1 1 2 3 4 5 6 - - - - - - - - - - 7 8 9 PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF 10 ROBERT HAMILL 11 12 - - - - - - - - - - 13 14 15 Held at: 16 Interpoint 17 20-24 York Street 18 Belfast 19 20 on Wednesday, 14th January 2009 21 commencing at 12.00 noon 22 23 Day 2 24 25 1 1 Wednesday, 14th January 2009 2 (12.00 noon) 3 Extracts of medical witness statements and post mortem read 4 by MR UNDERWOOD 5 MR UNDERWOOD: Good morning, sir, I was addressing you 6 yesterday on the medical questions. What I was 7 proposing to do was read some materials created by 8 Professor Crane, Dr Herron and Dr Lawler. 9 Had we not been running so ahead of schedule, 10 I would have called those learned gentlemen before 11 reading on, but what I propose to do instead is read 12 some of their materials so as to make sense of what 13 I will then propose to read, which is a series of 14 witness statements from other doctors. 15 May I start with the post mortem report of 16 Professor Crane, which one finds at page [00954]. 17 I hope I will be forgiven for not referring explicitly 18 to a great deal of this, but, rather, to go to the 19 conclusions which one finds starting at page [00959]. 20 Perhaps we could highlight everything from "Commentary" 21 down. Thank you. 22 "This young man died in hospital eleven days after he 23 had been assaulted. 24 "Death was as a result of the head injuries which he 25 had sustained. Externally his injuries appeared 2 1 trivial; there was a small area of abrasion on the left 2 side of the forehead, a bruise on the upper eyelid of 3 the left eye and a small spot of abrasion close to the 4 left nostril. Even internally, the injuries did not 5 seem particularly severe, with only two areas of 6 bruising on each side of the undersurface of the scalp 7 and a small almost hairline fracture in the front part 8 of the skull running into the roof of the left eye 9 socket. 10 "Detailed examination of the brain, however, and in 11 particular its microscopic examination, revealed 12 widespread damage within its substance of a type known 13 as diffuse axonal injury. This condition, most 14 frequently encountered in acceleration/deceleration 15 injury as a result of road traffic accidents, is also 16 well recognised as occurring as the result of repeated 17 blows to the head such as by punching or kicking and 18 this would seem the most likely mechanism of injury in 19 this case. It was ultimately the effects of the brain 20 injury which were eventually responsible for his death 21 in hospital. 22 "He had also sustained some other injuries, although 23 none of these were serious enough to have played any 24 part in his death. There was a fading bruise on the 25 front of the abdomen and some further bruising in the 3 1 muscles of the abdominal wall, which could have been due 2 to blows during the assault. There were numerous 3 bruises on the left upper limb, particularly on the 4 forearm and hand, which could have been sustained if the 5 arm was struck whilst raised in a defensive gesture. 6 A few further bruises were located on the right upper 7 limb, but some of these were probably related to 8 injections given whilst in hospital. A fairly large 9 area of bruising overlying the right side of the pelvis 10 was due to blunt force and might have been caused by 11 a kick." 12 Then going over the page, if we may, to [00960], 13 and, again, could we highlight all of it, please: 14 "The autopsy also revealed some changes in the lungs 15 caused in part probably by a period of assisted 16 ventilation and also by the terminal aspiration of 17 stomach contents, but these findings are unlikely to 18 have contributed to or accelerated death. 19 "In view of the lapse of time between the assault 20 and his death, an analysis for the presence of alcohol 21 was not carried out following the autopsy. On his 22 initial admission to hospital, however, an analysis 23 carried out at that time revealed an alcohol 24 concentration of 221 mg per 100 ml. 25 "Such a level would leave no doubt that he was 4 1 moderately intoxicated at the time of the incident. 2 Also, it is well recognised that alcohol intoxication 3 exacerbates the effects of head injuries and may well 4 have played a part in the fatal outcome in this case." 5 So there we have the post mortem analysis revealed 6 as it was by November 1997. 7 If we move on then to material produced by 8 Dr Herron, we see at page [31395] some notes. As I have 9 said, he is a neuropathologist. Professor Crane asked 10 him to examine sections of the brain and advise 11 Professor Crane. 12 These are notes which bear two dates. If we look 13 over on page [31396] briefly, one sees two dates, 14 7th August 1997 and 29th October 1997. Dr Herron will 15 be asked to explain the distinction between those two 16 dates and their importance. 17 Going back over to [31395] if we could magnify under 18 "Histology", please, the lower half of the page: 19 "Histology. 20 "Sections were taken from the right and left frontal 21 lobes, corpus callosum, left and right hippocampi, 22 hypothalamus, cerebellum, midbrain and pons. 23 "Frontal lobe: examination of the sections from the 24 right and left frontal lobes shows the presence of white 25 matter contusions. This is associated with tissue 5 1 necrosis and macrophage reaction. Surrounding this 2 there is extensive diffuse axonal damage. There 3 is no evidence of hypoxic/ischaemic necrosis of the 4 adjacent cortex. There is no meningoencephalitis. 5 "Corpus callosum: examination shows diffuse axonal 6 damage. 7 "Left internal capsule: examination shows extensive 8 diffuse axonal damage. 9 "Hypothalamus: examination shows no evidence of 10 haemorrhagic necrosis. There is, however, axonal damage 11 in the hypothalamic region." 12 Then if we go over the page, [31396] and if all of 13 it can be highlighted, please: 14 "Mid-brain: examination shows diffuse axonal damage. 15 There is no secondary brain stem haemorrhage. The 16 substantia nigra shows no evidence of degenerative 17 change. 18 "Pons: examination shows the features of severe 19 diffuse axonal damage. 20 "Cerebellum: examination shows no evidence of 21 cortical necrosis. The Purkinje cells are preserved. 22 A small gliotic scar is present in the white matter. 23 "Immunohistochemistry for neurofilament protein 24 and for the myelin stain LFB/H&E confirms the 25 distribution and severity of diffuse axonal damage. 6 1 "Comment: 2 "In summary, the predominant finding in this case is 3 the severe diffuse axonal damage. Diffuse axonal damage 4 is thought to be due to interruption of movement of 5 cytoplasm through axons, with subsequent accumulation of 6 axonal material seen on H&E examination as small 7 eosinophilic bulbs. In this case, it was distributed 8 throughout the deep white matter, corpus callosum and 9 brain stem. This pattern of damage is consistent with 10 being caused by trauma. It is indicative of a severe 11 head injury." 12 So that was, as it were, the intricate finding upon 13 which Professor Crane based his conclusions as to the 14 cause of death. 15 As I said yesterday, the Inquiry thought it best not 16 left there, bearing in mind the degree of contention 17 there had been about this, and so instructed Dr Lawler. 18 What I would like to do now is take you to three 19 reports of his. As I say, I am going to call, in due 20 course, Professor Crane, Dr Herron and Dr Lawler. 21 If we go to page [72226], one sees Dr Lawler's 22 initial opinion. If I just for the moment pause on the 23 documents that the doctor read, under "Documents": 24 "I have read all the documents provided to me by 25 Ms Fitzmaurice. 7 1 "The deceased's medical records 2 " - Craigavon Area Hospital notes 3 " - Royal Victoria Hospital, Belfast, notes 4 " - Neurosurgical Unit notes 5 " - Coroner's investigation file 6 "Professor Crane's autopsy report 7 "The Cory Collusion Inquiry Report 8 "Transcripts of the evidence given at trial by 9 Professor Crane" 10 He had also looked at photographs and copies of the 11 slides prepared for Professor Crane. We will see in due 12 course that he was also informed by what I read out 13 yesterday from Dr Helen Reid, who herself looked at the 14 slides which had been considered by Dr Herron. 15 If I can take you to page [72238], I will run 16 through quite a lot of this, if I may, because what 17 Dr Lawler carefully does is set out for us in a fairly 18 neat fashion, if I might respectfully say so, all the 19 findings on autopsy. They go to the degree of physical 20 injury that may or may not have had anything to do with 21 the head injuries, but which may assist you, of course, 22 in determining the assault or what happened during the 23 assault. 24 So picking it up at "Injuries sustained on 25 27.04.97": 8 1 "I must confess that I find determination of the 2 injuries sustained by the deceased on 27.04.97 much 3 more difficult than I had anticipated. This is, 4 I think, partly due to the inadequacy of the clinical 5 and the nursing notes made on 27.04.97, and partly due 6 to the duration of survival of eleven days before death, 7 with the consequent modifications, by healing, of the 8 injuries. 9 "Perhaps I could address each body area in turn, and 10 try to draw some reasonable conclusions:- 11 "(a) SIDES OF THE HEAD. 12 "Clearly there was a bruise on each side." 13 I need to say I think no more than that in that 14 paragraph. If I go down to the next paragraph: 15 "These presumably represent at least one blunt force 16 impact to each side, and more than one impact may well 17 have been involved; I would have thought that punches, 18 kicks and/or stamps are likely to have been responsible. 19 "I note referenceS in the Nursing Notes to 20 an abrasion on the left side. This suggests possible 21 contact with a rough surface (eg the roadway) and 22 I therefore wonder whether the left side of the 23 deceased's head was in contact with the roadway when the 24 injury to the right side of his head was inflicted." 25 Going over the page, [72239] under (b), "BACK OF THE HEAD": 2 "At one point, this was described as a 'small wound 3 approximately 1 cm long occiput'." 4 Going down two paragraphs: 5 "The Cory Report refers to 'blood on the collar and 6 back of Robert Hamill's jacket'", it gives a page 7 reference, "and the forensic scientist that worked on the 8 case noted that the back and collar of Robert Hamill's 9 jacket was 'extensively bloodstained'. The presence of 10 an open wound in the area of the back of the deceased's 11 head could, I am sure, explain the source of some, if 12 not all, of the blood responsible for this 13 blood staining." 14 If I go down to (c), "LEFT EYE": 15 "The autopsy photographs clearly show bruising into 16 the left upper eyelid and there may also be some more 17 extensive, local, fading and diffusing bruising." 18 Over the page, [72240], (d), "IMPACT WITH THE ROADWAY?": 19 "There is a constellation of four findings in this 20 case, all of which, in my opinion, could have resulted 21 from a forceful impact with the roadway - as in, for 22 example, a fall over backwards following a punch or 23 a push. Two of these have been considered above, but 24 there are two others; these four are:- 25 "(i). Occipital scalp injury. There is no doubt 10 1 that the injury to the back of the head, considered under 2 (b) above, could have resulted from an impact with the 3 roadway. 4 "(ii). Left orbital roof fracture. It is very well 5 recognised that fractures of the orbital roof, where the 6 bone is very thin, can be caused indirectly by forces 7 transmitted from an occipital impact (ie a contre-coup 8 phenomenon). This possibility in this case would 9 certainly explain the location of the fracture and also 10 why, as pointed out in evidence by Professor Crane at 11 trial, 'it didn't relate to bruising of the scalp'." 12 If I then go down to (iii), "Left eyelid bruising": 13 "It is also very well described that eyelid bruising 14 may not result from a direct blow into the eye socket 15 but that it may follow percolation of blood into the 16 orbit from a fracture of the orbital roof." 17 If I go down to (iv), "Bilateral frontal lobe 18 contusions": 19 "Although no contusions were seen on either of the 20 CT scans taken during life or macroscopically at 21 autopsy, and although no contusions were identified 22 histologically by Dr Reid, Professor Crane's report 23 clearly states, 'examination of the sections from the 24 right and left frontal lobes showed the presence of 25 white matter contusions'. If present, these must surely 11 1 represent a contre-coup phenomenon and thus provide 2 support for a significant fall backwards." 3 Over the page at [72241] under (e), "Brain": 4 "It is Dr Reid's assessment that the major 5 neuropathological finding was one of traumatic diffuse 6 axonal injury (TDAI), although she adds that, in her opinion, it 7 was not severe. 8 "TDAI represents direct traumatic damage to the 9 brain as a consequence of shearing or twisting forces. 10 These forces are often complex and involve acceleration, 11 deceleration, rotation and, sometimes, shaking. 12 Consequently, whilst TDAI often results from road 13 traffic incidents, it is well recognised to occur during 14 assaults, particularly when the head is subjected to 15 repeated kicking, punching or stamping. 16 "In this case, therefore, I have no doubt that the 17 deceased's TDAI must have been caused during the assault 18 shortly after 01.20 or so on 27.04.97. Furthermore, 19 I think that the identification of significant, even if 20 not severe, TDAI must reflect the severity of that 21 assault." 22 If I go down to (f), "Abdominal wall": 23 "I think that there are several bruises on the left 24 side externally and Professor Crane documented one 25 internally on the right side. I can not imagine that 12 1 these were caused during the deceased's stay in 2 hospital; I therefore think they represent areas of 3 blunt force impact and I would suggest that they are 4 likely to have been caused by punching and kicking. 5 Clearly, the amount of force involved must have been 6 sufficient to produce the bruising", overleaf, [72242], 7 "but was obviously insufficient to cause damage to any 8 of the intraperitoneal contents." 9 Going down to (h), "Right buttock and thigh": 10 "I can not imagine that this bruising was related to 11 treatment, and I therefore think that it reflects trauma. 12 Its appearance on photograph 14 suggests that it 13 resulted from the partial coalescence of several smaller 14 bruises, and these could have been caused by punching, 15 kicking and/or stamping." 16 Starting at the bottom of the page is 17 a paragraph headed "Cause of death", but if I pick it up 18 over the page, [72243]: 19 "... the immediate cause for the deceased's death 20 was the Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome. 21 "This is a rare, and probably the most serious, 22 complication of neuroleptic medication and it has been 23 reported following treatment with Chlorpromazine. 24 "Criteria for making the diagnosis of NMS seem to 25 vary somewhat between papers, but the major findings 13 1 seem to include:- 2 "Fever, particularly over 38.5 Centigrade. 3 "Neurological features, eg rigidity, dysphagia, 4 tremor", etc. 5 "Autonomic instability, eg hypertension, hypotension 6 tachycardia", etc. 7 "Laboratory abnormalities, eg elevated CK levels" 8 and others. 9 "Absence of other identifiable physical illness. 10 "In this particular case, I would point to the 11 following findings documented over the last 24 hours or 12 so of the deceased's life:- 13 "Marked fever -- 'over 40 degrees Centigrade' and 14 '42 degrees Centigrade' were mentioned; 15 "Autonomic problems -- hypertension, hypotension, 16 tachycardia, tachypnoea and sweating; 17 "Significantly elevated serum creatinine kinase 18 enzyme" -- that's CK -- "concentration; 19 "Elevated serum aspartate aminotransferase enzyme (AST) concentration; 20 "Possible mild/early renal function impairment; 21 "No other explanation for these findings ..." 22 If we go over the page to [72244] under the heading 23 "Causation": 24 "In my opinion, there is an unequivocal and 25 incontrovertible, direct cause and effect relationship 14 1 between the assault on 27.04.97 and the deceased's 2 death on 08.05.97. 3 "I believe that the sequence of events can be 4 summarised as follows: 5 "ASSAULT causing significant and permanent traumatic 6 diffuse axonal injury and temporary unconsciousness; 7 this necessitated: 8 "ADMISSION TO HOSPITAL, where treatment included: 9 "ADMINISTRATION OF CHLORPROMAZINE. Although I am 10 not a clinician, the prescribing of chlorpromazine in 11 this case seems to be perfectly reasonable, given the 12 agitation, the restlessness and the apparent lack of 13 cooperation documented in the notes. This caused: 14 "DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEUROLEPTIC MALIGNANT SYNDROME. 15 This is a well recognised but very rare complication of 16 treatment with chlorpromazine and other similar drugs. 17 This then caused: 18 "DEATH." 19 That's all I want to take from that. If I then go 20 to Dr Lawler's next document prepared for the Inquiry, 21 that's at page [72270]. What Dr Lawler very kindly did 22 here was a glossary of terms referred to both in his and 23 others' reports. I point it out rather than intend to 24 refer to very much of it. For example, I pick up two of 25 his explanations. On that page we see "Chlorpromazine". 15 1 Perhaps we can highlight it: 2 "This is a drug (major trade name Largactil) ... and 3 it is used largely as a neuroleptic, ie to treat various 4 psychiatric conditions or states, including 5 schizophrenia, paranoid psychosis, mania, anxiety, 6 agitation and violent or dangerously impulsive 7 behaviour." 8 I should, of course, say there is no suggestion of 9 any of those on the part of Mr Hamill. It was obviously 10 used because he was unconscious and thrashing about 11 Can we then go, please, to page [72272]? The final 12 paragraph of that page, "Hypoxic/Ischaemic Changes", if 13 we can highlight that: 14 "By definition, hypoxia is the inadequacy of oxygen 15 supply to organs or tissues; in contrast ischaemia 16 represents inadequacy of blood supply to the relevant 17 area. In practice, both often occur simultaneously at 18 least to a greater or lesser extent, eg during 19 cardio-respiratory arrest, where failure of respiration 20 causes hypoxia and cessation of the heart produces 21 ischaemia." 22 Finally in this document if we went to page [72274], 23 neuroleptic malignant syndrome is there referred to 24 again. This probably does not add anything to the 25 substance of the report, but nonetheless: 16 1 "This is a rare but potentially very serious and 2 sometimes fatal reaction to antipsychotic drugs, 3 especially phenothiazines in general and chlorpromazine 4 (please see above) in particular. It is described in 5 detail in my report... and it may be associated with many of 6 the features defined and discussed in this list." 7 Then if I briefly go to page [72278], Dr Lawler has 8 also appended here a diagram of a skull with labelling 9 of some of the regions for those of us who are not 10 familiar with these medical terms 11 Then can I move, please, to the third of Dr Lawler's 12 documents, which we find at page [72809]? What has 13 happened by this stage is that the Inquiry had 14 interviewed Professor Crane and Dr Herron. For the 15 purposes of the hearing what will happen is that you 16 will see witness statements which have been put together 17 from those transcripts and will have been signed off by 18 Professor Crane and Dr Herron and they will be asked 19 about them. What generated the document we are looking 20 at instantly is that the transcripts of those interviews 21 were sent to Dr Lawler for him to comment on to see what 22 differences there were between him and the other experts 23 If I pick this up at the final paragraph. Perhaps 24 we could highlight that, please: 25 "In the light of my reading not only of the 17 1 neuropathology report by Dr Reid but also of the 2 transcripts of the evidence given by Professor Crane and 3 Dr Herron, I think that the absolutely fundamental 4 point, and one on which we are all agreed, is that the 5 major cause for the deceased's cerebral damage following 6 the incident at approximately 01.30 on 27.04.97 was 7 Traumatic Diffuse Axonal Injury, and that there was only 8 a mild and", over the page [72810], "insignificant 9 degree of hypoxic/ischaemic damage present. In other 10 words, it must have been the assault in its entirety 11 (and this would be with or without any associated fall 12 to the ground) which was responsible for his ultimately 13 fatal head injury (whatever the terminal mechanism), and 14 it therefore follows that any possible delay in the 15 provision of first aid at the scene neither contributed 16 significantly to, nor exacerbated, this traumatic damage. 17 The inevitable conclusion from this, therefore, is that 18 the outcome would have been the same, even if the 19 deceased had been given first aid immediately after the 20 assault." 21 There you have then encapsulated in those documents 22 the areas of agreement and disagreement between these 23 eminent gentlemen, which, of course, you will hear more 24 about when I ask them questions over the next day or 25 two, but I hope that gives some context to what I am 18 1 about to read, which is the witness statements of 2 various of the clinicians who I hope I said yesterday 3 are regarded as important, but not controversial. Hence 4 they can be read 5 With that introduction, I will read, first, the 6 statement of Dr Gormley. This is at page [80327]. What 7 I am proposing to do with these is simply highlight 8 areas of them which I hope will be of assistance to the 9 Panel. If anybody else wants me to read any other part, 10 then, of course, I am happy to do so. 11 This is the statement of William Paul Gormley. If 12 we go to paragraph 2 of it, perhaps I could highlight 13 that: 14 "I am a Consultant Anaesthetist at the Mater 15 Hospital in Belfast. On the night of 26/27 April 1997 16 I was the Senior Registrar on call for anaesthetics at 17 the Craigavon Area Hospital (CAH). My role was to 18 provide emergency anaesthetic cover for general surgery, 19 an epidural service for maternity and cover for patients 20 in intensive care, including resuscitations, as well as 21 to be on call for the Accident and Emergency Unit (A&E) for any emergencies. 22 "3. I commenced my shift at around 1300 on 26 23 April 1997 and I worked through until 0900 on 27 24 April. I cannot recall what time I was called to attend 25 to Mr Hamill in A&E. It would have been somewhere 19 1 between 0200 and 0400 but I have not recorded the time 2 in my notes. I was called to assess a person admitted 3 with head injuries. I may have been given other 4 information at that stage but I cannot remember it now. 5 I cannot recall who called me down but I assume it would 6 have been the Senior House Officer (SHO) in A&E." 7 If we go over the page, [80328], and highlight 8 paragraph 6, please: 9 "I can recall there being blood on Mr Hamill's face 10 but I cannot recall if he was actually bleeding or how 11 much blood there was. The document headed 'Nursing Care 12 Plan' which commences at page 38665 is a form that 13 I assume a member of the nursing staff completed, rather 14 than a doctor. I have not made any entries on that 15 document but I note it mentions that Mr Hamill had blood 16 on his face. The phrase 'bloody + + head + face' 17 indicates that his head and face were very bloody. The 18 plus signs indicate the amount of blood present. I do 19 not know who made that entry or any other entry on that 20 document, including the note 'attacked by group, hit on 21 head by ?? bottle'. I do not recall whether Mr Hamill 22 had any injuries to indicate that he had been hit on the 23 head with a bottle or a sharp instrument." 24 That's all I can I think usefully derive from that 25 witness statement. You will be hearing, as I said 20 1 yesterday, from two of the nurses, who I hope can give 2 evidence about that nursing care plan and those entries. 3 Then we go to the statement of Dr Lavery. That's to 4 be found at page [80633]. Again I will take selected 5 passages from this, if I may. It is the statement of 6 Gavin Lavery. If I pick it up at paragraph 3. 7 Highlight that and paragraph 4, please: 8 "In April 1997 I worked in the same department as 9 I do now at the Royal Victoria Hospital and I was 10 a Consultant in intensive care and anaesthesia. Along 11 with my colleagues, I was responsible for providing the 12 senior medical input into the care of patients in the 13 intensive care unit (ICU). I was not directly involved in the 14 care of Robert Hamill until 29 April 1997, the day on 15 which he was transferred from the ICU to the 16 Neurosurgical Unit. 17 "The clinical notes contained at page 38599 show 18 that Mr Hamill arrived at the hospital by ambulance at 19 0630 on 27 April 1997, having been transferred from Craigavon 20 Area Hospital." 21 If we go over the page, please, [80634], 22 paragraph 6: 23 "I would have become the doctor in charge of 24 Mr Hamill's care in the ICU at around 0800 to 0900 on 25 29 April 1997 and I would have stayed in charge until 21 1 he was transferred to the Neurosurgical Unit at 1300 2 that day. I was only responsible for his care in the 3 ICU. From the notes I can see that the Consultant 4 neurosurgeon in charge of Mr Hamill's care on 29 April 1997 5 was Mr Tom Fannin. This is confirmed by Mr Fannin's 6 final summary letter which is contained at pages 38772 7 [onwards]." 8 Then over the page [80635], paragraph 13: 9 "A CT scan was undertaken on Mr Hamill's brain and 10 Mr Fannin's comments are recorded in the notes contained 11 at page 38551: 'CT scan of the brain which shows soft 12 tissue swelling in the scalp over the left temporal 13 parietal region and also over the right temporal 14 occipital region'. In other words, Mr Hamill had very 15 obvious bruising in two separate areas of his head which 16 was outside his skull. It is almost certain that there 17 was a bruise or possibly a haematoma on his left temple 18 parietal (above the left ear) and the right temple 19 occipital (behind the right ear)." 20 Over the page, [80636], he says: 21 "However, although the scan showed physical injury 22 to his head in terms of bruising and swelling, and 23 probably bleeding under the scalp on both sides, the 24 scan did not show any evidence of any physical injury to 25 the brain." 22 1 Again that's all I seek to get from that statement. 2 If we go then to the statement of Mr Fannin, who is 3 at page [80245], this is the statement of 4 Thomas Francis Fannin. If I pick it up at paragraph 2: 5 "In April 1997 I was Senior Consultant Neurosurgeon 6 in the Regional Neurosurgical Unit at the Royal Victoria 7 Hospital (RVH) in Belfast. I retired in April 2000. On 8 27th April 1997 I was the Consultant Neurosurgeon on call at 9 RVH and any cases admitted in that 24-hour period would 10 have been under my care. 11 "3. After Mr Hamill's death I prepared a 'Final 12 Comment', which is dated 14th May 1997 and is contained 13 at pages 38551 to 38552." 14 We saw that yesterday: 15 "I later gave a statement to the police 16 investigating the death of Robert Hamill which is dated 17 11th July 1997 and is contained at page 09205. 18 "4. Robert Hamill arrived at RVH by ambulance at 19 0630 on 27th April 1997, having been transferred from 20 Craigavon Area Hospital (CAH). This arrival time is stated in 21 my Final Comment ... and in the clinical notes." 22 If we go over the page, [80246], paragraphs 9 and 23 10: 24 "I would normally have got in at around 8.15am and 25 I assume I saw Mr Hamill for the first time shortly 23 1 thereafter. I say this is an assumption because I have 2 not got a written note of exactly when I saw Mr Hamill 3 and I cannot now recall the time. After that I would 4 have seen Mr Hamill at least once a day and possibly 5 more frequently as I used to walk through the ward 6 regularly. 7 "In my police statement I said, 'We were given to 8 understand that he had been hit by a bottle and put on 9 the ground and immediately rendered unconscious'." 10 Over the page [80247]: 11 "This information may have come from the CAH notes 12 at page 38669 and 38670 or it may have been passed on to 13 me verbally." 14 Again that's something which we will ask the two 15 ladies who were nursing at the time. 16 "12. When I first saw Mr Hamill he was deeply 17 unconscious. He would have been chemically paralysed 18 and sedated, and on a ventilator. I do not recall 19 whether he had any open wounds or a wound to the back of 20 head and none is recorded in the notes. I have read in 21 the notes that Mr Hamill had a bruise on the left 22 temporal region, although I did not record this. I have 23 also seen the reference in [other] notes at page 38601 24 to there being a scalp haematoma, but I cannot recall 25 this either. 24 1 "14. My view after I initially examined Mr Hamill 2 on 27th April was that he had a closed head injury, as 3 a result of which he was deeply unconscious. The 4 results of the CT scan, combined with my overall 5 impression of that type of injury, led me to think that 6 whilst Mr Hamill was still deeply unconscious, he did 7 not have a major head injury. We felt that he would 8 probably start to wake up over a period of days." 9 Then if I go to page [80251] finally on this, 10 paragraphs 29 through to the end: 11 "I prepared the discharge summary, which is purely 12 for the hospital records. The information recorded on 13 it reflects the suspicion we had that the cerebral 14 hypoxia had made the head injury worse, and that 15 a widespread blood infection or septicaemia had caused 16 his sudden collapse. We did not know why he had 17 deteriorated so suddenly ten days after his injury and 18 this seemed a reasonable theory as to the cause of death 19 at the time. 20 "31. I have seen the autopsy report of 21 Professor Crane which concludes that cause of death is 22 a diffuse axonal injury and I would entirely agree with 23 him. Diffuse axonal injury is a perfectly acceptable 24 diagnosis." 25 That's all I seek to derive from that statement. 25 1 We then go to Dr McCann, whose statement is at 2 page [80821]. He is John Patrick McCann. At 3 paragraph 2: 4 "In April 1997 I was a consultant in rehabilitation 5 medicine at the Royal Victoria Hospital. My department 6 is responsible for assessing patients' rehabilitation 7 needs. I had a regular commitment to the neurosurgical 8 unit dealing with people who had suffered head injury or 9 other causes of acquired brain injury. I first became 10 involved in the care of Robert Hamill on 5 May 1997. 11 I don't recall who requested that I see Mr Hamill, but 12 at that time we had a routine whereby any patient 13 admitted with a head injury would have been seen by me. 14 Sometimes I would have learned of their admission by 15 memo or word of mouth from medical or nursing staff or 16 I may have asked whether there were any new patients 17 with head injury." 18 If we go down to paragraph 4: 19 "With regard to Mr Hamill, having checked over my 20 notes, I can see that it was a Bank Holiday and I was on 21 call. I went in and made an assessment of him, reviewed 22 his notes and looked to see the nature of injury and 23 then briefly assessed to see whether anything specific 24 required in a rehabilitation context at that stage. 25 I only saw him the once." 26 1 Over the page, [80822], paragraphs 5 and 6: 2 "I think I would have been told that he had been 3 assaulted but I can't recall whether I was given any 4 detailed information. I did, however, examine Mr Hamill 5 and can see from my notes (page 38608) and recorded that 6 he was 9 days post injury. He was sedated on the basis 7 of possible cerebral irritation secondary to hypoxia; 8 that his Glasgow Coma Scale is 6, ie he remained deeply 9 unconscious, and that he did not show any evidence of 10 spasticity or rigidity and was non-responsive. 11 Therefore, there was no indication that I needed to treat 12 at that stage but I would reassess. He would have been 13 receiving physiotherapy provided through the 14 neurosurgical unit. 15 "6. When I examined him, I would have recorded any 16 open injuries if I had seen any, but would not have 17 recorded bruising." 18 Then if we go to the statement of Dr Patel, which is 19 at page [81076], it is Umang Jashbai Patel. 20 Paragraphs 2 and 3: 21 "In April 1997 I was a Specialist Registrar in 22 Neurosurgery at the Royal Victoria Hospital and had been 23 for 16 months. I am not certain but I assume that 24 I first became involved in the care of Robert Hamill on 25 5 May 1997 when I returned from holiday, which was 27 1 a Monday. [...] 2 "3. The procedure for admitting a patient to the 3 neurosurgery ward was that we would get a phone call 4 from a peripheral hospital about a trauma case which had 5 been admitted to A&E or any other case. If the doctors 6 felt that they required neurosurgical advice or 7 assessment they rang the neurosurgeons. The 8 neurosurgeons would accordingly advise, get scans, see 9 the scans, and advise, keep the patient there, treat 10 as such or bring the patient across or whatever was 11 needed. In the case of Robert Hamill the doctors had 12 decided that he was comatose, had to be ventilated and 13 they needed to do a brain scan. I understand that in 14 Craigavon Area Hospital the scanner was not working so 15 they had to get him transferred to Royal Victoria, for 16 scanning and to manage his head injury. Patients are 17 usually consulted with neurosurgeons first, accepted by 18 neurosurgeons, but the point where they arrive depends 19 on whether they", over the page, [81077], "come 20 ventilated or not ventilated." 21 All I need to do is pick up paragraph 5, if I may: 22 "In respect of physical injuries I do not recall if 23 there was a scalp haematoma. If I attended to Robert 24 Hamill, it would have been so far down the line 25 I wouldn't be looking for a scalp haematoma unless there 28 1 was a problem with it, for example, if it was bleeding 2 or infected." 3 That's all I get from that statement. 4 If we go then to Dr Sloan found at page [81171], 5 this is Samantha Anne Sloan. We see from paragraph 3, 6 although we don't need to highlight it, that in April 7 1997 she was the senior house officer attached to the 8 neurosurgery unit at the Royal Victoria Hospital. 9 If I go to page [81180], can I highlight 10 paragraph 45, please? 11 "I am told that Mr Patel said the following in his 12 interview for the Inquiry, 'When Robert Hamill was 13 admitted he had a minor head injury and was hypoxic at 14 the scene of the assault. He was initially treated for 15 a minor head injury with hypoxic damage'. I would agree 16 that we were managing a man with a head injury, but 17 I would probably disagree with the terminology 'minor'. 18 This is because Mr Hamill was admitted with a Glasgow 19 Coma Scale of 4 and that indicates to me that his head 20 injury was more severe than minor. Mr Patel may have 21 said minor because the CT scan did not show any evidence 22 of a blood clot or contusion." 23 Then Dr Gray, whose statement is at page [80337]. 24 If I can pick up paragraphs 2 to 4, please. This is 25 William John Gray: 29 1 "In April 1997 I was a consultant neurosurgeon at 2 the Royal Victoria Hospital. I continue to hold that 3 post. I have no recollection of being involved in the 4 care of Robert Hamill, but looking at the medical 5 records it would appear that I was present at the time 6 of his death." 7 If we go to paragraph 4: 8 "I have looked today at the autopsy report and all 9 I can say is that I do not have any disagreements with 10 Professor Crane's conclusion. My view from a casual 11 review of the notes, copies of which I received today, 12 is that Mr Hamill died from the effects of a brain 13 injury. I'm afraid there is nothing further I can 14 add." 15 Finally in reading these statements I go to that of 16 Dr Unni, who we find at page [81224]. If I can pick up 17 paragraphs 1 to 3. Paragraph 2: 18 "In April 1997 I was a consultant anaesthetist at 19 the Royal Victoria Hospital. I worked mostly with 20 neurological patients, so technically I was 21 a neuro-anaesthetist. 22 "3. I first became involved in the care of 23 Robert Hamill shortly before he died on 8 May 1997. 24 I take this from the notes, as I do not recall 25 specifically treating this patient." 30 1 Those are the statements I wanted to read to you. 2 They vary, of course, in the weight that they may carry. 3 What I am quite keen to impress is that every care 4 has been taken to interview anybody who was involved in 5 the care of Mr Hamill to discern whether there is any 6 useful evidence that can possibly be gleaned about the 7 assault itself and about the actual cause of death after 8 his admission to hospital. 9 As I say, in the light of all that and in the light 10 also of the specific instructions given to independent 11 experts, we have a limited range of people to call. 12 As I have repeatedly said now I think, I am 13 proposing to call Professor Crane, Dr Herron and 14 Dr Lawler, all of whom are slated for tomorrow onwards. 15 We have one other doctor, Dr Low, who has very 16 kindly rescheduled himself from tomorrow to today, for 17 which I am extremely grateful. He is going to attend at 18 2 o'clock. 19 We will also again, as I have repeatedly said, 20 endeavour to call the two nurses this week -- that's 21 Maureen Millar and Maureen Hagan -- to give evidence 22 about what they saw and recorded and indeed heard about 23 the nature of the assault when Mr Hamill was admitted to 24 hospital initially. 25 With that, may I invite you, unless there is 31 1 anything else I can help with, to rise at this stage so 2 that we can reconvene at 2 o'clock with Dr Low? 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 2 o'clock. 4 (12.55 pm) 5 (The luncheon adjournment) 6 (2.00 pm) 7 MR UNDERWOOD: I am very sorry for the delay, sir. Can 8 I call Dr Low, please? 9 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 10 DR BOON KEE LOW (called) 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Dr Low, I gather you have had to rearrange 12 your schedule for today in order to come unexpectedly 13 and you have come virtually straight from the hospital 14 theatre. 15 DR LOW: No, I was not in theatre. I was transferring 16 a patient. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: I see. We are grateful to you for putting 18 yourself at our service. 19 MR UNDERWOOD: Could Dr Low be given the oath, please? 20 DR BOON KEE LOW (sworn) 21 Examination by MR UNDERWOOD 22 MR UNDERWOOD: Doctor, can you give us your full name, 23 please? 24 A. My name is Boon Kee Low, L-O-W. 25 Q. Your professional address? 32 1 A. Lagan Valley Hospital. 2 Q. Thank you very much. 3 In front of you there is a screen and on it in 4 a moment you will see page [80691]. I am going to ask 5 for that document to be scrolled through fairly slowly. 6 Is that the witness statement you signed for the Inquiry 7 on page [80699]? 8 A. That's correct. 9 Q. Is that accurate? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Thank you. I want to ask you some specific matters. 12 About that. Perhaps we could go back to page [80691], 13 please. 14 In paragraphs 2 and 3, we see from paragraph 2: 15 "On the night of 26/27 April I was the Senior House 16 Officer on duty at the A&E department at Craigavon Area 17 Hospital." 18 Is that correct? 19 A. That's correct. 20 Q. You say there you were the only doctor on duty at A&E 21 that night. Are you clear about that? 22 A. Within A&E, yes. 23 Q. Again, I think you there say you don't recall whether it 24 was a busy night or not? 25 A. I wouldn't recall that, no. 33 1 Q. You refer in paragraph 3 to some notes which are at 2 page [38677]. You signed them. Can we have a look at 3 [38677], please? 4 I think we are going to have to enlarge this part by 5 part. We see these are notes for Robert Hamill. Before 6 we enlarge any part of it, can I ask you: what is this 7 form? 8 A. This is the A&E notes and it is written by myself for 9 Mr Robert Hamill. 10 Q. How does one of these forms come about? Do you walk 11 around armed with blank forms or does somebody give you 12 a form before you see the patient, or what? 13 A. Generally what happens, when a patient comes to A&E 14 department they are registered by the reception staff in 15 the computer. Then this is generated. 16 So I gather in Mr Hamill's case the reception must 17 have got the history and the details from somebody, 18 I presume the ambulance, because this patient was 19 brought in by the ambulance. 20 Q. Then how does it come to you? 21 A. What normally happens in most patients is that the 22 patient is seen by the triage nurse first. The triage 23 nurse's job is to quickly identify if there are any 24 worrying features in a clinical state, usually based on 25 the history and physiological scoring. Then he is 34 1 assigned to which triage category. 2 However, in this case, I think it was obvious to the 3 ambulance he was in serious distress and he was, I am 4 sure, probably brought straight to a resuscitation room 5 so he would simultaneously be seen by myself, the 6 nurses, as well as the reception staff getting details 7 as well. 8 Q. Can we go down this form, as it were, block by block? 9 If we pick up and magnify the first part, which has, 10 "Name: Hamill, Robert", on it, we see the name. The 11 part that has been blanked out, of course, is the 12 address. We have a date of birth, the GP's name and 13 address there, the age, sex, occupation and telephone 14 number. Then: 15 "Initiator: brought by ambulance. 16 "Arrival: brought by ambulance." 17 So that would all have been completed by the time 18 you saw Mr Hamill, would it? 19 A. Not necessarily. As I say, in an emergency situation 20 like that, quite often it goes on simultaneously, so it 21 is possible I could have seen the patient first before 22 the note was generated. 23 Q. Then, if we go back and highlight the next block, 24 "History", can you help us with, in the first place, who 25 wrote any part of that? 35 1 A. That's my writing. 2 Q. Okay. Can you decipher it for us, please? That was not 3 meant to be rude. 4 A. This is the bit about history: 5 "Assaulted?", which is a query. "Hit on left side 6 of head with bottle", that bit I think is, "allegedly by 7 9 people." 8 Q. Could it be "attacked"? 9 A. "Attacked". Sorry. You are right. 10 Q. Could you help us with where you would have got that 11 history from? 12 A. I think Mr Hamill came in and his GCS was 5, so it is 13 obviously not from himself. It could be from the notes 14 that's written by the ambulance. It could be from being 15 told by the ambulance during handover or it is possible 16 it could be from the nurse as well. It is not specific 17 where that came from. 18 Q. Going back to the picture you painted for us a moment 19 ago, that where somebody comes in urgently, as it were, 20 and comes to see you very urgently, and perhaps this 21 form has not yet been created, would there have been any 22 other piece of paper created, a triage form, for 23 example? 24 A. Yes. The triage nurse -- I can't remember how 25 specifically it is done in Craigavon Hospital at that 36 1 time -- 2 Q. Okay. 3 A. -- but certainly the nurses do make a note in the sheet 4 as well, and in most departments it is the same sheet 5 itself attached together, but I am not sure specifically 6 at that time what happened in Craigavon. 7 Q. Fair enough. Towards the bottom of that page we have 8 enlarged: 9 "... pupils size 3". 10 Is that your writing? 11 A. No, I believe that would be a nurse writing. 12 Q. Can we go back and move down to the examination part, 13 please? Is this your writing? 14 A. Some of it is. The pulse of 100, that's not my writing. 15 "BP of 160/103." There would be a nurse writing as 16 well. I am not sure what the squiggle is with the 17 GCS -- 18 Q. Okay. Can you -- 19 A. -- but the rest of that -- 20 Q. Sorry. Go on. 21 A. The small writing would be mine. 22 Q. Although it is not your writing, can you just help us 23 with what the significance is of pulse of 100 and blood 24 pressure of 160/103? 25 A. The normal pulse rate for an adult, a 25 year old, would 37 1 be between 60 and 100. In fact, a resting pulse would 2 be somewhere in the region of 80, 90. 100 would be in 3 the high side and basically shows there is a bit of 4 tachycardia, as we call it. The pulse was up for 5 whatever reason. 6 The blood pressure is raised as well, 160/103. 7 Usually what happens is, if you do lose a lot of blood, 8 initially you may have a slight -- I will say that 9 again. 10 If you lose some blood, or there is fear, anxiety, 11 you might increase your blood pressure. As you lose 12 some blood, perhaps maybe a litre or so, you can 13 maintain your systolic pressure, which is your 160. 14 Your diastolic may even go up as the body compensates 15 for it by squeezing the artery -- the vessels, but your 16 pulse can go up as well in that case. 17 So, in essence, that blood pressure is slightly on 18 the high side, but it doesn't speak anything in 19 particular. 20 Now, there is also -- what I look out for is if the 21 blood pressure is high and the pulse is very low, there 22 is a certain reflex that you can follow if there are 23 signs of raised pressure in the brain. Obviously this 24 is not the case, because the pulse is not low. 25 Q. Right. If we can then go on to the -- sorry. 38 1 I shouldn't have said that. 2 Still in this part, moving to the part of it that 3 was your handwriting, again, can you help us with what 4 you have written there? 5 A. Yes. The first bit says: 6 "Unresponsive. 7 "Airway: breathing with upper airway obstruction. 8 Will not open jaw to introduce Guedel airway. 9 "02 saturation 75%. [Patient was] bagged. No open 10 injury. Abdomen soft. No limb fractures. 11 "Pupils equal and reacting. 12 "Plantars both downwards reacting. 13 "Left knee reflexes decreased." 14 It is very poor for a copy of that. Below that is 15 "areas", "breathing" -- it must be "circulation stable". 16 Q. Again, can I get you to help us with the meaning of some 17 of these things? 18 A. Sure. 19 Q. Where you say: 20 "Upper airway obstruction. Will not open jaw." 21 Is that the same thing? Has he got an obstruction 22 which is, in fact, that he wouldn't open his jaw, or 23 were they two separate things? 24 A. What happens is that, to assess upper airway 25 obstruction, the first sign of it is obviously you can 39 1 hear sounds, a bit like snoring. So there are signs of 2 upper airway obstruction. I felt in this patient there 3 were signs of upper airway obstruction. The next thing 4 I did was try to open his airway -- open his mouth to 5 put what we call a Guedel airway to try to lift out the 6 tongue, because quite often it is the tongue that falls 7 down and obstructs the upper airway. 8 Q. The oxygenation of 75 -- 9 A. Uh-huh. 10 Q. -- can you tell us the significance of that? 11 A. Well, I mean, anyone with oxygen saturation of 75%, 12 that's very low. Normal person's oxygen saturation 13 is -- well, it is 95% to 100%. 14 For example, patients with COPDI, people who have 15 chronic lung disease and are very used to a low level of 16 oxygen, you know, about 88%, 89%, 90%. 75%, if anybody 17 has oxygen of 75%, they would be very, very -- well, 18 they wouldn't be conscious, would they? So something is 19 very wrong there. 20 Q. Is that associated with airway obstruction? 21 A. I believe so, yes. 22 Q. By "bagged", I think you explain in your witness 23 statement at a later point that this is a bag over to 24 introduce oxygen? 25 A. Yes. We put a mask over the face and then this mask is 40 1 attached to a bag which is filled with an oxygen 2 reservoir. Then we squeeze the bag to blow the oxygen 3 into the lungs to try to bypass the airway. 4 Q. Can I ask how the degree of saturation, the 75%, for 5 example, that we have measured here is actually 6 measured? 7 A. That's measured on the 02 saturation probe, which is 8 a probe which is put on the finger usually. 9 Q. Then if we could move further down the page, please, 10 under "Investigation", you have got, I think, the 11 remains of the Glasgow Coma Score figuring -- 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. -- 5/15. I know you have dealt with this in your 14 statement. Can you just help us on that? 15 A. Normal person's GCS score is 15/15. Anybody who is -- 16 has a GCS of less than 8 is considered quite obtunded 17 and certainly at risk of losing the airway. 18 When you have a GCS of 5, it is basically 19 semi-comatose. The patient would not be responding. It 20 is made up of three elements: the GCS, the eye opening, 21 verbal and motor response. 22 Essentially, the eye opening is 1 out of -- is 1, 23 which is -- basically, his eyes are closed and he is not 24 doing anything. Verbal is also 1, which means he is not 25 making any sound at all even to any stimulus. I think 41 1 the "M" is the motor response, which is 3, which is 2 essentially making abnormal flexion posturing whenever 3 he has been stimulated. 4 Q. Sorry. I should have asked you before. We need not go 5 back to it. You explained that under the examination 6 part you also put "no open injury". 7 A. Uh-huh. 8 Q. The Inquiry may need to consider at some point whether 9 there was a head injury that was open from which 10 Mr Hamill was bleeding at some point. 11 A. Uh-huh. 12 Q. Can you help us with how you would have dealt with that? 13 If, for example, he had been presented to you with 14 either fresh bleeding from the scalp or there had been 15 bleeding which had recently ceased -- 16 A. Okay. 17 Q. -- would you have noted that? 18 A. Yes. If there was bleeding from the scalp to cause -- 19 enough anyway to cause him to be -- what we call 20 haemorrhagic shock, then there would have to be a huge 21 amount of bleeding and there would have been -- 22 obviously have been blood elsewhere. 23 There may be a small little contusion, as you call 24 it here, or abrasion on the scalp. I wouldn't call 25 those open wounds. They certainly would not bleed 42 1 enough. Bruising, contusion to the scalp itself, you 2 cannot really lose enough blood in the scalp itself to 3 cause you to go into haemorrhagic shock. 4 Q. All I am interested in at the moment is how significant 5 an open injury must have been for you to have noted it 6 at a time like this. 7 It would have to be very significant, would it? 8 A. It would have to be, yes, blood and a cut obviously. 9 Q. I understand. Then under investigation on the 10 right-hand side you have a signature which you say in 11 your statement is yours. That's true, is it? 12 A. On this beside the time of 0215? 13 Q. Yes. 14 A. Yes. That's mine. 15 Q. Help us with the time relative to you seeing and giving 16 your diagnosis and setting out treatment and management. 17 When would you sign off and time one of these forms? 18 A. Signing and putting the time, that would be the time 19 whenever I have written the top bit. I have seen the 20 patient, examined the patient and started the 21 preliminary investigation and that's when I would time 22 that. 23 Q. Okay. It is difficult to know now at this stage of the 24 Inquiry how significant timings in hospital may turn out 25 to be. Let me see if I can -- 43 1 A. There is a time at the top of that sheet which is stated 2 time of arrival. That's 0206. I presume that's the 3 time whenever he is booked into the computer, which 4 should be very close to the time when he actually 5 arrived in the department. 6 Q. So is this fair, that assuming he arrived at 0206, and 7 assuming your watch was accurate when you noted the 2.15 8 time, in that time he had been dealt with in triage? 9 You have seen him, investigated, given your provisional 10 diagnosis, set out the treatment and management and then 11 gone to write up the form. Is that right? 12 A. Yes. I mean, he -- when I say it is very close to the 13 time, it is possible in nine minutes I could have made 14 that assessment, written it and timed it, because, 15 I mean, there is really no time spent getting the 16 history from the patient, because that's not available. 17 The writing doesn't take a huge amount of writing. It 18 is quite obvious that the problem was airway and that's 19 the one I was trying to resolve -- 20 Q. So be it. 21 A. -- at that time. 22 Q. Finally on this form, under the "Treatment/Management" 23 heading, is that your writing? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Can you help us with what it says? 44 1 A. "Cervical collar. 2 "Anaesthetist for intubation. 3 "Brown Venflon", which is a large IV cannula. 4 Q. Was the cervical collar precautionary or did you have 5 reason to believe there might be a neck injury? 6 A. This is a patient who is unconscious with some injury to 7 the brain. You always have to be cautious about the 8 neck. That's what has been taught to us in BTLS 9 courses. 10 Q. Very well. Can we then go back to your statement at 11 page [80693], please? In paragraph 9, if I could 12 highlight that, please, you say: 13 "I gave a statement to the police investigating the 14 attack on Mr Hamill which is ... contained at page 673." 15 In that statement you added you attended to somebody 16 we now call D who had a scalp laceration and a small cut 17 in his scalp. 18 Referring to your notes, you see you have noted in 19 the first part of your history that he had been walking 20 down the road, etc. I want to take you to those notes, 21 if I may -- 22 A. Okay. 23 Q. -- which we see at page [38950]. A similar form. We 24 know that D went in the same ambulance or we believe D 25 went in the same ambulance as Mr Hamill to the Craigavon 45 1 Area Hospital. 2 If we look at this, and again, if we can pick up 3 down to the second line, the second break, here we have 4 a date and time of arrival of 2.07, so within a minute. 5 Again, you have age, etc. Different acuity and 6 revised acuity to Mr Hamill. Perhaps I should have 7 asked you this on the other form. What does acuity 8 signify? 9 A. I think that's for the triage, category 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 10 So that's -- 4 would be not that acute. 11 Q. Okay. So if we then look at the next box under 12 "History", please, again, is this your writing? 13 A. Yes, it is. 14 Q. Can you help us with what that says? 15 A. "Had 7 pints beer tonight. 16 "Walking down road with wife. 17 "Attacked by 30 people. 18 "Punched and kicked. 19 "Next thing remembered was in ambulance." 20 According to wife, "Wife: D was unconscious for 21 about 10 minutes." 22 Q. Does the way you have constructed that help us with who 23 gave you the information contained in the various parts 24 of it? 25 A. Yes. I mean, the first bit of it about the pints was, 46 1 I presume, from the patient himself and the last bit, 2 the wife had said that the patient was unconscious for 3 ten minutes. 4 Q. Were you aware that D and Mr Hamill were, as it were, 5 together? 6 A. I mean, I think this was about an hour after the -- 7 after I seen Mr Hamill. 8 Q. 3.05 we see later further down the form. 9 A. Yes. I certainly was aware it was the same incident, 10 but I am not sure whether they were related or know each 11 other. 12 Q. All right. Can I take you further down this page to the 13 examination section, please? 14 A. Uh-huh. 15 THE CHAIRMAN: Just before you do, does "acuity" mean 16 general awareness, alertness? 17 A. No. That's a triage acuity as in how serious the 18 patient potentially is. It is the job of the triage 19 nurse to assess the severity of the patients as they 20 present. Those with the highest acuity, it would be 1. 21 That basically means they need to be seen immediately. 22 I can't remember what Mr Hamill's acuity was. Was it 1 23 or 2? 24 THE CHAIRMAN: 2. 25 A. 2 would be very high acuity as well. Certainly the 47 1 guideline is seen within ten minutes. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 3 MR UNDERWOOD: So, looking at the examination, again some 4 different writing for the pulse, etc. I will not 5 trouble you with that. Is the rest of that your 6 writing? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Again, can you help us with what that says? 9 A. "Alert and orientated. Glasgow Coma Scale 15/15. 10 "ABC, 3 ticks", which means airway breathing, 11 circulation is fine: 12 "No neurological deficit. 13 "Small laceration in scalp. Tender plus" -- I think 14 that's "haematoma of scalp". Then: 15 "Tender right temporal mandibular joint -- teeth..." 16 I can't read that 17 Q. Don't worry. If you can't, you can't. 18 A. "Nose bruised plus. No tender chest, abdomen, pelvis 19 limbs or back. 20 "Good air entry. No crepitus or bronchi. Heart 21 sounds 1 and 2. No heart sounds, no murmurs. Abdomen 22 soft, not tender. Bowel sound is soft." 23 Q. Very well. 24 A. Sorry "teeth aligned", I think is what it is. 25 Q. There may be some question about whether, in the nursing 48 1 notes, the notes for Mr Hamill and the notes for D got 2 confused. Therefore, I want to ask you about whether 3 any of this signifies that D was bleeding from the scalp 4 or might have been bleeding from the scalp. 5 A. Well, he has a small laceration on his scalp, so he must 6 be bleeding if he has a cut. 7 Q. If he had been very bloody as a result of that 8 laceration, would you have had a different entry or 9 would that have covered it? 10 A. I think if he was very -- I wouldn't expect a lot -- it 11 is a small laceration of the scalp so it wouldn't be 12 very bloody. 13 Q. That's helpful. Thank you. 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Basing it on what you tell us, by the time 15 you wrote up these notes on D, you had already about 16 three-quarters of an hour before writing up the notes on 17 Robert Hamill? 18 A. That's right, yes. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Each form having the patient's name? 20 A. Yes. If I can refer back to Robert Hamill's notes. 21 THE CHAIRMAN: Please do. 22 A. Can you put it up on the thing? 23 MR UNDERWOOD: I am trying to find the page number for you. 24 [38677]. 25 A. Certainly from the history, examination and 49 1 investigation, I would have written it at 0215, and if 2 we go a bit further down, certainly the -- sorry -- yes, 3 the cervical collar and, if this -- you know, the tick 4 that is in for intubated would have been after the 5 patient has been intubated. So it would be later than 6 0215 that the tick would go in. So the 0215 would be 7 for the first bit. The bottom bit would be later than 8 0215. 9 Q. So you would have revisited the form after signing it 10 and dating it at that point? 11 A. Yes. You could not intubate a patient within 12 nine minutes of arrival. 13 Q. Very well. There is one other document I would like you 14 to look at, please. That is [38673]. It is 15 an emergency telephoned lab report on Mr Hamill. 16 A. Uh-huh. 17 Q. We see from the top right-hand corner the date of 18 specimen is 27/4/97. What I want to highlight, if 19 I may, is the haematology section. 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. This tells you that his white cell count was 13.9, his 22 haemoglobin was 16.2. Platelets were 198. 23 Can you assist us with what that tells us, if 24 anything, about injuries which Mr Hamill sustained? 25 A. That's basically normal. 50 1 Q. Right. 2 A. If you were going to lose a lot of blood, say, for 3 example, the circulating blood volume is 5 litres. If 4 you lose 2 litres of blood -- and really depends -- this 5 is a concentration, so if you lose 2 litres of blood, 6 the first thing that happens is you will find there will 7 be some changes in the blood pressure and pulse and 8 things. What we do is we give them the fluid in. 9 At that stage, you will find that the haemoglobin 10 will drop. However, in the acute situation, for 11 example, you can lose 2 litres of blood. If you don't 12 replace the blood, the haemoglobin will still be high 13 like that. 14 Q. Okay. 15 A. So it doesn't help you, I am afraid. 16 Q. So it gives you no assistance? 17 A. No. 18 Q. Sir, those are the questions I was proposing to ask the 19 doctor, unless anybody has anything that has emerged 20 from the process over the last three-quarters of 21 an hour. 22 MR ADAIR: No thank you. 23 MR McGRORY: No, sir. 24 MS DINSMORE: No, thank you. 25 MR UNDERWOOD: Doctor, thank you very much indeed for 51 1 coming. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Dr Low. 3 A. Can I leave? 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, of course. 5 DR LOW: Thank you. 6 (The witness withdrew) 7 MR UNDERWOOD: Can I just make good an omission of mine from 8 this morning? I was asked, when dealing with the 9 witness statement that I read of Mr Patel, to take you 10 to some passages and I entirely forgot to do it. Can I 11 go back to that, please? The page number that we need 12 is [81081]. What I was asked to take you to is 13 paragraph 20. I am happy do that now: 14 "I was also asked at the murder trial, 'Was it 15 shortly after 10 past 3 that the alert was raised as to the 16 man's condition?'." 17 This is 8th May 1997: 18 "I replied, 'I think my recollection would be 19 perhaps about 3.30 or something like that when I was 20 first called'. I was then asked, 'We know that at 10 past 3 21 he had been given 100 mg of chlorpromazine. Is 22 that correct?'. I replied, 'That's right'. I refer 23 to the extract from the transcript of the trial produced 24 and shown to me... I now know that Robert Hamill was 25 given Chlorpromazine at 3.10 am on 8 May 1997, so some 52 1 12 hours before his", over the page [81082], "condition 2 deteriorated and not half an hour before." 3 Then he refers back to a drugs chart. I understand 4 the purpose of that is just in case, when we hear more 5 evidence, there is any confusion about the sequence and 6 timing of the prescription of chlorpromazine. 7 Sir, that leaves us with the end of the evidence 8 that's available for today. What I am proposing to do 9 next is to call Professor Crane and Dr Herron tomorrow, 10 then Dr Lawler, Miss Hagan and Miss Millar on Friday to 11 conclude the medical evidence. 12 Unless there is anything else I can assist with 13 today, I have no more to present. 14 THE CHAIRMAN: No. Thank you. Yes, Mr ...? 15 MR ADAIR: No, sir. I have no ... 16 THE CHAIRMAN: I thought you were standing up to tell us 17 something. 18 MR ADAIR: I was getting ready to leave, sir. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Just anxious to get away. Very well. 10.30 20 tomorrow morning. 21 (3.55 pm) 22 (The hearing adjourned until 10.30 tomorrow morning) 23 --oo0oo-- 24 25 53 1 I N D E X 2 2 Extracts of medical witness ...................... 1 3 statements and post mortem 3 read by MR UNDERWOOD 4 4 DR BOON KEE LOW (sworn) .......................... 31 5 Examination by MR UNDERWOOD ............... 31 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25