Ruling on anonymity applications

Ruling on anonymity applications made at the oral hearing on 15-16 May 2006

These applications were initially refused by the Chairman on paper but with the proviso that he was ready to entertain additional submissions or, if the applicants wished, their applications would be heard de novo by the full Panel. They opted for the latter. We were presented with a great deal more material than was put before the Chairman when he gave his initial ruling.

The Panel has considered the applications de novo. A number of the applicants gave evidence before us at a two-day hearing in Belfast on the 15 and 16 May 2006. Following the conclusion of their evidence it was agreed by Mr O'Hare, Counsel for the applicants, Mr McGrory, solicitor for the Hamill family, Mrs Moore, solicitor for the PSNI and Mr Underwood, QC, Counsel to the Inquiry, that the remaining part of this rehearing should be conducted by written submissions from them and also from the CAJ and the BIRW, all to be provided in accordance with an agreed timetable. That course has been followed and this is our ruling.

The applicants are for the most part serving and former police officers, some in the RUC and some in both the RUC and the PSNI. A much smaller number of the applicants are civilians who have never served in the police force. Mr Underwood divided the applicants in his closing submissions into four groups. We deal in this part of our ruling with the third and some members of the fourth of those groups. The third group consists of serving and former police officers. It is not proposed to call them or to take statements from them. Those of the fourth group with whom we are concerned in this part of our ruling are in the same case as the members of the third group, save that they are not, and never have been, police officers.

We have considered whether it is appropriate in these circumstances to consider the applications for anonymity made on their behalf. We note that all the applications before us were argued by Mr O'Hare on the basis that the applicants would all be giving evidence and so should be screened from the public and should not be named in the proceedings before the Inquiry. We should point out also that the burden of the evidence called before us and of Mr O'Hare's submissions has been focused on the risks to serving and former police officers and their families because they are or have been police officers. This would in any event make it difficult to see how the case is put for any of those in the fourth group.

The names of those whose applications we are considering in this part of our ruling would only be likely to arise if someone other than Counsel to the Inquiry (who would not consider the name to have any relevance) were to seek to elicit it by a question. If this were to happen the relevance of the evidence, since only relevant evidence should be adduced, would be the basis of an objection by Counsel to the Inquiry and/or Mr O'Hare on the ground of irrelevance. There is no reason why the advocates for interested parties should not be provided, for their eyes only, with these names so that they may avoid the unlikely question which would provoke objection. If it were to be persisted that the name should be made public the Panel would then have to consider whether there are grounds which show the name to be relevant and no grounds under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or at common law to prevent the name being made public.

We point out that it would not be possible to give a wider circulation to a list of these names without risking placing them in the public domain at a time when the relevance and, therefore, the admissibility of them had not been established. Mr O'Hare has not in his submissions focused on how the question of anonymity might be managed in the case of these applicants.

We therefore make no ruling in the case of those applicants whose cases we have been considering in the preceding paragraphs. Their names are set out in Appendix 1, attached to this ruling.

Legal principles

Article 2 and 3 ECHR

Although Mr Underwood has, for the sake of completeness, referred in his submissions not only to Article 2 ECHR but also to Article 3 ECHR, Mr O'Hare has not referred in any of his submissions to Article 3. On the facts as presented to us we conclude he was manifestly correct in his decision not to do so. Article 3 can add nothing to Article 2 to support these applications for anonymity. We propose, therefore, to say nothing further in our ruling about Article 3.

The protection Mr O’Hare seeks under Article 2, if his case is made out, is also available at common law. The common law goes further, though, in providing protection to witnesses in appropriate cases which is not available under Article 2. For the sake of convenience we refer to protection provided both under the Convention and by common law simply as the Article 2 right and to that part of the common law protection which is not mirrored in this Article as the common law right.

We set out below what we consider are the legal principles which we have to apply to the facts which we find in relation to these applications. We have been helped by the submissions we have received, in which extensive reference has made to the relevant authorities. Rather than quote from these authorities, though, we have distilled the relevant principles which we have to apply.

The questions which arise for determination

Article 2 ECHR

I (a). The evidence from the PSNI in relation to the assessment of risk was that all police officers and former police officers and their families in Northern Ireland are at some risk of death or injury from attacks upon them by paramilitaries, whether republican or loyalist, and that in the Portadown and Armagh areas there has been an enhancement of those risks arising out of the death of Rosemary Nelson. No evidence was adduced in contradiction of this, however, it is acknowledged that views may differ in this regard. On the basis of the evidence, which we accept, the following question arises- is that risk materially increased in the case of an officer or former officer or his or her family if he or she is required to give evidence to the Inquiry either because he or she (i) is named in public or (ii) is able to be seen by the public when entering the Inquiry chamber and giving evidence or (iii) by a combination of these?

(b). So far as those witnesses are concerned who are not and never have been police officers and who are referred to in Counsel to the Inquiry's fourth group of witnesses the question of the risks to which all serving and former police officers in Northern Ireland are subject does not come into play. The question becomes for them: is there in the case of a witness or members of his or her family any real risk to life or limb if he or she is required to give evidence to the Robert Hamill Inquiry either because he or she (i) is named in public or (ii) is able to be seen by the public when entering the Inquiry chamber and giving evidence or (iii) by a combination of these?

II. If the answer to any parts of the question set out at I (a) or (b) above is ‘yes’ then, depending on the answers to the three parts of the question, the applicant should be allowed to give evidence without being named and/or behind a screen.

III. If the answer to all parts of the question set out at I(a) or (b) above is ‘no’ then, in so far as the application is based on Article 2 it must fail. The application must then be considered at common law.

Common Law

IV(a) In the case of a serving or former police officer - does the

applicant have a fear that, if he or she has to give evidence (i) as a named witness or (ii) without being screened or (iii) both as a named and unscreened witness, the general risk referred to in question I above will be materially increased?

(b). Does an applicant referred to in the fourth group have a fear that, if he or she is required to give evidence (i) as a named witness or (ii) without being screened or (iii) both as a named and unscreened witness, there will be a risk to life or limb of him or her or to the members of his or her family?

V. In answering question IV above it will be material, but not necessarily decisive, to take account of the fact that question I has been answered in the negative as being relevant to answering the question IV. We remind ourselves, though, of a passage from Lord Woolf's judgment in ex parte A set out on page 8 of Mr O'Hare's second submission:

"In the present appeal, the fact that the soldier witnesses will have subjective fears if called to give evidence in Londonderry is a relevant factor when considering whether it will be fair to require them to do so. Those fears, however, have much more significance if they are objectively justified."

VI. If the answer to question IV is ‘no’ then the application fails.

VII. If the answer to the question IV is ‘yes’ there has to be a balancing exercise and the applicant's fear has to be considered along with the following factors in order to determine whether the interest of justice and fairness to the applicant require that he or she should remain anonymous or be screened or both:

the seriousness of the applicant's fear and its impact on him or her;
the reason for the applicant's fear;
the likely effect of granting anonymity in removing or reducing that fear;
the effect on the public's perception of the impartiality of the Inquiry, having regard to the factors which led to the Minister's decision to hold a public inquiry and to its terms of reference;
the likely effect on the applicant of refusing his or her application in whole or in part;
the likely effect on the Inquiry's ability to arrive at the truth if it refuses or grants the application in whole or in part;
the likely effect on the ability of the public to follow the evidence if the Panel refuses or grants the application in whole or in part;
the fact that the answer to question I above was ‘no’.

In relation to Article 2, when considering whether there would be a material increase to the risks which applicants face if they were to give evidence named and unscreened we have to look at a number of factors. We set them about below in what seems to us to be a convenient order. This does not imply any relative weighting of them.

Are we helped, as Mr O'Hare submits we should be, by the conclusions reached in the Bloody Sunday judicial reviews as a result of applying the relevant legal principles to the facts of those cases?
The present situation in Northern Ireland.
The significance of the risk assessments with which we have been provided.
The reports of the International Monitoring Commission.
Recent terrorist activity in Northern Ireland.
The stance of the PSNI in relation to these applications.
The extent of the publicity given in the media to the Robert Hamill case at the time of his death and in the years since and the extent of the publicity given to calls made for a public inquiry and to the Robert Hamill Inquiry once it was set up towards the end of 2004.
Whether condemnatory attitudes towards the police have grown stronger as a result of or since the setting up of this Inquiry and the attendant publicity and interest it has generated.
Has the public perception of the police involvement in the investigations which followed Robert Hamill's death which was formed before this Inquiry was set up been altered for the worse by the use of the word "collusion" in the Cory Report, to which many of the witnesses have referred mistakenly as being included in our terms of reference?
The extent to which the names of the applicants are already in the public domain.
Whether it is relevant that no harm has been suffered by any of the applicants arising out of their involvement in the Robert Hamill case.
If terrorists had wished or wish to target those who were part of the Portadown police force in 1997 would they have had or have any difficulty in identifying and locating them, regardless of whether or not witnesses give evidence unnamed and screened?
The facts that, save for one officer, no other officers or former officers have claimed anonymity and that although consideration was given to making an application for anonymity at the Hobson trial it was not pursued.
The extent to which the names of police officers giving evidence in criminal proceedings are reported by the media.

We shall deal with these in turn after we have considered Mr O'Hare's Contentions

Mr O'Hare's Contentions

Mr O'Hare contends that in the Chairman's ruling he was wrong to equate proceedings before this Inquiry with proceedings in the civil and criminal courts, that it is not necessary to success for an applicant to show that the consequence of giving evidence named and unscreened would have the effect of materially increasing the risk to him or her and that it is impossible to prove that this threshold would be crossed. We deal with these points in turn.

(1). The comparison with civil and criminal proceedings is wrong in law.

Mr O'Hare refers to Article 6 of the Convention dealing with the right to a fair trial and submits that, in general, this precludes the grant of anonymity, whereas it can have no application to proceedings before the Inquiry. We accept this so far as the position at common law is concerned and, as can be seen, we have made no reference to any comparison with civil or criminal proceedings in the principles we have set out above to be applied in this hearing de novo. For the sake of accuracy, however, we point out that Article 6 must yield to Article 2 where the case is made out under the latter Article, since Article 2 provides for no derogation which could allow Article 6 to have effect.

(2) It is not necessary in law to prove that the withholding of anonymity would materially increase the risk which already exists.

This proposition is not supported by authority and is in our view unsustainable. In his submissions dated the 1st May 2006 at page 8 Mr O'Hare cites a passage from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Lord Saville and others v Widgery Soldiers and others which cites a passage from the judgment of Lord Woolf in ex parte A:

"…. the right approach here, once it is accepted that the fears of the soldiers are based on reasonable grounds, should be to ask: is there any compelling justification for naming the soldiers, the evidence being that this would increase the risk?"

(3) It would be an impossible task to prove that the threshold would be crossed absent anonymity.

We do not accept this. There is no question of an applicant having to prove that the risk would materialise absent anonymity and this has not been suggested. Just as it is possible to show that a risk exists in a certain situation it must also be possible to show that the addition of other adverse factors would materially add to that risk.

Indeed, in his first submission dated the 28th March 2006, Mr O'Hare said that the police witnesses in this Inquiry have a real and genuine fear of the risk to their personal safety if their identities are made known to the public or sufficient steps are not taken to ensure that they cannot be identified and subjected to a risk of reprisal. He also said that a number of these witnesses had serious health issues which would undoubtedly be exacerbated if their identities should become known to the public during the course of the Inquiry's proceedings. This appears to us to accept the possibility of proving an enhancement of risk. Certainly, the serving and former police officers are saying through Mr O’Hare that the risk to them will be increased unless they are granted anonymity.

We have chosen to separate the Article 2 case from the common law case in the way we have set out above because, in our view, it is of assistance when it comes to analysing and evaluating the evidence to be able to focus on the relevant issue when considering the application under Article 2, which turns on whether there would in fact be a material increase in the existing risk if anonymity were not to be granted, and to keep it separate from the common law case which does not require this.

Not to consider the two separately is liable to lead to confusion in analysing and weighing the evidence relating to the two separate bases on which applications are made and applying to it the appropriate principles. We find support for this in the dictum of Wheatherup, J in Re W (cited at page 5 of Mr O'Hare’s submissions) that for the purpose of Article 2 a risk to life is not real if it is not a risk to life, which demonstrates clearly the difference between the two bases.

The factors set out above bearing on Article 2

The Bloody Sunday judicial reviews.

Particularly having regard to the nature of the jurisdiction in judicial review, we do not think it is appropriate to regard the conclusion reached on anonymity in one case as dictating the conclusion to be reached in another case. Different facts may produce different results and what is important is to apply the legal principles. The facts of Bloody Sunday are far removed from the facts of the Robert Hamill case. The allegation in Bloody Sunday was that there was random and unprovoked killing by shooting of a significant number of innocent civilians. The allegations against the police in the Robert Hamill Inquiry are that they were ill-prepared to deal with trouble, if it should arise, at a known trouble spot, that they failed to deal effectively with it when it occurred, standing by and allowing events to take their course and that police officers were party to subsequent attempts to pervert the course of justice by suppressing and falsifying evidence.

The risk assessments in relation to the soldiers and, in the case of Donaghy, to the police showed there were serious risks related directly to them giving evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. The police officers gave their evidence in Northern Ireland and were named but screened. The soldiers were not named, save for those in command, and did not give their evidence in Northern Ireland, though they did so without being screened. It was also ruled that, if this should prove necessary in the case of any soldier, he could be named.

Northern Ireland today.

It is important not to lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with the present time. Past events of terrorist activity can help us to understand and assess the significance of the present state of affairs but it would be a grave error to substitute the significance of past events for an assessment of the present. No one would suggest that all is now peaceful in Northern Ireland. We have referred already to present risks which all serving and former officers and their families face. Nonetheless, it cannot be gainsaid that there has been significant improvement in Northern Ireland. There is a realisation among its people that a less strife ridden way of life is coming about. No one would suggest that terrorists no longer have their supporters or that they are without the ability to carry out terrorist activities or that sectarian animosity has ceased to exist. Nonetheless, the appalling and mindless violence of past terrorist activity against innocent men, women and children would today be likely to provoke horror, condemnation and rejection from both sides of the sectarian divide, regardless of the factional loyalties of the perpetrators, by a majority who do not want to see a return to the past. We see this as a factor which is itself working to reduce terrorist activity.

Moreover, times and attitudes have changed to the extent that uniformed police officers are generally to be seen out and about in the streets of Northern Ireland with their names displayed on their uniforms to be seen by the public, except in areas of particular risk. It has not been suggested that an exception has been made in relation to the areas which we have to take into consideration. Further, there has been an increase in the proportion of Catholics in the PSNI from 8% in 1999 to 12.3% by 2005. With the increase in the number of Catholics applying to serve in the PSNI (36% of all applicants) the expectation of the PSNI is that the number of Catholics in the force will continue to increase .

We would be hesitant to make these comments about the present state of affairs in Northern Ireland if we did not find support for them in the risk assessments which we have considered and in the reports of the Independent Monitoring Commission.

3. We have considered what the Chairman said in paragraphs 14 and 15 of his initial ruling on these applications and adopt them as part of our joint ruling.

"14. I have considered each of [the] risk assessments. There is a general threat against all police officers in Northern Ireland from dissident groups. That threat is thought to be increased because of the Rosemary Nelson affair.

15. In considering the risk assessments I have borne in mind the general threat and have had particular regard to any threat relating to any particular applicant. In considering those threats I have considered their nature, the person or body thought to have been responsible for them, the time when those threats are said to have been made and the fact that in most cases the identity of the officer concerned was known to the person or persons responsible for the threats. In particular I have considered whether there has been any threat which can be seen as related, directly or indirectly, to the death of Robert Hamill or to matters arising out of that death. There has been no such threat although, as stated above, the names of police officers were in the public domain at the time of and in relation to Robert Hamill's death and subsequently and in relation to them when criminal proceedings were brought arising out of death and when there were subsequent investigations."

These comments apply with equal force to the further information received by the Inquiry from the PSNI in response to requests it has made at the instance of the Solicitor for the applicants.

We shall return to the risk assessments when we consider the evidence of those who gave evidence before us and the letter we received from [names redacted]. The cases of the many serving and former officers who have applied for anonymity were all considered by the PSNI. It was in less than half that any risks were revealed and none of these related to the Robert Hamill case. We shall also return to the matter of the extent to which the applicants' names are already in the public domain.

We should explain that by the phrase “no risk assessment” we mean that an assessment was made of whether an applicant was at some risk special to him or her and there was no record of such a risk.

4. The International Monitoring Commission Reports.

In his submissions of the 26 June 2006 Mr O'Hare refers to the decision of the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in Donaghy (decided in February if 2002) in which the court concluded that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was entitled to decide that police officers who were to give evidence before it, and who would be named, should be screened from public view. He asserts that the threat from dissident republican terrorists to members of the security forces was exactly the same then as it is today. He supports this by reference to the reports of the IMC, to the 250lb unexploded bomb recently found in the Lurgan area and to the still more recent arrests of a number of men in relation to terrorist offences.

We do not accept that a careful consideration of the changing trend in violence reported in the sequential reports of the IMC supports Mr O'Hare's contention.

In its 1st report, April 2004, the Commission noted that since the Belfast Agreement in 1998 paramilitary murders had decreased in number (and Mr O'Hare refers to the fact that there have been no killings of police officers since 1998, though the PSNI inform us that these deaths are not seen to have been connected with the Robert Hamill case) but that other paramilitary violence had increased. There had been a greater increase in loyalist than in republican violence.

The 3rd report, November 2004, said that there been a marked reduction in shootings by terrorist groups, the reduction being proportionately higher on the part of republicans than on the part of loyalists. The level of violence for which the PIRA was responsible was reduced.

In its 5th report, May 2005, the Commission noted that the PIRA still had the potential for terrorism but that there was no evidence it intended to resume a campaign of violence. The CIRA was still sporadically active. The RIRA was the most active of the dissident groups and was targeting police officers. Overall, though, the downward trend in violence was continuing with more acts of violence being committed by loyalists than by republicans.

The 7th report noted that there was no evidence that the PIRA was any longer continuing any recruiting or training activities. The CIRA was intermittently active but still improving its capacity for violence. It was still targeting police officers but, despite its ambitions, had not recently shown the capability of mounting a sustained campaign of violence. The position with the RIRA was unchanged.

In its 8th report, February 2006, the Commission reported that the PIRA was indicating a strong desire to adhere to its commitment to peaceful progress. It was probably either the CIRA or the RIRA which had been responsible on two occasions for hoax devices directed against the police or the military. The RIRA was seeking to enhance its capacity and had developed its capacity to gather intelligence on the security forces.

The 10th and latest report covers the months of December 2005 and January and February 2006 and we set out its findings in a little more detail to include what it says about all terrorist groups. It reports that dissident republicans remained determinedly committed to terrorism and were deeply engaged in other crime. However, they were not always able to fulfil their ambitions and had recently been foiled by the police. Current paramilitary activity was geographically unevenly distributed. The CIRA was still active and committed to terrorism and represented a threat. It was still recruiting and training and seeking weaponry. It also practices intimidation. The RIRA was recruiting members and training them and acquiring weaponry. It continued to gather information on targets, including police stations, and had been responsible for violence and shootings. It is also involved in serious crime. However its level of activity was not very high and there is infighting between two factions within this group. The INLA's activity was at a low level but it is potentially serious. It had not been very active but hoped to be able to do more in the future. This organisation was involved in organised crime. Crime in this context means crime committed for gain. The PIRA had committed itself to following a peaceful path. It tries to dissuade its members from engaging in criminal activities, though some of them were still involved in crime.

The LVF's activity was at a relatively low level but it is involved in serious crime. The UDA was engaged in paramilitary activity and was seeking to acquire weaponry. It is also involved in non-terrorist crime. From time to time there was encouragement from the top to withdraw from non-terrorist crime but this encouragement had met with only mixed success. The UVF and the Red Hand Commando had been guilty of violence and sectarian attacks and were engaged in organised crime. They are ruthless and represent a serious threat to the rule of law. It appears that they intend to continue with their paramilitary activity. Some at the top want the movement to move away from criminality but do not have much influence.

Since the 1st October last there had been two paramilitary murders, one in October last year and one in February of this year, neither of them a police or former police officer.

The Report stated that dissident republicans were still committed to terrorism and were heavily involved in serious crime and in violent crime and that criminal activities organised by paramilitaries is a major challenge to law enforcement.

The Commission reported that the trend in violent incidents was down and that significantly more of them were the responsibility of the loyalists rather than the republicans. Loyalists caused 95% of shooting casualties and 76% of casualties resulting from assaults. In the period covered by this report there had been a greater reduction in casualties caused by republicans than in casualties caused by loyalists.

The report points out that overall the number of casualties resulting from paramilitary shootings and assaults had reached a lower level than at any period since the 1st March 2003 when the Commission began its analysis of trends. Republican shootings were down by 50% on the previous 6 months and 71% on the corresponding period in 2005. The corresponding figures for assaults were 63% and 76%. Bearing in mind the pattern of activities reported for the PIRA in the 3rd and subsequent reports we draw the inference that these figures can only be explained by a reduction in the activities of the dissident terrorist groups.

It also provides the figures for murders committed by dissident republicans for the period March 2003 to February 2006. There were no murders committed by the CIRA or the INLA and one murder committed by the RIRA in the period March to August 2003. The victim was a civilian.

Despite the reservations expressed in the Report and what it says about dissident republican ambitions, although we do not suggest there is any room for complacency and a lack of vigilance, it is apparent that overall terrorist crime (as opposed to crimes committed by terrorists for gain) has been decreasing.

5. Recent Terrorist Activity in Northern Ireland.

We do not overlook the recent finding of the unexploded bomb at Lurgan and the arrests made on the 19th of June 2006 of 10 men, said to be dissident republicans. Mr O'Hare lays stress on these incidents as showing that the dangers to the applicants if they should have to give evidence named and unscreened are not fanciful. In our view this finding and these arrests are in line with what the IMC has said in its reports, including its 10th report, about what can be expected of the activities of dissident terrorists. In fact what they tend to show is an ambition on their part to stage some major outrage which would involve indiscriminately inflicting multiple injuries and deaths and widespread damage to property rather than the picking off of selected individuals and members of their families because of some particular act or connection on the part of those individuals. They show also the success of the police in being able to defeat these schemes. We note that the "Guardian" newspaper has commented that the fact that so many dissident operations have been intercepted or disrupted suggests a greater willingness in the national and mainstream republican communities to provide information to the security services.

6. The Stance of the PSNI.

Mr O'Hare understandably underlines the fact that dissident republicans have been targeting police officers. In considering this we consider also his submission that the stance taken by the PSNI in its submission to the Inquiry is a neutral one. That the PSNI has not argued any case for the applicants is entirely understandable bearing in mind that they had their own representation. However, it seems to us that Mr O’Hare is implying that, arising out of the PSNI’s neutral stance, no inference should be drawn adverse to any of the applicants’ cases from the nature of the disclosures it has made relating to risk. We do not take this view.

The material disclosed points out the risks which have been assessed in the past to exist in the case of a number of the applicants. None of these has been related to the case of Robert Hamill or this Inquiry. The PSNI has also pointed out the dangers to which all serving and former officers in Northern Ireland are subject, including the risks posed by the continuing activities of dissident terrorists to those living in the general area of their activities, and the enhanced threat arising in the Portadown and Lurgan areas as the result of the Rosemary Nelson case. However, there has been no suggestion that there has been any material increase of risk to any former or serving officer arising out of being required to give evidence to the Robert Hamill Inquiry named and unscreened.

The PSNI is a public body which would have, whether or not a legal duty, certainly a moral duty to disclose in favour of its officers and former officers and those of its predecessor, the RUC, any material in its possession of material suggesting they would be at risk arising out of the Robert Hamill Inquiry if they were to be required to give evidence named and unscreened. Moreover, the PSNI has applied for and been granted interested party status and we take the view that it has a duty to assist the Inquiry by providing to it material in its possession which is relevant to the fair treatment of the applicants.

The PSNI is in the best position of any body or person to know what are the risks arising from a connection with this Inquiry and from giving evidence to it named and unscreened, including any risk which has come to light as a result of the recent arrests. We are satisfied that the PSNI has made full disclosure of material in its possession relating to risk.

Lest it be thought that such information would be protected by Public Interest Immunity we point out that this would not have prevented the PSNI from providing such information to the Inquiry, and that the risk assessments of which we have spoken already were provided and have been made available, in a mildly redacted form, which excluded no information relevant to the issue of risk, to the applicants' lawyers. We conclude that there is no information arising from the recent arrests to point to the targeting of any of the applicants.

We should add that it is the PSNI’s expectation that if the Independent Monitoring Commission were in possession of information identifying a risk not supplied to it by the PSNI, it would pass this on to the PSNI. The PSNI has not received any such information to date.

7. Media Publicity

8. Condemnatory Attitudes Towards the Police

9. The Significance of the word Collusion

We consider these three factors together. Almost from the time of Robert Hamill's death there has been considerable media interest in his case because of allegations made against police in connection with it and the subsequent investigations. Campaigns were maintained to urge Government to appoint a public inquiry into these allegations. Following discussions and an agreement between the governments of Great Britain and Ireland Justice Cory was asked to look into the Robert Hamill case and others and advise whether public inquiries should be appointed to enquire into any of them. He recommended that a number of inquiries should be appointed, of which the Robert Hamill Inquiry was one, and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland acted accordingly. In short, this Inquiry is a response to pressure mounted by several organisations and by members of the public.

We have considered carefully the submissions made to us by Mr O'Hare about developing media attention. We have considered also what those applicants who gave evidence to us have said about media attention. A new word has been used in their vocabulary in speaking of media interest and the allegations made against the police, namely, collusion. This word is used in the Cory Report not, as erroneously suggested in evidence, in our terms of reference. In our judgment this does not change the allegations which have been in circulation since the Robert Hamill case was taken up by interested parties, not least by the Hamill and Girvan families

There has never been a time when the campaigning, provoked by the perception of fault and wrongdoing on the part of police officers, has gone to sleep and the evidence, in our view does not show that condemnatory attitudes have grown stronger as a result of or since the setting up of this Inquiry. We do, though, conclude that some of those who gave evidence have latched on to the word collusion without asking themselves whether, in substance, it has changed or added to the allegations in circulation before this word was used in Justice Cory's report. It is clear from what we heard in evidence and the material before us that it has not. It was the allegations already made against the police which attracted the description of collusion in his report. We are ready to accept, however, that this word may have added to the fears of some without adding any further substance to the fears they had before the publication of the Cory report.

10. Names in the Public Domain

11. No harm has been suffered by any of the applicants

We deal with these two factors together. Witnesses have said that the fact of their involvement, however peripherally, with the investigations which followed Robert Hamill's death has not hitherto been generally known and that to give evidence as named witnesses, able to be seen by the public, places them in the public spotlight in a way which has not happened before and, as a consequence, places them at a risk to which they have not formerly been subjected. But Portadown is not a very large town. Further, it is an aspect of human nature that for those who might wish ill to police officers because of the events including and following the attack on Robert Hamill the target of their animosity is likely to have been the local police force of Portadown because of the alleged actions and malpractices of members of that force. (This may not apply in the case of any officer who later became involved and who would not be seen as part of the Portadown police.) The history of the Troubles in Northern Ireland is, all too sadly, littered with cases of terrorist activity against victims chosen for no better reason than that they were members of a group against whom perpetrators had a grudge, rather than for what they themselves had done. As we have said already we consider that indiscriminate violence of that kind would now be condemned on all sides.

It is common ground that criticisms of the police have generated considerable attention in the media. Many of the applicants are or were Portadown police officers who lived and who still live in the locality of Portadown. (See Appendix 2 which shows, where this is known to the Inquiry, which officers were stationed at Portadown police station.)

It can be expected that officers who work in a particular locality which is not part of a large city and who can be seen out and about in the area in which they work will be known by members of the local populace by sight and, in some cases, by name. It is not suggested that the local populace in Portadown does not include both republican and loyalist sympathizers. It is therefore unrealistic to suggest that if there are terrorists who wish ill to police officers connected with Portadown, or some of them, they do not already have and have for some years had the opportunity to recognise and identify them or that they have allowed themselves to remain in ignorance of whether or not they have a connection with the Robert Hamill case. Any ill will is not going to be of recent birth bearing in mind it is nine years now since Robert Hamill's death and the vigorous campaigning and the very considerable media attention to his case over the years since.

Witnesses who gave evidence before us say, though, that if their names have been known they will have passed out of their ill wishers' minds but will be brought back to their recollection if they give evidence named and unscreened. In our view this overlooks the fact that the Robert Hamill case has never ceased to be a focus of critical attention. It also ignores the mindset, more common perhaps, in Northern Ireland than in Great Britain (the result, it may be, and partly a cause of Ireland's unhappy history) of looking back to the past. Ill wishers must have many conduits of information, witting or unwitting, from whom they can gather information.

Mr O'Hare comments in paragraph 29 of his third submission on the fact that in December 2004 the BIRW announced that it had not disclosed on its website or in its submissions to the Inquiry the identity of certain persons in order to preserve their right to life and to a fair trial. He submits this is a responsible acknowledgement that to publish the identities of police officers involved in the Inquiry would be to create a risk to their right to life and provides an example of an objective justification for the subjective fears of the applicants.

As to that we make two observations. Firstly, BRIW has not had access, as we have, to the risk assessments. Secondly, its decision may have been motivated by a consciousness of the unwisdom, as a body which values its own sense of and its reputation for responsibility, of publishing identities which it must know, from its knowledge of the conduct of public inquiries, might have the effect of pre-empting decisions on applications for anonymity which, in the nature of things, might well be made to an inquiry like the Robert Hamill Inquiry.

Mr O'Hare also makes the point that the police officers have nothing to fear from the Hamill and Girvan families. It is not clear whether this is intended to suggest that these families would never provide information to others. However, as we have said already, the Hamill family has been vigorously engaged over the years in campaigning for a public inquiry. In two letters to the Inquiry, written in June and August of 2005, the solicitor for the applicants complained of a sustained campaign of vilification of the RUC and the officers involved, attempting to blame them for Robert Hamill's death and that this campaign had been supported by various political parties. We recognise that what one side in a dispute may regard as a campaign of vilification may be regarded by the other side as the pursuit of justice. Where the truth lies is something to be investigated in our hearings and we do not attempt to form any view at this stage.

It seems likely that the members of the Hamill family and, probably through them, those with whom they have already discussed Robert Hamill's case know most, if not all, of the names of those police officers who were involved in it. In our view it would be unrealistic to assume that anonymity would prevent members of the Hamill family from continuing to talk among themselves and to their friends and supporters and mentioning names. It follows that, without the need for any malicious intent on their part, it is likely that names not only have but would continue to receive a wider circulation.

We accept the submissions by Counsel to the Inquiry that the risk to officers connected with the Robert Hamill case would have been at its most acute during the trial of Mr Hobson, charged with and acquitted of murder. That was in 1999 when the general level of threat to police officers was significantly greater than at the present time. Even so, police officers gave evidence, named and unscreened. The trial was conducted against the background of an outstanding complaint of criminal neglect of duty made against those in the Land Rover by Rosemary Nelson on behalf of the Hamill family. This unresolved complaint was referred to in the course of evidence and in the judgment of the trial judge. Notwithstanding this no serving or former police officer has suffered any reprisal either at that time or in the years since.

The records of the officers identified in the course of the Hobson trial show it was not considered necessary to carry out risk assessments. Nor do they show any actual or perceived threat to any officer resulting from being identified in those proceedings either at the time of them or since. Any suggestion that the Robert Hamill Inquiry will be shining a spotlight for the first time on the Robert Hamill case and those involved in it would plainly be wrong. It is clear from what we have said already about the genesis of this Inquiry that its appointment is the result of all the publicity surrounding Robert Hamill's death, rather than the cause of it.

Mr O'Hare submits that the fact that no harm has come in the years since Robert Hamill's death to those officers connected with his case is irrelevant. He argues that the fact that nothing has happened to any of them so far does not show that there can be no risk for them in the future. We accept that safety in the past does not provide a guarantee of safety in the future. That, though, does not make the consideration of safety in the past irrelevant when one comes to assess future risks. It is plainly a positive and weighty factor to be put in the balance against the assertion that there will be risks in the future if witnesses have to give evidence named and unscreened. We think it relevant also to refer to the police officers who gave evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry named but screened (the Donaghy case). No suggestion has been made to us that any of these officers has suffered any reprisal as a result of being connected as witnesses with the Bloody Sunday Inquiry and named. We assume that the applicants must between them have a network of information available to them so that we would have been informed if there had been any reprisals. Nor has any such information been provided by the PSNI. Certainly none of them has been killed by terrorists.

Counsel to the Inquiry submits that those officers who are likely to be most controversially involved because of their activities in connection with Robert Hamill's death are those who are most known. He gives details in paragraph 19b of his first submission. We accept what he says.

We point out also that the applicants who are or had been police officers made a proper concession through their solicitors that their names could be put to potential witnesses for the purpose of obtaining evidence for the Inquiry. There were more than 200 people at the scene of the attack involving Robert Hamill, including the Protestants and Catholics. The interviewing of these is now almost complete. Most of them have been or will be told what has already been said about them in the statements made by others in order to obtain their response. Wherever, therefore, a police officer made a statement at the time of the investigations into Robert Hamill's death and has named an individual his name has been made known to those already interviewed and will be made known to those who have yet to be interviewed.

Appended to this ruling is Appendix 3 which lists the serving and former police officer applicants from which it can be discerned in the case of each officer the extent to which they have been identified with the Robert Hamill investigation.

Our conclusion is that with one exception, [name redacted], the identities of all the serving and former police officer applicants are to a greater or lesser extent within the public domain.

Additionally, as can be gathered from Appendix 3, there are quite a number of the applicants, for example the four officers who were in the police Land Rover who, even if they gave evidence unnamed and screened, would be able to be identified from the part they played in events.

12. The ability of the applicants to identify and locate the applicants

It is clear to us that if there are terrorists who have or might in the future have hostile designs against a serving or former police officer who gives evidence to this Inquiry screening and withholding his or her name would be of no avail. The identity of such a person is likely to be known already and could in any event be readily established.

13. There are other Serving and Former Officers who will not be anonymous

Save for one person, of all the serving and former police officers who are likely to be called as witnesses only the applicants, all represented by the same solicitor, have pursued an application for anonymity to a hearing de novo before the full Panel. The others have either not made any application or not pursued it beyond a paper application to the Chairman.

Submissions have been made about whether or not it would be giving preferential treatment to them if they were to be granted anonymity when other serving and former police officers have not been. We accept that Mr O'Hare is right when he submits that if the applicants make out their case they are entitled to succeed in their applications for anonymity regardless of the position of other serving and former officers. Our task is to apply the law correctly and to deal fairly with the applications which are before us.

This is not to say, though, that the position of these other serving and former officers is irrelevant. We attach modest significance to the fact that they do not appear to have found the risk to them or their fears sufficiently strong or well founded to bring them before the full Panel.

Mr O'Hare has submitted, without saying why, that the cases of those whom he represents cannot be equated with those of the civilian witnesses who are alleged to have taken part in attack on Robert Hamill. If he means that by being the subject of serious allegations the civilians can have no entitlement to anonymity he overlooks the fact that some of the applicants also face allegations which, for a police officer, are serious and we would reject his point. We would stress, though, that, whether made against police officers or civilians, they are at this stage allegations and not findings. It may be that Mr O'Hare meant no more than that the civilian witnesses are not subject to the risks which serving and former police officers face.

The Hobson trial for the murder of Robert Hamill took place in 1999. It was a high profile trial. Consideration was given to making an application for anonymity for police officers who would be giving evidence. However, it was decided by the department of the Director of Public Prosecutions that such an application would not succeed and it was not pursued. Mr O’Hare submits that this decision is to be explained by reference to Article 6 which entitled the accused to know the names of their accusers and to see who they were. In fact, if there had been a real risk of safety to life or limb of the officers, Article 2 would not have permitted a derogation so as to give effect to Article 6. This is a factor we take into account, though it could not be on its own a decisive factor.

14. Reporting the names of police officer witnesses in the media

In fact police officers are daily giving evidence in criminal courts in Northern Ireland, giving their names and able to be seen by defendants, other witnesses and members of the public. Mr O'Hare counters this in paragraph 16 of his third submission by saying that in Northern Ireland when the media record and publish the evidence of police officers in court invariably their identities are not published. To demonstrate his point he appends to his submission a copy taken from the BBC Northern Ireland News website relating to the recent arrests which says only that "a Detective Chief Superintendent told the court….". He continues by saying this is the way in which court proceedings in Northern Ireland are invariably reported in the local media and that a police officer giving his name in open court would remain anonymous to anyone reading the news item unless the officer had chosen to reveal his identity.

Mr O'Hare, as it seems to us, seeks to strengthen his point by the two final sentences of paragraph 16:

"As one of the witnesses, in oral evidence put it, giving evidence in criminal cases is part of normal police work. Giving evidence in an Inquiry like this is not."

Two witnesses spoke in answer to Mr O'Hare's questions about the difference, as they saw it, between giving evidence to the Inquiry and giving evidence in court. They were [names redacted]. Both of them spoke about what they saw as the difference between the two occasions but neither of them suggested that the name of an officer giving evidence in court would not be disclosed in the media.

We cannot accept what Mr O'Hare submits about the withholding of police officers' names in the media. He gains no support from the evidence of [names redacted]. The report of the recent arrests to whose contents we referred earlier named the officer heading the investigation. Also the Inquiry has received a letter from the News Editor of the “Belfast Telegraph” in which he writes:

“Our normal policy is to name police officers that give evidence in court. Police officers who do not give evidence would not normally be named. However, if a name is spoken aloud in court then that name may well appear in print.”

We are informed by the publication “News Letter” that its normal editorial policy is to name police officers unless the court orders otherwise.

Research by the Inquiry staff shows that the “Irish News” only very rarely refers to police officers by name.

The applicants’ solicitor has commented that the Inquiry did not enquire what was the press policy in relation to “terrorist related cases”. As to this we make two comments. The answers to which we were referred were not in any way qualified. Secondly, we were dealing with Mr O’Hare’s submission, made as being of universal application that names are not published by the media. Nor does the death of Robert Hamill seem to us to be a “terrorist related” case.

We would add that, in considering whether or not police officers remain anonymous and unknown as police officers so far as the general public are concerned, it needs to be remembered that on many occasions officers who give evidence in court are stationed in the same locality as the court and will often be resident in that area and be known to the community either by sight or by name or both. This is the case with many of the applicants.

The evidence we have reviewed, taken without the evidence of the applicants who appeared before us and the letter from [names redacted], would lead us to conclude that the three parts of the question set out in paragraph 1 must all be answered in the negative. We must consider now, though, the evidence of those applicants and that letter to see whether in any of their cases question one is to be answered differently. We have to consider also whether what any of them has had to say adds to the cases of those who did not give evidence in support of the application they make pursuant to Article 2.

Witnesses

[There now follows a summary and consideration of the evidence of the witnesses and the letter]

It is clear from our review of the evidence of the witnesses that we reject their cases that for them to give evidence named and unscreened would add materially to the risk to which they are already subject as serving and former police officers. It follows from this that evidence provides no support for any similar contention advanced on behalf of the other serving and former police officers.

[specific reference to the case of an applicant redacted]

Accordingly the applications made by all the serving and former police officers under Article 2 are rejected.

Common Law

Mr O'Hare’s submissions about the existence of risk and fear have focused on the cases of serving and former police officers who have applied for anonymity. We cannot see that the submissions bear on the single applicant to be considered who falls within Counsel to the Inquiry's fourth group. [name redacted] is not and never has been a police officer in whose case it is intended to adduce in evidence the statement he has made.

We do not have before us in his case any evidence about his fears such as to show that to read his statement, giving his name, would place him or his wife at risk to life or limb or that it would adversely affect his health. His application at common law must therefore be rejected.

We turn now to the serving and former police officers in Counsel to the Inquiry's first and second groups.

What those who gave evidence told us can provide evidence about the climate of fear which prevails among their colleagues and former colleagues and, by exemplifying how they see their own positions, give us some further insight into the fears of those colleagues and former colleagues. Having said this, they cannot tell us about any special fears from particular incidents which those colleagues and former colleagues may have experienced.

We have to strike a fair and humane balance between the applicants' fears and the other factors which fall for consideration.

In assessing the weight to be attached to what we regard as understandable fears in the light of the troubled times Northern Ireland has experienced over many years, referred to by Mr O'Hare in his submissions, we nonetheless consider it right, when balancing those fears against the public interest, to take into account the very significant fact that they are not well founded in fact, particularly having regard to the words of Lord Woolf in re A.

In deciding what weight should be given to them it is also right and an important factor to be weighed against subjective fears that, despite what dissident republicans might wish and try to do, there has, as we have pointed out already, been a significant improvement in the tenor of life in Northern Ireland since the worst times of the Troubles and that people are beginning to experience a life less fraught with danger and are gaining hope.

We spoke earlier of the effect of the introduction of the term collusion and expressed our views about this. It is sufficient to say in relation to the common law application that in so far as subjective fears have been increased by the use of this term a rational examination of the criticisms made of the police before and after it became current in relation to the Robert Hamill Inquiry would show it had in fact added nothing. We take the view that we should not be influenced in these circumstances by any heightening of subjective fear by the introduction of this term.

A somewhat similar point arises from some of the witnesses who gave evidence. They were unaware that their names had been made public in the Hobson trial. None of them, though, has said that he tried to find out if his name had been mentioned. We find this surprising in view of the concern which they now express. It suggests, as we conclude, that their fears have increased in their minds as result of dwelling on them.

Finally on the question of fear we refer to a letter of the 8th August 2005 written by the applicants' solicitor to the Secretary to the Inquiry in which he said:

"If I have not managed to do so before, I want to convey to you the climate of fear which obtains among some of my clients at the prospect of being required to give evidence about the circumstances surrounding the attack on Robert Hamill. I do not mean specifically this Inquiry - I mean about giving evidence in public to any investigation. The fear is very real and arises out of a belief - whether rational or irrational – that their lives will be placed in danger if they give evidence in public."

It seems to us that so generalised a fear has more of the irrational than rational in it.

We do not think it would be helpful to attempt any further elaboration of the general fears arising firstly from those risks which all serving and former officers face and secondly from the criticisms and hostility directed from some quarters against the police handling of the various aspects of the Robert Hamill case.

The Balancing Exercise

Mr O'Hare accepts that the Inquiry's terms of reference make the openness with which it conducts its proceedings particularly important. He qualifies this by saying it is not an overriding factor. We accept this but, save to say it is not a decisive factor at every turn, it helps us to decide what weight it should be given.

He goes on to say that the applicants feel they are on trial and that this is the perception of the general public. We view a sweeping assertion of this kind, unsupported as it is by evidence, as speculative. However, we are prepared to assume there is a substantial element of the public which holds the view that there are those among the police officers who had dealings with the Robert Hamill case who have something to answer for. Mr O'Hare submits that there are limits to openness which the public interest can require of the Inquiry's proceedings. These limits are dictated by the competing right to fairness of the serving and former police officers and their families, who have a real and genuine fear of the risks to themselves and their families if their applications for anonymity should be rejected. And as for the public's confidence in policing, that is not the Inquiry's concern Mr O'Hare tells us.

If one asks what is the public interest in the Robert Hamill Inquiry, Mr O'Hare provides the answer when he asserts what is the public perception: it is to see that the conduct of police officers in relation to Robert Hamill's death are carefully investigated. But he would have us accept the proposition that all those whom he represents, those who are criticised and those who are not, should explain themselves and speak of their colleagues and civilians shielded by a cloak of secrecy as to their identity. Nor is it an answer to say that the Panel will know the names and ranks of the witnesses and be able to report on them freely to the Secretary of State because when he publishes his report it will be expected of him that he should abide by our ruling on the issue of anonymity. We asked rhetorically, what will this do to engender public confidence in our findings. To put it bluntly, it simply would not wash with the public, and rightly so, to tell them that the members of the Panel know and the Secretary of State knows who behaved badly, if anyone did, but that they do not need to know.

In considering the significance of the inroad anonymity would make on openness it is necessary to look at the context in which this Inquiry is being held and the reasons why it was appointed and the public expectations arising from this.

There was sufficient public concern about whether the police had dealt appropriately with the Robert Hamill case for there to be an agreement between the Irish and British governments that, with certain other cases, it should be looked at by a judge of international repute so that he might decide whether the facts merited a public inquiry. Justice Cory investigated and recommended that there should be a public inquiry into the Robert Hamill case and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland acted on his advice and set up the Robert Hamill Inquiry. In his recommendations Justice Cory said at paragraph 2.261:

"If this public inquiry is to proceed and if it is to achieve the benefits of determining flaws in the system and suggesting the required remedy, and if it is to restore public confidence in the police and the judicial system, it should be held as quickly as possible."

When setting up this Inquiry the Secretary of State said, in explaining his purpose:

“It is essential that all people in Northern Ireland can have confidence in the integrity of the state and its institutions. Where there are serious allegations of wrongdoing it is important that the facts are properly established. It is important that we find a way in Northern Ireland of dealing with the past in the way that recognizes the pain associated with it without allowing it to destroy all hope of a better future”

We find assistance in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the submission made by the British Irish Rights Watch and the Committee on the Administration of Justice. In paragraph 6 it is pointed out that the allegations made in this case are so serious that they engage the public interest. Otherwise, it is pointed out, there would have been no public inquiry in the first place. Paragraph 7 states:

"Secondly, police officers are public servants. Society gives them extraordinary powers not granted to ordinary citizens, such as the power to search, detain and question people, to carry weapons, and to deprive others of their liberty. Police officers carry these powers in order that the rule of law can be maintained. Police officers play an important role in the administration of justice and it is not in the public interest that they should do so anonymously, except in exceptional circumstances."

The paragraph goes on to refer to the exceptional circumstance where there is a genuine risk to personal safety but we have rejected the case under Article 2.

Mr McGrory, in his submissions for the Hamill family, makes a number of points. He says, and we agree, that the public perception of the impartiality of public inquiries is vital to their success. Without the consent of the community to be policed those in whose trust that task has been placed are destined to fail. This principle, he points out, was recognised by the authors of the Belfast Agreement when it was agreed to set up what became the Patten Commission, to examine policing in Northern Ireland. If, as he says, the broader Nationalist community still has its reservations about policing the openness of the Inquiry’s proceedings is all the more important. He submits that in the context of events in Northern Ireland known as The Troubles and since, "This is no ordinary inquiry and one in which the principal of openness is exceptionally important.". We accept this.

We cannot accept, though, Mr O'Hare's proposition that the public confidence in policing is none of our business. It flies in the face of Justice Cory's remarks, quoted above, words from which the Secretary of State did not dissent. Moreover, Mr O'Hare overlooks the fact that we are also charged with the duty to make recommendations. It is plainly within our remit to make recommendations which may help to bolster the public's confidence in the police. Moreover, if any recommendations we may make are worthy of adoption the public's confidence in the impartiality of the Inquiry which made them would be an important factor in persuading acceptance of those likely to be affected by them. In our view to offer the cloak of secrecy, when unease about the conduct of the police has led to the setting up of this Inquiry, would make an unacceptable inroad into the openness of our proceedings and give rise to doubts among a significant proportion of the populace about our impartiality. As Counsel to the Inquiry cogently puts it in his first submission:

"If the Inquiry were to anonymise, or screen, the very people whose actions the Inquiry was designed to illuminate, it would serve to undermine public confidence in the process."

In the light of the context in which this Inquiry was set up we do not find persuasive Mr O'Hare's propositions that anonymity would not detract from its openness and would make only a limited inroad into openness.

To grant anonymity would also put practical difficulties in the way of the Inquiry’s task to try to establish the truth. We can do no better than quote paragraphs 25 and 26 of Counsel to the Inquiry's first submission:

"25. The first question for the Inquiry to determine is whether the RUC officers present at the scene facilitated the murder. There were, eventually, about 17 officers at the scene. It was a melee. The events are now nine years old, and memories will have faded. The task of the Inquiry will be to call as many of the witnesses who were present at the scene as is possible and to elicit what they saw. In particular it will have to assess what actions each officer took. It is impossible to see how that can usefully be done if the officers cannot be seen by the witnesses and cannot be identified by name. The difficulties in the way reconstructing the events of the night are formidable, and it would be wrong to add to them.

“26. So far as the investigations are concerned the problem of identification is less pressing. Nonetheless it will still be important for the purpose of eliciting evidence from some witnesses…”

Counsel goes on to explain the difficulties created by redacting 1000s of documents. However, this is not a consideration which forms any part of the basis of our decision.

Further, not only may it be difficult for the Panel to understand to whom a witness is referring when he speaks of another witness if that other cannot be named or be seen by the first witness it may be difficult also for the public to follow and understand the evidence. If this were to happen, as it might on important points, it would defeat the purpose of holding the inquiry in public.

There will also be civilian witnesses who may be identified or described by police witnesses as having played a part in the violence on the night in question. They have a legitimate interest in seeing and knowing their accusers. For example, if a police officer were to be screened and unnamed and said he saw Mr Brown doing something, Mr Brown could be denied the opportunity of saying whether the officer was where he says he was or disputing the identification in other ways, based, for example, on having seen an officer whom he is able to recognise, or whose name he knows, and being able to deny that the officer was where he says he was. It is true that the Inquiry's terms of reference are directed to the activities of the police. However, as there were many civilians as well as police on the ground it may not be possible to determine what a police officer did in a vacuum. It may be necessary to try to place his action in a sequence of events, which may depend upon what others did and when they did it.

Another factor we bear in mind is that there will be some officers who, even though screened and unnamed, can be identified by the role they played by those who already have some knowledge of events and the people involved.

Having weighed the material before us about the applicants’ fears and Mr O’Hare’s submissions in favour of the applications, which we have taken into account though we have not referred to each and every one, we have come to the clear conclusion that the applications for anonymity based on common law in the case of those which are not supported by medical reports must also be rejected. It is our firm view that the balance comes down heavily against them.

The Medical Reports

In the case of each of those applicants for whom we have been supplied with a medical report we have to add to the factors we set out earlier, the medical considerations relating to his or her state of health and the effect on him or her of being required to give evidence named and unscreened and to carry out the balancing exercise, considering all factors, in order to decide how the balance should be struck. Without them these applications would have failed along with the others. The factors for and against upon which we have based our decision in those other cases apply in these cases also. However, we have considered the reports individually and, in the case of each subject, have considered the balancing exercise afresh to determine whether, having regard to what they tell us about the subject, a different balance should be struck.

[There follows a summary and consideration of the medical reports]

It has been made clear much earlier that addresses and other contact details will not be made known unless, in any particular case, there is a compelling reason.

We think it right to conclude this ruling by repeating the direction we gave on the second day of our sitting in Belfast.

There will be no televising in the Inquiry chamber.

No likenesses are to be made in the Inquiry chamber, in other words, no newspaper artists or anything of that kind will be allowed.

Press cameras and television cameras will not be allowed in the Inquiry chamber or in any part of the building controlled by the Inquiry.

No mobile phones or cameras of any kind will be allowed into the Inquiry chamber or in those parts of the building controlled by the Inquiry.

Suitable and suitably located warning notices will be posted relating to these directions.

Publicity will be given on the Inquiry’s web site to these directions.

There will be a screened entrance into the Inquiry’s car park and from the car park into the building.

3 August 2006