

recollection whatsoever, as to what he may have said to the officers.

14.16 When you consider the fact that at that early stage of the investigation, some 24 hours after Robert Hamill had died, there does appear to be little merit or advantage, in treating Timothy Jameson as a witness as opposed to a suspect. All the investigating officer's interviewed are adamant that if the information passed by Constable's McCaw and G [redacted] was as described, they would have sought to arrest Timothy Jameson immediately. This is a factor, which has some merit.

14.17 Timothy Jameson has refused to co-operate with this office. The revelation made by Constable G [redacted] resulted in the arrest and re-interview of Timothy Jameson. Following submission of a Crime File, by K [redacted] the DPP directed that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute.

14.18 It is unfortunate that neither former P39 [redacted] nor DC McAteer agreed to assist further with the PONI investigation.

15.0 **Misconduct Recommendations**

15.01 The murder of Robert Hamill raised wide scale community concern from the start. There was early speculation that the police sat by and 'watched' the attack take place and did not intervene. That particular allegation is not dealt with in this report but is relevant in that the SIO should have realised that he was conducting an investigation in the glare of media and public scrutiny. It makes the failures identified all the more significant.

15.02 In relation to DI Irwin, it is accepted that he found himself placed in a very difficult position, particularly after the departure of his immediate line manager DCI P39 [redacted]. During interview it is clear that he at least understood the perception within the community that "local police were investigating local police". The evidence indicates that he made every effort to bring this to the attention of both his supervisors and the ICPC.