Q. That's an action sheet? 111 1 A. Yes. Sorry. 2 Q. Let's just have a look at what he says about 3 John Robert Lynne: 4 "Does not wish to make a statement but outlines that 5 at the time of the incident he was alone in his home 6 which is in a second floor flat, which is only slightly 7 up Thomas Street ... He was watching TV at the time of 8 the incident when he heard a fracas outside. States he 9 looked out through his window which he had to open. 10 States he saw a fight at the end of Thomas Street 11 involving about 40 people. He describes the fight as 12 involving two crowds which came together fighting, then 13 stepped back momentarily ... he recalls seeing a police 14 Land Rover near Clarke's shop but does not recall seeing 15 police on the ground." 16 Now, do you see that? 17 A. Yes, sir. 18 Q. "At the time, Lynne thought this fight had spilled out 19 of a pub. He only observed what was going on for a few 20 second and closed the window because the light was on. 21 He describes the crowd as being made up of males and 22 females, mostly male. 23 "He does not want to make a statement because he is 24 involved socially with both sides ..." 25 Most of that is consistent with what he told you on 112 1 10th June? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. But for the fact I would suggest that what he said 4 initially to D Con Williamson was he did not see police 5 on the ground or recall seeing police on the ground. So 6 he appears to have changed what he had to say about it 7 between then and 10th June. Do you agree with me? 8 A. Yes, sir, yes. 9 Q. Indeed, by the time 10th June came along, he is 10 introducing to you the whole subject of the rights and 11 wrongs of what the police did. 12 A. That's correct, sir, yes. 13 Q. But that's not something he had said initially at all? 14 A. No, it doesn't seem to be, sir, no. 15 Q. In fact, he said he didn't see the police at all? 16 A. He seems to have, yes, sir. 17 Q. Just in terms of the -- I know that this man has said 18 twice, once to Williamson and secondly to you 19 personally, that he didn't want to get involved. Was 20 there anything more that could have been done in terms 21 of following up on what he had to say in terms of 22 revisiting him a few months later to see if he had 23 changed his mind? 24 A. Sir, you could do that on every inquiry. You could keep 25 going and keep going, but when people have been saying 113 1 they are not going to make a statement, they are usually 2 very strong in that situation. A lot of people don't 3 want to be involved in the process, and they are very 4 adamant that they don't want to make statements. 5 When somebody says they don't want to make 6 a statement, I think police are subject to their wishes 7 and I don't see what you can do further to ... 8 Q. Well, would you have considered a door-to-door sort of 9 search, or knocking on doors to see who had seen what 10 right up the whole street? 11 A. Yes, we could have, sir, yes. 12 Q. You see, that doesn't appear to have been done. Do you 13 agree? 14 A. I am not sure, sir. Most of the premises in 15 Thomas Street are commercial premises. There was 16 a number of flats. 17 Q. Yes. Would you agree that it would have been best 18 practice to have knocked on every single flat? 19 A. Oh, it would, sir, yes. Uh-huh. 20 Q. Indeed, had that been done -- well, you don't know about 21 P42, but I am going to suggest to you that P42 submitted 22 an anonymous account that, had there been a door-to-door 23 exercise carried out by the police, he and maybe others 24 might have been uncovered as eye-witnesses? 25 A. There is the potential, sir. What you do is you can do 114 1 door-to-door, but if people don't open, and if they are 2 from flats, if they don't open the front door, you are 3 very limited. You can keep calling and keep calling, 4 sir, but, yes, I would agree in general with your ... 5 Q. What I am suggesting to you is that it wasn't done. 6 A. Okay, sir. I accept that. Was there an action sheet 7 raised to do door-to-door in Thomas Street? 8 Q. If there was, I can't find it. That's maybe a matter 9 for another day. 10 A. That's okay. 11 Q. I want to move on to a different subject. If I can 12 turn, please, to your own statement that was submitted 13 to the Inquiry through your lawyers at [81463], now the 14 entry at 5th June 1997. This is where you quote, 15 I think, a notebook entry concerning your contact with 16 Diane Hamill. 17 What you say is this: 18 "Liaised with ICPC ref witnesses ... and 19 Diane Hamill - no word from either ref meeting tonight. 20 Contacted [blank] office again and left message to 21 confirm attendance tonight." 22 A. That would have been the solicitor's office, I think. 23 Q. I presume it is Rosemary Nelson. 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. "Phoned ICPC ref no acknowledgment ... contacted by 115 1 phone by Diane Hamill ref murder of her brother ... 2 asked if police officers had been suspended. I related 3 they hadn't, and, on asking to make contact with the 4 chief constable, I gave police network number and told 5 to inform them of her request. Asked if she was 6 attending tonight for ICPC meeting. She asked if I had 7 letter from [the solicitor]. Informed her that I hadn't 8 received any letters and, despite numerous phone calls, 9 I received no return calls. I explained the present 10 state of investigation and outlined court procedure ... 11 I explained I was willing to speak to her at any 12 time ..." 13 Then over the page [81464], you said: 14 "A number of vital enquiries had been directed by 15 witnesses to [Rosemary Nelson's] office who refused to 16 acknowledge my enquiries. She asked if I had received 17 notification from [Rosemary Nelson] ref the witnesses 18 regarding the murder which was in result of 19 correspondence sent by Detective Chief Inspector P39." 20 Now, doesn't that reveal that Diane Hamill, firstly, 21 had understood that you would have been informed that 22 she was not attending the ICPC meeting and perhaps why? 23 A. That is correct, yes, sir. 24 Q. Then, secondly, that she expected that any witnesses 25 that had come forward, and the information from those 116 1 witnesses, would be forwarded on to you? 2 A. That's correct, sir, yes. 3 Q. Thank you. 4 THE CHAIRMAN: You say you had not received anything from 5 Rosemary Nelson? 6 A. No, sir. Immediately after that then we did get a fax, 7 I believe, from Rosemary Nelson's office to say that 8 Diane wouldn't be attending. 9 What I believe happened was Diane obviously rang 10 Rosemary Nelson's office and the next thing a fax 11 arrived at the police station to say that Diane wouldn't 12 be arriving. 13 MR McGRORY: But it is clear from her conversation with you, 14 Inspector Irwin, that she was not holding anything back. 15 She was expecting that people would cooperate and that 16 the information would be given to the police. 17 A. Yes, and I was explaining to her that we weren't getting 18 that cooperation and we weren't getting it from 19 Rosemary. 20 I was making it very plain to Diane that Rosemary 21 was not answering any of my calls and wasn't prepared -- 22 or didn't appear to be prepared to meet me or talk to me 23 on the matter, and I was saying, you know, I think there 24 was another entry where, you know, we were going to 25 witnesses. The witnesses were saying "I refer you to my 117 1 solicitor, Rosemary Nelson". We would then phone 2 Rosemary Nelson and Rosemary Nelson was not answering 3 her phone calls. That's the circle we were going in. 4 Q. But, of course, you don't know what the witnesses were 5 saying to Rosemary Nelson in terms of their attitude 6 about going to the police. Let's not put the blame on 7 Rosemary Nelson. 8 All I am asking you to confirm, insofar as 9 Diane Hamill is concerned, she felt that was being dealt 10 with and, if people were going to come forward, that's 11 what she wanted them to do? 12 A. That is correct, sir, but in saying that, Rosemary could 13 have contacted me. She was aware I was making phone 14 calls. Rosemary could have contacted me to even let me 15 know she was not prepared to meet me or on the advice of 16 her clients she was not prepared to meet me. 17 Q. But it obviously wasn't on Diane Hamill's instructions? 18 A. No, I can't say that, sir. 19 Q. Thank you. 20 Two other minor matters in terms of your contact 21 with Diane Hamill. I have to say to you that 22 Diane Hamill, her recollection and the recollection of 23 her sister Fiona agree, as recounted to the Inquiry, is 24 very clear -- 25 A. Right. 118 1 Q. -- about the conversation in respect of the Land Rover, 2 and that, as far as they can recollect, that meeting was 3 in May, but my understanding is they are prepared to 4 accept it may have been later. 5 A. Okay. 6 Q. But that during the course of a meeting with you in 7 Portadown Police Station, you gave a clear indication 8 that you understood that there was in existence CCTV 9 material which revealed the presence of the Land Rover? 10 A. Yes. No, I didn't, sir, no. What I can say, sir, and 11 if you look at the book and I refer to that book, "See 12 no evil, hear no evil", where Diane specifically says 13 the meeting happened on 30th October, and where they 14 then wrote to Mo Mowlam and had a meeting with Mo Mowlam 15 in November and this issue arose regarding the CCTV and 16 we responded to Mo Mowlam's letter by saying, "No, there 17 was no coverage of the Land Rover on the CCTV." 18 Now, in saying that, I accept on me trying to 19 provide a suggestion or give a sequence of events, it 20 may have been interpreted wrong, but what I was trying 21 to say was that the Land Rover had been parked outside 22 the First Trust Bank. It had then moved to the 23 junction, and at that junction -- and the only chance of 24 getting it covered on CCTV was from the 25 First Trust Bank, and the only coverage it would have 119 1 possibly given was the side of a Land Rover 2 Q. Yes. 3 A. That may have been misinterpreted, sir, and I can't 4 answer that. 5 Q. Moving on now to another topic, you were asked for some 6 information about the progress of this case in December 7 of 1997. If you could turn, please, to page [16500], 8 this is a document from Detective -- it is to Detective 9 Superintendent Hooke, and I suggest it is from you. If 10 we go to the back page of it, it is [16502]. That's 11 your signature, isn't that correct? 12 A. That's correct, yes. 13 Q. Do you remember this document? 14 A. I can't say I do, sir, no. 15 Q. The document gives some information about this case 16 under a number of headings. There are various points. 17 The point that I am interested in is point 5, which is 18 on the last page. If it could be highlighted, please. 19 Have you no recollection as to the circumstances in 20 which you authored this document? 21 A. There must have been queries come down, sir, and then 22 I would have responded to those queries. 23 Q. Yes. Indeed, on 24th November there was a meeting 24 between the Hamill family and the Secretary of State, 25 Dr Mowlam. 120 1 A. That's what come out of -- that's right, sir, yes. 2 Q. You recall that? 3 A. I recall that, yes. 4 Q. Following on from that, the Northern Ireland Office, on 5 the direction of Dr Mowlam, asked for detailed 6 information about this case from the chief constable's 7 office? 8 A. Okay, sir, yes. 9 Q. You accept that? 10 A. Yes, sir, yes. 11 Q. I am suggesting to you that that request for information 12 filtered through to you -- 13 A. Yes, indeed, sir. 14 Q. -- and that this document that I have shown you is your 15 response. 16 A. That is correct, sir. 17 Q. What the Hamill family raised with Dr Mowlam at the 18 meeting was the fact that there were rumours that there 19 was some connection between police in the Land Rover and 20 those who were suspected of the murder. 21 Are you aware that that issue was raised? 22 A. I may have been at the time, sir. I am not sure. 23 Q. If you look at this point 5 that's on the screen, this 24 is your answer to a point 5 -- 25 A. Okay, sir. 121 1 Q. -- in which you say: 2 "A DPP file is being submitted which relates to 3 an allegation of a link between one of the accused and 4 one police officer." 5 A. That's correct, sir. 6 Q. Indeed, that is absolutely accurate, isn't it? 7 A. It is, sir. 8 Q. So one can presume that you were asked "What have you 9 got on this? Is there anything on this allegation of 10 contact?" 11 A. Right. Okay, sir, yes. 12 Q. Now, if I could turn, please, to page [15376] -- perhaps 13 the previous page would help put this in context, 14 [15375]. This is the reply from the chief constable to 15 Dr Mowlam in respect of all that information. 16 A. Yes, sir. 17 Q. The last page reveals that at page [15377]. There is 18 his signature. 19 Now, if we go to point 5 on page [15376], here is 20 the answer that the Secretary of State was given, 21 Mr Irwin. 22 First of all, the heading is: 23 "Relationship between some officers and some of the 24 defendants." 25 Do you see that? 122 1 A. Yes, sir. 2 Q. The answer is: 3 "This allegation has been included in the criminal 4 investigation and will be considered by the Director of 5 Public Prosecutions." 6 Now, that's not quite what you said in your answer, 7 sure it is not? 8 A. No, it is not, sir. 9 Q. Indeed, you were at pains to point out to 10 Superintendent Hooke that there was a specific 11 allegation in respect of a specific officer and one of 12 the suspects? 13 A. That's correct, sir. 14 Q. I presume you have no explanation as to how it 15 translated into what we have before us sir? 16 A. No, unless someone has been speaking to Mr McBurney or 17 someone like that on it, as well, sir. I honestly don't 18 know. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: You just sent your report to Mr Hooke and it 20 was out of your hands then? 21 A. Yes. 22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 23 MR McGRORY: I want to turn to the issue of the whole 24 investigation into Reserve Constable Atkinson and in 25 particular the taking of the statement from Andrea McKee 123 1 which supported his contention that he did not make the 2 phone call, Inspector Irwin. 3 First of all, in answer to Mr Adair in respect of 4 how you handled the information from the phone company 5 that, in fact, some calls had been made between the two 6 households on the night in question, it is my 7 recollection that what you said was that there was no 8 way of attaining that by force or by law, that you 9 depended upon the goodwill of the phone company. 10 A. I do believe that's correct, sir, yes. 11 Q. I have to contradict you on that. Are you not aware of 12 the special procedure contained within PACE of 1989 13 which is designed to obtain confidential information 14 which comes into existence by way of application to 15 a county court judge? 16 A. Right, sir. I am not, no. 17 Q. Well, you are an experienced police officer now. Surely 18 you are aware, for example, in the many video 19 identification cases of riots, for example, where 20 television footage comes into existence -- 21 A. Yes, sir. 22 Q. -- of people engaged in a riot -- 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. -- and say, for example, Drumcree -- 25 A. Uh-huh. Yes, sir. 124 1 Q. -- that the evidential basis for any potential 2 prosecution is the television footage -- 3 A. Yes, sir. 4 Q. -- and that it is a matter of course that what the 5 police does is makes an application under schedule 1 of 6 PACE 1989 to the television company for production of 7 the video footage? 8 A. Yes, sir, yes, yes. 9 Q. Do you agree with me? 10 A. That's correct, yes. 11 Q. I am suggesting to you that the telephone records are in 12 exactly the same position as television footage? 13 A. I can't answer that, sir. In 1997, that wasn't the 14 process that we went down. 15 Q. You see, what I am suggesting to you existed was 16 a convenient relationship between the police and the 17 telephone companies in terms of the quick and speedy 18 gathering of intelligence, in that they would hand over 19 the information on request on certain conditions. 20 A. Yes, sir, yes. 21 Q. They didn't want you running willy nilly to suspects 22 revealing the fact that you had easy access to their 23 telephone records. 24 A. I am not sure, sir, of the circumstances, to be honest 25 with you. All I know, in 1997, there was difficulties 125 1 with certain phone companies. I can't explain which 2 ones they were, sir. 3 Q. But if you required, I am suggesting to you, information 4 about anyone's telephone records in the context of the 5 investigation of a serious crime, all you had to do was 6 make an allocation? 7 A. Sir, what I am saying to you is that was Mr McBurney's 8 field. He had the telephone enquiry and he was dealing 9 with it in his manner. I actually hadn't addressed my 10 mind to that situation at all, sir. 11 Q. Well, I am asking to you address it simply, Mr Irwin, 12 because it has been put forward before this Inquiry that 13 there was some obstacle to confronting Mr Atkinson with 14 the telephone records because of the manner in which the 15 information was communicated from the telephone 16 companies, and I am suggesting to you that that is 17 neither here nor there. If the police wanted the 18 information to be used in an evidential way, all they 19 had to do was make the application. 20 A. I believe, to be honest, in this circumstance, I thought 21 Mr McBurney was going to raise the telephone enquiry in 22 interview, and he could do it that, "We have information 23 or intelligence that a phone call was made", or 24 whatever. 25 However, I think the response from Mr Atkinson 126 1 prevented him from doing that, or he changed his mind 2 but it was my belief that that was going to be addressed 3 in interview. 4 Q. Well, let's come to the interview and the strategy for 5 interviewing and the strategy developed after the 6 interviews took place. 7 A. Yes, sir. 8 Q. First of all, the interview didn't take place until 9 September? 10 A. That's correct, sir. 11 Q. And you had the information about the telephone billing 12 since May? 13 A. I hadn't -- I don't think I had the intelligence -- the 14 telephone information from May, sir. 15 Q. Well, the information, you accept, was in the system 16 from May? 17 A. Or was it with the Chief Inspector? 18 Q. Okay. Well, it may have been with the Chief Inspector. 19 So you are not able to help us then -- 20 A. No, sir. 21 Q. -- with the reason for the delay between May and 22 September? 23 A. No. 24 Q. Did you expect to be involved in September? 25 A. No, I didn't, sir. 127 1 Q. Indeed, you told Diane Hamill that you wouldn't be 2 involved? 3 A. That is correct, sir, I did. 4 Q. So how did you end up being involved in September? 5 A. I think it was a process that the chief had moved on. 6 She wasn't -- the Chief Inspector wasn't available, and 7 it was a case of I was there to do the introductions and 8 Mr Murnaghan and Mr McBurney were to proceed with ICPC 9 investigation and I was there as previously agreed in 10 a sort of back-up capacity for the investigation. 11 Both gentlemen were well aware that I had told Diane 12 that I wouldn't be involved in the investigation. 13 Q. But in any event, you were involved in September? 14 A. That's correct, sir. 15 Q. Before you went into that interview in September, was 16 a strategy outlined to you? 17 A. Yes. Mr McBurney and Mr Murnaghan had -- I believe that 18 there were questions arranged between the ICPC and 19 Mr McBurney. There was a list of questions that they 20 had agreed to cover, a list of areas that they had 21 agreed to cover in interview, sir. 22 Q. We know that most part of the interview dealt with the 23 Land Rover issue -- 24 A. That's correct. 25 Q. -- but a significant enough section of it addressed the 128 1 issue of some contact or knowledge by people in the 2 Land Rover of those who conducted the murder. Isn't 3 that correct? 4 A. That's correct, sir, yes. 5 Q. Was it outlined to you that, "Look, here is what we are 6 going to do about this information we have about the 7 phone call"? 8 A. Mr McBurney said I was to caution him for -- that he 9 would be covering the allegation of the contact between 10 Atkinson and Hanvey, and, at the start of the interview, 11 I actually cautioned him for assisting offenders and 12 withholding information regarding the murder. So that 13 was to cover that aspect of it, sir, yes. 14 Q. Then, of course, there is a second interview on 15 October 9th. 16 A. That's correct, sir. 17 Q. You attended that one as well? 18 A. I did indeed, sir, yes. 19 Q. Did you expect that on October 9th he would be fully 20 confronted with the information that there was indeed 21 telephone contact between his household and the Hanvey 22 household? 23 A. Had he not produced the telephone billing by that second 24 interview, sir? 25 Q. Yes. 129 1 A. He had? So, yes, I would. 2 Q. Yes. 3 A. He said he wasn't aware of it. His wife could tell us 4 about it. 5 Q. Yes. Whom else did he involve? 6 A. Michael McKee. 7 Q. And who else? 8 A. Well, Michael McKee -- he didn't involve anybody, 9 because he said his wife could tell us about it. So 10 Michael McKee and Andrea McKee became involved in it. 11 Q. But you knew then, at that stage, from the moment he 12 introduced the McKees on 9th October, that he was almost 13 certainly giving you a fake alibi? 14 A. That's correct, sir, yes. It was a potential. Until 15 you made the enquiries. Until you made the enquiries to 16 confirm that, yes, sir. 17 Q. You were sufficiently concerned about this to raise it 18 with Mr McBurney? 19 A. When I was going into the interview with Andrea McKee? 20 Q. Yes. 21 A. That's correct, sir, yes. 22 Q. And -- 23 A. I wanted to satisfy myself to his strategy and how we'd 24 approach the interview. It wouldn't be an interview 25 I would want to go into every day of the week, sir. You 130 1 needed a bit of advice and guidance from the 2 investigating officer. 3 Q. But you were uncomfortable, were you not, 4 Inspector Irwin? 5 A. I was uncomfortable at the start, yes, sir, until I got 6 a line from where Mr McBurney was coming from. 7 Q. Because you knew what you were doing in allowing 8 Andrea McKee to make the statement, and indeed drawing 9 your attention to the declaration of truth and signing 10 that statement, was the commission of a crime. 11 A. A potential commission. As I said, if you look at 12 Tracey Clarke's statement, sir, and if you want to put 13 it up on the screen there, Tracey Clarke gave us the 14 hearsay information that Robert Atkinson was phoning -- 15 had phoned Hanvey on the morning of the incident and was 16 continually phoning him on a regular basis. 17 Now, that could have been made from a telephone box, 18 from a mobile phone, even from the police station, sir. 19 The potential was also that a phone call had been made 20 from Atkinson's house to Hanvey's house and that the two 21 cases could run together, sir. 22 Q. But the fact was you did not believe her. 23 A. No, sir, I was sceptical about that, and until the 24 enquiries were conducted regarding that whole area, then 25 I agree I was sceptical to it. 131 1 Q. I am going to suggest you were more than sceptical. You 2 did not believe her. 3 A. Sir, sceptical or I didn't believe her, sir, you know, 4 you have to do the enquiries to confirm you are 5 sceptical or you didn't believe her, sir. 6 What I did was I made sure when I was speaking to 7 Andrea that, if I ever had to speak to Andrea again, she 8 was aware that I would give her every opportunity to 9 tell the truth in that interview. I could certainly say 10 to anybody in a court later on that she was given every 11 opportunity to give the truth that day and if she was 12 subsequently convicted of a criminal offence, it was 13 because of her own doing, sir. 14 Q. At this point, after Andrea McKee has made the 15 statement, did Mr McBurney then explain he had 16 a strategy as to what he would do, having put you in the 17 uncomfortable position of taking the statement? 18 A. When I came out of that interview, sir, I believe I met 19 Mr McBurney a few days later and explained to him what 20 had occurred in taking the statement, and I said, "You 21 need to get a team with another investigating officer 22 and investigate that area of it". He said, "Leave it 23 with me", and he came back, because, at that stage, the 24 Hanveys hadn't been interviewed, sir, and he came back 25 to me some time later. 132 1 He says, "Now is not the right time to jump. What 2 we would get at the minute is we would get Andrea McKee, 3 potentially get Andrea McKee, but we wouldn't get 4 Atkinson", because Andrea McKee at that stage was 5 closely linked to Michael and closely linked to the 6 Atkinsons and his belief was she would not give evidence 7 against Atkinson. That was his belief at that time, 8 sir. 9 Q. Did he say to you at that time that he had a hunch that 10 this union between the McKees wouldn't last? 11 A. What he said was he was delighted that -- not 12 delighted -- he was pleased that two individuals that 13 weren't attached to the family units had become involved 14 in the investigation and he saw that as the opportunity 15 to get to the truth. 16 As I said earlier, sir, we are talking about 17 a one-minute phone call. We are talking about not only 18 what was said or who made the phone calls, but what was 19 actually said in that phone call. That was the only way 20 he was going to convict Mr Atkinson, because Mr Atkinson 21 had said he had went home, had gone to bed, and had no 22 dealings -- and wasn't aware of the phone call. The 23 only way to break that was to get direct evidence from 24 somebody involved in that alibi issue. 25 Q. See, the problem with all of this is, I have suggested 133 1 to you, Inspector Irwin, it is the best part of another 2 three years before anything does happen. 3 A. That's correct, sir, yes. 4 Q. I am suggesting to you that it stretches the imagination 5 far too far that something as important as this, in 6 terms of an investigative strategy, would be let sit for 7 three years. 8 A. But, sir, what is the point in jumping too early and 9 losing the opportunity? 10 Q. Well, what if the opportunity never comes? 11 A. Yes. Put it this way, sir. Andrea McKee was going to 12 be arrested -- I am in no doubt about that -- at some 13 stage, and be interviewed about it. 14 I know you don't want to accept that, sir, but if 15 you look at the message sheet that I also put in, in 16 '99, or whatever it was, that Andrea McKee and her 17 husband had separated, there is a message sheet in the 18 system and that Mr McBurney intends to interview these 19 witnesses again. 20 Q. But what if they had not separated? 21 A. Sir, they were going to be arrested then. That's what 22 I am saying. 23 Q. How long did Mr McBurney say he was going to wait for 24 this separation before he would then arrest her? 25 A. The trial had went on, sir, and then he was very keen to 134 1 get an inquest. 2 As you are aware, the inquest process went on for 3 longer than we anticipated. You were objecting to the 4 inquest and Mr McBurney wanted an inquest for all the 5 information to come out. 6 Q. So this was discussed between you then, that, "This may 7 take us years before we get a break"? 8 A. No, it wasn't discussed, sir. What he said at that time 9 after the interview of Andrea McKee was the time was not 10 right to jump. 11 Q. What I am saying to you is, what would have happened -- 12 well, I have asked you what would have happened had they 13 never split up. You are saying, "Then we would have 14 moved to arrest her", but when? 15 A. Mr McBurney would have had to make that choice, sir. If 16 after the process -- if we had not got the information 17 that the two of them had separated, Mr McBurney was 18 waiting then for the coroner's inquest to move forward. 19 Now, I don't know what conversations Mr McBurney had 20 with other individuals or senior officers regarding it, 21 sir. All I can say from my point of view is that 22 Mr McBurney, to me, was keeping it under review, and 23 I was briefing him regularly during the coroner's 24 inquest of how the process was going. 25 Q. Well, you have been shown the report that Mr McBurney 135 1 put in that you assisted him with. 2 A. Yes, sir. 3 Q. On page [09082], which is the last page of that report, 4 at the bottom of it, if I could have it on the screen, 5 please, he says: 6 "Having found no evidence other than the telephone 7 billing to substantiate the allegation of Witness A, one 8 can remain sceptical but there is absolutely no other 9 evidence to substantiate the allegation by Witness A. 10 I therefore recommend no prosecution." 11 A. That is correct, sir. 12 Q. Isn't he saying that is the end of the matter? 13 A. Not to me, sir, he wasn't, no. 14 Q. He recommended no prosecution. He did not say, 15 Mr Irwin -- 16 A. No, sir. 17 Q. -- "This is an ongoing investigation. There may be 18 further developments." 19 A. No, sir, and I wouldn't put that in any of my murder 20 files that investigations were ongoing, sir. 21 Q. You wouldn't? 22 A. No, sir, no. 23 Q. Is that not the conclusion of this? 24 A. No, I wouldn't put it that was the conclusion. What he 25 had to do, sir, was that four officers had to be 136 1 interviewed about inactivity. He had to put a file in 2 in relation to that. Included in that was the 3 allegation against Mr Atkinson. So he had to conclude 4 them all on the DPP file, but as far as I was concerned, 5 it wasn't the end of the matter, sir. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Just give us the date of this report again, 7 will you, please? 8 MR McGRORY: I am sorry, sir. I have the front page. I am 9 going to have to ask the Inquiry for assistance in terms 10 of the date of it. 11 A. It was December 1997. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 13 MR McGRORY: I have to suggest to you, Inspector Irwin, that 14 it is simply unbelievable that this strategy which 15 Mr McBurney and you have outlined actually existed. 16 A. Sir, it happened. 17 Q. What happened was, Inspector Irwin, that the prosecution 18 or any prospect of a prosecution of Reserve Constable 19 Atkinson was buried in this report. 20 A. No, I don't accept that, sir. Sure, put it this way, 21 sir, I put in an action sheet or a message sheet to say 22 that the two individuals had separated and that it was 23 Mr McBurney's intention to interview them as witnesses. 24 Q. Indeed. You put that in in October 1999. 25 A. And they separated in ... 137 1 Q. You put in the information that they had separated in or 2 about October 1999. 3 A. That's right, and that's the time they had separated, 4 I believe. 5 Q. Indeed, but Mr McBurney does not visit Andrea McKee 6 until 20th June 2000 -- 7 A. That's correct, sir. 8 Q. -- eight months later. 9 A. One person was living in the south of Ireland at that 10 time, sir, so you could not interview one and not the 11 other, sir. 12 Q. Why didn't he interview them both? 13 A. He couldn't go down to the south of Ireland and 14 interview a witness down there, sir. He didn't even 15 know where he was living in the south of Ireland. 16 Q. First of all, let me put it to you that it's not correct 17 that he couldn't have them interviewed in the south of 18 Ireland. 19 A. He couldn't have them interviewed, or he couldn't 20 interview them, sir? 21 Q. That's not correct, is it. Haven't the RUC for years 22 used the cooperation of the Garda Siochana to interview 23 people on their behalf when they have the energy and 24 interest in doing so? 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGrory, I think you have only listened to 138 1 a part of the answer. He said: 2 "How can you interview them when you don't know 3 where they are?" 4 MR McGRORY: Couldn't you have used the good offices of the 5 Garda Siochana to find out where he was? 6 A. Sir, if you look at the message, it was Mr McBurney's 7 decision to interview them at some stage. That's what 8 I done. I put in the message. I spoke to Mr McBurney. 9 He said it is his intention to interview these persons. 10 Q. "At some stage"? This is how you investigate the 11 wrongdoing of a police officer, "at some stage"? 12 A. He did interview them, sir. 13 Q. Eight months later. 14 A. Sir, he was making inroads into the investigation. 15 Q. We will come to the reasons for that with some other 16 witnesses, I can tell you, Mr Irwin, but in terms of 17 locating Mr McKee, if it was necessary, you knew he was 18 in Cork? 19 A. At that stage, sir? 20 Q. Yes. 21 A. Did I? I am not sure, sir. 22 Q. Mr McBurney knew he was in Cork. 23 A. Right. I can't -- it may have been so, sir. 24 Q. So what if Mr McKee is not available? If Andrea McKee 25 and Michael McKee have split up and you think, as part 139 1 of your long-term strategy, that she might now talk, 2 what is the problem with talking to her on her own? 3 A. Sir, I think in any investigation, when you move, you 4 would want to move as a complete investigation. 5 Q. I am suggesting to you there would have been absolutely 6 no difficulty in talking to her on her own. You didn't 7 need Michael McKee. 8 A. Sir, again, what I done was I found out that they had 9 been separated. I went to Mr McBurney and I told him 10 they were separated. He told me it was his intention 11 again to interview them as witnesses and to try to get 12 their addresses actually at that particular stage. 13 I put in a message sheet. 14 As far as I was concerned, Mr McBurney was in charge 15 of the investigation. He was continuing to review it 16 and he moved as soon as he thought it was appropriate, 17 sir. 18 Q. And you think waiting around for another eight months is 19 a reasonable proposition? 20 A. Sir, at that stage, we were still going through the 21 coroner's inquest process. 22 Q. Indeed, at that point in October 1999 the Hamill family 23 still did not know anything about the allegation of the 24 tipping-off, sure it didn't? 25 A. I would well believe that, sir, yes. 140 1 Q. Are you aware that the first time the Hamill family 2 learned of it was in January 2000, when the coroner told 3 them? 4 A. That could be correct, sir, yes. 5 Q. Then things started to move, didn't they? 6 A. When, sir? 7 Q. In terms of the implementation of this so-called 8 strategy? 9 A. No. I think, sir, as you are aware, the coroner was 10 intending to hold an inquest, and you, on behalf of the 11 family, was objecting to the holding of an inquest. 12 That prolonged the whole process. 13 Q. You knew very well -- 14 A. The coroner then said he was going to hold an inquest 15 and then he said, no, he wasn't. He turned round and 16 said, no, he wasn't going to hold an inquest. As soon 17 as that inquest process came to an end, Mr McBurney 18 moved. 19 Q. On what conceivable basis do you suggest, 20 Inspector Irwin, that the debate over whether or not 21 there should have been an inquest had anything to do 22 with when Inspector McBurney interviews Andrea McKee? 23 A. Mr McBurney, it was his strategy, sir. I was operating 24 with Mr McBurney. It was him that was dictating when to 25 move. 141 1 Q. Is it not the case that, once the coroner blew the gaff 2 in early 2000 about the tipping-off allegation, 3 Inspector McBurney, Chief Inspector McBurney had no 4 choice but to go and interview Andrea McKee? 5 A. But, sir, my message sheet is before January 2000 -- 6 Q. Exactly. 7 A. -- and it indicates that it is Mr McBurney's intention 8 to interview these witnesses. So that was before 9 January 2000, sir. 10 Q. But he didn't. 11 A. But he was going to, sir. That was the intention. It 12 was already in the system, and I am not sure -- was that 13 in October '99 that was put in, sir? 14 Q. Yes, but he didn't do it, did he? 15 A. He did, sir, at the appropriate stage. 16 Q. Once he had no option, I suggest to you, 17 Inspector Irwin. 18 A. Sir, the information, when I went to him in October '99, 19 he was going to move at an appropriate stage, and I put 20 in the message sheet to say that it was Mr McBurney's 21 intention to interview these two witnesses again. 22 That's all I can say about it, sir. 23 Q. I suggest to you this strategy is a fiction. 24 A. Well, sir, it's in writing there. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGrory, you said a few minutes ago that 142 1 Mr McBurney knew that Michael McKee was in Cork. Can 2 you give us the reference in his interview to that, 3 please? 4 MR McGRORY: Can I undertake to do that, sir? 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 6 MR McGRORY: If I am wrong about it, I will let the Inquiry 7 know. 8 THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. Thank you. 9 MR McCOMB: Thank you, sir. I will be about ten to 10 fifteen minutes, sir. 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 12 MR McCOMB: Is it convenient for me to continue at this 13 stage? 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 15 Questions from MR McCOMB 16 MR McCOMB: Mr Irwin, my name is McComb. I represent 17 a number of people who were charged with the murder, 18 those apart from Mr Hobson and some others. I just want 19 to ask you a few questions. 20 I make it clear at the outset that we do not in any 21 way challenge the fact that you and your colleagues 22 worked diligently on this inquiry and this investigation 23 and did your very best. Certainly that appears to be 24 what you were at. I am sure you would agree with that. 25 A. I would, sir, yes. 143 1 Q. Now, were you hampered in a number of ways? First of 2 all, that there was a silence from really both 3 communities? 4 A. That is correct, sir, yes. 5 Q. You have referred to that in your statements and I don't 6 intend to go over that. 7 There were also items, snippets of information which 8 came in I think quite early on from various sources, 9 some of varying value when one looked into them? 10 A. That would be correct, sir, yes. 11 Q. I don't propose to go through all of them, but could we 12 have [02185] flagged up, please? Really, I am just 13 taking this as perhaps an example. 14 Would you care to look at -- that's message 12 -- is 15 that right -- M12? 16 A. Yes, sir. 17 Q. It seems to be dated 9th May 1997, 12.45. Would that 18 have been brought to your attention? Would you have had 19 a look at that? I will maybe just read it out. It 20 says: 21 "From a sister of deceased Hamill. States that 22 a female friend of hers whose boyfriend has already made 23 a statement to the police told her that a male with 24 a ponytail was the ringleader in the assault on 25 Robert Hamill. 144 1 "Sister is ..." 2 Then it gives her name. 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. That is one of the sisters, as we know. 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Can you assist the Inquiry at all first of all with what 7 enquiries, if any, were made to follow that up or what 8 assistance might have been given from Ryanne. 9 A. That probably was one of the enquiries we had to make 10 with the solicitor, sir, regarding that individual. Can 11 I see the action underneath that, sir? 12 Q. Please do. Yes, indeed. 13 A. There is no action note on it. 14 Q. On some we see, "No further action" and things like 15 that. Is that a blank there just? 16 A. I do see that, yes, sir. 17 Q. Was that perhaps because it was left in abeyance for a 18 while and then it may have died a death -- 19 A. It may have, sir. 20 Q. -- because of non-cooperation? 21 A. That's correct, sir. That may have been one of the 22 areas that -- I can't honestly give a reason for that, 23 sir, at all. 24 Q. That may be no fault of yours. Just in relation to even 25 the quality of that information as it came to you as you 145 1 were trying to sort out at this early stage and get 2 a picture of things -- 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. -- was there anybody with a ponytail who appeared on 5 your radar, as it were, when you were investigating 6 this? 7 A. Had Marc Hobson a ponytail, sir? I am thinking off the 8 top of my head here. I know that would have been one of 9 the Witnesses D, E or F that we are probably talking 10 about there. 11 Q. Yes. 12 A. I wonder, was Marc Hobson -- the description of 13 Marc Hobson, did he -- he may have had a ponytail, sir. 14 Q. I don't know. In any event, whoever it was? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. That clearly was from somebody, we assume, from the 17 Nationalist community? 18 A. It would have been E, F or Maureen McCoy, sir. 19 Q. Well, it says: 20 "... whose boyfriend has already made a statement to 21 the police ..." 22 A. That's right. 23 Q. This is was what was exercising me. I wonder if you can 24 help us at all about -- 25 A. That would either be D -- D, probably it is. I would 146 1 only be suggesting that, sir. Eliminating the 2 individuals that were there that night, it was either D 3 or the girlfriend. It could have been Maureen McCoy, 4 sir. 5 Q. Again, just in relation to the quality of the 6 information you were getting, even from those who might 7 have been willing to help, I think in your statement to 8 the Inquiry you said that there was difficulty even with 9 the conflicting accounts? 10 A. That's correct. 11 Q. Even amongst police people who were there as well as 12 civilians? 13 A. That's correct. 14 Q. Indeed, that's understandable. Is that because in 15 a situation like this each person has a very limited 16 scope really to see what's going on? 17 A. That's right, sir. People are frightened and scared, 18 and sequences of events, even though they believe what 19 happened in the sequence is not correct, sir, and it 20 happens regularly, particularly where there is a public 21 order situation like that. Terrifying for everybody 22 involved. 23 Q. Absolutely. Indeed, we heard just the words of the late 24 Mr McBurney there the other afternoon, where he said he 25 spent quite a while stepping back from all the 147 1 paperwork. He said he would lie on his bed and try to 2 figure out what had happened that night and try to get 3 a picture in his own mind. 4 A. Yes, sir. 5 Q. I am sure you yourself tried to sit back and figure out 6 what had happened? 7 A. I think, sir, in fact, we done a document out, 8 a sequence of events -- 9 Q. Yes, indeed, you did a sequence of events. 10 A. -- to try to establish what happened, and the movements 11 of individuals at the incident. 12 Q. That was a sequence of events. Was that actually drawn 13 up by yourself? 14 A. D9. Yes, I think it was. Sorry, which page number is it? 15 Q. Is starts off in the 17000s, I think, 17022, and goes on 16 for quite a -- and that sets out all the different 17 stages during that night. 18 A. I was trying to put some sort of system into place, sir, 19 of what happened. 20 Q. Indeed. I will not take through it now. It will be 21 a matter for observation later on. That was a very 22 thorough sequence of events, trying to get to grips with 23 what had happened? 24 A. That's correct, sir. 25 Q. I was not sure. When was that sequence of events 148 1 prepared? 2 A. I am not sure, sir. Is it document 9? So it must have 3 been into that -- not into the investigation that long, 4 sir. 5 Q. Yes, indeed. Did you ever have a picture in your own 6 mind of what might have happened in terms of time? We 7 have so many conflicting accounts, but just very briefly 8 when one hears, as I say, that the Hamill group, if I 9 may put it that way, once they had got on to the 10 junction, they had come out of Thomas Street, things 11 happened very, very quickly? 12 A. Yes, sir, yes. 13 Q. That within, it must seem, a very short time, the two 14 males were down on the ground? 15 A. It seemed to be -- my impression was that there was 16 a spontaneous assault or incident and then it progressed 17 for a period, sir, but it was very hard to really put 18 any sort of time limit on it. 19 Q. I understand that, but would it be -- is this consistent 20 with your understanding of it as best one can, that the 21 serious damage was done at a very early stage? 22 A. Yes. That would be one potential. There was potential 23 for that. 24 On saying that, if a person is lying on the ground 25 and has been knocked unconscious and somebody runs over, 149 1 and I suggest, like Stacey Bridgett, who was at the 2 police Land Rover, and had four police officers as 3 an alibi when the incident occurred, he could then have 4 ran over and put the boot in and inflicted serious 5 damage at that particular time. So putting times on it, 6 sir, is very difficult in the circumstances. 7 Q. Indeed, but I am sure again you thought -- this is 8 ultimately a matter for the Inquiry. It does appear 9 that the two women were with their male relations at 10 an early stage. They made their way over to them and 11 they would be quite close to them. 12 A. That's correct, sir. 13 Q. It appears also, that, once they were with them, the 14 kicking had stopped. There was still an awful lot of 15 melee going on and people running in and out when the 16 police were there, trying to get -- charging at them. 17 A. It seemed to be a serious situation, sir. Certainly 18 those female witnesses must have been terribly, terribly 19 frightened being subjected to that round them, sir. 20 Q. There is no doubt about that, but just doing the best 21 one can to form a picture -- and again, one may not be 22 able to -- would you agree that it is at least 23 a reasonable scenario that the attack happened quickly, 24 that the womenfolk were with their men and that, after 25 that, there may well have been -- and there was -- a lot 150 1 of fighting going on peripherally and that numbers of 2 people were charging in and out, but by that stage they 3 were no longer actually kicking? 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McComb, you are asking these questions of 5 someone who was not himself a witness. 6 MR McCOMB: I understand that, yes. 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Are you not really asking him to make 8 findings of fact which it is our responsibility to make 9 on our view of the evidence? 10 MR McCOMB: I tried to preface it, and I may have wandered 11 away from my preface, by saying it is a matter for 12 yourselves, sir. 13 THE CHAIRMAN: I think you are trespassing on our province 14 or -- 15 MR McCOMB: I will just say, perhaps in self defence, that 16 I was wondering whether having heard what Mr McBurney 17 had said, if he was trying to form a picture or his 18 colleague himself had ever arrived at a picture, but 19 I will move on. 20 May I ask you just about a thing which I am sure you 21 have addressed your mind to, and that is what we might 22 call the leakage of information to Mr Atkinson? It is 23 in the context of Tracey Clarke's statement, which I am 24 sure you are familiar with. 25 A. Yes. Uh-huh. 151 1 Q. Indeed. She had said when she made her statement at the 2 late 9th or early 10th May that Allister Hanvey had told 3 her that Mr Atkinson was being kept up-to-date -- was 4 keeping him up-to-date with information -- 5 A. Yes, that's correct. 6 Q. -- about the progress of the police information. 7 Now, try to break that down a tiny bit. 8 Robert Atkinson was no part of the police investigation? 9 A. Absolutely not, sir, no. 10 Q. Did that concern you, how this -- if it is true -- could 11 have come about? 12 A. It obviously did, sir. I have to say, on saying that, 13 I had full trust in my team in the CID in Portadown, 14 sir, full trust in them, and I don't believe any of them 15 would ever have even went down that road, sir, to be 16 honest with you. 17 Q. You certainly can't think of any basis on which that 18 could have happened? 19 A. No, sir. It is like any incident, sir. There would be 20 talk around the police station -- 21 Q. Oh, yes. 22 A. -- of the investigation. If an investigation is 23 running, there would be talk around the police station. 24 It would be chit-chat, sir, and so I don't know in what 25 terms that was being kept up-to-date, sir. 152 1 Q. But nothing of any use to somebody -- 2 A. No, sir. 3 Q. -- who might be a potential suspect on a murder charge? 4 A. Oh, definitely not, sir. We were going back to 5 individuals and asking them on evidence and things like 6 that, sir, so, you know, certain amounts of information 7 has to go out, because you are making the enquiries. 8 Q. Yes. Just a matter which arose this morning in relation 9 to Stacey Bridgett, just to come back to him. It was 10 suggested that perhaps -- I think there were two 11 officers who saw him -- that they should have been 12 afforded the opportunity either to confront him or 13 whatever. I think your answer to that was that, in 14 fact, that was in relation to an allegation which may 15 have been made to them at the time by one of the ladies? 16 A. That is correct, sir, yes. 17 Q. Did you then pursue that yourself -- 18 A. That's correct. 19 Q. -- and check that out? 20 A. That is correct, sir. 21 Q. Was she firm in saying that that was not what she had 22 ever said? 23 A. That's right. She said she didn't mention that, sir. 24 Q. Did you accept that and then just move on? 25 A. Well, I think, sir, that was probably one of the other 153 1 areas that you would have wanted to talk to 2 Rosemary Nelson about, sir. 3 Q. But again, you never really had an opportunity to do 4 that? 5 A. No, sir. 6 Q. May I just ask you briefly about -- I think it is still 7 redacted -- is it G and Mr McCaw? Did you know either 8 of those reservists? 9 A. No, I don't believe so. I think the first time I met 10 Mr McCaw was that first day, sir, and then -- when he 11 had given the intelligence or information regarding 12 Andrea McKee, and then he came in the second day. 13 I didn't know [G] at all, sir, no. 14 Q. You got the information in relation to the Tae Kwon Do 15 club and Andrea McKee and so on in the morning, I think. 16 Is that right? 17 A. It possibly could have been, sir, yes. 18 Q. Then I think you went out -- 19 A. What happened is DC McAteer went out to interview 20 Tracey Clarke, and she gave an account that she did not 21 see anything. 22 Q. That's quite right. 23 A. Then Mr McAteer came back in and it was a case of, 24 "Let's go and see the individual that has given this 25 information". 154 1 Q. I will come to that. Just before you did that, there 2 was -- again they came back with information -- some 3 information about a Timothy Jameson? 4 A. That is correct, sir, yes. 5 Q. Now, both those names had appeared I think when one 6 looks at your statement -- I don't intend to go through 7 it -- there was reference to somebody called Tracey 8 I think on 29th April. Can you comment on that at all? 9 A. Yes. I think there is a number of Traceys. Was there 10 a Tracy McAlpine? 11 Q. There was a Tracy McAlpine. Yes. 12 The question is whether, in fact, she was actually 13 in the town that night at all. There is reference also 14 to Timothy Jameson, I think, if one goes to your 15 statement -- sorry to hesitate -- again on the 29th. 16 Were there a whole lot of names which had come into your 17 possession just as -- 18 A. What happened, sir, was, as I said, I was running the 19 actual management and I was going through the statements 20 and then going through the questionnaires that were 21 being submitted and other individuals' names were being 22 raised in those conversations, then I was raising 23 actions to go and interview those people. So it was 24 a case of managing the actions and trying to see as many 25 witnesses as we could, as quickly as we possibly could, 155 1 sir. 2 Q. May we just -- I don't know if you can assist us. 3 [81436], please. It is the fourth entry down: 4 "Action 25. 29.04.97." 5 A. Yes, sir. 6 Q. There is a reference to: 7 "P51", I don't want you to say who he is, "and 8 Jameson re movements Portadown town centre." 9 That is logged, of course -- isn't that right -- and 10 that was negative? 11 A. That's correct, sir. 12 Q. Can you say how that name came on to your list? 13 A. It would have been one of the documents that was -- 14 rather, it was a statement or a questionnaire, but it 15 was one of those documents that was being put back into 16 the system. 17 In fact, that must have been put in on the 28th, 18 27th/28th, because it was the 28th night that I started 19 to go through all the documents, sir, and all the 20 statements. So that name must have been there at that 21 particular time 22 Q. Then just over the page, the next page, at the bottom, 23 four up from the bottom: 24 "A55. 30.04.97." 25 Would that be the 29th or 30th: 156 1 "ID unknown Tracey re presence in town." 2 We don't know who that is. 3 A. If you looked at the action, if you looked at action 55, 4 sir, it might say at the top of the action where is that 5 from. 6 Q. Those actions don't, of course, show the source of -- 7 A. It doesn't, does it not? 8 Q. You can't, I am sure, assist us now with how those names 9 came into being actioned, as it were? 10 A. As such, sir, I was raising those actions as a priority. 11 What I was doing was, as I was saying, I was looking at 12 the statements from the police officers that had made 13 statements at the scene and that. So, as I was coming 14 across a name, I was raising an action, ID, take 15 statement from these individuals. 16 Q. Just in relation to Timothy Jameson then, when Mr McCaw 17 and G came in to give some information about that, are 18 you absolutely certain that there was no mention to you 19 of the fact that he had taken a kick at one or put in 20 the boot? 21 A. I am absolutely certain, sir. If that had been 22 mentioned, sir, I am in no doubt, if I had not said, 23 "Arrest Timothy Jameson", Mr McBurney and the Chief 24 Inspector would have been down there to arrest 25 Timothy Jameson. 157 1 My recollection of the incident, and I have to say, 2 sir, it is similar to the entry of Detective Sergeant -- 3 when he spoke to G some years later, and that initial 4 notebook entry, G said that the individual had witnessed 5 the incident. That was the same information that I had 6 got. 7 Q. He had been a witness but not a participant or 8 a potential suspect? 9 A. A witness to the incident, yes. 10 Q. Clearly, of course, did you ever have a chance to 11 discuss that with Mr McBurney in the intervening period? 12 A. No, sir, no, no. 13 Q. Timothy Jameson was never, so far as we have heard -- 14 never had any subsequent conversation with G or P20 in 15 relation to this incident. I think that was the 16 evidence of G. 17 A. Right-o. 18 Q. As far as you were concerned, he was not brought into 19 the station ever again, was he -- 20 A. After he made -- 21 Q. -- after he made the statement? 22 A. No, sir, no. 23 Q. Or interviewed anywhere else -- 24 A. No, sir, no. 25 Q. -- certainly to your knowledge? 158 1 A. No, not to my knowledge. 2 Q. Albeit in 2002 he was arrested, but I think that was 3 after your involvement had ceased in Portadown? 4 A. I think so, yes. 5 MR McCOMB: Thank you very much. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Now, can I just see how much more 7 cross-examination there is of the witness? I suspect we 8 are not going to be able to finish him today. 9 MS DINSMORE: My estimation -- and I am always loathe to do 10 this -- would be in the region of fifteen minutes, but, 11 of course, it can be a moveable feast, Mr Chairman. 12 MR EMMERSON: Less than ten, sir. 13 MR O'CONNOR: Mr Chairman, I have only five minutes at the 14 very most. I do know that the witness is keen to get 15 finished today. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Then there is only re-examination. We can't 17 sit after 4.45 pm in any event. So really I think the 18 best thing is to finish now. What do we have tomorrow, 19 Mr Underwood? 20 MR UNDERWOOD: We have Christine Smith, Sir Ronnie, who has 21 flown from Saudi Arabia for the purpose, and 22 Mr Mahaffey. So a fairly full day. 23 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we had better sit then at 10 o'clock 24 tomorrow morning. 25 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, Mr Irwin? 159 1 A. Thank you, sir. 2 (4.30 pm) 3 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 tomorrow morning) 4 5 --ooOoo-- 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 160 1 I N D E X 2 3 MR PHILIP MICHAEL IRWIN (sworn) .................. 1 4 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD ............... 1 Questions from MR WOLFE ................... 86 5 Questions from MR ADAIR ................... 88 Questions from MR McGRORY ................. 108 6 Questions from MR McCOMB .................. 143 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 161