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PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF

ROBERT HAMILL

 

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Held at:

Interpoint

20-24 York Street

Belfast

 

on Monday, 21st September 2009

commencing at 2.00 pm

 

Day 67

 

 

 

 1 Monday, 21st September 2009

2 (2.00 pm)

3 (Proceedings delayed)

4 (2.40 pm)

5 MR ANTHONY JAMES LANGDON (sworn)

6 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD

7 MR UNDERWOOD: Good afternoon, Mr Langdon. Thank you very

8 much for coming. I know it is something of a surprise

9 to be involved in our Inquiry. May I ask your full

10 names, please?

11 A. Anthony James Langdon.

12 Q. We have a statement from you now, which I hope will

13 appear on the screen at [82063]. Would you mind keeping

14 your eyes on that while we scroll through the five

15 pages quite briefly?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Is that your witness statement?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Are the contents true?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Very little to ask in addition to that on my part, but

22 it may well be, once I have done, others may have

23 supplemental questions.

24 May I ask you to look at page [39672]? This is

25 a memorandum. I know you have seen it recently, but it

1
 1 is not yours. I want to ask you to look at paragraph 8,

2 if you would. What it says is:

3 "The Hamill family are now aware, following

4 consultations between Mr Leckey and Mr McGrory",

5 Mr Leckey was the coroner, Mr McGrory the solicitor then

6 for the Hamill family, "of the information contained in

7 the two crucial witness statements that were withdrawn

8 in view of the individuals' concerns for their personal

9 safety. One of the statements alleges that an officer

10 present at the time of the attack subsequently made

11 contact with one of the assailants following the attack.

12 It is alleged that the officer phoned the individual and

13 advised him how to go about destroying forensic evidence

14 and thus avoid detection. There is no evidence in the

15 statements to suggest that the police may have colluded

16 in some way or 'set up' Mr Hamill for the attack. The

17 behaviour of the officers in the vicinity at the time of

18 the attack was investigated under the supervision of the

19 ICPC, and, on 30th September 1999, the DPP directed 'no

20 prosecution'."

21 Now that, we know, is dated 15th June 2000, so

22 appears to be recording that the revelation to the

23 Hamill family there was of the information contained in

24 the two statements and, in particular, what we are

25 calling the tip-off made by the police officer to one of

2
 1 the individuals. Do you see?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. If we now look at your memorandum, if we start it at

4 page [39692], you will see this is yours of

5 24th July 2000.

6 If we look over the page, [39693], paragraph 7, you

7 are talking here of a discussion you had with the chief

8 constable, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, on 21st July 2000. You

9 said here:

10 "I asked what had precipitated the new criminal

11 investigation of the chief constable said that when the

12 coroner had given 'the gem' to Robert Hamill's family

13 solicitors he himself had squad 'pushed and pushed', and

14 the re-interview of Mrs McKee followed directly from

15 that. ('The gem' is presumably the information that

16 statements identifying the murderers had been

17 withdrawn)."

18 Can I push your memory to the furthest extent here

19 and see if you can help us with whether the thing that

20 had precipitated the change in stance here was the

21 revelation to the family that the statements had been

22 withdrawn, or, on the other hand, the revelation of what

23 was in the statements and in particular this allegation

24 about a police officer?

25 A. I really do find it very difficult to remember details

3
 1 with this precision. My overall recollection is that

2 the incident that had precipitated the activity that was

3 taking place in June, including my own appointment to

4 this report that I did, the precipitating incident was

5 the collapse of the inquest and I have got a pretty

6 solid recollection that that was the starting point.

7 As to what precisely influenced the police or the

8 department to take any action, I really can't remember,

9 if, indeed, I ever knew.

10 Q. Very well.

11 A. As for the extract from my own note to the Northern

12 Ireland Office that you've put on the screen, that was

13 the note that I made at the time and I have simply got

14 no reason to distrust it, but I can't really gloss it in

15 any more detail.

16 Q. Fine. If we look at paragraph 9 of your statement,

17 which we find at page [82065], you make a reference

18 there to a note that you submitted on 15th August 2000

19 to accompany your report. You say there:

20 "In paragraph 3 of the note I refer to speaking with

21 Mr McBurney and Mr Irwin. I recall that this meeting

22 lasted for about two or three hours, during which time

23 we spent a considerable amount of time discussing the

24 allegation against Reserve Constable Atkinson.

25 Mr McBurney explained to me that he had been waiting for

4
 1 the McKees to separate, giving him the opportunity to

2 expose the false alibi statement."

3 Again, on that point, your, as it were, overarching

4 recollection is that it was the collapse of the inquest

5 that precipitated the moves here. Can you help us at

6 all with any recollection about whether, the inquest

7 having collapsed, Mr McBurney sprang into action first

8 or whether it was the chief constable?

9 A. Well, during the course of the day I have been asking

10 myself that question and I can't really add much to what

11 I say in this statement. I can't remember discussing

12 the chief constable or his possible involvement in any

13 way. I have no recollection of that.

14 MR UNDERWOOD: Very well. I think I have pushed your memory

15 as far as I dare. Thank you for that. As I say, other

16 people may have some supplemental questions.

17 MR McGRORY: Sir, if I may, a few questions.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory.

19 Questions from MR McGRORY

20 MR McGRORY: I am the Mr McGrory referred to in the

21 document. I represent the family of Robert Hamill.

22 I have a very few brief questions for you, if you

23 don't mind.

24 We have been given some documents today that we have

25 just seen attached to your statement. If I could

5
 1 perhaps refer you to the first one, which is at [39511].

2 It purports to be from a Permanent Undersecretary. It

3 is copied to a number of people and it seems to be

4 addressed to you via somebody else. Do you see that?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What I would like to ask you about is, this document is

7 dated 23rd March 1999?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, the document would suggest that in the context of

10 the Patten Review after the Good Friday Agreement that

11 Mr Patten has raised some very serious concerns about

12 the Hamill case with the Northern Ireland Office and was

13 giving the Northern Ireland Office the opportunity to

14 tell him what they were doing about the case before he

15 reported. You appear to have been engaged, this

16 document would suggest, to address this issue as early

17 as 23rd March 1999.

18 Now, can you help us with that at all, please?

19 Because this is considerably earlier than you were

20 specifically engaged, in July of 2000.

21 A. Yes. In March 1999, the Northern Ireland Office

22 approached me and asked if I would be interested in

23 doing some work for them. I see from the note on the

24 screen that on 22nd March I went in and had a meeting

25 with the Permanent Secretary. He asked if I would be

6
 1 willing to prepare a report or reports in particularly

2 significant cases that had attracted the attention of

3 the Patten Review and I agreed to do that.

4 I first did a report on a completely different case

5 that's mentioned here and that was completed during the

6 summer of '99, I would think, and then I was approached

7 again in the following year to do similar work on the

8 Hamill case.

9 Q. Can I take it from what you have said then that there is

10 in existence a document from you concerning the Hamill

11 case which predates the one which you prepared in

12 July 2000?

13 A. No. The document that I mentioned just now as being the

14 previous document, that was on a totally different case,

15 not the Hamill case.

16 Q. It is just that this request to you asks you to address

17 the Hamill case. So are you saying you didn't do that,

18 or that --

19 A. I am sorry if I haven't been clear. The Northern

20 Ireland Office came to me and said that, "The

21 Patten Review has raised particular interest on

22 a number of cases", and these two cases are mentioned in

23 the heading of this note that you have put on the

24 screen, one of them being Hamill.

25 In 1999, I did a report for the Minister on one of

7
 1 those cases and, at that point, I did not look at the

2 Hamill case in any way at all, as I recall.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. In the following year, 2000, I was approached by the

5 department and asked if I would do the same sort of

6 review on the Hamill case.

7 Q. That's very helpful. Thank you. Can I just bring you

8 to your memorandum of 24th July? It is at [39692]. At

9 paragraph 3 you make a number of observations about the

10 mood of the chief constable:

11 "I generally found the chief constable in a pretty

12 defensive and critical mood."

13 He commented that Hamill's death could well have

14 been caused by his own family cradling his head in a way

15 that led to oxygen starvation."

16 I know you have little memory of this meeting with

17 the chief constable now, but we can presume, Mr Langdon,

18 you would not have noted these comments had they not

19 been made?

20 A. Well, I think I have just said that I have no reason to

21 distrust the notes that I made at the time and I don't

22 in this matter either. This actually is a point of

23 detail that I do have an independent recollection of.

24 I can recall these comments, yes.

25 Q. Thank you. Moving on then to paragraph 7:

8
 1 "I asked what had precipitated the new criminal

2 investigation. The chief constable said that when the

3 coroner had given 'the gem' to Robert Hamill's family

4 solicitors, he himself had 'pushed and pushed' and the

5 re-interview of Mrs McKee followed directly from that."

6 Now, the bit in brackets was brought to your

7 attention by Mr Underwood:

8 "('The gem' is presumably the information that

9 statements identifying the murderers had been

10 withdrawn.)"

11 Would it assist you to know that the Hamill family

12 had been well aware that eye-witness statements had been

13 withdrawn from the time the murder investigation -- some

14 of those accused of the murder had the charges

15 withdrawn.

16 So that wasn't news, but what was news to the Hamill

17 family was that, in fact, one of those eye-witnesses had

18 given the information about Reserve Constable Atkinson

19 and the tipping off of Allister Hanvey.

20 So in the light of that knowledge, would you agree

21 the "gem" being referred to is almost certainly the new

22 information to the Hamill family about the Atkinson

23 allegation?

24 A. What I wrote at the time is obviously what I thought was

25 correct.

9
 1 Q. Yes.

2 A. What you have just said seems very persuasive, but I am

3 not in a position to ...

4 Q. I will take that no further. In any event, it is your

5 recollection that the chief constable very clearly said

6 to you that it was he who had pushed to reinvigorate the

7 investigation?

8 A. I don't have a clear and precise recollection, as of

9 today, of him having used the words "pushed and pushed",

10 although, as I keep saying, I have no reason to doubt

11 what I wrote at the time. I do have a clear but general

12 memory that he was at pains to show himself to me as

13 being energetic to pursue the allegations against

14 Atkinson.

15 Q. Indeed, if we go to paragraph 13 of the document, which

16 is on [39694], by this time you have moved on to your

17 meeting with the ICPC --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- in your note. You say there:

20 "I asked when and how the current criminal

21 investigation had got underway and Mr [blank]", who

22 I can tell you is an individual within the ICPC; it is

23 blanked out, "gave virtually the same account that I had

24 earlier heard from the chief constable, ie that the

25 chief constable had himself pressed it when the coroner

10
 1 had decided to drop the inquest."

2 So that again, I would suggest to you, would confirm

3 what the chief constable had already said to you, which

4 was that it was at his instigation that this was

5 recommenced?

6 A. Well, I think all I can say is that that's what I wrote

7 at the time, and I am repeating myself, I am afraid.

8 I have no reason to suppose I wasn't accurate at the

9 time.

10 MR McGRORY: Of course not. Thank you.

11 Questions from MR McGUINNESS

12 MR McGUINNESS: Good afternoon. My name is McGuinness and

13 I represent Sir Ronnie Flanagan in these proceedings.

14 You seem to indicate, or you have indicated, in your

15 evidence that you had some experience of

16 Northern Ireland prior to coming over in June 2000 and

17 that experience appears to have been, if I am right,

18 from in and around March 1999 to I think you indicated

19 around the summer of 1999.

20 Do you recall during that period had you met

21 Sir Ronnie Flanagan?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do you recall how often you had met him?

24 A. Not very -- definitely once. I think possibly twice.

25 I doubt as much as three times.

11
 1 Q. Do you recall the circumstances of those meetings?

2 A. I wanted to discuss with him the case that I had been

3 asked to do a report on for the Northern Ireland

4 Secretary.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: That's the Robert Hamill case?

6 A. No.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Another case?

8 A. If I have understood the question correctly, this is the

9 case that I was working on in 1999, which was not the

10 Hamill case.

11 MR McGUINNESS: Prior to your meeting with

12 Sir Ronnie Flanagan, which occurred on 21st July 2000,

13 you had familiarised yourself with, I anticipate,

14 whatever documents had been provided to you by the

15 Northern Ireland Office --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- and you had been engaged by the Northern Ireland

18 Office. Can I take it that the first report that you

19 refer to in 1999 was a report again dealing with whether

20 a public Inquiry ought to be held or not?

21 A. Broadly speaking, that would be right.

22 Q. Had you had any previous experience in this particular

23 area or in advising in this capacity?

24 A. Well, I had plenty of experience in advising ministers,

25 because that had been my job, but I had never been asked

12
 1 to report on this particular kind of thing, no.

2 Q. Just prior to meeting Sir Ronnie and to the -- the

3 representatives of the ICPC, had you, for example, had

4 an opportunity to look at the documentation relating to

5 the police investigation?

6 A. I can't remember how much material the Northern Ireland

7 Office gave me before I went over to have these meetings

8 with Sir Ronnie Flanagan and the Chairman of the

9 Complaints Commission. I do know that documentation

10 that I had seen before I went over included the

11 transcript of the Hobson trial, because I see there's

12 a reference to that in one of the papers that I've been

13 sent.

14 Q. I think I can help you. [39691], if that's of

15 assistance.

16 A. Right. In general, the documentation that the Northern

17 Ireland Office had made available to me had a great many

18 gaps in the story it told and I was at a fairly early

19 stage of trying to assemble a coherent account of what

20 the case was about and what the main issues were.

21 Q. In fact, what you were doing is you had to assemble

22 really, did you, from first principles what the case was

23 about, because I think, if it is of assistance, at

24 [39694], paragraphs 15 and 16, if they might be

25 highlighted, you say:

13
 1 "Before I can do that, though, I shall need to

2 construct an account of the Hamill case as a basis for

3 consultation. I shall try to do this within a week or

4 so."

5 So at that stage, you had not even formulated

6 an account of what had gone on. Is that correct, or

7 have I misread that?

8 A. No, I think that's right. I was able to do a better

9 note after I had seen the chief constable and the

10 Complaints Commission than I would have been able to do

11 beforehand.

12 Q. So, in fact, whenever you met Sir Ronnie, you were

13 interested not only in his role in a strategic sense as

14 chief constable, but in the minutiae of what he

15 understood had gone on that day or gone on that evening?

16 A. Well, my job for the Northern Ireland Office was to

17 prepare a general account of what had happened and what

18 the main outstanding issues were and what the points of

19 controversy were. It was directly to the Secretary of

20 State and it was in the nature of being an expanded full

21 briefing note to enable the Secretary of State to get

22 hold of the case, and there hadn't been any document of

23 that sort in existence before.

24 Against that background, I think I would rather

25 question whether I was expected to get into minutiae.

14
 1 I don't think I was expected to get into minutiae.

2 Q. Certainly one document I know you had read before

3 speaking to Sir Ronnie, or perhaps you can confirm you

4 did read it, was the document Mr Underwood referred you

5 to and that's a document which is numbered [39623].

6 That's a memo from [Blank]. That refers to

7 a meeting you had had with the chief constable on

8 9th June.

9 Do you recall having sight of that document prior to

10 meeting Sir Ronnie?

11 A. My guess is that I might well have seen it, but I can't

12 recall now, I'm afraid.

13 Q. Well, perhaps -- I want to ask you specifically, do you

14 recall paragraph 11, which is found at [39627]?

15 I will allow you the opportunity to read that first

16 A. Yes. When I say "yes", I mean, I can see it.

17 Q. Do you recall reading that now, having refreshed your

18 memory?

19 A. Do I recall reading it before I went to see --

20 Q. Prior to seeing Sir Ronnie?

21 A. Well, no, I think I said in my previous answer that my

22 guess would be that I probably had seen that document,

23 but I can't recall that now.

24 Q. Of course, in that document it had been alerted to you

25 that someone else's opinion was that Sir Ronnie was

15
 1 being defensive on this aspect. That would be right,

2 wouldn't it?

3 A. Well, that certainly seems to be what this paragraph is

4 saying, yes.

5 Q. It seems to be that the height of the defensiveness is

6 contained within what it is alleged Sir Ronnie said to

7 [Blank] and that's that:

8 "... the case was one of murder but he thought that

9 there was something odd about the medical care. Hamill

10 had been well on the way to recovery, sitting up in bed

11 talking to his friends and family and soon to be

12 discharged. The next day he was dead. Ronnie then

13 caught himself on and said that, of course, there could

14 be no doubt that Hamill had died as a result of injuries

15 sustained during the assault and therefore it was

16 murder."

17 Did you consider that the medical care of Mr Hamill

18 was relevant to the criminal investigation?

19 A. Do I consider the medical care was ...?

20 Q. It is a proper line of investigation, is it, can

21 I suggest to you, for an investigating officer to

22 ascertain what medical care was provided?

23 A. Well, I mean, it obviously might be in some

24 circumstances, but -- I am very sorry. I am not quite

25 sure what point you are getting at.

16
 1 Q. Perhaps I can put it this way to you. On the face of

2 it, the suggestion that Mr Hamill had been recovering,

3 and then, unfortunately, had subsequently died, that

4 suggestion of itself isn't defensive, is it, do you say?

5 A. Well --

6 Q. I accept this is not your note, but on the basis you may

7 have read that note.

8 A. Would I -- this is an extract from a note by the

9 Permanent Secretary saying that he thought the strength

10 of Ronnie's defensive feelings were illustrated by what

11 was said about the -- what he then went on to report

12 about the adequacy of the medical care.

13 Are you asking whether I agree whether --

14 Q. Whether you agree that the fact that Sir Ronnie thought

15 there was something odd about the medical care was in

16 itself defensive, or, in the face of that, is

17 "defensive" a strange adjective to describe that

18 statement?

19 A. Well, no. I would rather agree with the

20 Permanent Secretary's use of the word "defensive"

21 myself. I think the way I would construe it would be

22 that, looking at the circumstances of the Hamill case,

23 the police felt that in the early stages at least it

24 hadn't been a murder case. They just regarded it as

25 perhaps an almost routine riot in Portadown, which seems

17
 1 a place where these things happened, and then, of

2 course, it had become much more severe, a much more

3 important and tragic case, and the police were in

4 a defensive mode.

5 This business about the adequacy of medical care

6 should be seen in that context. That's how I would

7 construe it.

8 Q. Just in that context, is the adequacy of medical care

9 not likely to be of concern to the police? For example,

10 if there is to be a murder trial, then that's

11 a potential defence which is open to a defendant to say,

12 "Well, the medical care intervened in this case. This

13 is a new act", and that might reduce the charge from one

14 of murder. So is it not entirely pertinent to be

15 concerned about that?

16 A. I honestly want to be as helpful as I can, but I think

17 I'm getting a very long way from anything that I can

18 give evidence about from my own knowledge.

19 Q. Well, perhaps then I will go directly --

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, the chief constable had said to the

21 Permanent Secretary, if the Permanent Secretary is

22 right, he had no doubt that it was a murder, because

23 Robert Hamill had died as a result of the injuries

24 sustained.

25 I think the evidence we have heard is that he never

18
 1 recovered consciousness. Am I right, Mr Underwood?

2 MR UNDERWOOD: You are, sir.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

4 MR McGUINNESS: As regards the meeting on 12th July (sic)

5 itself, I think you attended on your own with Sir Ronnie

6 and --

7 A. Sorry to interrupt. On the 21st?

8 Q. I apologise. The meeting on the 21st, you attended on

9 your own with Sir Ronnie. Is that correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. He didn't have any aides with him, for example?

12 A. I think I note we were by ourselves, don't I?

13 Q. You have indicated both in your statement and in your

14 evidence to the Inquiry that the note that is found at

15 [39692], that that was made immediately before the

16 discussion.

17 A. Yes. My note is dated the 24th, but I would have done

18 a note of a meeting as quickly as possible afterwards

19 I'm sure.

20 Q. Well, first of all, throughout the meeting, would you

21 have made any contemporaneous notes as you were

22 discussing matters with Sir Ronnie?

23 A. I would probably have jotted a very brief aide-memoire

24 down, I imagine, but I can't remember distinctly.

25 Q. Had you jotted an aide memoire, would it be likely that

19
 1 that was attached to the NIO file or to any of this

2 documentation?

3 A. No, I wouldn't have thought so.

4 Q. Have you retained any of those notes or would it be your

5 practice to dispose of those notes?

6 A. No, I don't have any material on the case at all.

7 Q. Do you recall exactly when -- you have indicated that

8 the meeting was on the 21st. Unfortunately, I don't

9 have access to the LiveNote, but I think you have

10 indicated that you would have undertaken this note as

11 quickly as possible thereafter. It is dated 24th. Is

12 it likely that this note was dictated by you, or typed

13 or written on your behalf on 24th July?

14 A. Well, I would have done it as quickly as I reasonably

15 could, because I know from long experience that it's

16 always best to note meetings very quickly.

17 I've got a feeling there is a reference in the

18 papers somewhere to the 21st being a Friday.

19 Q. Yes. I think that's right.

20 A. So the 24th would be the Monday, which would be the

21 first time that it could have been typed. I probably

22 did it at home, I expect.

23 Q. It is likely you did it at home on the Monday?

24 A. No, on the Saturday.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: And have it typed up at the office on the

20
 1 Monday?

2 A. I might have typed it at home.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: I see. Hard to remember now?

4 A. I am doing my best to remember. That seems to me to be

5 what I would probably have done. I certainly would have

6 done it as quickly as I could.

7 MR McGUINNESS: Had you done it at home and typed it up at

8 home, is it likely you would have dated it the Monday or

9 dated it on the day on which you actually formed the

10 note?

11 A. No, the day that it went into the office system, which

12 would have been the Monday.

13 Q. I am right to say that the comments that you attribute

14 to Sir Ronnie, some you have put in parentheses or

15 inverted commas and others you have not.

16 This doesn't represent a verbatim note obviously of

17 the conversation you had with Sir Ronnie?

18 A. No.

19 Q. There were a number of other matters that would have

20 been discussed at the time?

21 A. A number of other matters that aren't ...

22 Q. Perhaps it is better that -- I have asked you if this

23 was not a verbatim note. If, for example, I can take

24 you to paragraph 3, if that could be highlighted.

25 A. Yes. I have got it in front of me.

21
 1 Q. Do you have a particular memory of the comments that you

2 ascribe to Sir Ronnie in paragraph 3 or are you relying

3 on the note that appears now some nine years later?

4 A. In the inset one about the cradling of Robert Hamill's

5 head, that I do have a clear recollection of the chief

6 constable saying. I have a memory separate from looking

7 at my notes. I can recall that now.

8 Q. Is that the only one of the four --

9 A. Well, I was just going to go on, if I might.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Go on.

11 A. And I think the -- the second one, more detailed

12 commentary on the results of the alleged oxygen

13 starvation, I don't remember that quite as clearly as

14 the cradling. I remember the cradling assertion partly

15 because I can remember the chief constable making

16 a cradling gesture as he was speaking, so it lodged in

17 my mind. The second sub-paragraph, it obviously is

18 a perfectly cogent extension of the first but I don't

19 remember that precise point.

20 The third sub-paragraph, I do remember the general

21 drift of the chief constable's conversation with me

22 saying that he thought that his force were being --

23 I think "unfairly pilloried" is the phrase I have seen

24 just now. I remember that general point. I don't

25 remember him specifically mentioning Robert Hamill's

22
 1 sister.

2 On the last point, I don't remember that as of now

3 either, but I have no reason to doubt my own note

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McGuinness, if this becomes relevant to

5 what we have to consider, it surely will be important to

6 ask ourselves whether Mr Langdon made an accurate note

7 rather than how much of it he can now remember a good

8 many years later.

9 MR McGUINNESS: Yes, I accept that, sir. Just at this stage

10 I am asking whether he actually recalls any of this

11 conversation or whether his recollection is based on the

12 note itself.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, it hardly matters, does it? If we

14 consider that he did his best at the time to make

15 an accurate note, how much he remembers now doesn't

16 matter so very much. This is one of the purposes of

17 making a note.

18 MR McGUINNESS: Absolutely, sir. It may become relevant

19 when I ask my next question.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: I will wait and see.

21 MR McGUINNESS: Do you recall at this stage whenever you

22 were speaking to the chief constable that there was

23 a general discussion about what had been said at the

24 time that was, for example -- that was that -- sorry --

25 that there was a general perception at the time or that

23
 1 there was some allegation that Mr Hamill's injuries

2 might have been caused by the manner in which he was

3 dealt with at the scene. For example, it could have

4 been by police officers, by first aiders, by other

5 people at the scene cradling his head.

6 Was that not the context in which this comment was

7 made?

8 A. No, I can't remember anything of that sort.

9 Q. Well, do you recall that this was an issue at the time?

10 A. Well, you drew my attention a few minutes ago to

11 an extract from the Permanent Secretary's earlier note

12 of his talk with Sir Ronnie when the question of medical

13 care came up, and I said in reply to your question then

14 that I might have seen that, but I can't recall it.

15 I certainly can't think of anything else in this general

16 area of medical treatment or medical condition that

17 would have been in my head at all.

18 Well, I don't want to speculate about the past, but

19 I think that the reason why I remember this particular

20 comment about the cradling of the head so distinctly is

21 that it was probably rather a surprise to me. I had

22 never heard anything about it before, but, as I say,

23 I am speculating that might be the reason why

24 I remember.

25 Q. Would you necessarily have noted, if Sir Ronnie and you

24
 1 had been discussing that there may have been

2 a difficulty caused by oxygen starvation by virtue of

3 the way the head was cradled, if he had mentioned, for

4 example, that there were others at the scene who may

5 have cradled the head as well? Would you have noted

6 that as well? Would there have been any necessity to

7 note that?

8 A. All I can say is I noted at the time everything

9 I thought was worth noting.

10 Q. I am obliged to formally suggest to you that

11 Sir Ronnie's evidence is that he, in fact, didn't make

12 that comment, but that the comment may have been made as

13 part of a more general discussion as to oxygen

14 starvation and that other people may have been involved.

15 A. Well, my recollection is as I have stated it.

16 Q. Again, I think as regards the second bullet point, if

17 I can call it that, that's not an unreasonable comment

18 for a police officer to make, is it, that it may well be

19 that there was another act which was directly

20 responsible for the death and that it may not have been

21 possible to sustain a charge of murder if the issue had

22 been tested at trial?

23 A. You are asking whether I think that's a reasonable

24 comment?

25 Q. Yes. That didn't strike you as unreasonable, did it?

25
 1 A. Well, it struck me as worth noting. This was a progress

2 report that I sent into the Northern Ireland Office to

3 tell the Permanent Secretary how I was getting on and

4 what had been the significant things that had happened

5 since I had started and I thought that these were all

6 worth mentioning to him.

7 Q. Now, am I right to say that these comments are

8 paraphrasing what Sir Ronnie has said? They are not in

9 inverted commas and, for example --

10 A. No. Absolutely.

11 Q. I know I am jumping back, but as regards the first

12 comment about the family cradling his head, did that

13 strike you as surprising? Did you challenge Sir Ronnie

14 and say, "That allegation hasn't been made before.

15 I haven't seen that allegation"?

16 A. No, I didn't see my job as challenging him at all.

17 Q. Again, I have to suggest to you that Sir Ronnie Flanagan

18 indicates that his view of Diane Hamill is and always

19 has been that she has been motivated by her desire to

20 see justice -- I am paraphrasing -- for her brother and

21 that he didn't -- he certainly didn't and wouldn't have

22 indicated to you that she had her own agenda to

23 discredit the RUC?

24 A. Well, I have just told you that I don't have a personal

25 recollection of the mention of Diane Hamill now, but

26
 1 this was the note that I wrote at the time and I had no

2 reason to suppose I was doing an inaccurate note.

3 Q. Would you regard Sir Ronnie as a forthright, robust

4 individual? Did you form an opinion of him, having met

5 him?

6 A. Forthright, yes, yes.

7 Q. Am I right in saying that your use of the word

8 "defensive" I think is really of him being defensive of

9 his organisation? Would that be right? He was not

10 personally defensive. He was defensive generally of the

11 organisation?

12 A. Yes, and looking at this note I wrote, this paragraph 3,

13 I am rather looking at it as though it was written by

14 somebody else actually. Looking at it now, I think that

15 the first two subparagraphs could be called defensive

16 and the last two critical. I think that's probably why

17 I drafted it in that way.

18 Q. But I am right to say that his general -- or your

19 impression of him was he was saying his force was being

20 unfairly pilloried? That was your general view of what

21 he was saying?

22 A. Yes. I have got a clear but generalised memory that he

23 felt that his -- sorry. If I could just start again.

24 Insofar as the handling of the riot itself was

25 concerned, his force had done its best, as it turned out

27
 1 an inadequate best, but its best in a difficult and

2 dangerous situation.

3 I do remember distinctly that he mentioned

4 Constable Neill. It might have been the first time

5 I had heard that name and that might be why I remember

6 this point. He went out of his way to say that Neill

7 was a decent and reliable officer, and, instead of his

8 courage being recognised, he was being traduced very

9 unfairly.

10 I also remember in the same broad way that he was at

11 great pains to present himself as being as concerned as

12 anybody else that the allegations against Atkinson

13 should be pursued vigorously and thoroughly, because

14 they were extremely serious and the sort of thing that

15 no force could ignore. As for the general shape of our

16 conversation, that's my recollection of it

17 Q. And his main concern, would it have been or would one of

18 his other concerns have been -- we have not already

19 covered it -- there would be nothing to impede the

20 criminal investigation into Reserve Constable Atkinson?

21 A. I think I make that comment somewhere in this note,

22 don't I?

23 Q. If I could take you just to your report at [38494],

24 paragraph 41, and in your report you indicate:

25 "Both Mr McBurney and the chief constable have

28
 1 stressed to me that Hamill's death might have been

2 caused by oxygen starvation during the time before the

3 ambulance arrived, and I think that this assertion

4 simply has to be dismissed out of hand since the

5 pathologist was questioned in depth at the Hobson trial

6 and was clear that Hamill died of brain injury."

7 As part of your investigation, or of your meetings

8 with Mr McBurney and the chief constable, can you

9 indicate whether Mr McBurney told the chief constable or

10 gave the chief constable that information? Are you

11 aware?

12 A. I have got no idea what passed between them, but -- and

13 I can't remember McBurney mentioning the point to me

14 with the same clarity that I remember the chief

15 constable mentioning it to me, but again, I have got no

16 reason to suppose that what I wrote here is not correct.

17 Q. If one goes on in that paragraph, it indicates:

18 "So far as I can judge, the police were indeed

19 surprised when Hamill died, but judging from the Hobson

20 trial transcript so may have been the hospital doctors."

21 So am I right to say that in general there was some

22 surprise as to the death? That surprise wasn't

23 contained just within the RUC, but it was also the view

24 of the medical staff?

25 A. Well, that's what I'm saying here, yes. I must have got

29
 1 it from somewhere, but I can't remember what the trial

2 transcript says now.

3 Q. I think Mr Underwood and Mr McGrory -- this is on

4 a different point -- were asking you what you perceived

5 the chief constable meant when he used the term "gem".

6 I think that's at paragraph 7. It is at [39693].

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. I have to suggest to you that the word "gem" is --

9 Sir Ronnie Flanagan has given evidence that's not a word

10 he would use. He might use the word "gen", G-E-N, which

11 is colloquial for information. Is it likely the word

12 might be "gen" rather than "gem", and that's inaccurate?

13 A. I would not dispute that at all. It is impossible

14 I misheard him, yes. I don't think I could have

15 misunderstood the general point that he was making, that

16 whatever it was that the coroner had said to

17 Robert Hamill's family was an important factor in

18 spurring him to whatever decisions he had taken, but no,

19 I would agree I might have misheard this particular

20 word.

21 Q. I think you have attempted to be of assistance as to

22 when that information was passed by the coroner.

23 Certainly Mr McGrory put some questions to you.

24 Your report suggests at page [38510] that, on

25 11th January 2000:

30
 1 "Coroner for Greater Belfast talks with Hamill

2 family solicitor and discloses contents of statements by

3 Witnesses A and B in great detail. [whether he

4 disclosed their identities and/or gave the solicitor

5 copies of the statements is not known.]"

6 Certainly at that stage, so some seven months before

7 your meeting with Sir Ronnie, it appears that the

8 coroner had provided the information to the Hamill

9 family outlining the allegation against Reserve

10 Constable Atkinson.

11 Am I correct in my reading of that?

12 A. I am sorry. Yes, I think so, yes. This is an extract

13 from the note on the sort of sequence of events which

14 attached to the report that I did, I think. Isn't it?

15 Q. Yes, I think this is an extract from the chronology.

16 A. So I would have done that about a month after the note

17 of my meeting with the chief constable, by which time

18 I probably had a better grasp of what happened when.

19 Q. So is it likely that whenever you refer to the chief

20 constable suggesting that he had "pushed and pushed",

21 the information -- the more recent information which was

22 provided to the Hamill family, I understand, would have

23 been in or around 7th June the decision was taken not to

24 have a coroner's inquest?

25 Is it not, therefore, more likely that that's what

31
 1 precipitated any reaction from the chief constable?

2 A. The comment in -- I haven't got it on the screen --

3 where the "gem" comes, the comment that I make in

4 brackets there might very well be inaccurate and the

5 information that he was talking about might have been

6 other information, I agree, but it must have had

7 something to do with the action that the coroner took

8 when the inquest was aborted. That's how I read it all.

9 Q. Whilst you have indicated -- you have used the term --

10 your note uses the term "pushed and pushed", had the

11 chief constable been indicating he had been meeting any

12 resistance from any other officers at the time, would

13 you have been likely to have included that in this

14 paragraph?

15 A. You are asking me to speculate rather about what I might

16 have done and I'm finding it a bit difficult. What

17 I noted at the time was what I thought was significant

18 and worth noting.

19 I can't recall that the chief constable gave me any

20 reason to suppose he was pushing against resistance. He

21 was particularly concerned to tell me how fully he was

22 committed and involved, and that's all I remember in

23 a general way.

24 Q. Indicating how fully he was committed and resolved,

25 whilst you have described the chief constable as

32
 1 defensive and critical, would it be right to say that at

2 all times he was indicating to you that, whilst he was

3 defensive of his organisation, that, were there anyone

4 in his organisation who had fallen below the high

5 standards that he would set, that you ought to be in no

6 doubt that he would ensure that they would be -- that he

7 would find them, prosecute them?

8 A. Absolutely. Absolutely.

9 MR McGUINNESS: I have nothing further. Thank you,

10 Mr Langdon.

11 Questions from MR McCOMB

12 MR McCOMB: Mr Langdon, my name is McComb. I represent

13 a number of the people who were charged with the murder.

14 I don't intend to ask you too much about your initial

15 report.

16 That was prepared in 2000, I think. Isn't that

17 right? We are all much obliged. We have been through

18 that many times I am sure.

19 May I just take you to [38492], please? It is

20 paragraph 32, sir. Do you have that in front of you

21 A. I am sorry, paragraph 32?

22 Q. So I may just -- this is really towards the end of your

23 report. You have already been through the differing

24 pieces of evidence and the judge's comments in the

25 Hobson trial --

33
 1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- and I don't intend to catechise you about that. It

3 is really a matter for the Panel.

4 Is it fair to say that you are here trying to

5 summarise two conflicting approaches about what happened

6 on the night of the 26th?

7 You say:

8 "It will help the reader to focus, if, at this

9 point, I summarise in my own words the RUC story of the

10 incident as explained to me by DCS McBurney and set it

11 against the campaigner's version.

12 "(a). The RUC believe that there was ...

13 a preliminary fight."

14 Then things happened very swiftly. It was either

15 Prunty or Hull came rushing to get the police out of the

16 Land Rover.

17 Set against that is (b):

18 "The campaigners say that Hamill and D", whom you

19 may recall was the other male person along with

20 Mr Hamill who was attacked, "were set upon without the

21 slightest provocation, and if the patrol did not

22 actually witness the attack without intervening, as

23 Diane Hamill originally alleged, then at the very least

24 their negligence was appalling."

25 Doing the best you can to recall, were you given

34
 1 a number of different accounts by, say, the Nationalist

2 side -- I don't mean to use that in any pejorative

3 sense -- the Catholic side?

4 A. I wasn't -- the only people whom I interviewed to do

5 this report, and if I could just emphasise again it was

6 by way of being a briefing report for Ministers and not

7 an investigative thing or anything of that sort.

8 Q. Of course.

9 A. The only people that I had discussions with were the

10 chief constable and the ICPC --

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. -- and Mr McBurney and his detective inspector. By far

13 the main source of information that I had, apart from

14 those interviews, was the mass of material that the ICPC

15 had assembled and which they gave me free run of.

16 Q. Yes. It is quite clear you had examined a lot of

17 written material --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- as well as having spoken to the various parties that

20 might have been involved.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Really, did it end up that, doing the best you could,

23 you were still faced with a number of very conflicting

24 versions of what happened that night, which will be, of

25 course, ultimately for the Panel --

35
 1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- as far as it is relevant to determine?

3 A. Absolutely. Sorry.

4 Q. Please finish.

5 A. I was just going to say the report that I did was

6 largely directed to pointing out where the conflicts of

7 evidence arose --

8 Q. Where the conflicts lay.

9 A. -- and in some cases I made some comment on that

10 I think. Others, I left it without comment.

11 MR McCOMB: Yes. Thank you very much indeed.

12 MS DINSMORE: I have no questions. Thank you.

13 MR UNDERWOOD: There is nothing arising. Thank you.

14 Questions from THE PANEL

15 THE CHAIRMAN: You were advising the Secretary of State to

16 put him into a position in which he could decide whether

17 or not it was appropriate to appoint a public Inquiry.

18 Is that the position?

19 A. Yes.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: And that --

21 A. To help him approach that, yes.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. In those circumstances, it was

23 necessary for him to be acquainted with the conflicting

24 contentions being made and you made the occasional

25 comment on where you thought the truth might lie, but

36
 1 you were not the fact-finder.

2 A. Precisely.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

4 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Langdon. It

5 is very kind of you to have come at such short notice.

6 Sir, as I say, I am going to call Colin Murray.

7 I am told we need a ten-minute break, so may I invite

8 you to have one?

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. Ten minutes.

10 (4.42 pm)

11 (A short break)

12 (4.52 pm)

13 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much, sir. Colin Murray,

14 please.

15 MR COLIN JOHN MURRAY (sworn)

16 Questions from MR UNDERWOOD

17 MR UNDERWOOD: Good afternoon, Mr Murray.

18 A. Good afternoon.

19 Q. Can you tell us your full names, please?

20 A. Colin John Murray.

21 Q. I want you to identify two reports you have done. If we

22 look at page [74391], is that the first page of the

23 first report?

24 A. That is, yes.

25 Q. Is [74518] the final page of your CV attached to that?

37
 1 A. Yes, it is.

2 Q. Then if we look at page [74519], is that the start of

3 your second report?

4 A. Yes, it is.

5 Q. At page [74538], is that the conclusion of that one?

6 A. It is, yes.

7 Q. Then if we bring up page [75406], is that the first of

8 two pages which you kindly gave us last week setting out

9 revisions in the light of evidence you have seen and

10 heard?

11 A. Yes, it is.

12 Q. Can I just run through that very briefly? If we pick up

13 the bullet point part, the second half of the page, you

14 tell us in the first of those:

15 "I accused DCS McBurney of being criminally

16 negligent. I wish to revise that conclusion. I have

17 listened to evidence ..."

18 That relates, does it, to page [74498], if we have

19 a look at that, where in your conclusion towards the

20 bottom there at 22.49, you say:

21 "I do not find the account of DCS McBurney

22 credible."

23 Is that a reference to that paragraph?

24 A. It is and it is a reference really to the dealings he

25 had in relation to the reserve constable.

38
 1 Q. Thank you. Then going back to [75406], the third bullet

2 point says:

3 "I do accept that in the early stage of the

4 investigation a major priority for the RUC was the

5 safety of Tracey Clarke."

6 To what does that point go, in your view, now?

7 A. It goes to the point made that I have heard being given

8 in evidence, and the question that was asked was: how

9 could the reserve constable be confronted with the

10 statement of Witness A, Tracey Clarke, and exposed as

11 a witness in that area and the threats that she may come

12 under?

13 That's really what I was referring to there, because

14 the point has been made here, but later in my evidence,

15 I will perhaps have the opportunity of talking how

16 I believe those telephone calls could have been managed

17 without exposing Tracey Clarke.

18 Q. Your point there, is it, is you accept that a factor in

19 how the investigation into the tip-off allegation could

20 have been conducted may well have been the safety of

21 Tracey Clarke?

22 A. Yes, indeed.

23 Q. Then going on to the telephone billing, the next bullet

24 point is this:

25 "In compiling my report under section 20, the

39
 1 management and effectiveness of the investigation into

2 the alleged misconduct of Reserve Constable Atkinson,

3 I place significant emphasis on the failure to challenge

4 in the interview of the reserve constable the initial

5 account of the telephone billing. I was unaware that

6 a number of telephone service providers would not assist

7 with evidential telephone billing due to the security

8 situation prevailing at that time."

9 Where does that leave this point?

10 A. I make that comment in relation to, again, evidence that

11 I have heard before the hearing here. You will note

12 that I put "evidential telephone billing" as opposed to

13 "intelligence".

14 Q. Uh-huh.

15 A. My contention will be that still could have been used

16 within the interview of Reserve Constable Atkinson and

17 I have also heard that the RUC, as they were then, could

18 also ask service providers from the mainland to provide

19 that evidence.

20 So it's an acknowledgment that I didn't know that

21 the RUC sometimes were not able to get that information,

22 but, in fact, it doesn't really take me far from my

23 conclusions.

24 Q. Right. So when, a couple of minutes ago, you said later

25 in your evidence you'd like to have the opportunity to

40
 1 set out how you think that interviewing and the records

2 could have been managed, are you saying that they should

3 have got either, as it were, the mainland source for

4 these records or, alternatively, simply put them to

5 Reserve Constable Atkinson, whether they were evidential

6 or not?

7 A. They should, in my view, have put them to the Reserve

8 Constable at the time of that interview.

9 Q. Then the final bullet point there is that in your report

10 at paragraph 23.17 you say:

11 "I stated I believed DI Irwin assisted Andrea McKee

12 in perverting the course of justice. I do not stand by

13 that comment. Having listened to the evidence,

14 I believe DI Irwin was reluctant to take that statement

15 and only did so because he was ordered to."

16 Can I ask you something else about that? We have

17 heard evidence that, in essence, police officers,

18 particularly in relation to alibis, have to take

19 statements regularly which they may or may not believe

20 and the question really is what they do with them

21 afterwards.

22 What do you say about that sort of evidence?

23 A. It may well be that an officer takes a statement that he

24 or she doesn't believe, but, first of all, I would

25 comment that that officer should then challenge that

41
 1 account and, secondly, perhaps even more importantly,

2 that officer should make it clear to the appropriate

3 authorities, whoever they may be, that that statement is

4 believed to be false.

5 Q. Right. Do you take it then from what you have heard

6 that DI Irwin would be acquitted of failing to do those

7 things because he was reluctant to take the statement,

8 did it on express instructions, and, indeed, did report

9 back to Mr McBurney what he thought?

10 A. Yes. I listened to the evidence of Mr Irwin and do

11 believe he was reluctant to do that and did report back

12 to DCS McBurney.

13 Q. I want to put very briefly to you what Mr Armstrong has

14 done in a report in which three contentions were put by

15 those representing a number of police officers which he

16 has commented on.

17 Can we go to page [74592], please? This, you see,

18 is the frontispiece of Mr Murray's (sic) first report.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. He refers to contention (i), which is on page 11. We

21 can see that at page [74602]. It is at the top:

22 "Contention (i) - 'In paragraph 2.3 of his report

23 Mr Murray concedes the unique position of the RUC. He

24 mentions policing against the background of sectarian

25 divide. In this concession Mr Murray is seriously

42
 1 mistaken. The RUC was attempting to police in the face

2 of a terrorist campaign. Mr Murray has no experience of

3 policing in a terrorist environment'."

4 Before we move to what Mr Armstrong says about that,

5 have you now any experience of policing in a terrorist

6 environment or did you have then?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Thank you. Do you regard that as relevant to the

9 ability to provide the report which you provided?

10 A. I think it's a relevant comment, but I don't agree with

11 the comment.

12 Q. If we look at page [74636], we see the conclusion under

13 that contention in Mr Armstrong's report at

14 paragraph 1.8.1:

15 "It may be correct to say that Mr Murray has little

16 or no experience of policing in a terrorist environment.

17 However, in the context of the Robert Hamill

18 investigation and Mr Murray's terms of reference to the

19 adequacy of RUC resources and to comment upon the

20 various police investigations connected with the death

21 of Robert Hamill, it is difficult to understand of what

22 value being experienced on terrorism could have added to

23 Mr Murray's report or how it would have influenced his

24 conclusions on the facts."

25 What do you say about that?

43
 1 A. Well, I entirely agree. I think I am in a position to

2 comment on the Robert Hamill investigation, all aspects

3 of the GBH and the murder investigation. I do concede

4 that during, obviously, the period termed "the

5 troubles", there were areas in Northern Ireland where

6 policing was impossible.

7 Back in 1972, for instance, you know, there were

8 490-odd terrorist-related murders and there were certain

9 areas where the policing couldn't conduct any crime

10 scene assessment, any cordoning off, but the truth is,

11 as evidenced by the investigation here conducted by the

12 DCI who was called out, they were able to cordon off

13 that scene. They were able to take some actions in

14 line with the murder investigation manual.

15 Q. Right. Thank you. Then if we look at page [74639], the

16 second paragraph sets out contention (ii). That was:

17 "Mr Murray reveals no appreciation of the influence

18 of the Drumcree situation and the consequent community

19 tensions and violence which dominated this society in

20 those years."

21 Then I take you to page [74654] at paragraph 2.5.1

22 towards the bottom:

23 "In the preparation of Mr Murray's report ... it is

24 evident that he did not make reference to the Drumcree

25 situation or what impact it may or may not have had in

44
 1 the police investigation. However, Mr Murray did adhere

2 to the terms of reference he was given and does not

3 appear to have been asked or required to comment on the

4 influences of Drumcree or what the consequent community

5 tensions and violence might have had on the police

6 investigation."

7 We, of course, have heard a lot of evidence about --

8 never mind Drumcree, about community tensions there were

9 and about the likelihood there was of getting any lay

10 witness to come and give evidence against any member of

11 his community.

12 Have you factored into your conclusions, in the

13 light of all the materials, the effect of that sort of

14 evidence?

15 A. No, I didn't. I didn't look at Drumcree. I do accept

16 through the evidence that I have heard here at the

17 hearing that it was an incredibly difficult policing

18 period for the RUC and would have been extremely

19 impactive on the community, particularly in Portadown,

20 and I think it would have just increased and created

21 problems for the RUC. I do accept that.

22 Q. If we look at page [74656], on this point again at

23 paragraph 2.5.8 of Mr Armstrong's report, he says:

24 "Overall, the impact of Drumcree I believe

25 entrenched divided community views and polarised them

45
 1 even further. The sectarian nature of Robert Hamill's

2 attack may well have been an overriding factor as to

3 whether or not local people who could have helped would

4 have had the necessary trust, confidence or moral duty

5 to impart information or assist the police in their

6 investigation. Although difficult to measure, I believe

7 it's not beyond reason to assume that the heightened

8 influences and feelings in Portadown in 1997 could well

9 have had a detrimental effect."

10 Would you accept that?

11 A. Fully. I fully accept that.

12 Q. Thank you. Then contention (iii) follows directly

13 underneath that. It is that:

14 "In discussing Mr McBurney's approach to securing

15 the attendance of Witness A and Witness B as witnesses

16 for the prosecution, Mr Murray seems to be unaware of

17 the experience of the Northern Ireland legal system

18 arising from 'supergrass' or 'converted terrorists'

19 prosecutions post-1982."

20 These are dealt with in a study. The conclusion on

21 that is at internal page 81, which is at page [74672]

22 I just pick it up at 3.6.5:

23 "It is difficult to conclude that Mr Murphy's

24 comment that Mr Murray seems to be unaware of the

25 experience of the Northern Ireland legal system arising

46
 1 from supergrass or converted terrorists prosecutions

2 post-1982 has any bearing on the status of Witnesses A

3 or B."

4 Any comment on that?

5 A. I didn't consider it in my original report. I never

6 considered them to be converted terrorists and, as

7 I understood it, the supergrass system in

8 Northern Ireland collapsed mid-80s due to the

9 unreliability of some of the proceedings.

10 Q. Can we go down to paragraph 3.6.8 here, where

11 Mr Armstrong says:

12 "It remains unknown what the impact on either

13 witness was when it became apparent that the suspects

14 charged with this murder elected to go on remand in the

15 LVF wing of the Maze prison. This, together with the

16 influence of the LVF in Portadown at this time,

17 particularly their leader Billy Wright, might well have

18 had a bearing on why both witnesses did not go through

19 with their evidence. Other outside factors or pressures

20 might well have played a big part in their decision. It

21 is apparent that, following the recording of their

22 statements, resentment of police over Drumcree continued

23 as did sectarian and terrorist incidents around the

24 province. All this, I would suggest, would have done

25 little to help reassure both witnesses."

47
 1 Do you accept the thrust of that?

2 A. Absolutely.

3 Q. Now that you have heard the evidence that you have heard

4 and indeed read, did you think, or do you now think,

5 that police had a realistic chance of getting witnesses

6 to prosecute this murder?

7 A. No.

8 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much, Mr Murray.

9 Questions from MR WOLFE

10 MR WOLFE: Good afternoon, Mr Murray. My name is Wolfe.

11 I am going to ask you some questions on behalf of the

12 policing service.

13 I note from the introductory section of your report

14 that you call yourself an independent police expert.

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Is that a name you have given to yourself or is that the

17 name the Inquiry has given you?

18 A. That's the name the Inquiry used or applied.

19 Q. Do you consider yourself a policing expert?

20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. From what date did you become a policing expert?

22 A. Well, I was officially appointed the policing expert,

23 independent police expert, to the Inquiry on

24 16th May 2005.

25 Q. Is this the only circumstance, the circumstances of this

48
 1 Inquiry, in which you have held yourself out as

2 an independent policing expert?

3 A. Yes, it is.

4 Q. Is it fair to say that your expertise in policing has

5 been gained experientially mainly in your work with the

6 Kent Constabulary?

7 A. Yes, Kent principally, yes. I have obviously worked

8 with other forces as and when the need arose.

9 Q. Yes. Is there any form of accreditation or

10 standardisation for policing experts?

11 A. I don't know is the answer to that.

12 Q. You are not a member of an expert panel?

13 A. No, no.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Are you able to suggest there is such a body,

15 Mr Wolfe?

16 MR WOLFE: I am genuinely enquiring.

17 Now, with regard to your report, it will obviously

18 be a matter which will be mainly for submissions in due

19 course, but in terms of your report, the first number of

20 sections deal with the public order situation that had

21 to be policed on 27th April 1997, and you have looked

22 carefully at the actions of the Land Rover crew --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- whom you accuse of negligence. Isn't that right?

25 A. That's correct.

49
 1 Q. You have looked at the action of the police who arrived

2 in support and you say that the calming of the situation

3 and the dispersing of the crowd was in a sense

4 praiseworthy. You believe that was conducted with

5 diligence and professionally?

6 A. Absolutely, yes.

7 Q. Just in terms of your commentary on all of that, do you

8 purport to be a policing expert on that area of public

9 disorder and operations associated with public disorder?

10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. Have you held a uniformed command post?

12 A. I briefly, some years ago, was what we would call

13 PSU-trained, which was riot-trained. Many years ago,

14 during the miners' strike, I was deployed, not as

15 a commander, as a member into some of the more

16 troublesome areas back in England, but I have not

17 commanded a PSU public unit in riot conditions. I would

18 never say that at all.

19 Q. Yes. So you haven't had to take strategic decisions

20 surrounding, for example, the operational planning and

21 the aftermath of a public order situation?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Have you received training in these kind of uniform

24 operational issues such as -- is it the command course?

25 A. No, I was never of a uniform rank where I would have

50
 1 been required to undertake that training.

2 Q. Could I enquire then, in terms of your expertise in

3 commenting critically on police performance arising out

4 of a public order situation, do you apply any particular

5 policing principles that you have learned or do you

6 comment simply on the basis of what you say is good

7 policing practice in your experience?

8 A. Well, I comment on good policing practice in relation to

9 the dispersal of that crowd. I think it would have

10 been, as I said, very easy for the officers to be

11 overwhelmed, and I do believe the RUC acted resolutely

12 on that night in dispersal of the crowd.

13 Q. But, as I think I have highlighted, you have commented

14 critically upon a matter which this Inquiry will have to

15 consider, and that's the performance of the Land Rover

16 crew.

17 What is your expertise to comment on that?

18 A. My policing background. I think it's -- when I look at

19 my career in the round, I think I am well able to

20 comment in relation to that. You are talking about

21 basic police training and a number of issues.

22 I mean ...

23 Q. Forgive me. What qualifies that as an expert opinion as

24 opposed to a general policing opinion based on your

25 experience?

51
 1 A. Well, the only answer I can submit to that is that I was

2 appointed the independent police expert and asked, as

3 part of the terms of reference, to look at that, but

4 I do accept I have not been a riot commander,

5 PSU-trained, in that regard.

6 Q. Giving you the label doesn't mean you are an expert in

7 that area, does it? You are not an expert in that area.

8 A. I feel very confident and able to comment in relation to

9 the initial actions of the four officers.

10 Q. Now, your connection to Northern Ireland and its affairs

11 and policing nuances, had you any experience of

12 Northern Ireland affairs, in particular in policing,

13 prior to your appointment?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What was that in?

16 A. That was we -- sorry. Let me start again. A body of

17 a young girl was found in Kent who it would turn out was

18 abducted, raped and murdered and buried in Kent, and the

19 suspect was believed responsible for an offence over in

20 Northern Ireland. So I spent a considerable amount of

21 time over in Northern Ireland looking at that

22 investigation.

23 Q. This is the Castlederg situation you refer to in your

24 report?

25 A. Yes, it is.

52
 1 Q. Now, you will have read Mr Armstrong's reports. Isn't

2 that right?

3 A. I have.

4 Q. You would accept that the contextualisation that he has

5 provided the Inquiry is entirely relevant --

6 A. Absolutely.

7 Q. -- to the Inquiry's terms of reference?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You will have seen in particular the first section of

10 the report, the summary of which was recently put up on

11 screen for you, or part of the summary. Mr Armstrong

12 talks about the particular issues for policing in

13 Northern Ireland in 1997 and the problems which faced

14 the CID in particular at that time. Isn't that right?

15 A. That is correct, yes.

16 Q. Did you know of any of those difficulties prior to

17 reading his report?

18 A. I had no -- well, sorry --

19 Q. I can be particular.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Just let him -- he had not finished

21 answering.

22 MR WOLFE: I am sorry.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Then you can put your question.

24 A. I was obviously unaware of the -- and I would never

25 profess to sit here and say I fully understood all the

53
 1 problems and tensions that the RUC faced during the

2 period of the troubles.

3 Is that the answer -- have I answered the question?

4 MR WOLFE: Let me build on that. You wouldn't, for example,

5 have been aware, until Mr Armstrong reported in terms of

6 the difficulties which some members of CID experienced

7 in terms of being able to get training; in other words,

8 being able to get away from their day job to be trained

9 up on good practice as it develops?

10 A. I did learn an awful lot from the Castlederg incident

11 and some of the issues that the RUC faced there were not

12 dissimilar to those that were confronted by the RUC back

13 in '97.

14 Q. You would accept that issues like that have to be

15 weighed and considered by anybody who would purport to

16 comment authoritatively on the circumstances of the

17 Hamill investigation?

18 A. I think -- no, I don't agree with that necessarily,

19 because the fact is my report deals with the murder of

20 Robert Hamill, and many of the taskings that were

21 undertaken by the RUC were common throughout the United

22 Kingdom.

23 So I am not sitting here and saying for one minute

24 that the terrorist situation prevented them from

25 expeditiously and diligently investigating that murder.

54
 1 I don't believe it did.

2 I do believe it caused problems, particularly in

3 relation to witness evidence, but in relation to

4 forensic evidence, crime scene management, fast-track

5 actions, suspect strategy, forensic strategy and the

6 policy file, the witness management, search strategy,

7 I think I am well able to comment upon, because they

8 were all common police practices undertaken in a murder

9 investigation.

10 Q. Yes. What I am asking you specifically about, sir, is

11 the training issues, the resource issues, the specific

12 difficulties that were occurring in Portadown in the

13 community sense at that time in terms of cooperation

14 with police, trust in police.

15 You don't cover any of those areas in your report.

16 A. I wasn't asked to.

17 Q. Do you agree that they are, of course, relevant to be

18 considered when analysing all of these issues?

19 A. With respect, I would suggest that's for the hearing to

20 determine.

21 Q. Finally, one other area. You have obviously gone

22 through the aspects that you have been asked to go

23 through within your terms of reference with

24 a fine-toothed comb.

25 A. Yes.

55
 1 Q. One of the issues that has been presented to the Inquiry

2 for it to consider is whether sectarianism, or

3 a sectarian attitude on the part of any police officer,

4 or indeed the organisation, affected policing whether of

5 the public order situation or the investigation.

6 Have you found any evidence of sectarianism on the

7 part of police officers?

8 A. No.

9 Q. If you had found evidence, you would, of course, have

10 identified that. Isn't that right?

11 A. If, as I understand from the question, I had formed the

12 opinion that officers were prejudiced or acted in a way

13 because of one particular religious divide, then I would

14 have commented upon that.

15 MR WOLFE: Thank you, Mr Murray.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Adair.

17 MR ADAIR: Before I ask any questions can I just for the

18 record, sir -- I have spoken to Mr Underwood about this.

19 There is a very substantial body of issues that are

20 raised by Mr Murray which he has not given direct

21 evidence about today, but which is in his report, and

22 about which I could stand and cross-examine for a very

23 substantial period of time reciting bits of evidence

24 that have been given and so on.

25 I don't see that that's going to help you, sir, or

56
 1 the Panel, in your Inquiry, frankly, because ultimately

2 those issues are for you to decide.

3 So I intend to restrict myself, but I hope the Panel

4 understands this, to fairly general questions, some

5 limited specific ones, but it shouldn't be taken as any

6 acceptance on my part that I accept one various part of

7 the report or another.

8 I will be making those submissions, sir, in due

9 course in my submissions to you.

10 If that seems appropriate, sir, I will be

11 a relatively short period of time with the witness

12 THE CHAIRMAN: If they are submissions that really, from his

13 point of view, have already been dealt with in

14 Mr Murray's report, I entirely agree.

15 MR ADAIR: Sorry, sir?

16 THE CHAIRMAN: If they are points you wish to make that

17 really have, from Mr Murray's point of view, already

18 been dealt with, then I agree there is no need to go

19 over them. If it was something which might leave us

20 saying, "Well, we would like to know what Mr Murray says

21 about that", that's obviously different.

22 Questions from MR ADAIR

23 MR ADAIR: Yes, sir. Thank you very much.

24 Now, Mr Murray, do you accept that this

25 investigation that you carried out in relation to the

57
 1 entirety of the work that the police did in the

2 Robert Hamill case really essentially meant that you

3 examined their movements practically minute by minute

4 under a microscope?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You have come across a number of areas in your report

7 where you are critical of either omissions or actions of

8 the police officers?

9 A. I have.

10 Q. Do you accept, Mr Murray, that if one were to pick

11 a random ten cases over the past 20 years and put the

12 microscope on it the way you have done, that the

13 probability is one would equally find a number of

14 factors which the police may have done which one could

15 be critical about and a number of omissions, again which

16 one may be critical about, if one put this same

17 microscope on those?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. Can I ask you what criminal negligence is?

20 A. Well, that's why I revert from that, sir, because that's

21 tantamount to accusing somebody of perverting the course

22 of justice.

23 Q. That's why I am asking you why you used the words

24 "criminal negligence".

25 What do the words "criminal negligence" mean?

58
 1 A. In this regard, perverting the course of justice.

2 Q. Well, why didn't you say that rather than use the words

3 "criminal negligence". Where do those words come from?

4 A. It is just the wording I used. It really was setting

5 out to describe it was negligent, because that's what

6 I was asked to do, but it went beyond that.

7 Q. Okay.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Isn't it misfeasance in a public office,

9 which is, of course, different from perverting the

10 course of justice?

11 MR ADAIR: Yes, but I can see the reasoning, sir.

12 So can I understand originally your thought

13 processes into the use of the words "criminal

14 negligence" were that the act had been negligent and --

15 would this be a fair way of saying it -- probably

16 accompanied by either an improper or illegal motivation?

17 A. Yes. When I put all strands of looking at the

18 investigation in black and white and I put a number of

19 issues together, then yes, I did see that as

20 an intentional act.

21 Q. Yes. So when you described, as you did originally, for

22 example, some particular action which related to

23 Mr McBurney in particular as being criminally negligent,

24 you were conveying at that stage the fact that your

25 belief was that it was either an improper or illegal

59
 1 motivation in relation to the negligent act?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Is that a --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. If I am not right on that, tell me, but that's the

6 impression.

7 A. No, no, no. I originally viewed the actions there as

8 deliberate with intent to mislead and bring it into the

9 realms of what I determine -- described as criminally

10 negligent.

11 Q. I understand. You no longer say that?

12 A. Well, I don't, because, upon reflection, I have heard

13 evidence here which has altered my opinion, and in some

14 ways, sir, I wondered if I was going beyond my terms of

15 referencing in making -- drawing that conclusion.

16 I question whether I was the appropriate person to

17 come to that conclusion if such a conclusion were to be

18 reached.

19 Q. And --

20 A. Sorry, sir --

21 Q. Carry on.

22 A. I have taken account, as I said in that further report,

23 of the high esteem that Mr McBurney was held in, the

24 comments made by Sir Ronnie Flanagan, and that has

25 impacted upon my feeling. I do question what the

60
 1 motivation was.

2 Q. The disadvantage, when coming to a conclusion, I suggest

3 to you, Mr Murray, about someone's actions when you are

4 simply relying on paper is that you don't know the

5 person.

6 A. Absolutely.

7 Q. An assessment, for example, of whether you are going to

8 buy a secondhand car from somebody includes what you

9 make of them, what you know of them and what other

10 people say of them?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You didn't have the advantage of knowing about

13 Mr McBurney's acknowledged integrity, professionalism

14 and so forth.

15 A. No.

16 Q. So the impression I'm getting is that, when you take

17 everything into account, including what you now know

18 about a man whom you read about on paper, you have come

19 to the view that he was negligent, but you are

20 withdrawing the criminal allegation --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- and motivation? Okay.

23 Now, let's deal briefly with the positives in this

24 investigation and what you found.

25 You found that, after the police got the statements

61
 1 from Timothy Jameson and Tracey Clarke, the arrest

2 strategy was good and it was immediate?

3 A. Yes, it was.

4 Q. They moved with, I think it would be fair to say,

5 commendable speed to get the resources --

6 A. That's right.

7 Q. -- such as interview teams, arrest teams, search teams

8 available for early the following morning?

9 A. Yes, I think they worked particularly well to achieve

10 that.

11 Q. We all know that the statements were taken late on the

12 evening probably going into the early hours of the

13 morning and the search teams were sent out very early

14 the following morning. It was within hours that all

15 these teams were organised and briefed.

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. As far as witness strategy is concerned, you say, and

18 I think I quote:

19 "There was little more the RUC could have done in

20 face of people saying that they saw nothing."

21 A. Absolutely.

22 Q. So again it is absolutely clear that, as far as

23 attempting to get witnesses to bring these murderers to

24 justice, your evidence is that there is essentially

25 nothing more the RUC could have done?

62
 1 A. Essentially, that's it.

2 Q. Now, you did at one stage -- and I wasn't absolutely

3 clear what -- maybe you could help me about this -- seem

4 to criticise the strategy in relation to Witness A.

5 Am I right in reading that into what you are saying or

6 am I wrong in that?

7 A. No, no, no. I am not 100% sure I am clear what you are

8 alluding to. I am not critical of the strategy in

9 relation to Witness A.

10 Q. Okay. Are you critical in any way as to how Witness A

11 or Witness B were treated and how the RUC tried to keep

12 them on board?

13 A. No, not at all.

14 Q. Okay. Steps such as we know were taken -- for example,

15 trying to get Witness A relocated, trying to get her

16 a job in another part of the province and so on --

17 that's all good police practice?

18 A. Yes, indeed.

19 Q. Especially where you have a potentially vulnerable

20 witness?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So dealing with that, it is absolutely clear, isn't it,

23 Mr Murray, that the police were trying to keep A and B

24 on board, again for the obvious reason of trying to

25 keep -- trying to get the murderers to justice?

63
 1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Again, you, as I understand it, accept the search

3 strategy of 6th May -- you know what I am talking

4 about --

5 A. Yes, I do. Yes.

6 Q. -- when the arrests were made when it was still

7 a GBH charge?

8 A. It was focused.

9 Q. You accept those were focused and proportionate?

10 A. Absolutely.

11 Q. We have dealt with the later search strategy of

12 10th May. In fairness to you, I think that's subject to

13 a criticism in relation to whether or not the search

14 team were properly briefed, in relation to the Hanvey

15 house --

16 A. That's it.

17 Q. -- to look for a burn site, to look for a particular

18 jacket.

19 A. That was my only area of concern. I believe the other

20 searches that were conducted were both thorough and

21 proportionate again.

22 Q. In relation to the forensic strategy of the

23 investigation, if we call it, which covers both GBH and

24 murder, your evidence or your report, am I right in

25 saying, in summary, is that the forensic strategy was

64
 1 good apart from one minor matter in relation to DNA

2 extraction from a bottle on which the fingerprint of

3 Mr Lunt was found?

4 THE CHAIRMAN: When you say "forensic strategy", you mean

5 the scientific strategy, because all evidence is

6 forensic.

7 MR ADAIR: Yes, sir, I mean the scientific strategy in

8 relation to all the various items that were collected at

9 the scene.

10 Do you understand what I am asking you when I use,

11 for the purposes of this question, the wording "forensic

12 strategy"?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. It was good?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. The internal strategy we -- again, I know and I think we

17 all know from reading your report what that is, but lest

18 anybody does not know, that relates to internal

19 communication between the senior investigating officer

20 and those beneath him involved in the investigation?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. That was good?

23 A. Yes. It appeared to be.

24 Q. In fairness to you, because I don't want to just skip

25 over this, you do say in your report in relation to

65
 1 internal strategy that the one query you have is why

2 Hanvey was asked, do you remember in the first

3 interview, whether he talked to a policeman that night?

4 A. Yes, I do.

5 Q. You seemed to say that shouldn't have been asked. Why

6 not, if they had evidence that he had?

7 A. What, talking to a policeman that night?

8 Q. Yes. If they had evidence that Hanvey had been talking

9 to a policeman, there is evidence of potential -- why

10 not ask him about it? Can you not see potentially they

11 would be criticised for not asking him about it?

12 A. I was looking at that from the viewpoint as: was that in

13 accordance with the information that a reserve constable

14 had allegedly telephoned Allister Hanvey?

15 Q. Sorry. It is obviously my fault, Mr Murray. I don't

16 follow that.

17 A. No, when I have come to comment in relation to that,

18 I am looking at that as if they were referring to the

19 alleged telephone call that was made from the reserve

20 constable to Allister Hanvey.

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. Now, unless they were directed to do that by

23 DCS McBurney, then I do not feel it is for those

24 interviewing officers to ask those questions.

25 Q. You may be right, Mr Murray. It is for the Panel to

66
 1 form a view about it, but if they are told or if, for

2 example, they are shown the statement or told of the

3 contents of the statement of Tracey Clarke to include

4 the allegation about the phone call, would it not be

5 a perfectly proper thing to ask him about it?

6 A. Not in these circumstances, no, because --

7 Q. But why?

8 A. Because Allister Hanvey had not been interviewed or

9 arrested on suspicion of being involved in conspiracy to

10 pervert the course of justice.

11 Q. So it is for that reason?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. I think if he had been arrested for that, it would have

15 been perfectly right and proper to be questioned about

16 it.

17 Q. Should he have been arrested there and then, once that

18 information came in?

19 A. Well, that's difficult to say.

20 Q. Well, I am asking you.

21 A. Okay. If DCS McBurney was able to adduce the evidence

22 of the telephone billing at that early stage, then

23 I believe he should be, but, as far as I recollect,

24 whilst he had the report articulated, he had nothing

25 documented to support that.

67
 1 Q. Well, he had a witness statement which said this had

2 occurred.

3 A. Yes, but I --

4 Q. Admittedly hearsay.

5 A. I would have preferred, if I was the SIO -- I would want

6 to have documented evidence in relation to that.

7 Q. Okay. So --

8 A. So the answer is I don't believe he should have been

9 arrested at that early stage --

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. -- but I do believe he should have been arrested

12 possibly later.

13 Q. Once they got the telephone information?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Is that what you are saying?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And also Atkinson then?

18 A. I believe consideration should have been given to that.

19 Q. Well, can we ask you -- you seem to say in your report,

20 and I want to be clear as to where we go, because it is

21 important to another issue.

22 Are you saying, in your expert opinion, that once it

23 became known that the telephone billing corroborated the

24 hearsay allegation of Tracey Clarke, that both Atkinson

25 and Hanvey should have been arrested there and then,

68
 1 that's early May, and those allegations put to them?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Which would blow Tracey Clarke immediately.

4 A. No.

5 Q. Well, do you not realise, Mr Murray, that within half

6 an hour in Portadown it would have been absolutely clear

7 where that information would have come from?

8 A. I would have adopted, looking at the papers, a different

9 strategy to that. I don't think Tracey Clarke need be

10 introduced into the equation at all. I would have had

11 to consider how we could advance that investigation

12 quickly, and one possible way was, because there were

13 named suspects, to actually ask for itemised billing

14 from all suspects including Allister Hanvey.

15 Q. Right.

16 A. Now, in that way, sir, the police would have unearthed

17 evidence of the phone call independently of the account

18 of Tracey Clarke.

19 Q. Okay. I will come back to this just briefly in relation

20 to another issue about strategy, but if Hanvey and

21 Atkinson are both interviewed and deny knowing anything

22 about it, where do you go then?

23 A. You don't go anywhere.

24 Q. No.

25 A. Without admissions, that's never going to proceed.

69
 1 Q. I understand that. I will come back to that when we

2 deal with your proposed strategy and the strategy that

3 was engaged by Mr McBurney.

4 A. Okay.

5 Q. Just to go back to -- I am sorry I went off on a bit of

6 a tangent there, Mr Murray, but the internal

7 communication strategy was good also, because you stated

8 there were regular briefings by Mr McBurney to his

9 officers?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Your overall view, both in relation to the grievous

12 bodily harm issue and the investigation when it became

13 a murder, was that the RUC -- this is the way you put

14 it -- tried to bring to account -- in other words, tried

15 to bring to court -- the perpetrators of this murder?

16 A. I do, but that's against the background of the apparent

17 lapses and failures that I have put in my report in

18 relation to some of these investigative strategies.

19 Q. I understand that.

20 A. But, yes, I do believe there was a desire on the RUC, as

21 I put it, to bring the offenders to justice.

22 Q. Now, to go back then to where I was in relation to

23 asking you about strategy, without going into everything

24 you say about Mr McBurney, one of your main criticisms

25 which involves a number of strands is the strategy he

70
 1 employed in relation to his pursuit of Atkinson. Isn't

2 that right?

3 A. That is.

4 Q. The strategy we know, for example, from the evidence of

5 Mr Irwin was his quoting that patience was an art --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- and he was essentially waiting in the long grass to

8 see if he could break into the conspiracy.

9 You are critical overall of that whole strategy from

10 start to finish?

11 A. I am.

12 Q. Right. Do you know it came within that of working?

13 Only for Pendine, only for some decision by the DPP

14 because the main witness said she was at a hospital

15 appointment when she wasn't that Mr McBurney's strategy,

16 Mr Murray, had worked, and potentially Atkinson and

17 others would have been nailed? Are you aware of that?

18 A. I am aware of that.

19 Q. Now, let's look at your strategy and where it would have

20 got. Your strategy would have been to arrest

21 Mr Atkinson and Mr Hanvey some time in early May when

22 the telephone billing came in. Isn't that right?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Put it to them?

25 A. Yes.

71
 1 Q. We have seen, Mr Murray -- I don't know whether you were

2 here -- both Mr Atkinson and Mr Allister Hanvey giving

3 evidence. Do you accept that the chances of either of

4 those gentlemen admitting what was being put to them was

5 about zero?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Where then, on your strategy?

8 A. There were other strands that could be looked at.

9 I have heard a great deal of talk of the covert

10 listening devices. There were enquiries to try to

11 substantiate or corroborate the account in relation to

12 the coat. I would have undertaken a number of actions

13 as outlined by DCI K when he took over the investigation

14 and I make the comment that I didn't find the strategy

15 credible, because I have never known of an alleged

16 perverting the course of justice where anybody can

17 justify doing nothing for three years. That's on the

18 basis where I come from in relation to that.

19 Q. Okay. The timespan, as you know, Mr Murray, is that

20 there is no interview of Atkinson until September, then

21 there is another one in October. Then we know

22 Mr McBurney's thoughts were, "Strike if and when the

23 McKees separate."

24 A. Yes, I have seen that.

25 Q. Were you aware of the action sheet that Mr Irwin

72
 1 generated which indicated, I think it was in November of

2 1999 for the information of Mr McBurney, that the McKees

3 had now separated?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You are aware there was then a lot of toing and froing,

6 just to put it in simple terms, about whether there

7 should be an inquest?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Whether it took three months or three years, it nearly

10 worked.

11 A. I agree with that. It nearly did work, yes.

12 Q. Mr Murray, all I am suggesting to you is this: sometimes

13 waiting in the long grass with the art of patience can

14 work.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, I want to ask you briefly about P39. Do you know

17 who I am talking about?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, I don't know whether you were here when P39 gave

20 evidence. Were you?

21 A. I was, yes.

22 Q. You saw her?

23 A. I did.

24 Q. You saw the way she answered the questions and gave her

25 answers about what she did that day?

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 1 A. I did.

2 Q. Isn't it clear from, first of all, what she told us that

3 in relation to crime investigation she had very limited

4 experience?

5 A. Yes, indeed.

6 Q. I think although her rank was Detective Chief Inspector,

7 she had been at a crime strategy seminar for one day?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, you make a number of -- I think I am right in

10 saying before I say this that you don't for one moment,

11 Mr Murray, doubt her genuineness in trying to pursue

12 this investigation and do the best she could. I don't

13 think there is any issue on that.

14 A. I don't take issue with that, no.

15 Q. I think that's clear from your report. Having seen her

16 and heard her, did that back up your feeling about that?

17 A. Very much so. There was a notable lack of absence of

18 paperwork that I was able to work upon in relation to

19 that.

20 Q. I think, Mr Murray, I suspect that part of your problem

21 when you formed your views about P39 -- this is in

22 fairness to you again -- was that you didn't have much

23 documentation to form a view as to what she did and what

24 her thought processes were?

25 A. Absolutely.

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 1 Q. We know, of course, that she did, in fact, keep a very

2 detailed, explicit journal setting out her thought

3 processes which she destroyed for security reasons.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. None of us, unfortunately, obviously can see it, but if

6 one looks at what she said she did -- just before I deal

7 with that, Mr Murray, you do seem, as the Inquiry will

8 see in your report, to criticise her, for example, of

9 not taking control of the crime scene and directing the

10 forensic scientists, and so on, photographers, as to

11 what to do?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Now, this is a lady who had been at a one-day crime

14 seminar. The person actually down at the scene was

15 Detective Constable Keys, whom we have heard about in

16 glowing terms in relation to his capability and

17 expertise as a detective constable.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Isn't he the obvious person to direct the forensic

20 strategy, direct the photographer, direct what should be

21 lifted, rather than Detective Chief Inspector [P39]?

22 A. He is, but the DCI remains accountable and fully

23 responsible for any acts or omissions in relation to

24 that, but --

25 Q. I understand that.

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 1 THE CHAIRMAN: I think he had not finished.

2 MR ADAIR: Sorry. Go on.

3 A. I do acknowledge the role DC Keys played, because, in

4 fact, I think the RUC were critical of that officer

5 whereas, in fact, I wasn't. I felt he did a very good

6 job at the scene.

7 Q. While we are touching upon it, in case I forget to come

8 back to Mr Keys, it is absolutely clear from your report

9 that your view is that Detective Constable Keys did

10 everything he possibly could to further this

11 investigation in difficult circumstances.

12 A. Yes, indeed.

13 Q. You see, what P39 told us -- and I am going to just

14 briefly ask you about some of this, because I am not

15 going to go through the entirety of her evidence as

16 I promised to at the start. What she said was she had

17 daily briefings during the day -- this is not just one

18 briefing, but daily briefings, sometimes morning,

19 sometimes evening, sometimes both, with Mr Irwin and

20 others. That's good police work?

21 A. It is, yes.

22 Q. That's showing supervision?

23 A. Yes, it is.

24 Q. At those briefings she would be discussing the way

25 forward with her detectives. That's good police work?

76
 1 A. If that's what she was doing, it is good police work.

2 Q. That's what she said she was doing.

3 A. That's good police work.

4 Q. She said -- and again, I want your comment about this,

5 because there is an implication of criticism in this --

6 that Mr Irwin was managing the grievous bodily harm and

7 she was supervising. Is that appropriate?

8 A. That's entirely appropriate.

9 Q. She said that when she was called in that morning, she

10 immediately went in. That's what she should have done?

11 A. That's right.

12 Q. She treated it as a serious incident. That's what she

13 should have done?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. She went to the scene with Mr Keys.

16 A. Yes, she did.

17 Q. That's what she should have done?

18 A. Definitely.

19 Q. She was involved with Scenes of Crime Officers and

20 photographers. That's what she should have done?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. She gets briefed by both Inspector McCrum and

23 Detective Constable Keys into the circumstances as to

24 what they know so far. That's again, as a supervisor,

25 what she should have done?

77
 1 A. Yes.

2 Q. She calls the hospital to talk to the consultant about

3 the condition of the people who had been injured.

4 That's what she should have done?

5 A. Yes, indeed.

6 Q. She directs that those police officers from the

7 Land Rover should return to the police station

8 immediately to make statements setting out what they

9 know and who they saw. That's good police work?

10 A. I wasn't sure it was her that did that. I thought that

11 was somebody else. But that is good police work, to

12 recall officers to duty.

13 Q. I think there were two people. Possibly Mr Keys, on

14 reflection, also said that he had -- he was the person.

15 But let's put it this way: she was aware, she was

16 supervising a situation -- let us put it neutrally --

17 where Keys had organised the bringing back of the four

18 people from the Land Rover. That's good police work?

19 A. Correct. Good police work.

20 Q. When the police arrive -- that's the police officers

21 from the Land Rover -- she briefs them, saying that she

22 wants detailed statements. That's good supervision?

23 A. It is.

24 Q. And also the following day. And the impression we got

25 from this, Mr Murray, is that she was not entirely happy

78
 1 about some of the contents of the statements she

2 received.

3 Do you remember hearing her evidence about that?

4 A. I do indeed.

5 Q. She directs I think it was Detective Sergeant Bradley to

6 go back to them --

7 A. And question them.

8 Q. -- and get further information.

9 A. Yes, she did.

10 Q. That's good supervision?

11 A. It is good supervision.

12 Q. She reads the statements herself. That's good

13 supervision?

14 A. It is.

15 Q. Then we come to what possibly I suspect is a minor point

16 of disagreement I might have with you on her behalf.

17 You heard her saying that she then decided

18 essentially the arrest strategy. She wasn't content to

19 arrest even Stacey Bridgett on the limited amount of

20 evidence there was against him, but decided to engage

21 the local community and hoping especially that the

22 Catholic community would give her something to put to

23 these people. Do you remember her telling that?

24 A. I do remember her saying that.

25 Q. That's a fair enough strategy?

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 1 A. It can be described as that, but there's the alternative

2 strategy, and this is the big issue where I do criticise

3 her --

4 Q. The alternative strategy -- I am sorry. Have you

5 something more to say?

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

7 A. It was in relation to an early arrest strategy. It is

8 clearly going to be difficult for the RUC, as they were

9 then, to rely upon witness evidence, and the longer

10 evidential forensic opportunities are lost, the harder

11 it is going to be to do that. So you have to weigh up

12 the balance of how likely it is for people to come

13 forward with information and be prepared to go to court,

14 and, on the other hand, have scientific evidence that

15 you might be able to place before a court.

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. So that's the area where I say ...

18 Q. Okay. So your judgment call would have been to arrest

19 Stacey Bridgett?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Her judgment call was to, because it was tenuous against

22 him, anticipate that perhaps people from the Catholic

23 community would come forward with names and have

24 something solid to put to people in interview.

25 Do you accept that's a judgment call?

80
 1 A. That is a judgment call, yes.

2 Q. What she told us -- and again, I want to ask your

3 opinion about this. When she realised that there was

4 a reluctance on the part of not just the Protestant

5 community, but the Catholic community, to come forward

6 and make statements, she then said, "Right. We will

7 have to revert to another strategy", which was the

8 arrest strategy.

9 A. Yes, she did, yes.

10 Q. That's perfectly good police work?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. She approaches the Hamill family. She approaches local

13 priests. That's excellent police work?

14 A. It is.

15 Q. She raises a questionnaire for the people that they can

16 identify in the area to answer. That's good police

17 work?

18 A. Very good police work.

19 Q. She calls in McDowell to analyse the statements. That's

20 good police work?

21 A. Absolutely.

22 Q. I can go on. I mean, she played, Mr Murray,

23 an excellent role in the pursuit of this investigation.

24 A. I think she did, yes, having heard her evidence.

25 Q. Now, you criticise her for at one stage for not having

81
 1 a policy file.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, whatever the book is called, whether the book is

4 called on the outside "policy file" or whether on the

5 outside it says "journal", the object is so that, in the

6 interests of continuity, should someone fall ill or

7 become involved in something else, the person coming in

8 can see what's happening, what the strategy has been?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. That's, I think, one of the main objects.

11 A. It is. The aim of the policy file, call it whatever, is

12 to direct the inquiry, to keep the focus, to identify

13 why certain things are being done, why certain things

14 aren't being done. For instance, if -- sorry.

15 Q. Go on.

16 A. For instance, if she had had a policy file and was able

17 to say -- and it would be perfectly permissible to do

18 this -- "Consideration was given to arresting

19 Stacey Bridgett overnight and one other person,

20 Wayne Lunt. The decision is they will not be arrested

21 at this stage", and she would then document the reasons

22 why and that might be because she felt there was better

23 chances. So that's the rationale behind it.

24 Q. I understand, but she did that in her journal. So is

25 there -- does it matter whether it is called a journal

82
 1 or whether it is called a policy file?

2 SIR JOHN EVANS: Can I ask a clarification? Forgive me

3 interrupting. Have we actually had her journals and

4 seen them? Has anybody seen them?

5 MR ADAIR: No, she destroyed them, sir.

6 SIR JOHN EVANS: I know she did. That's why -- I am asking

7 at what stage. Did anybody in the Inquiry, either at

8 the early stages or later, see her journal? Because

9 more than once you have made reference to her detail in

10 the keeping of her journal.

11 MR ADAIR: My answer is I don't believe so. I certainly

12 have never seen it.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Did she give evidence that she recorded this

14 in her journal, for example?

15 MR ADAIR: Yes. In fact, at one stage in answer to you,

16 sir.

17 She was asked "Did you not only record the suspects,

18 but the reasons why you were regarding them as

19 suspects?" and she said, yes, she went into great detail

20 in her journal.

21 MR UNDERWOOD: Of course, Mr Adair is right about that.

22 I think the evidence as to destruction was that the

23 Police Ombudsman sent the letter to her address, the

24 wrong address, in 2000, and that's when she destroyed

25 the documents.

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 1 SIR JOHN EVANS: I remember that.

2 MR ADAIR: In fact, my recollection also, Mr Murray, is, as

3 far as P39 was concerned, she had never kept a journal

4 in her life -- she had never kept a policy book. Do you

5 see there is no difference? (Laughter). She had never

6 kept a policy book. The first policy book she started

7 was, in fact, when this investigation became a murder

8 investigation.

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. So it is clear, isn't it, that if her evidence is

11 accepted, that she was effectively doing exactly the

12 same thing in her journal, if her evidence is accepted,

13 as would be contained in the policy book?

14 A. I am not sure you can actually say that at all, because

15 the journal, as I understand, has quite a different

16 purpose to that of a policy file.

17 Officers in the RUC of inspector rank and above

18 would keep journals. That's to record their daily work,

19 some of the incidents that they deal with, and other

20 occurrences that would take place. A policy file is

21 specifically in relation to the investigation that's

22 undertaken and it drives that forward and should be

23 actually -- officers engaged in that inquiry should be

24 reading that in order to understand the direction of

25 that inquiry. So I think the journal has a different

84
 1 purpose.

2 Q. What's your comment about her evidence that policy

3 files, in 1997, were not kept in relation to, for

4 example, GBH cases?

5 A. I think that's perfectly fair. I think a number of

6 forces in the UK would have kept policy files and there

7 would be a number that didn't in relation to GBH.

8 Q. So if there was no policy in force directing, for

9 example, P39 to keep a policy book, one can't criticise

10 her for it?

11 A. No.

12 Q. The final thing I want to ask you about was in relation

13 to -- which is a separate issue from the taking of the

14 statement from Andrea McKee -- the file that was

15 submitted in relation that. There is only really one

16 area I want to just ask you about.

17 You have read the file and we are all aware as to

18 the contents of the file where it sets out the

19 statements taken from the McKees, including

20 Andrea McKee.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You are also aware that, at the end of the report, it

23 stated essentially that one can be sceptical about what

24 they say. Do you know it says that?

25 A. Yes, I do.

85
 1 Q. What does it mean when you are saying to the reader that

2 one can be sceptical about what X or Y says? What are

3 you conveying to the reader?

4 A. You can believe or otherwise what that witness says.

5 Q. Well, are you? If I am sceptical about what you say, am

6 I expressing -- let's put it this way -- some doubt

7 about what you say?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Or some misgivings about what you say? Would those

10 words --

11 A. Yes, yes, I would agree.

12 Q. So do you accept then that Mr McBurney in his report to

13 the DPP had expressed misgivings and some doubt about

14 the statement of Andrea McKee?

15 A. No, I don't. I don't at all.

16 Q. He says -- sorry?

17 A. Sorry. That could have been, and in my view should have

18 been, outlined specifically what the concerns were in

19 relation to that statement.

20 Q. I understand that and I am not necessarily actually

21 taking major issue with you about that actually,

22 Mr Murray. It may well be that the much more preferable

23 way would be to say, "Look, we don't believe a word of

24 this statement because of X, Y and Z".

25 A. Yes.

86
 1 Q. But you describe it as the report indicating that

2 Andrea McKee's statement was a statement of truth. He

3 never said that, Mr Murray.

4 A. By not pointing out the belief of its veracity and

5 truthfulness, I think it was put forward as a statement

6 of truth.

7 Q. Even though he said one should be sceptical about it?

8 A. Absolutely. I have no doubt in my mind that

9 DCS McBurney should have made clear his thoughts around

10 that statement. There is no indication anywhere I have

11 seen within the papers that gives a clear indication

12 that he believed that that statement was false and it

13 was all part of a grand strategy.

14 Q. I have accepted that that would be a much preferable way

15 to have put it, Mr Murray, but do you not accept equally

16 that by indicating to the reader that one should be

17 sceptical about those statements, that one is expressing

18 misgivings or doubts about them?

19 A. No, I don't.

20 Q. I think you have already accepted that.

21 A. Well, in isolation you could say that, but in the round,

22 I don't. I don't --

23 Q. I am not talking about isolation.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Your question, forgive me, missed out what

25 the witness said about the grand strategy, which was not

87
 1 hinted at or disclosed in the report.

2 MR ADAIR: Sir, I think I will go as far as to say that in

3 the perfect world that should also have been disclosed.

4 I am not taking issue that there were --

5 I shouldn't speak to you, sir, like that.

6 I am not taking issue that there should have been

7 things in that report which either clarified their

8 disbelief and set out, as the Chair has said, the

9 proposed long-term strategy. I am not doubting that for

10 a second, that that would be much more preferable.

11 All I am saying to you is this: it is not correct to

12 say it was presented as a statement of truth, because

13 when he says he is sceptical, he is indicating

14 misgivings and doubts about the truth of the statement.

15 That's all I am saying

16 A. I don't agree.

17 MR ADAIR: You won't accept that? Okay. Thank you.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: I see the time. About how much longer do you

19 think the witness' evidence will take?

20 MR UNDERWOOD: I am really, I think, in the hands of

21 Mr McGrory.

22 MR McGRORY: I don't expect to be very long, sir. Ten or

23 fifteen minutes. I am in the Tribunal's hands.

24 MR UNDERWOOD: I am hoping -- perhaps people will put me

25 right globally if I have got this wrong -- another

88
 1 45 minutes perhaps.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we will adjourn now until 10 o'clock

3 tomorrow morning.

4 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you.

5 (5.10 pm)

6 (The hearing adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning)

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