- - - - - - - - - - PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF ROBERT HAMILL - - - - - - - - - - Held at: Interpoint 20-24 York Street Belfast on Tuesday, 13th January 2009 commencing at 10.30 am Day 1 1 Tuesday, 13th January 2009 2 (10.30 am) 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Before I open the proceedings, I will invite 4 the legal representatives appearing before us today to 5 identify themselves. 6 MR UNDERWOOD : I appear for the Inquiry with my learned 7 junior, Miss Anderson. 8 MR WOLFE: I appear for the PSNI. My name is Wolfe. 9 I appear instructed by the Public Inquiries Liaison Unit 10 of the PSNI with my learned friend Mr Richard Ferguson 11 QC, who is not present today. 12 MR ADAIR: My name is Charles Adair. I appear for 13 a substantial number of the persons in this case along 14 with my learned friend Mr Kevin O'Hare. We are 15 instructed by Edwards & Co. 16 MR McGRORY: My name is Barra McGrory. I appear for the 17 Hamill family, leading Mr Eugene McKenna. We are 18 instructed by PJ McGrory & Co solicitors. 19 MS DINSMORE: My name is Margaret Ann Dinsmore. I appear 20 with my learned friend Mr Jim Mallon. I am instructed 21 by John P Hagan and I appear on behalf of Eleanor and 22 Robert Atkinson. 23 MR EMMERSON: My name is Ben Emmerson. I appear with my 24 learned friend Maggie O'Kane. I appear for the Public 25 Prosecution Service instructed by the Director of Public 1 1 Prosecutions, Northern Ireland. 2 MR GREEN: My name is Richard Green. I appear for 3 Marc Hobson with my learned friend Mr Conor Gillespie 4 and we are instructed by Gus Campbell solicitors. 5 MR O'CONNOR: My name is Hugh O'Connor. I appear for 6 Michael Irwin and I appear instructed by 7 Russell Jones & Walker solicitors. 8 MR MCKILLOP: My name is Thomas McKillop. I appear on 9 behalf of Gerard Maguire and Witnesses D, E and F 10 instructed by O'Connor & Moriarty. 11 MR BERRY: My name is Greg Berry. I appear with Mr Daly for 12 Andrea McKee, and we are instructed by 13 Arthur Downey & Co. 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you all. I hope you will forgive me if 15 I make some mistake about the names. It may take me 16 a little time to remember them all. 17 When I opened this Inquiry in May 2005, I explained 18 it had been established by the then Secretary of State 19 for Northern Ireland, the Right Honourable 20 Paul Murphy MP, under section 44 of the Police (Northern 21 Ireland) Act 1988 to implement the recommendation of the 22 retired Canadian Supreme Court judge, Peter Cory, 23 following an investigation by him into a number of 24 deaths which have occurred in Northern Ireland, among 25 them the death of Robert Hamill. 2 1 This was an investigation which was made in 2 consequence of an agreement between the British and 3 Irish governments that his death, among others, should 4 be looked at anew. 5 I little thought then, nor, I believe, did any of 6 us, that it would be more than three years before we could 7 begin hearing evidence and I think it important, 8 therefore, to explain the causes of the delay. 9 Firstly, the volume of preparatory work which had to 10 be undertaken by the Inquiry team was very considerable. 11 Documents had to be obtained from various sources. 12 These had to be considered and decisions made about who 13 should be interviewed and what topics they should be 14 asked about, and thereafter interviewing and taking 15 statements from over 200 people. Some idea can be 16 gained of the size of the task from the fact that it was 17 thought appropriate to give those parties on whom the 18 papers were served three months in order to consider 19 them before any hearings began. 20 Next, the Inquiry received many applications from 21 witnesses and potential witnesses seeking anonymity. 22 These all had to be considered and decisions made. 23 A substantial number of serving and former police 24 officers applied for anonymity and screening and there 25 was a two-day hearing by the full Panel in mid May 2006, 3 1 when we considered a great deal of material, both 2 written and oral. 3 At the beginning of August, in a lengthy ruling, 4 we refused those applications in all but one case. Our 5 decision was judicially reviewed here in Northern 6 Ireland and the decision of the court, given subsequent 7 to a hearing held at the end of August, was that our 8 decision should be quashed. 9 The Inquiry appealed against this decision to the 10 Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland and our appeal was 11 rejected. Thereafter, the Inquiry sought and was 12 granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords. Our 13 appeal was successful, judgment being given on 31st July 14 in the following year, 2007. The decision of the House 15 of Lords left a issue still to be dealt with by the 16 High Court in Northern Ireland, as to whether we were 17 entitled to reach the decisions we did on the evidence 18 before us. In the event, that issue was not pursued, 19 so that our decision then became effective. 20 While the hearing of our appeal to the House of 21 Lords was awaited, and as our investigations proceeded, 22 doubts arose as to whether our terms of reference would 23 enable us to consider all those matters which we 24 consider are relevant if we are to respond properly to 25 the public's legitimate interest in what happened when 4 1 the attack on Robert Hamill was investigated. 2 A request was made on behalf of the Hamill family at 3 the beginning of January 2007 for an extension of our 4 terms of reference. This was refused by the Secretary 5 of State of Northern Ireland nearly fifteen months later 6 on 20th March 2008. This decision was successfully 7 challenged by the Hamill family by way of judicial 8 review on the ground that he had not applied the correct 9 test. His decision was quashed on 1st July 2008 and it 10 was necessary then for him to consider the matter 11 afresh. 12 On 4th November, the Secretary of State's new 13 decision was communicated to the parties. His decision 14 remained unchanged, though it could not be suggested 15 that, in reaching it, he had applied the wrong test. 16 The bone of contention had related to the extent, if 17 at all, to which the Inquiry was entitled to look into 18 the role played by the Director of Public Prosecutions 19 in relation to the investigation which followed 20 Robert Hamill's death. However, the Secretary of State 21 has adopted a wide but entirely legitimate 22 interpretation of our powers under our terms of 23 reference as they stand. Our hope and expectation is 24 that we shall be able to look critically at those 25 matters which we think are germane to the legitimate 5 1 interest of the public in relation to the investigation. 2 If, though, we find we have to stop short in a way which 3 leaves important questions unconsidered, it will be our 4 duty to say so in our report. 5 Until the matters which were the subject of 6 litigation were resolved, we were not in a position to 7 begin these hearings, nor, once they were resolved, 8 could we have begun hearings after only a week or two. 9 Time had to be given for the parties to prepare their 10 cases with their eye on a fixed date in order that they 11 could make arrangements about other litigation so as to 12 avoid conflict with other commitments. 13 Moreover, the nature of advocacy is such that 14 preparation has to be approximate in time to the hearing 15 of the case being prepared. Furthermore, those affected 16 by the Secretary of State's interpretation of the terms 17 of reference were entitled to an opportunity to consider 18 that interpretation before the hearings commenced. 19 There is, though, a brighter side to the delay. 20 Since this Inquiry was appointed, there has been 21 a gradual, but significant, improvement in the way 22 things are in Northern Ireland. There are anxieties 23 still, but there is now a prevailing feeling of hope for 24 a more peaceful future here. More and more people feel 25 they have had enough of the old ways and want a life 6 1 free from the fear of terrorism, and there is a growing 2 feeling that grievances have a better hope of being 3 resolved in the political forum than by acts of 4 violence. 5 I can remember a small illustration of the fact that 6 things were changing when we came to Belfast in 7 April 2005 to inspect possible premises in which to hold 8 our hearings. It was in the morning and we called in at 9 a cafe for coffee. In the window, which extended from 10 floor to ceiling, were sitting two police officers in 11 uniform, a man and a woman, looking out on to the street 12 as they drank their coffee. 13 The Belfast man who was conducting us to the 14 premises made the remark to me, "You wouldn't have seen 15 that in Belfast six months ago." I think it is worth 16 repeating what I said when I opened this Inquiry. In 17 setting the Inquiry the Secretary of State said, in 18 explaining his purpose, "It is essential that all people 19 in Northern Ireland can have confidence in the integrity 20 of the State and its institutions. Where there are 21 serious allegations of wrongdoing, it is important that 22 facts are properly established. It is important that we 23 find a way in Northern Ireland of dealing with the past 24 in the way that recognises the pain associated with it 25 without allowing it to destroy all hope of a better 7 1 future." 2 Perhaps we may be permitted to add a few words of 3 our own about the hope of a better future. Looking back 4 at the past, and particularly seeking to appreciate its 5 impact on present experience, can help us to a better 6 understanding of the present and the future, but if all 7 we do is to look at the past, we are ignoring both the 8 present and the future. 9 A society which is so busy remembering only past 10 conflicts that it ignores the present and does not 11 anticipate its future life is a society without hope. 12 This is because the very essence of hope lies in having 13 a positive attitude to the future. It is our hope that 14 our work in this Inquiry may do a little to help people 15 look forward with hope. If mutual trust and respect can 16 be built among the people of Northern Ireland, hope is 17 likely to be based on a surer foundation. 18 My colleagues with whom I am conducting this 19 Inquiry, are the Reverend Baroness Richardson, a former 20 Moderator of the Free Churches' Council of England and 21 Wales, and Sir John Evans, formerly Chief Constable of 22 Devon and Cornwall. 23 After practising at the Bar in England and Wales, 24 I became first a Circuit judge and then a High Court 25 judge. I am now retired. 8 1 None of us have has met or held any communication 2 with one another before our appointment to this Inquiry. 3 More detail is available on the Inquiry's website. 4 The Secretary and Solicitor to the Inquiry is 5 Judi Kemish. She is a civil servant. Prior to her 6 appointment to this Inquiry she had not been involved, 7 in the course of her work, in the affairs of Northern 8 Ireland. Our proceedings will be reported on the 9 Inquiry's website. 10 Our terms of reference are as follows: "to inquire 11 into the death of Robert Hamill with a view to 12 determining whether any wrongful act or omission by or 13 within the Royal Ulster Constabulary facilitated his 14 death or obstructed the investigation of it, or whether 15 attempts were made to do so; whether any such act or 16 omission was intentional or negligent; whether the 17 investigation of his death was carried out with due 18 diligence; and to make recommendations." 19 The need for this Inquiry to be set up by Government 20 arises from three facts. Firstly, the agreement between 21 the British and Irish Governments and the recommendation 22 by Justice Cory; secondly, the rule that only an Inquiry 23 set up by Government under an Act of Parliament would 24 have power to pursue the appropriate investigations in 25 relation to Robert Hamill's death; thirdly, it was 9 1 necessary that the work of the Inquiry should be 2 facilitated by proper funding. 3 Having said this, it is important to point out that 4 we are independent of Government or any other body or 5 person. We control the conduct of this Inquiry. We 6 decide what evidence we shall receive. The decisions 7 and recommendations which we make following the 8 conclusion of the Inquiry, and which will be set out in 9 our report to the Secretary of State, will be ours and 10 ours alone. 11 We are quite independent in all these matters of the 12 Northern Ireland Office, a fact which the officials from 13 the Northern Ireland Office have been at pains to make 14 clear in our dealings with them. Nor shall we allow 15 ourselves to be led or improperly influenced by others, 16 whoever they may be. 17 At the outset of these hearings, we should like to 18 express again our sincere condolences to the fiancee and 19 children of the late Robert Hamill and to his family for 20 his untimely death. As well as being a matter which has 21 given considerable public interest and concern, none of 22 us should lose sight of the fact that Robert Hamill's 23 death was and is a matter of sadness and grief to those 24 who mourn him. We express the confidant hope that 25 no-one having business before this Inquiry will forget 10 1 this and that we shall all remember that whether 2 Robert Hamill was of one faith or another is irrelevant 3 to the fact that he was a fellow human being. 4 We are very conscious of the many emotions to which 5 the death of Robert Hamill has given rise and we repeat 6 that our overriding concern in this Inquiry will be to 7 do all we can to ascertain where the truth lies 8 concerning the issues raised by our terms of reference. 9 The evidence and the issues to be considered will be 10 prepared and presented by Counsel for the Inquiry. 11 Theirs is a neutral role, as is appropriate for 12 lawyers whose task is not to argue a case but, firstly, 13 to place before us all the evidence and considerations 14 which have any relevance to the issues of fact which we 15 shall have to decide, and, secondly, to assist us also 16 to decide what recommendations it is appropriate for us 17 to make to the Secretary of State. 18 We should like to stress that we will embark on our 19 task without any preconception as to where the truth 20 lies. We are anxious to do all we reasonably can to 21 discover that. The evidence placed before us may vary 22 in its quality, but we are sure that it is only by 23 considering and weighing all the evidence which has 24 relevance to our terms of reference that we can properly 25 perform our task of seeking after the truth. 11 1 These proceedings are unlike a civil or criminal 2 trial in which there are two sides with each side 3 calling its own witnesses and advancing its own case. 4 It seems certain that we shall have conflicting evidence 5 upon various issues. Counsel to the Inquiry will 6 present all the evidence and test it so as to assist us 7 to reach our conclusions. From time to time, we may ask 8 questions ourselves. Interested parties, though, will 9 not be permitted, as a matter of course, to question 10 witnesses, still less to call their own witnesses. 11 Advocates who wish questions to be put to witnesses 12 which are not dealt with in their statements should 13 speak in advance about them to Leading Counsel to the 14 Inquiry, Mr Underwood. If he agrees to pursue them, 15 that may be sufficient, but if he does not agree, or if 16 the advocate wishes to put the questions himself, the 17 matter can be referred to me and I shall rule on it. 18 Such questions will follow questions by Counsel to the 19 Inquiry, who, at their conclusion, will be permitted to 20 ask further questions. 21 Although I have said that additional questions 22 should be raised with Mr Underwood in sufficient time 23 for him to consider them, I accept there will still be 24 cases when some line of questions is not foreseen and 25 arises only as a result of what the witnesses say in the 12 1 witness box. In such a case, if the advocate affected 2 needs time to consider the position and discuss it with 3 Mr Underwood, I shall listen sympathetically to 4 an application for a brief adjournment -- minutes, not 5 hours -- to facilitate that. I hope advocates will 6 realise that after a good many years of experience in 7 the courts as an advocate and a judge, I am likely to be 8 able to take a realistic view of how long is needed. 9 If anyone should seek himself to call a witness 10 rather than that he be called by Counsel to the Inquiry, 11 there will need to be very good justification for this. 12 Save for material protected by public interest 13 immunity, the statements of the witnesses to be called 14 or read by Counsel to the Inquiry have been provided to 15 the interested parties or their legal advisers in 16 advance to assist them in their preparation. This has 17 been done in the interests of fairness to all of them so 18 that they should know, so far as possible, what is the 19 general tenor of the evidence to be adduced. 20 To allow interested parties to call their own 21 witnesses in the absence of very strong reason would 22 militate against this and might delay proceedings if 23 a new matter were to be introduced in this way, and it 24 became apparent, as a consequence, that a witness 25 already called might have had something to say on the 13 1 point and so had to be recalled. 2 Although it is not my intention to adopt 3 an inflexible approach, nor shall I be prepared to 4 permit a free-for-all. I shall be vigilant to restrict 5 questions to those which are relevant to our terms of 6 reference and to prevent repetition and long-windedness. 7 There is a great deal of material to be considered 8 and it can be divided into separate topics. 9 Mr Underwood will not, therefore, simply make one 10 opening speech, but will open each new topic as we come 11 to it. This, I hope, will help to crystallise the 12 thoughts of all of us and I am sure will be of 13 assistance to the members of the public who wish to 14 follow the whole or any part of the proceedings. 15 Advocates who wish to make a brief opening speech 16 may do so. Some will not be concerned with every topic 17 and I suggest that any opening speeches be directed to 18 the particular topic about to be dealt with by the 19 evidence. This means that we may hear more than one 20 opening speech from some advocates. 21 I am sure that advocates will remember the purpose 22 of an opening speech, which is to help the Panel to 23 understand what are the issues and to follow them, and 24 not to seek to address a wider audience. This would 25 still be the case when it comes to closing speeches, but 14 1 at that stage, what is said to us in the light of the 2 evidence we have all heard will plainly be of interest 3 to the public at large. 4 When I opened this Inquiry, I said that a witness 5 who gives evidence at this Inquiry will not be obliged 6 to answer any question if the answer might incriminate 7 him or her in respect of any criminal or police 8 disciplinary offence of which he or she has not been 9 convicted. This dispensation will no longer apply in 10 the case of any answer which might incriminate the 11 witness in respect of any criminal offence. 12 This is because the Attorney General has given 13 an undertaking that neither the evidence a witness gives 14 before the Inquiry, whether orally or by written 15 statement, nor any document or information produced by 16 him or her to the Inquiry will be used in evidence 17 against him or her in any criminal proceedings, except 18 in proceedings where he or she is charged with having 19 given false evidence in the course of the Inquiry or 20 having conspired with or procured others to do so. 21 The Chief Constable of the Police Service of 22 Northern Ireland has given a limited undertaking in the 23 case of police disciplinary proceedings. Any evidence 24 given by a police officer which falls short of providing 25 evidence of serious misconduct will not be used against 15 1 him or any other serving officer. This undertaking has 2 called for a reconsideration of what I said on the 3 question of immunity for police officers when I opened 4 the Inquiry. 5 The privilege against self-incrimination in relation 6 to criminal proceedings became part of the Common Law 7 long before any codes with statutory force came into 8 being in relation to disciplinary proceedings against 9 police officers. Such proceedings relate to 10 an officer's employment. They can have serious 11 consequences to him, but they are not and cannot be 12 equated with criminal proceedings. 13 The privilege against self-incrimination does not 14 extend at Common Law to police officers facing 15 disciplinary proceedings. On reflection, I have 16 concluded that there can be no warrant, by extending this 17 privilege to officers facing disciplinary proceedings, 18 for according to them a privilege which does not extend 19 to those in other occupations who may face disciplinary 20 proceedings relating to their conduct in employment, 21 which, in their cases also, have serious consequences 22 for them. 23 Moreover, it would, in my judgment, run the risk of 24 frustrating our attempts to get at the truth and so 25 fulfil our terms of reference. Accordingly, there will 16 1 be no dispensation for serving police officers in 2 relation to answering questions whose answers could put 3 them at risk in relation to disciplinary proceedings. 4 They have their immunity given by the Chief 5 Constable within the terms of his undertaking, but this 6 will not affect the requirement on them to answer 7 relevant questions which they may be asked. 8 A word now about the proceedings. Subject to 9 retaining some need for flexibility to meet 10 circumstances which may arise, our aim is to sit on 11 Tuesdays to Fridays, generally from 10.30 am to 4.30 pm 12 breaking off for lunch from 1.00 pm to 2.00 pm. On 13 Fridays, we may sit earlier so as to rise earlier. We 14 propose to sit for three weeks at a time with a one-week 15 break between each stint. The time allotted to the 16 various stages of these hearings and the intervals 17 between them are set out in a schedule to be found on 18 our website and have been posted up on the notice board 19 at these premises. Each stage of the proceedings will 20 follow after the interval shown in the schedule. So, 21 for example, if the evidence takes less or longer, then 22 the scheduled time for the next stage will be 23 correspondingly brought forward or delayed. If there 24 should be good reason to do so, we may have to consider 25 whether to depart in other ways from the schedule. 17 1 I say something now about our own preparations, that 2 is the Panel. To prepare ourselves for the Inquiry we 3 visited Portadown in January 2005, when we walked around 4 the streets forming the crossroads where or near to 5 which Robert Hamill received his injuries. We looked 6 particularly at sight lines from various points. We did 7 not announce our visit, because we wished to see the 8 site without attracting attention and without 9 distraction. 10 We shall make a further visit to Portadown in the 11 presence of interested parties and their legal advisers 12 to see whatever they wish to draw to our attention. We 13 shall also see the Land Rover which was used on the 14 night in question, or one similar, to see what could be 15 seen from it at different locations and what could be 16 heard inside it of what was going on outside. 17 We are all comparative strangers to Northern Ireland 18 and in particular to Portadown and its ethos. I had 19 never visited Northern Ireland until after my 20 appointment to this Inquiry. Bearing this in mind, we 21 have sought to learn something of the troubled 22 background against which the events of 27th April 1997 23 and subsequent investigations were played out and the 24 continuing turmoil after that, in order, as we hope, 25 better to understand the events placed before us. The 18 1 material we have read was not all written from the same 2 standpoint. 3 We shall also read the witnesses' statements before 4 they give evidence. When we come to the fact-finding 5 exercise, we shall take account both of what we hear 6 from the witnesses and what they say in their 7 statements. Whether in the case of any witness we gain 8 more assistance from his or her oral evidence or written 9 statement about a particular matter is not something we 10 shall decide upon until we begin to consider our 11 findings. 12 Let me add that in an Inquiry such as this there are 13 no formal rules of evidence, and we shall also take into 14 consideration hearsay evidence. We shall, of course, 15 remind ourselves of the limited value which hearsay 16 evidence may often, but not necessarily, have. 17 Finally, before I call upon Mr Underwood, may 18 I express the thanks of all of us at the Inquiry for the 19 willing cooperation we have received and for the 20 goodwill shown by so many in our work in preparing these 21 hearings. 22 Mr Underwood? 23 Opening speech by MR UNDERWOOD 24 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, I think it is now well-known that in the 25 early hours of 27th April 1997 Robert Hamill was 19 1 assaulted in the centre of Portadown. He was a Catholic 2 and his attackers were Protestant. The crossroads where 3 the assault took place was a known flash point for 4 sectarian violence. An RUC Land Rover with four 5 officers in it was stationed nearby to maintain public 6 order. Nonetheless, Mr Hamill suffered severe head 7 injuries and died from those without regaining 8 consciousness on 8th May 1997. 9 By 10th May 1997, the RUC had the identities of 10 a number of Protestants who were said to have murdered 11 Mr Hamill. Further, it had evidence that one of the 12 Reserve Constables in the Land Rover, Mr Atkinson, had 13 protected one of those by telling him to get rid of his 14 clothing and by keeping him informed about the 15 investigation. 16 Nonetheless, no-one has been convicted of murdering 17 Mr Hamill and only one person was convicted of affray 18 arising out of the attack on him. 19 Reserve Constable Atkinson was eventually charged in 20 relation to a conspiracy arising out of the alleged 21 tip-offs that he gave, but he was not prosecuted to 22 trial. This Inquiry was established as part of the 23 peace process and its terms of reference have been set 24 out in the Chairman's opening remarks. We would 25 respectfully suggest that those terms of reference 20 1 recognise two areas of public concern arising out of 2 Mr Hamill's death. Very broadly, the first is whether 3 the RUC officers in the Land Rover should be in any way 4 responsible for the death. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: I wonder if I can interrupt you? There is 6 something amiss with the sound, certainly on the bench. 7 I don't know if other people's speakers are working. 8 The sound from that speaker has disappeared. 9 SIR JOHN EVANS: And our screens have gone off. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: I think, Mr Underwood, we will rise while 11 this is sorted out. 12 (11.13 am) 13 (A short break) 14 (11.30 am) 15 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Underwood? 16 MR UNDERWOOD: I do apologise for that, sir. I think, 17 despite all the excellence of our technology, something 18 came unplugged. 19 I was saying that the terms of reference appear to 20 recognise two areas of public concern which arose out of 21 Mr Hamill's death. 22 Very broadly, the first of those is whether the RUC 23 officers in the Land Rover should be regarded in any way 24 responsible for his death. 25 The second is whether the investigation into his 21 1 death was inhibited in some way by the wrongdoing, 2 incompetence or lack of due diligence on the part of the 3 RUC, or lack of due diligence on the part of any other 4 person or body who is connected with the investigation. 5 Mr Hamill's tragic death occurred at a time when 6 sections of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland 7 had great mistrust of policing and the criminal justice 8 system in general. Mr Hamill's death and the failures 9 of the State to secure convictions arising out of it 10 were emblematic of that mistrust for many. They 11 resonated with the perception that the RUC was unwilling 12 to assist Catholics generally, that the RUC and the 13 criminal justice system were reckless about the 14 investigation and prosecution of those who attacked 15 Catholics, and that the system protected RUC officers. 16 The Inquiry intends to shine a powerful and unbiased 17 spotlight on the public concerns that gave rise to it 18 being established so that the truth can be revealed. 19 The truth may show that the mistrust about the RUC and 20 the criminal justice system was unjustified. If, on the 21 other hand, the spotlight uncovers failures, whether on 22 the part of individuals or organisations, then 23 recommendations can be made for the future. 24 We hope by those means the Inquiry will make 25 a contribution to the break with the past that the peace 22 1 process already represents and that Mr Hamill will not 2 have died in vain. 3 To that end, the Inquiry will have the advantage of 4 hearing a large number of witnesses. It will be shown 5 several thousand documents. It will have to consider 6 a number of questions, some of which will require the 7 resolution of a variety of competing accounts. It would 8 be, I think, oppressive if I attempted to open every 9 issue and every conflict of evidence at any stage. 10 Equally, an opening which attempted to set out all the 11 facts in one bite would be indigestible. As you 12 foreshadowed, Sir, what I propose to do is introduce 13 matters in several stages. 14 Before I get to any of the detail, I am firstly 15 going to give a brief overview of the main events which 16 the Inquiry is likely to consider, so as to give some 17 context. Secondly, I will move to suggest some of the 18 principle questions which, I hope, the Panel may find 19 helpful in determining and to determine the issues set 20 out by the terms of reference. Then I will turn to more 21 detail, which, as I say, you foreshadowed in your 22 opening remarks, sir, by doing mini-openings in stages, 23 as it were, before each group of witnesses. 24 Only when the evidence has fully emerged will 25 I attempt to marshall that evidence by reference to any 23 1 issues which appear to suggest themselves. 2 Before undertaking the first of those stages, 3 I propose to say a few words about the approach which 4 I and my team have adopted so far. I should make it 5 clear how my role and that of the Panel differs. 6 I am, of course, part of a team of lawyers who have 7 gathered and sifted the evidence so far to be produced 8 to the Panel. My task, together with Miss Anderson, is 9 to present that evidence as fully and clearly as 10 possible by questioning witnesses, drawing attention to 11 documents. I will suggest what questions may usefully 12 be considered, and in due course I may diffidently 13 suggest how they might be answered. My function is to 14 permit you to reach the most informed conclusion 15 possible. 16 You have not heard, I know, any evidence beforehand. 17 You will only have read documents and statements that 18 have been available, or will be available, to the 19 lawyers for interested parties and witnesses. You are 20 likely, I know, to read those materials shortly before 21 relevant witnesses are called so they are fresh in the 22 mind. 23 Your function, of course, is to reach conclusions on 24 the material that is to be made public. You will decide 25 what questions you consider to be relevant, despite any 24 1 suggestions that I may make and, of course, you alone 2 will answer them. No-one should regard anything I say 3 or do during the course of the hearings as being said or 4 done on your behalf. 5 So far as the events of the night are concerned, 6 I will seek to adduce as much live evidence as possible 7 in order for you to decide what happened. Insofar as 8 the murder investigation is concerned, I will restrict 9 myself to evidence about the investigation or 10 investigations which, in fact, took place, so as to 11 enable you to decide whether they or it was flawed and, 12 if so, how and why. My team has resisted the temptation 13 to re-investigate the murder ourselves as being outside 14 the terms of reference. 15 In addition to the murder investigation, there have 16 already been a number of investigations into the conduct 17 of the RUC, which I will describe a little later. Those 18 investigations have uncovered materials and those are 19 helpful to the Inquiry I apprehend. Some of them will 20 be used in evidence insofar as they are helpful. 21 Insofar as those investigations reached conclusions, 22 no doubt you will wish to be informed what those 23 conclusions were. Equally, no doubt you will not 24 consider yourself bound by them. 25 The terms of the reference are not restricted, as, 25 1 again, you foreshadowed in your opening remarks, sir, to 2 an investigation of the behaviour of the RUC and its 3 officers. As the Secretary of State has pointed out, 4 the due diligence part of it also entails consideration 5 of the behaviour of any other person or body involved in 6 or who may have contributed to, or whose actions relate 7 to the investigation into Robert Hamill's murder. The 8 Inquiry is therefore required to investigate whether 9 such behaviour involved due diligence. 10 There is reason to believe that the office of the 11 Director of Public Prosecutions had such a relationship 12 with the investigation. To the extent that 13 prosecutorial decisions shaped the investigation into 14 Robert Hamill's death, the facts relating to those 15 decisions must also be considered to ascertain whether 16 they were made with due diligence at the beginning. 17 The Inquiry is not obliged or even entitled to 18 question the correctness of any prosecutorial decision. 19 To the extent that the Inquiry is required to find facts 20 that have already been considered by the DPP, it must 21 reach its own conclusions, whether or not those 22 conclusions are different to those reached by the DPP. 23 As will become clear, there is reason to believe 24 that the DPP's prosecutorial's decisions about the 25 alleged murderers and about Reserve Constable Atkinson 26 1 may have shaped the investigation into the murder and so 2 must be considered. 3 The evidence which I lead and the submissions which 4 I may make on the evidence in due course may suggest 5 that some individuals have acted in a way which, if this 6 were a court, could amount to a finding of guilt or 7 a civil wrong, but, if so, that will be an incidental 8 effect of fulfilling our terms of reference. 9 I want to emphasise this is not a criminal or civil 10 trial, as, again, you foreshadowed, sir. It is 11 a process designed to reveal the truth about the matters 12 which are set out in the terms of reference. The 13 Inquiry will not regard itself as being bound by your 14 rules of evidence or presumptions. It is only realistic 15 to acknowledge that meeting the terms of reference poses 16 a number of challenges. Those include these. 17 Firstly, the tragic death of Robert Hamill occurred 18 over ten years ago now. It resulted from an assault 19 that occurred in a chaotic situation at night-time when 20 many of those involved had been drinking. No-one has 21 been convicted of murder. Investigations into the 22 murder and also into an allegation of neglect of duty on 23 the part of the RUC officers in the Land Rover were both 24 dogged by the unwillingness of witnesses to come forward 25 or to give evidence. Important aspects of the RUC 27 1 investigation were unfortunately not recorded, either on 2 paper or on computer. A number of witnesses who may 3 have given evidence have suffered serious illnesses 4 which have compromised their ability to recall events, 5 and, indeed, some have sadly died. 6 We can't rule out the possibility that evidence will 7 be given with a sectarian slant, either deliberately or 8 innocently. Finally, there is the prospect that 9 a number of individuals conspired to prevent the full 10 picture of the murder emerging. 11 In order to rise to these challenges, my team has 12 undertaken a number of steps. They include these. 13 Firstly, we have interviewed well over 200 14 prospective witnesses to ascertain what they know about 15 matters into which the Panel will be enquiring. Then we 16 have endeavoured to ask prospective witnesses in 17 interview about matters which appear to call for 18 explanation by them, so as to get the fullest possible 19 explanation from them. 20 We have, of course, secured limited immunity from 21 prosecution and in respect of disciplinary matters 22 relating to police officers. We have used powers of 23 compulsion in order to overcome the resistance of some 24 people to participate in the Inquiry process. We have 25 resisted blanket calls for anonymity and for screening 28 1 by some of those most involved in the matters which fall 2 for consideration. 3 We have combed through tens of thousands of 4 documents in preparation for this hearing and we have 5 welcomed suggestions concerning the way in which we 6 should present the evidence. We have been particularly 7 assisted by representations from a number of parties 8 including British Irish Rights Watch and by reading 9 submissions made at earlier stage by the Committee for 10 the Administration of Justice, as well as lines of 11 enquiry offered by interested parties and witnesses. 12 We have also commissioned independent police and 13 medical reports. 14 In the event then, I propose to call over 150 15 witnesses and to read statements from some others. 16 Statements will be read, of course, subject to what the 17 Panel decides, only where the evidence in them appears 18 to be both uncontroversial and also likely to be helpful 19 in establishing facts. I will draw attention in 20 addition to a considerable number of documents we have 21 distilled from all the materials we have gathered. 22 As I have said, when we come to deliver closing 23 submissions, I will seek to draw the strains of the 24 evidence together by reference to the questions which 25 appear to arise. 29 1 I should make it clear that my Inquiry team has 2 looked at a considerable amount of material in order to 3 decide what evidence to present. We have discarded some 4 material as irrelevant. That includes a number of 5 witness statements which, in the interest of fairness, 6 we have nonetheless served on interested parties. 7 A very few witnesses have been granted anonymity and 8 screening. They will give their evidence under 9 codenames. When they do that, the chamber will be 10 closed to the public. Their evidence will be relayed by 11 sound only to a room in which the public will be able to 12 follow it. Where documents contain details such as 13 names and addresses that are not referable to the 14 Inquiry, they have been blacked out. Otherwise, it is 15 our intention to conduct the hearing entirely openly. 16 When a witness is called, he or she is likely to be 17 asked to adopt the witness statement or the expert 18 report which they have made for the purpose of the 19 Inquiry. If so, that will be taken as read, and I will 20 be asking supplemental questions about important and 21 contentious matters. The more important and contentious 22 the witness is likely to be, the more I am likely to 23 want to elicit the material rather than rely on the 24 statement. 25 The questions will take into account lines of 30 1 questioning suggested by other witnesses and interested 2 parties. If other lawyers wish to ask further 3 questions, then, again, as you said in your opening 4 remarks, sir, they need to seek your permission. 5 This is a paperless Inquiry. We aim to use 6 technology to the extent it will assist. It may be 7 helpful if I spend a little time explaining what 8 technological aids we have and to demonstrate them quite 9 briefly. 10 The material documents -- that is all those 11 documents which we have sifted and which we think may 12 have some relevance to anything that is of interest in 13 relation to the terms of reference -- have been scanned. 14 They have been given numbers. They can being called up 15 by the document number and, for preparation purposes, 16 the interested parties and some witnesses have been 17 given search facilities. 18 During the hearing, documents to be relied on will 19 be shown on the screens in the chamber. We all have 20 large screens in front of us. For example, we can see 21 page [06080]. The technology we have in relation to 22 documents gives us a number of facilities. For example, 23 the person who has control can highlight, they can zoom 24 and they can magnify part. There is also a split-screen 25 facility for documents and each of the features we have 31 1 just seen can be applied to both documents on the split 2 screen. 3 To take an example, we could have page [09135] up on 4 one side and [09630] up on the other side. This gives 5 us the facility to highlight parts that one might want 6 to compare. As I say, this is a facility, among many, 7 which are in the hands of those who have control of the 8 system. The control of technology is generally in the 9 hands of the experts to my left. It can be and will be 10 given to witnesses or, indeed, anyone else in the 11 chamber with a touch-screen who, as it were, has the 12 stand at the time. So a lawyer who is examining the 13 witness can have control. 14 We also have a plan of the centre of Portadown on 15 which are marked both the positions of the Land Rover as 16 identified by its occupants and also the positions from 17 which photographs were taken. They were taken on two 18 different occasions: firstly, on the morning of 19 27th April 1997 itself, and, secondly, at night in 20 a reconstruction on 10th June 1997. 21 We can have a look at those now. You can see what 22 we have here is a plan with blue or dark grey circles 23 with numbers in. Those show the positions from which 24 photographs were taken. This also shows the police 25 cordon which was applied later on the morning of 32 1 27th April. From this plan, as I say, bearing in mind 2 one has those circles from which the photographs were 3 taken, one can go directly to the photographs by 4 clicking on them. That obviously was taken on the 5 morning. There is the cordon itself. Then we can see 6 one of the night-time photographs. Again, there is, on 7 the right-hand side of the screen, the Land Rover as 8 placed in the reconstruction. 9 We have applied technology to these photographs as 10 well so that you can pan and zoom. You can see quite 11 good definition when it is zoomed in. 12 With the entire virtual reality suite of which this 13 is all part there is the facility to draw the image on 14 the screen and capture that screen image with a drawing 15 on it as a piece of evidence. So if, for example, 16 a witness wants to tell us where they were standing on 17 the night, they can draw a cross, they having the 18 control when they are in the witness box. 19 We also have virtual reality views of the area. We 20 are looking here at simply one shot, one example: again, 21 as with the rest of this suite, there is the facility to 22 draw the image on the screen and capture that as a piece 23 of evidence. Again, if a witness is happier with 24 a photograph, and round like that to mark where they 25 were, they can use that rather than a plan or a map. 33 1 We have night views as well as these day views in 2 the virtual reality suite. Those who know the area may 3 have noticed that these photographs and the virtual 4 reality suite are taken at various times. This is 5 contemporaneous with the hearing, as it were, so the 6 names on the shops are not necessarily the names on the 7 shops as they were in 1997. 8 To do that, what we have done is modelled the area. 9 Here we see a day view of it as clearly as possible. We 10 also have a night model. The main purpose of these 11 models is to reconstruct the scene with the right shop 12 signs on. Obviously this has been taken from 13 photographs and we hope it is a fairly accurate 14 representation for illustrative purposes and to aid 15 witnesses. Again, it is possible to draw lines, make 16 markings and capture the result as a piece of evidence. 17 Additionally, we have aerial photographs of 18 Portadown. This, of course, has key locations marked on 19 it. You can see from what has just happened that this 20 can be zoomed in. Yet again, markings can be made on 21 this. So if somebody wanted to draw their track, as it 22 were, on the night, or mark a position, they can do that 23 and, again, it can be captured. 24 In addition to all those, we have some maps ranging 25 from small to large scale. Inevitably, of course, these 34 1 can be zoomed. Again, we can draw lines, make markings 2 and the result can be captured and saved as evidence. 3 The advantage of some of these different maps, of 4 course, is they tend to show larger areas, so that 5 people who say they were coming from somewhere outside 6 the centre can, if necessary, go to that map to show us 7 how far that might have been. 8 The advantage of this particular map we have on the 9 screen at the moment is that it has labelled on it some 10 other significant locations, in particular, towards the 11 bottom right-hand side, marked "G", is St Patrick's 12 Hall, "F", further up and on the right, is the police 13 station. Continuing to go up from the police station, 14 "C" is Boss Hoggs, a place about which there will be 15 some evidence, and "A", towards the top, the highest 16 marking on the right is Heron's Country Fried Chicken, 17 again a place where, on the evidence, people were. 18 In addition to, as it were, the static exhibits, we 19 have voice recordings and transcripts. For the 20 ambulance call, we have simply put the transcript and 21 the voice recording on the same thing. 22 (Ambulance call played) 23 That's just a short snippet of it. Obviously we 24 have available the entirety of it, and we will come to 25 that in due course. 35 1 For police channels, the position is a little more 2 complex. There were two channels used on the night, and 3 in the heat of the moment officers used them 4 indiscriminately. That's not a criticism, but it has 5 led to us having to mix and match, as it were. What we 6 have done is combined both of the channels and the PSNI 7 has very kindly added times to them. The transcript 8 with timings is then shown in a combined recording. 9 (Police calls played) 10 I hope that will give a sense of immediacy. Also, 11 with the timings, it may be possible to reconstruct the 12 sequence and see what happened when. 13 The PSNI kindly positioned a Land Rover similar to 14 that involved on the night at the crossroads in 15 Portadown to enable us to take video recordings from the 16 inside, which was done at my direction to give an idea, 17 and only an idea, of what could being seen from inside 18 the position we put it. We have those views. 19 Witnesses will be asked to say how representative 20 they are of what could be seen from the actual Land 21 Rover on the night. What you are seeing there is the 22 views from inside the Land Rover in position which is 23 called LR2. We also have the position LR3: I hope this 24 gives some idea, and will give some idea, when the 25 evidence comes to be called on this, just how different 36 1 the views were from the two positions that the Land 2 Rover was in relevantly. 3 In addition, there is a virtual reality view from 4 inside the Land Rover. Again, it is in all three 5 positions. This is the third position as we apprehend 6 it at the moment. One has a choice of views. This is 7 the driver's view. Again, the only reason I am showing 8 these at the moment is to see what facilities we have at 9 our command when the witnesses come to give evidence. 10 Clearly most of these facilities are directed to what 11 happened on the nights of 26th and 27th April 1997. 12 In addition to that, we have a time line, which my 13 legal team has compiled. Here you see it on screen. It 14 contains references to most of the relevant events and 15 the documents that relate to them. 16 What you can see as we scroll through are the 17 coloured lines which relate to the various 18 investigations I have spoken about. If we take 19 a snapshot here, you get red, blue, green, etc. We have 20 the start date for each of the investigations, the end 21 date. I hope it will be of some value for anybody 22 looking through for a snapshot of what was going on at 23 any particular date to see what investigations were 24 afoot. In addition, one can, of course, drill down into 25 this by looking at a particular date. 37 1 Take at random 10th May 1997. What we have done 2 here is precis, and these are my precis, of the evidence 3 we know about of events that happened on that day with 4 the page reference leading to where the evidence 5 actually is. 6 This is very much, of course, a preparation tool. 7 I hope it has been helpful to legal teams in preparing 8 for the hearings. I hope it will be useful for 9 preparation for the final submissions. It may be useful 10 to you when you come to writing your report. 11 If it is helpful, I am very pleased about it. If it 12 is not, it is not evidence, it is simply my precis of 13 where I believe the evidence to be. Again, for anybody 14 looking at a particular date, it may be useful for them 15 to see the context. 16 The transcripts of the hearings which you referred 17 to in your opening remarks, sir, will be, together with 18 all documents referred to in evidence, uploaded on the 19 Inquiry's website as hearings progress. The aim is to 20 get transcripts on the website by the lunchtime of the 21 day after the evidence is given. The proceedings are, 22 of course, simultaneously being transcribed on LiveNote. 23 I think almost everybody in the room has had training on 24 that now, and, to see just how helpful that can be, it 25 has an electronic tagging facility which allows lawyers 38 1 to highlight evidence as it arises, and, as I think will 2 be evident, this comes up on the personal laptop 3 computers of legal representatives and, of course, 4 before you. 5 I want to emphasise all of this technology is simply 6 an aid to get the evidence out. It is not a substitute 7 for it. It will carry such weight as, in the end, you 8 think fit, once you have heard the oral evidence. It is 9 important to remember that about very important issues 10 there is very little common ground, particularly what 11 precisely happened on the night of 26th and 12 27th April 1997. There is controversy about aspects of 13 the murder investigation that no amount of technology 14 will help with. There will be conflicts of oral 15 evidence and only an analysis of that evidence is going 16 to enable you to resolve it, I apprehend. 17 In general, again, as your opening remarks 18 suggested, I will be the one asking questions of 19 witnesses. Representatives of interested parties and 20 others have been asked to provide lines of Inquiry and 21 lines of questioning to me, and I have been provided 22 already with some extremely helpful suggestions, for 23 which I am very grateful. 24 No doubt, as the hearings progress further, 25 questions will occur to my learned friends. I will be 39 1 very happy to take suggestions as and when they can be 2 made. There are no rules. Obviously, the earlier I get 3 them, the more efficiently the hearing will run. I, of 4 course, understand, as again you foreshadowed, that some 5 questions will only occur to people as witnesses are 6 giving their evidence. 7 If a suggestion comes to me by way of a note during 8 the evidence, I will do my very best to deal with it. 9 To the extent that, for whatever reason, any of my 10 learned friends believe that I have not dealt fully with 11 questions to be asked of a witness, then, of course, 12 they must ask your consent to put questions themselves. 13 Having said that then, what I propose to embark on 14 is a very brief overview of the facts. I have attempted 15 to make this as uncontroversial as possible, which is 16 not necessarily an easy task. I have endeavoured to 17 avoid assumptions of fact. I don't propose to trail the 18 oral evidence that we believe may emerge. 19 I think it is now known that, in 1997, Portadown was 20 a town with Protestant and Catholic communities and 21 there were tensions between the two. Thomas Street, 22 Market Street, High Street and Woodhouse Street met in 23 the centre of Portadown and, in 1997, the town centre 24 was regarded as a Protestant area. Nonetheless, 25 St Patrick's Hall in Thomas Street was a Catholic venue. 40 1 We can see the crossroads on there. Market Street and 2 the High Street is running, as it were, left to right 3 upwards. Thomas Street has Jameson's Bar on it and 4 Eastwoods is at the corner. Woodhouse Street leads more 5 or less straight off from that. The Halifax and the 6 Alliance & Leicester are on the corners there. 7 The Catholic patrons of St Patrick's Hall would walk 8 home occasionally up Thomas Street and into Woodhouse 9 streets to the Catholic estate after a night out. I say 10 occasionally because, on the evidence, it appears they 11 would do that only if they couldn't get a cab. 12 Protestants were liable to walk home up the High 13 Street and into Market Street in the early hours of 14 Sunday mornings. The town centre lay behind barriers, 15 so it was effectively pedestrianised only. As I said, 16 the crossroads appears to have been a notorious flash 17 point. 18 On 27th April 1997, four RUC personnel -- 19 Constable Neill, Reserve Constable Atkinson, 20 Reserve Constable Cornett and an officer who has 21 anonymity and is known by code of P40 -- were detailed 22 public order duties in an armoured Land Rover in the 23 centre of Portadown. They were given that detail at 24 12.10 midnight. They had been on duty since 3.00 pm on 25 26th April and public orders duties were a regular task. 41 1 All four knew they meant patrolling and watching for 2 drunken fights and sectarian clashes. The reservists 3 were full-time. The principal differences between 4 ordinary constables and reserves was the latter were 5 employed on three-year contracts which were capable of 6 being renewed and reservists had less training than 7 regular officers. By what we believe to have been an 8 unwritten convention, constables appear to have been 9 regarded as senior to reservists. 10 The officers on duty at the time of the incident are 11 well documented. We are concerned with what was called 12 J Division, which comprised Portadown, Lurgan and 13 Banbridge. There were night duty officers, and, 14 including those working from the late turn headed by the 15 inspector, were Inspector Alan McCrum, one sergeant, 16 Sergeant P89, a communications officer, who 17 is called Constable Godley, a station office duty 18 constable, three station security constables and then 19 some mobile personnel. 20 There were two of those in a vehicle which was call 21 signed JD70, and those were Constable Orr and 22 a constable who has, again, been given anonymity, and we 23 refer to her as Constable A. There were three personnel 24 in the vehicle which had call sign JD80. Those were 25 Constable Cooke, who drove it, Reserve Constable Warnock 42 1 and Reserve Constable Murphy. There were two in call 2 sign JB70. Those were Constable Silcock, who drove it, 3 and Constable Adams, who was the observer. That was 4 deployed in somewhere called the Birches. 5 Then there were four in JD81, which was the 6 Land Rover at the crossroads, who, as I have already 7 told you, were Constable Neill, Reserve 8 Constable Atkinson, P40, and Reserve Constable Cornett. 9 There was also, I should say, a mobile support unit on 10 duty. That comprised two sergeants and 12 constables. 11 There were, in fact, two mobile support units allocated 12 to what was then J Division, but, having completed 13 an earlier tour of duty, the one MSU was deployed on 14 public order duties from 2330 hours on the 26th, and, at 15 the time of the incident, it was deployed at Banbridge. 16 The MSU then did deploy to Portadown, because it was 17 called out and was briefed by Inspector McCrum. By the 18 stage that it arrived, the public order incident had 19 largely been brought under control. The role of the MSU 20 then was to deter further disorder. It is for that 21 reason that the MSU does not, in fact, feature very 22 heavily in the evidence to be led. 23 So, at about 1.30 to 1.40 on the morning of 24 27th April 1997, events began to unfold in two ways. 25 Firstly, a bus load of Protestants arrived at the bottom 43 1 of the High Street. We see, in fact, the top right-hand 2 corner of our screen. They came from a club called the 3 Coach Inn. Secondly, a number of Catholics emerged from 4 a night of dancing at St Patrick's Hall in 5 Thomas Street. They decided to walk up into 6 Woodhouse Street. Again, the evidence seems to suggest 7 that was because of a want of taxis. 8 The Land Rover was at about this time parked in 9 a lay-by on Market Street facing down into the 10 High Street. At some point it moved off and the 11 officers then stopped and spoke to a gentleman called 12 Thomas Mallon. He was a Catholic who had come up from 13 Thomas Street. He warned them that Catholics were 14 coming up behind him from St Patrick's Hall. 15 Accounts vary about the extent to which Protestants 16 were in the area by then or what they were doing. 17 Mr Mallon then had an encounter with some Protestants. 18 It is not clear how many there were of them, but they 19 did include Stacey Bridgett and Dean Forbes. 20 Accounts also vary about the nature of that 21 encounter. What is clear is that the Land Rover, having 22 begun to move off, then stopped again. At least one of 23 the officers in it then spent some time talking in 24 a friendly way to Mr Forbes and Mr Bridgett. 25 Finally, accounts also vary about whether Mr Mallon 44 1 carried on home or whether he remained in the area. 2 We can see all those positions on the vehicle 3 location map. If I just briefly take you to it, if one 4 looks to the shops at the top side, First Trust Bank, 5 Clarks Shoe Shop, Instep Sports, LR1 is the position of 6 the Land Rover in a lay-by just outside Clarks Shoe 7 Shop. That's where the vehicle was stationary for some 8 time. 9 LR2 is, according to the reconstruction of 10 10th June, where the Land Rover then stopped temporarily 11 while Mr Mallon made it pause and while he spoke to at 12 least one of the officers in it. 13 LR3 then is where the Land Rover ended up. I hope 14 what the evidence is going to show is that the Land 15 Rover ended up there because of the meeting that 16 occurred between Mr Mallon and the Catholics in which 17 the Land Rover crews stopped initially to diffuse that, 18 and then so that at least some of them, or at least one 19 of them, could talk to Mr Bridget and Mr Forbes. 20 While that discussion was continuing, something 21 happened at the junction. That seems clear, because 22 somebody approached the Land Rover and pulled at 23 Constable Neill, in fact, pulling him out of the 24 Land Rover, accusing him of sitting there while it 25 happened. It is not clear who that person was. We know 45 1 then that violence broke out. There is a considerable 2 dispute about precisely how, where and between whom, nor 3 is it presently clear whether Mr Hamill was an immediate 4 casualty of that violence and whether he was knocked to 5 the ground before the officers dismounted from the 6 Land Rover. 7 A primary task for the Inquiry may well be to reach 8 conclusions about all of those matters, and it would be 9 unhelpful to attempt to set out the various accounts in 10 this brief chronology. Baldly, though, there are 11 essentially two versions of what happened to precipitate 12 the fight. 13 The first is that Mr Hamill and a small group were 14 walking up Thomas Street. When they reached the 15 junction, they were suddenly set on and Mr Hamill was 16 knocked down very quickly. He was then kicked and 17 jumped on. 18 The second version essentially is that a small 19 number of Catholic men either ran up Thomas Street and 20 attacked two or three Protestants who were at the 21 junction or they squared up to Protestants at the 22 junction until someone struck the first blow. 23 That version of events may involve Mr Hamill running 24 into Market Street to continue the fight. Other 25 Protestants walking up from the bottom of High Street 46 1 then outnumbered those Catholics, and that version has 2 the support of some of the witnesses who lived or worked 3 around the area and of some of the Protestants who admit 4 fighting. 5 The position of Mr Hamill on the road when 6 unconscious is not at all clear on either of those 7 accounts, and resolution of that issue might determine 8 which of those accounts is the more likely. 9 What is clear is that Mr Hamill was rendered 10 unconscious. He was left lying in the road together 11 with one of the other Catholics who had come up 12 Thomas Street with him. That person has anonymity. We 13 refer to him as "D". D was knocked briefly unconscious. 14 He also was in the road. Again, it is not at all clear 15 precisely where. 16 The officers in the Land Rover give varying accounts 17 of what they saw when they emerged from the Land Rover. 18 They have been asked about this a number of times in the 19 course of the various investigations. None of them says 20 that anyone was lying in the road when they got out. 21 Read as a whole, I think it is fair to say their 22 accounts to date are to the effect that no serious 23 assault had taken place by the time they got out. They 24 say they all got out when Constable Neill was pulled 25 out, that fighting began then and that they attempted to 47 1 restore order, but the Catholics and the police were 2 hopelessly outnumbered. 3 That, of course, has to be contrasted with what the 4 person pulling Constable Neill had said; that he had sat 5 there while it happened. 6 On the other hand, some witnesses will says that the 7 Land Rover crew waited in the vehicle while the assault 8 took place and that they only emerged when back-up 9 arrived. Reserve Constable Cornett, as you have heard 10 a snippet of, radioed for back-up. The timing we have 11 for that is at 1.45. Vehicles responded. We think the 12 most likely sequence of the response vehicle arriving is 13 that Constables Silcock and Adams arrived a few minutes 14 after 1.47. The second vehicle appears to have been 15 a police car containing Reserve Constables Cooke, 16 Warnock and Murphy, who arrived about 1.51 and 17 Constables Orr and A arrived at about 1.55. 18 Sergeant P89 and Inspector McCrum, who had been 19 in the police station we saw earlier marked on the plan, 20 arrived on foot at about 2 o'clock. Again, as you know, 21 because we have the ambulance tapes, 22 Reserve Constable Cornett called for ambulances as well 23 as back-up. Significantly, her first call for 24 an ambulance was after the first call for back-up. The 25 ambulance call was at 1.48. 48 1 So it is likely, we diffidently suggest that 2 Robert Hamill was on the ground by that stage, hence the 3 call for the ambulance. By at that stage, as I have 4 suggested, it looks as if Constable Silcock was on the 5 screen, and, interestingly, he made a virtually 6 simultaneous call for ambulances for two victims. 7 Again, it is possible that one may be able to 8 reconstruct the sequence and timing from this 9 intersection of course. One ambulance was sent. 10 Fortunately for us, it had automatic time recording 11 equipment which tells us it was on the scene at 1.58. 12 It left again smartly at 2.02, arriving at Craigavon 13 Area Hospital at 2.09. Assuming that its timings and 14 the police timings were both correct, as it were, again 15 there is an intersection of timings from all these which 16 may allow a reconstruction. 17 It is fair to say it is not clear precisely who was 18 conveyed to hospital. Certainly Mr Hamill was taken. 19 He was unconscious throughout. The person we are now 20 calling "D" appears to have walked to the ambulance, 21 having been rendered, as I said, briefly unconscious 22 before. He, too, was taken to hospital. A gentleman 23 called Colin Hull also attended hospital. 24 We think it likely, though we will see how the 25 evidence comes, that he, too, went in the ambulance. He 49 1 was a Catholic. Conflicting accounts have been 2 attributed to him, whether he came from St Patrick's 3 Hall or, indeed, from the opposite direction, from the 4 top of Woodhouse Street. 5 A further gentleman, Mr Vincent McNeice, may also 6 have travelled in the ambulance. Of course, we will 7 call these witnesses to tell you what they saw. 8 Police gradually got between the Protestants and 9 those on the ground. They formed a line and pushed the 10 Protestants up into West Street, so to the left on the 11 map we are looking at now. A number of the officers 12 recognised various Protestants who were behaving 13 aggressively towards them and also to the men on the 14 ground but the only direct identification any of the 15 officers has given in relation to the assault is by 16 Constable Neill, who described a person kicking at 17 Mr Hamill. 18 The person he identified as doing that was 19 subsequently identified as Mr Marc Hobson. In addition, 20 Constable A detained a gentleman called Wayne Lunt. She 21 placed him in the Land Rover in order to confirm his 22 name and address. When she released him, which she did, 23 because she didn't arrest him, she was challenged by at 24 least two Catholics who asked her why she was letting 25 him go, as he was "one of the ones who did it". Again, 50 1 you may be assisted by the contemporaneity of some of 2 these remarks such as, "You sat there and watched it 3 happen", or, "Why are you letting him go?". 4 Again, we are going to call all the witnesses 5 relevant to these matters for you to determine that. 6 Reserve Constable Atkinson warned Sergeant P89 7 about a gentleman called Allister Hanvey, who, it 8 transpires, was behaving aggressively towards the 9 sergeant while the police had formed the line trying to 10 push the Protestants up the road. 11 In particular, Reserve Constable Atkinson warned the 12 sergeant that Mr Hanvey was a martial arts expert. At 13 hospital, Mr Hamill was comatose, but he was not thought 14 to be in immediate danger originally. The constables at 15 the scene were then re-directed either to other duties, 16 or, in the case of those who had been on duty a long 17 time, allowed to go home at the end of their shifts. 18 None was asked to make notebook entries. There was no 19 immediate debriefing. That is despite the fact that 20 although at hospital nobody thought Mr Hamill to be in 21 immediate danger, in fact, a number of the police at the 22 scene thought he had been stabbed or at least had very 23 serious breathing difficulties. So they thought, even 24 though they were not debriefed about it, that he was 25 seriously ill. 51 1 The RUC, nonetheless, did begin an investigation 2 into the assault on the morning of 27th April. 3 Inspector McCrum had contacted the hospital, realised 4 the assault may be serious and called in a duty 5 Detective, Detective Constable Keys at 0442. 6 Between about 0540 and 0553, the Land Rover crew was 7 recalled and attended the police station to give 8 statements. They and other officers at the scene then 9 duly did make statements which were left for CID 10 officers to read. The statements were not the result of 11 interviews by the CID officers, and there is an issue 12 about the extent to which any meaningful debriefing of 13 the officers took place. 14 Later in the morning, Mr Hamill was moved to the 15 Royal Victoria Hospital because the CT scanner at the 16 first hospital was not working. He remained in a coma, 17 but the CT scan disclosed no particular injury. At 0837 18 on the morning of 27th April, a telephone call was made 19 from Reserve Constable Atkinson's home to a house 20 belonging to Allister Hanvey's parents, Kenneth and 21 Elizabeth Hanvey. Allister lived there with them. The 22 purpose of that call and the question whether it was 23 made by Reserve Constable Atkinson himself has attracted 24 a considerable degree of attention and gives rise to 25 important issues. 52 1 The statements made by officers on the morning of 2 27th April identified Mr Forbes and Mr Bridgett as being 3 at the scene of the fighting. They, as I said, were the 4 ones to whom the police officers were actually -- some 5 of the police officers were actually talking when the 6 Land Rover was stationary. Those gentlemen were 7 arrested for assault on 6th May 1997. 8 The statements made by various police officers also 9 named others who were at the front of the hostile crowd, 10 but no arrests were made in reliance on that 11 information. In particular, we will in due course draw 12 your attention to a gentleman who again has been 13 anonymised. We refer to him as P53. 14 As will become clear in the course of the hearings, 15 officers at the scene actually did identify a number of 16 people who were potential witnesses or suspects, but 17 they did not mention them in their statements. Those 18 omissions include any reference to Allister Hanvey and 19 any reference to the challenge made to Constable A when 20 she let Mr Lunt go. 21 On 6th May 1997, the solicitor for the Hamill family 22 made a complaint of neglect of duty against the 23 Land Rover crew for failing to intervene to protect 24 Mr Hamill. I will refer to that as the neglect 25 complaint. It obviously features quite largely in the 53 1 course of the evidence will emerge. 2 The complaint had two components: firstly, it was 3 an allegation of a criminal offence; secondly, it was 4 an allegation of misconduct. The practice of the RUC 5 was to deal with the criminal aspect of complaints like 6 that first, and those are the investigations, or, 7 rather, those are types of the investigations which come 8 within the category I have already referred to and you 9 have seen in the coloured line on the time line. 10 You will no doubt wish to have regard to the outcome 11 of investigations like that, but obviously you will see 12 reach your own conclusions about the facts they give 13 rise to. 14 On 8th May 1997, there were two important 15 developments. Firstly, Mr Hamill died unexpectedly. 16 The cause of death was not immediately clear and gave 17 rise to some speculation. We will indeed lead our 18 evidence with evidence by experts of the cause of death. 19 Secondly, later that day Andrea McKee met 20 Detective Constable McAteer and an inspector, Detective 21 Inspector Irwin, and she told them something that her 22 niece, Tracey Clarke, had been saying about the assault 23 and its aftermath. 24 That meeting came about because a Reserve Constable, 25 Reserve Constable McCaw, brought Andrea McKee to the 54 1 attention of the detectives in Portadown Police Station. 2 At the meeting, Mrs McKee told the detectives that 3 Tracey had seen the assault and could identify a number 4 of Protestants who kicked Robert Hamill while he was on 5 the road, including Allister Hanvey. Furthermore, she 6 said that Reserve Constable Atkinson had been keeping 7 Allister Hanvey informed of the progress of the 8 investigation. 9 Also on that day, changes were made to the 10 investigating teams. Initially, there was a Detective 11 Chief Inspector, who again has anonymity. We call her 12 P39. She had been appointed as the senior investigating 13 officer to the grievous bodily harm investigation, as it 14 had been until 8th May. Detective Inspector Irwin had 15 been her deputy. He is one of the gentleman who met 16 Andrea McKee that I just mentioned. Detective Chief 17 Superintendent McBurney apparently considered that his 18 role was to ensure they had adequate resources, but once 19 the neglect complaint was received, the Chief 20 Constable's office appointed him, that is DCS McBurney, 21 to be the senior investigating officer of that 22 investigation. 23 Once the police were informed of Robert Hamill's 24 death, Mr McBurney also became the senior investigating 25 officer for the murder investigation. By that stage, 55 1 DCI P39 became the investigating officer and DI Irwin 2 was then described as the office manager. 3 The investigation of the neglect complaint we 4 suggest needs to be considered with great care. There 5 is reason to believe, I respectfully suggest, that it 6 had an effect on the murder investigation and that it is 7 arguable at least that it was not conducted with due 8 diligence. 9 At 11.50 on the morning of 9th May 1997, the 10 detectives sought billing information regarding 11 telephone calls made between the Atkinson and Hanvey 12 homes to confirm the account which had been given to 13 them by Andrea McKee. Later that same day, 9th May, 14 Tracey Clarke attended the police station accompanied by 15 Andrea McKee and she gave a statement to the police, 16 which went, as it were, over midnight and was dated 17 10th May. She became known as Witness A to give her 18 some degree of protection. 19 In the statement she made to police she identified 20 a number of people: Dean Forbes, Allister Hanvey, 21 Stacey Bridgett, somebody called "Muck" and 22 Rory Robinson as having kicked and jumped on 23 Robert Hamill. She also said that Mr Hanvey told her 24 that Reserve Constable Atkinson had been very good to 25 him, had rung him about 8 o'clock on 27th April and told 56 1 him to get rid of his clothes and had rung him regularly 2 since to keep him informed of the investigation. 3 Also on 9th May, Reserve Constable McCaw, the 4 gentleman who had alerted detectives to Tracey Clarke, 5 alerted the detectives to an urgent need to see somebody 6 else. That was Timothy Jameson. Mr Jameson had 7 previously completed a questionnaire administered by the 8 police, who were looking to find witnesses on the night. 9 In that questionnaire he denied any knowledge of the 10 assault. His father was a prominent local builder who 11 had police protection because he worked on police 12 stations, and Mr McCaw visited the police station in 13 response to what Timothy Jameson had said to him. 14 Apparently at the police station Mr McCaw saw DI Irwin 15 and DCS McBurney. There is a conflict about what was 16 said there and to whom. 17 Mr McCaw was accompanied by somebody called, for the 18 purposes of this Inquiry, Reserve Constable G. Both 19 Mr McCaw and Reserve Constable G were close protection 20 officers and they were assigned to Mr Jameson senior. 21 Their account is that Timothy Jameson had told him he 22 had "put the boot in" to one of the men on the road. 23 They passed that information on to the detectives. 24 The detectives, for their part, have all asserted 25 they were merely told that Timothy Jameson was 57 1 a material witness. Whatever transpired there -- and it 2 is a matter which, no doubt, you will take an interest 3 in -- in the event, Timothy Jameson was interviewed and 4 he was interviewed as a witness. 5 He gave a statement. In that, he identified again 6 somebody called "Muck" who was fighting; Rory Robinson, 7 who was fighting; Allister Hanvey, who was kicking and 8 punching somebody of Mr Hamill's description on the 9 ground; and somebody called "Fonzy", who he said kicked 10 Mr Hamill in the face a couple of times. 11 The statement also said that Mr Jameson saw 12 Dean Forbes punch someone. Again, for reasons of 13 protection, an initial was given to Mr Jameson. He was 14 known as Witness B for those purposes. We will see that 15 "Fonzy" was identified and arrested but not charged, and 16 Timothy Jameson was later to retract his statement in 17 its entirety. 18 On 10th May, all those who had been identified by 19 Tracey Clarke were arrested and their homes were 20 searched. "Muck" was discovered to be Marc Hobson. 21 Wayne Lunt was also arrested. DNA samples were taken 22 from those arrested and the search of the Hanvey home is 23 a matter of some significance. It appears not to have 24 extended to the garden or surrounding area for signs of 25 burnt or discarded clothing and, in fact, it seems to 58 1 have been confined to one room. A black padded jacket 2 was recovered from that one room and, at interview, 3 Mr Hanvey said that that was his only jacket and that he 4 had been wearing it on the night. 5 On 11th May 1997, Allister Hanvey's parents and his 6 uncle Thomas were seen by police. They said 7 Allister Hanvey had been with Thomas Hanvey on the 8 morning of the incident from about 3.00 am to 9.00 am. 9 Also on 11th May, Jonathan Wright gave his first 10 statement. He is a gentleman who said he was with 11 Allister Hanvey on the night. Very significantly you 12 may think, he described Mr Hanvey as wearing a grey top 13 with orange stripes on the sleeves at the time of the 14 incident. 15 Although further searches of the Hanvey homes were 16 conducted in an attempt to find that jacket or traces of 17 it, other witnesses were not asked about what they saw 18 Mr Hanvey wearing until 2001. Importantly, 19 Tracey Clarke was not asked. She was a sometime 20 girlfriend of Allister Hanvey. Had she been asked about 21 it, the indications are she would have said she had 22 bought a jacket which was silver with orange stripes 23 down the sleeves for Allister Hanvey for Christmas 1996, 24 and that, she would have said, was what he destroyed. 25 According to materials given to us by the PSNI, 59 1 Tracey Clarke's mother and her stepfather would have 2 corroborated the purchase of such a jacket and would 3 have corroborated that Tracey Clarke was upset that that 4 jacket had been destroyed. As I say, none of that 5 emerged in 1997. 6 On 15th May 1997, Andrew Allen was arrested. He 7 accepted that he was known as "Fonzy". Unhappily, due 8 to a typing error in the transcript of Timothy Jameson's 9 statement, that identification of "Fonzy" was corrupted 10 to "Gonzy" and Mr Allen was released without charge the 11 day he was arrested. The RUC became aware on 12 12th June 1997 of the typing error, but we will see it 13 persisted. 14 David Woods is a gentleman who was also arrested and 15 interviewed later on 15th May 1997 and he was released 16 without charge on 16th May. The billing records that 17 had been sought on about 9th May of the Atkinson/Hanvey 18 telephones arrived on 16th May as far as we can 19 ascertain. They showed the call that I spoke about at 20 8.37 from the Atkinson household to the Hanvey 21 household. They also showed another one in the same 22 direction on 2nd May 1997. 23 Obviously, those give some support to the contention 24 that a telephone call was made by Mr Atkinson, as it 25 were, to tip off Mr Hanvey on the morning of the 27th 60 1 and perhaps keep him informed afterwards. 2 Notwithstanding getting those records on 16th May, 3 no action was taken. Detective Chief 4 Superintendent McBurney treated the possibility of 5 Reserve Constable Atkinson having perverted the course 6 of justice as part of the neglect complaint. That 7 complaint was supervised -- and one again sees this from 8 the coloured bands on the time line -- by the 9 Independent Commission for Police Complaints. Yet that 10 body had no power to supervise an investigation that was 11 no part of a complaint unless the Chief Constable 12 referred it to them. The Chief Constable was not asked 13 to refer the Atkinson matter to the ICPC and, further, 14 the ICPC appears not to have been told of the arrival of 15 the billing information. 16 You will be hearing a good deal of evidence about 17 the way in which complaints or allegations which emerge 18 in the course of some other investigation about a police 19 officer should have been treated as part of complaints 20 and discipline investigation and the chain of 21 communication that should have gone up to the Chief 22 Constable. You will be hearing from all the officers 23 involved, including the Chief Constable. 24 On 30th May 1997, DCI P39, who was the lady I told 25 you who was originally the senior investigating officer 61 1 of the assault, was transferred out of Portadown. She 2 had maintained something called a policy book, a murder 3 policy book. She handed that on her transfer to 4 DI Irwin. That was the last that happened to it, as it 5 were. No further entries were made in that policy book. 6 On 22nd July 1997, Detective Inspector Irwin signed 7 off a crime file for submission to the DPP, which was, 8 as it were, a report going up to the prosecuting 9 authorities to alert them of the potential for charges 10 and prosecutions. That crime file unhappily perpetuated 11 the typing error of "Fonzy", which I would apprehend on 12 a fair reading makes it look as if that's a reason for 13 not prosecuting Mr Allen. You will see that and form 14 your own views, of course. 15 On 9th September 1997, Reserve Constable Atkinson 16 was finally interviewed under caution. He was 17 interviewed by Detective Inspector Irwin and Detective 18 Chief Superintendent McBurney. You will recall, of 19 course, that DI Irwin had been instrumental in the 20 evidence coming out or rather the statement being made 21 by Tracey Clarke and had, of course, met Andrea McKee. 22 Reserve Constable Atkinson was interviewed in relation 23 to the neglect complaint. 24 Now, as I have said, the neglect complaint strictly 25 was the complaint made by xxxxxxxxxx on behalf of 62 1 the Hamill family and went to the four officers not 2 getting out of the Land Rover, even though Detective 3 Chief Superintendent McBurney, as it were, wrapped up 4 into it the allegation being made of tipping off. 5 In the course of that interview, Mr Atkinson was 6 asked about telephone calls, but it was not put to him 7 that billing records showed that telephone calls had 8 been made. He was released for re-interview a month 9 later and in the meantime was to obtain his own billing 10 records. He was duly re-interviewed on 11 9th October 1997, this time in the absence of any 12 representative of the ICPC, who obviously took the view 13 at that stage they were not supervising that part of 14 what might have been regarded as the neglect complaint. 15 In the course of that second interview, he said that 16 the call on 27th April was made by Michael McKee, 17 Andrea's husband, who he said had been staying at his 18 house with Andrea McKee, but unbeknown to him, 19 Mr Atkinson. The call on 2nd May, between the houses, 20 was said to have been made by Mr Atkinson's wife, 21 Eleanor, to the Hanveys. Both Eleanor Atkinson and 22 Michael McKee duly attended and gave what I think could 23 reasonably be called alibi statements to that effect. 24 On 17th October 1997, Gordon Kerr, Queen's Counsel, 25 who was leading counsel briefed to prosecute those 63 1 charged with murder or to consider those charges, saw 2 Tracey Clarke. In that interview, in consultation, she 3 made it plain she would not give evidence. 4 Significantly perhaps she did not deny the truth of the 5 statement she had made dated 10th May 1997. 6 On 21st October, Mr Kerr QC, saw Timothy Jameson to 7 evaluate his evidence. He, you will recall, had been 8 brought to the attention of the detectives by Reserve 9 Constable McCaw, about which there is some contention. 10 Mr Jameson alleged he had been drunk on the night 11 and that words had been put into his mouth by the 12 detective who took the statement. That was 13 a Detective Constable Honeyford. It is only fair to 14 say, I think, that nobody present at that 15 consultation -- and you will be hearing from them -- 16 took that allegation at all seriously. You may think it 17 was a serious allegation and that, if made in the 18 presence of Queen's Counsel, who was supposed to 19 prosecute, and in the presence of representatives of the 20 DPP, and they had thought there was anything in it, then 21 they might have done something about it. 22 Be that as it may, counsel concluded that Mr Jameson 23 would not give any evidence of any value. Mr Jameson 24 has kindly waived privilege over attendance notes which 25 were made by a solicitor he instructed at the time. 64 1 When you come to see those, you may think those are not 2 wholly consistent with the account he gave counsel about 3 his statement. 4 Whatever the causes of witnesses withdrawing their 5 evidence may have been, as a result of the inability to 6 call those witnesses, the DPP issued a direction on 7 29th October 1997 to withdraw the murder charges against 8 Messrs Hanvey, Forbes and Robinson. That left others. 9 The evidence against Mr Hobson was, as I have 10 suggested, directly from Constable Neill, who, you will 11 recall, had said he had seen a person who turned out to 12 be Mr Hobson kicking at somebody on the ground. The 13 evidence against Mr Lunt came from Mr Prunty, one of the 14 Catholics who was on the scene, and the evidence against 15 Mr Bridgett included that some of his blood was found on 16 Robert Hamill's jeans. 17 There was also evidence that Mr Bridgett was in the 18 crowd attempting to get through the police line to 19 attack Mr Hamill and he had, in fact, in interview, 20 denied being anywhere near Mr Hamill, notwithstanding 21 that his blood had managed to get on to Mr Hamill's 22 jeans. So there were those outstanding possibilities 23 for prosecution based on that evidence or that material. 24 Also on 29th October 1997, Andrea McKee gave 25 an alibi statement supporting what Mr Atkinson had said 65 1 about the telephone call on 27th April. So, having 2 initially met Detective Inspector Irwin way back in May 3 to tell him what her niece had said about Mr Atkinson 4 tipping Mr Hanvey off, she now makes a statement to the 5 police. Not only does she make it to the police; she 6 makes it to Detective Inspector Irwin, so completely 7 contradicting what she said, which had caused six people 8 by this stage to be in custody for five months. 9 Obviously the contradiction between what she told 10 Detective Inspector Irwin on 8th May, and which had been 11 the basis for the seeking of the billing records and the 12 basis on which people had been in custody, is a matter 13 which is likely to take some time in this Inquiry. 14 Despite that contradiction, no further action was 15 taken at that stage. When Mr McBurney duly compiled his 16 report to the DPP, which was on the neglect complaint, 17 and that was 22nd December 1997, he did not suggest any 18 action at all against Reserve Constable Atkinson. 19 I will come in some detail later to see how he 20 treated the contradictory evidence, as it were, that 21 Andrea McKee provided and how it was treated. 22 On 5th November 1997, Mr Kerr saw Colin Prunty, who, 23 as I said, was the key witness in respect of Mr Lunt. 24 Mr Prunty by that stage had seen some news footage of 25 those defendants who had been released from custody, and 66 1 he was now adamant that the man he had identified as 2 an attacker was, fact, one of the other defendants and 3 not Mr Lunt. 4 On 11th November 1997, the RUC received the post 5 mortem report from Professor Crane. That report 6 identified the assault as the direct cause of 7 Mr Hamill's death. Until then, it is fair to say the 8 RUC had not been able to be clear about that causal 9 connection. 10 On 13th November 1997, Mr Kerr advised that more 11 information was required about that bloodstain on 12 Mr Hamill's jeans before a decision could be reached 13 about prosecuting Mr Bridgett. 14 On 17th November 1997, a Mr Davison of the DPP spoke 15 to Mr Marshall of the Forensic Science Agency. 16 Mr Marshall was very guarded about how he would 17 interpret the bloodstain, but no further inquiry was 18 made. Mr Bridgett was not re-interviewed. On the 19 materials that were then before him, Mr Kerr concluded 20 on 18th November 1997 that there was insufficient 21 evidence against Messrs Bridgett and Lunt, and the 22 holding charges against them were then dropped. The 23 case proceeded then against Mr Hobson alone for murder. 24 As I have said, the decisions not to prosecute 25 others have been highly controversial, and to the degree 67 1 to which they shaped the murder investigation, you will 2 no doubt wish to explore whether they were reached with 3 due diligence. 4 On 25th November 1997, Kenneth and Elizabeth Hanvey 5 were seen by Detective Inspector Irwin. They, too, 6 confirmed the Atkinson alibi, as I am calling it, for 7 the telephone calls of 27th April and 2nd May 1997. So 8 on 22nd December 1997, Detective Chief 9 Superintendent McBurney submitted his crime file in 10 relation to the neglect complaint and recommended no 11 prosecution of the officers in the Land Rover. 12 That recommendation was the subject of a good deal 13 of further consideration and advice, but the 14 recommendation was in due course accepted, so no action 15 was taken against the four in the Land Rover for failing 16 to get out of it. The recommendation in that crime 17 report extended to the question of whether Mr Atkinson 18 did tip off Mr Hanvey. As I said, it concluded nothing 19 should be done, but it did, to be fair, point out that 20 the explanation which he gave was to be doubted. 21 As I say, you will see it in detail to see how 22 fairly the known facts were set out there. 23 On 25th March 1999, after a trial, Mr Hobson was 24 convicted of affray. I said before that Constable Neill 25 said he saw Mr Hobson "kicking at" Mr Hamill, not kicking 68 1 him, so no evidence was led that any kick by Mr Hobson 2 connected with anybody. It was that distinction which 3 led to the conviction on the lesser charge. 4 On 11th November 1999, the criminal aspect of the 5 neglect complaint was complete. The ICPC certified that 6 it was satisfactory, and you will see in the course of 7 its certification process that there was an internal 8 conclusion, as it were, reached in the ICPC that the 9 allegation that Mr Atkinson tipped off Mr Hanvey did not 10 itself call for further investigation. You may wonder 11 what the ICPC was doing discussing that at all if it was 12 not part of his remit, and that's something we will be 13 calling evidence on. 14 In respect of the discipline side of the neglect 15 complaint, that was then, too, considered under ICPC 16 supervision and, on 29th March 2000 that aspect of the 17 neglect complaint was finished and a certificate of 18 satisfaction was signed off again by the ICPC. Again, 19 the conclusion was no action was called for. 20 So in respect of the neglect complaint, by that 21 point then both the criminal and disciplinary aspects of 22 it had been concluded with no action taken. 23 On 2nd June 2000 Detective Chief 24 Superintendent McBurney decided to re-interview the 25 McKees about the alibi they provided for 69 1 Reserve Constable Atkinson. A Detective Chief Inspector 2 was brought into the team for that. He is a gentleman 3 who has been given anonymity. We call him DCI K. 4 On 14th June 2000, Mr McKee, when interviewed, said 5 he had nothing further to add. Andrea McKee, 6 interviewed without being cautioned on 20th June 2000, 7 admitted that the alibi she had given was false. So she 8 went back, as it were, to her first version given which 9 had led to people being arrested. She said in this 10 interview that the McKees had not been at the Atkinsons 11 and that Reserve Constable Atkinson had later asked them 12 to make false statements. By that point she was 13 separated from her husband and had moved away. 14 On 26th June 2000, it was decided to re-investigate 15 the actions of Reserve Constable Atkinson. Detective 16 Chief Superintendent McBurney was to be the senior 17 investigating officer for that. DCI K was to be the 18 investigating officer for that. 19 In November 2000, the Police Ombudsman for Northern 20 Ireland, which we called PONI, replaced the ICPC. On 21 13th December, the Ombudsman expressed dissatisfaction 22 with Detective Chief Superintendent McBurney as the SIO 23 of the continuing investigation into Mr Atkinson. He, 24 Mr McBurney, was then quickly replaced by Detective 25 Chief Superintendent Colville Stewart. DCI K remained 70 1 as investigating officer. The office of PONI had power, 2 unlike the ICPC, to investigate possible crimes by 3 police officers. 4 It decided, though, merely to supervise the apparent 5 conspiracy involving Mr Atkinson and others, but it 6 launched its own investigation into the treatment of 7 Andrea McKee and Timothy Jameson by Detective Chief 8 Superintendent McBurney and Detective Inspector Irwin; 9 that is, having taken the alibi statement from her, that 10 they knew or were likely to have known that that was 11 false. 12 In January 2001 a new Complaints and Discipline 13 investigation by the internal investigations branch of 14 the RUC started. That looked into quite a separate 15 aspect. That looked into, as it were, the early stages 16 of the investigation. It looked into scene 17 preservation, arrest strategy, forensic strategy and 18 debriefing in relation to the assault. That was 19 initially led by a Superintendent Kennedy. It was 20 supervised by PONI. 21 It, in due course, resulted in recommendations to 22 admonish two of the officers who were involved in the 23 early stages of the investigation. 24 On 10th April 2001, arrests were made. Those were 25 of Reserve Constable Atkinson, his wife 71 1 Eleanor Atkinson, and Kenneth, Elizabeth, Thomas and 2 Allister Hanvey and Michael McKee. Interviews were 3 conducted. Michael McKee admitted then that what 4 Andrea McKee was now saying -- that is in June 2000 -- 5 was true. None of the others made any admissions. 6 Intrusive surveillance was then begun but came to 7 nothing, because within days it was discovered by those 8 under surveillance. Andrea McKee was then, in due 9 course, interviewed under caution -- that is on 10 10th April 2001 -- and she repeated under caution what 11 she had admitted on 20th June 2000: namely, that she had 12 given a false statement to support Mr Atkinson. 13 On 23rd May 2001 a crime file was submitted by the 14 PSNI to the DPP, which dealt with Andrea McKee alone. 15 It led to her prosecution. There are two important 16 features of what happened in consequence of it. 17 The first of those is Michael McKee was also 18 prosecuted in respect of perverting the course of 19 justice, though the crime file on its face deals 20 explicitly only with Andrea McKee. There does not 21 appear ever to have been a crime file in respect of 22 Michael McKee. 23 Secondly, the PSNI actively sought to prevent the 24 DPP from having Mrs McKee sentenced until she gave 25 evidence against the others involved in the conspiracy. 72 1 The choices, of course, were to prosecute her, have her 2 sentenced and take the chance she might come and give 3 evidence or hold over a sentence for her until she gave 4 such evidence as she was going to give and so the judge 5 could form a view about everybody. 6 What you will hear is that the PSNI was very 7 concerned that, if she was sentenced, she might not turn 8 up and give evidence against Mr Atkinson and others. 9 The DPP rejected that course of action. She was 10 prosecuted. 11 On 4th November 2001, the RUC ceased to exist. It 12 was replaced by the PSNI, which, of course, has 13 significance for the terms of reference. 14 On 4th March 2002, Andrea and Michael McKee both 15 pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to pervert the 16 course of justice. Both were given prison sentences. 17 Mrs McKee's was suspended and Mr McKee's was immediate. 18 Further enquiries were then launched into the 19 murder. DCI K undertook those. What he was interested 20 in was a large number of matters, including attempting 21 to resolve the question of what Allister Hanvey had been 22 wearing on the night of 27th April and who had seen him. 23 A result of his investigation was he revealed the 24 investigation that Reserve Constable McCaw and the other 25 Reserve Constable had told detectives that 73 1 Timothy Jameson had "put the boot in". 2 On 19th December 2002, as a result of that 3 revelation, Timothy Jameson was arrested on suspicion of 4 the murder of Robert Hamill. Under interview he made no 5 admissions and the DPP concluded there was insufficient 6 evidence to proceed, so in the event he was not 7 prosecuted. 8 On 6th December 2002, the Atkinsons were notified 9 they were to be prosecuted for conspiracy to pervert the 10 course of justice. That is Mr and Mrs Atkinson. 11 Kenneth Hanvey was charged with doing an act with the 12 intent to pervert the course of public justice, and both 13 charges related to the accounts given by them about who 14 had made the telephone call of 27th April 1997. So one 15 had got the McKees prosecuted and sentenced and here are 16 the others, rather later, being prosecuted. 17 On Monday, 22nd December 2003, Andrea McKee was due 18 to give evidence at what's called a preliminary inquiry. 19 For those of us brought up in England, a committal 20 hearing. She telephoned on the Sunday before she was 21 due to give that evidence to say she could not attend 22 from her home in Wales because her son was ill with 23 mumps. 24 An adjournment was granted but the magistrate who 25 was due to hear the preliminary inquiry ordered that 74 1 a medical certificate be obtained. The police duly 2 asked the GP's surgery for a certificate, but the GP was 3 away. So the police then asked local Welsh police to 4 inquire into the medical history had been given by 5 Andrea McKee, and they did so. They discovered that her 6 child had indeed been ill and had been treated. They 7 concluded, though, that the records and recollections of 8 doctors and their staff did not tally with the full 9 account that had then been given by Mrs McKee about the 10 treatment of her son at an out-of-hours clinic. The 11 account she gave which related to that out-of-hours 12 clinic went way beyond what the court had been told and, 13 of course, beyond what the magistrate had required. 14 All of that information was relayed back to the DPP 15 and, after consultation with leading counsel, the DPP 16 concluded that Andrea McKee could now not be advanced as 17 a witness of truth in respect of the matters for which 18 she had received a prison sentence. 19 On 19th March 2004, the prosecution against the 20 Atkinsons and Kenneth Hanvey was discontinued. It will 21 no doubt become necessary to decide whether you can 22 regard her as a witness of truth in order to evaluate 23 the important matters to which she goes telling you 24 about the alleged conspiracy. 25 You may also wish to consider whether any 75 1 opportunity to further the murder investigation was lost 2 as a result of the failure to prosecute Mr Atkinson and 3 others, because, if it is true that there was 4 a conspiracy in respect of what he saw Mr Hanvey do, 5 then you may think he may been able to give some useful 6 evidence. 7 If you take the view those are matters into which 8 you need to inquire, then perhaps you would consider 9 also whether the prosecution or failure of prosecution 10 in respect of Mr Atkinson was considered with due 11 diligence. 12 The end result of that all of that then is, of 13 course, the murder remains unsolved. One person has 14 been convicted of a lesser offence and two people have 15 been convicted of covering up, on their own admission, 16 a conspiracy. 17 Sir, I am going to go on now to the principal 18 questions which I would respectfully suggest at this 19 stage might arise. I wonder, though, whether that might 20 be better done in one bite. 21 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, certainly. 22 MR UNDERWOOD: This is a convenient moment. 23 THE CHAIRMAN: 2 o'clock. 24 (12.55 pm) 25 (The luncheon adjournment) 76 1 (2.00 pm) 2 MR UNDERWOOD: Sir, I promised to have the second stage of 3 the opening in which the principal questions that might 4 recommend themselves to you could be posed at this 5 stage. The purpose of posing these is simply to provide 6 a context within which the evidence, when it comes, can 7 be digested. Whether these questions turn out to be of 8 value at the end is, of course, entirely a matter for 9 you. 10 I will divide the questions according to the two 11 major components of the terms of reference, if I may, 12 and then discuss them under sub-headings. 13 The first component of the terms of reference is 14 whether any wrongful act or omission by or within the 15 RUC facilitated Robert Hamill's death and some 16 subsidiary questions within the terms themselves. 17 The first question that seems to frame itself under 18 that is: what was the cause of death? There are two 19 questions which you may wish to consider under this. 20 The first is whether the assault was the cause of 21 the death or whether there was some other intervening 22 cause. 23 The second is whether the medical findings could 24 reveal something and assist you in determining the 25 intensity and duration of the assault itself. 77 1 So far as intervening cause is concerned, it has 2 been suggested that Mr Hamill was starved of oxygen 3 between the time of the assault and the time he was seen 4 at the Craigavon Area Hospital. I am proposing to call 5 Professor Crane, who prepared the original post mortem 6 report and Dr Lawler, an independent pathologist 7 instructed by the Inquiry to deal with that issue. 8 In respect of the second issue -- that is whether 9 the medical findings can assist you in determining what 10 happened in the assault -- the experts disagree about 11 the precise mechanism of the death. That is whether he 12 died because Mr Hamill had an axonal injury resulting 13 from the assault or whether he contracted something 14 called neuroleptic malignant syndrome. I should be 15 entirely clear about this: nonetheless, the experts 16 appear to agree that, whatever was the precise cause of 17 the death, there was an unbroken chain of causation 18 between the assault and the death. Obviously a matter 19 for you to determine, but that's the state of play 20 between the experts at the moment. 21 That difference of opinion may itself of course shed 22 light on the degree and intensity of the assault. It is 23 fair to say that Mr Hamill did not suffer very severe 24 external injuries so the neurological and other medical 25 evidence may be highly material in deciding what 78 1 actually happened, whether there was a prolonged and 2 violent assault. 3 The next issue to be considered is perhaps the 4 intelligence available to anticipate, or otherwise, 5 public disorder at what was a recognised flashpoint. 6 The first question under this heading appears to be 7 a general one, with respect: historically, what events 8 had occurred at the location which should have put the 9 RUC on notice that there was a risk of a sectarian 10 assault? 11 We think you may find it easy to conclude that that 12 crossroads was a notorious flashpoint and that the RUC 13 in general and the Land Rover crew in particular was 14 aware of the need to be vigilant for an outbreak of 15 violence there at that time. 16 The secondary question is whether there was any 17 specific intelligence of any intended assault or 18 sectarian reprisal on that night. It is fair to say 19 none has emerged yet on the materials, but the oral 20 evidence is yet to come. 21 Next, one might usefully turn to the resources 22 available to the RUC to deal with this matter. The 23 first question is: what was the equipment available and 24 the training and experience of the personnel who were on 25 duty on the night of 26th/27th April? 79 1 Secondly, I will be addressing evidence to the 2 question: could, and should, more have been done to 3 police public order at the junction? On this, as I have 4 mentioned earlier, we have instructed an independent 5 police expert, Mr Murray. He addresses that question, 6 and his provisional conclusion at the moment on the 7 basis of historic difficulties at the junction, is that 8 the RUC made adequate provision in telling off 9 a Land Rover crew to be there for the events which could 10 reasonably have been foreseen. 11 Obviously, again, this is a matter for evidence and 12 a matter for your resolution. 13 Next, one might usefully consider the content of the 14 briefing of the Land Rover crew. It appears to have 15 been perfunctory, but that's no criticism. It didn't go 16 beyond, as it were, public order duties. You will have 17 in mind the notoriety of the flashpoint, the 18 experience, when it comes to considering this, of the 19 people ordered to go out there, and you may well easily 20 conclude that, in particular, Constable Neill, 21 an experienced officer, told off for that sort of duty 22 would not have needed more specific instructions, but, 23 again, a matter for the Inquiry. 24 The next matter to which I will be directing 25 evidence is what happened between the Land Rover 80 1 officers and Mr Mallon's warning. The first question 2 which appears to arise there is: what information did 3 Mr Mallon actually give to the officers in the 4 Land Rover that might have put them on notice of 5 impending trouble? 6 Naturally, that's going to turn on whether the 7 account given by Mr Mallon and supported by the 8 Land Rover crew is accepted. Obviously at present the 9 information is that all four in the Land Rover and 10 Mr Mallon are saying very much the same thing, but, 11 again, we don't proceed on any assumptions. 12 The second question in relation to that is: what 13 were the positions of the Land Rover at about the time 14 of the warning? 15 I have already indicated that on 10th June 1997 16 there was a reconstruction of the placing of the vehicle 17 on the night and the three positions we see on screen 18 before us as LR1, LR2 and LR3 were identified as the 19 starting, mid and end point of the journey of the 20 Land Rover at the material time. 21 There will be at least one further reconstruction at 22 which the Panel will see a Land Rover in roughly the 23 position on the night, but there may be more, for all 24 I know. In the end, of course, the reconstructions may 25 help; they may not. It is going to turn on the evidence 81 1 of the various people who saw the Land Rover and were in 2 it. 3 The third question on this discussion between 4 Mr Mallon and the officers is: what could the officers 5 in the Land Rover see and hear from inside the vehicle? 6 We perhaps could usefully see here in more detail 7 just what could be seen from the different positions. 8 This is the position where it appears Mr Mallon 9 stopped the Land Rover, and this is the driver's eye 10 view down Thomas Street. So from that position, the 11 driver could see anybody coming up the town and, of 12 course, anybody coming up from Thomas Street. 13 If we look at the rear side window view, despite 14 very small windows, there is even some view from there 15 down Thomas Street. Again restricted, but you may think 16 quite a useful view even from there. 17 If we go then to the LR3 location, which is where 18 the vehicle ended up -- and again, I emphasise this is 19 reconstruction. This may or may not represent what 20 happened, but it is the best evidence we have at the 21 moment. Here, again, we have the driver's eye view, 22 fairly good down the High Street, but not into 23 Thomas Street. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thomas Street we saw, as you go away from the 25 junction, veers slightly to the right, turns slightly to 82 1 the right. 2 MR UNDERWOOD: Yes, it does. 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you know if the church hall is before or 4 beyond that curve? 5 MR UNDERWOOD: It is after the curve. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 7 MR UNDERWOOD: Then we have a rear side window view here, 8 this time much more limited out of the front and rather 9 more restricted out of the side. 10 Finally in this position, we have the back door 11 window view. Given the angle of the Land Rover, there 12 may have been something to be seen out of that. 13 So there in reconstructed form, however reliably, 14 one can see the distinction between what could have been 15 seen at the position when Mr Mallon stopped the 16 Land Rover and the position where the police actually 17 were, as it appears, when the violence broke out. 18 Still dealing with the interplay between Mr Mallon 19 and the Land Rover crew, the fourth question is: what 20 happened between Mr Hamill and his assailants? 21 Plainly, that's likely to be critically important. 22 As I have said, there are broadly two versions of that, 23 which appear to be irreconcilable, and within each 24 version there is a variety of differences between 25 different accounts. The questions which I am about to 83 1 pose deal with events which form some sort of clash 2 involving Mr Hamill. 3 The next question then is: at what stage relative to 4 that clash the Land Rover crew became aware anything was 5 happening. In particular, this question calls for 6 resolution of the issue: what motivated that 7 unidentified person who pulled Constable Neill from the 8 Land Rover, accusing him of sitting there while it 9 happened? 10 As I suggested, I think, all of the officers in the 11 Land Rover support that having happened. It is very 12 difficult to see why they would do that unless it did 13 so, because it is hardly in their interest. As I have 14 suggested, though, that person has not yet been 15 identified. We will, of course, ask anybody we can 16 bring before you whether they were that person. So far, 17 we have drawn a blank with everyone we have interviewed. 18 Next, it will probably be necessary to decide at 19 what stage relative to the start of the violence 20 Mr Hamill received his head injury. If the version of 21 events which is propounded by the three people walking 22 up or three of the people walking up Thomas Street, who 23 we know as D, E and F, is correct, then that may have 24 happened very quickly. If that's right, then it is 25 difficult to see how the police might have had the 84 1 chance to react. 2 On the other hand, if the version of events which 3 has Mr Hamill pursuing someone is correct, then there 4 may have been quite a lengthy period between the start 5 of the violence and the decisive injury. 6 To decide this, I regret that you are going to have 7 to be faced with a large number of accounts, all of 8 which in some degree conflict with each other, and, 9 again, there were conflicting versions of whereabouts on 10 the road Mr Hamill ended up, and, again, it may be 11 helpful to resolve that. 12 The next question which appears to be material is: 13 if there was some sort of warning by Mr Mallon, and if 14 some violence took place at the junction which the crew 15 missed, why did they miss it? 16 As I say, at least one of the officers was chatting 17 to Dean Forbes and Stacey Bridgett. It may well be that 18 they were simply concentrating their attentions on that 19 discussion rather than on what they had been warned 20 about. 21 Again, a matter for you, of course, but plainly 22 that's going to involve a question of how long they were 23 sitting there chatting, and all of these questions 24 interrelate. How did the violence start? How quickly 25 after it did Mr Hamill get injured? How long were they 85 1 there chatting? 2 Finally, under this section, if the Land Rover crew 3 did indeed stay in their vehicle knowing that 4 Robert Hamill was being attacked, why did they do that? 5 Was it because they were outnumbered? Was it because he 6 was obviously a Catholic? Again, these are questions 7 that can be posed to them. 8 The next heading that may pose some interesting 9 questions is: what was the response to the warning and 10 to the disorder? 11 Firstly, on the part of the Land Rover crew, the 12 first question appears to be what the officers did once 13 they were alerted. 14 As I have said, their version is that immediately 15 they were alerted by the person pulling at Mr Neill, 16 they all got out. I have also said some of the Catholic 17 witnesses have accused them of not getting out until 18 either reinforcements or the ambulance arrived. 19 A number of Protestant witnesses have given 20 conflicting accounts which fall somewhere between the 21 two. Oral evidence of those witnesses who were at or 22 around the scene and who we can call will plainly have 23 to be evaluated, but in order to answer the question, 24 the contemporaneous radio traffic will also need to be 25 considered and may, as I have suggested, form quite 86 1 a useful framework of timing and sequence. 2 The second question under this is what steps the 3 Land Rover crew and the radio controller took to obtain 4 back-up. Again, the radio traffic may help on that. 5 The third question is what steps the police officers 6 took to protect Robert Hamill and others from assault 7 once they got out of the Land Rover. 8 They assert they did their best whilst overwhelmed, 9 while others say only two of them did anything active at 10 all. The question may be again: if two or more of them 11 held back once they had got out, why was that? 12 Again, was it because they were outnumbered and this 13 was a riot and they were fearful of their own safety, or 14 was it because they didn't mind what happened to 15 Mr Hamill? 16 Finally, under this heading the question may be 17 posed: what, if anything, did the officers see 18 Allister Hanvey do? If they saw him participating in 19 the attack, did they refrain from stopping him and, if 20 so, why? 21 That's a question not posed in order to attach any 22 degree of criminality to Mr Hanvey. Rather, it goes 23 directly to the next issue in the terms of reference one 24 needs to consider: did any of the officers get in the 25 way of the investigation specifically in order to 87 1 protect somebody they had seen, namely, Mr Hanvey? 2 Looking then at the reaction of the police, moving 3 from the four in the Land Rover to the back-up officers, 4 the first question that neatly falls to be addressed is: 5 at what stage in the disorder did they arrive? 6 I have suggested the materials show us a sequence 7 and a timing and it is obviously the subject, or will be 8 the subject, of evidence. 9 The second question naturally is: what did they do 10 when they got there? Then one might ask whether the 11 back-up officers could and should have done anything 12 more to contain violence or to administer first aid and 13 what impact any failings had on Mr Hamill's death. 14 It is fair to say that the question of 15 administration of first aid is one that carries rather 16 less weight now than it once might have done. The 17 reason for that is, in the early days after Mr Hamill's 18 death, as I have said, there was a distinct lack of 19 clarity about what caused that death. It was 20 speculated, as I have suggested, that oxygen starvation 21 may have played a part. 22 If that's right, then, of course, it may be 23 necessary to consider whether the police should have 24 given first aid so as to do something about that. As 25 I have said, though, it seems highly unlikely, though 88 1 a matter for you, once the medical evidence is out, 2 though that's still a live issue. 3 Finally for the back-up, if they could and should 4 have done more to protect those on the scene, what 5 stopped them? Again, did anybody deliberately refrain? 6 I move then to the second part of the terms of 7 reference, which is whether in substance any wrongful 8 act or omission by or within the RUC obstructed the 9 investigation of the death and whether there was due 10 diligence in relation to the investigation. 11 I have attempted to split this into three 12 components: firstly, the identification of suspects; 13 secondly, making a case against those suspects who were 14 identified; and, finally, the due diligence of agencies 15 other than the RUC. 16 Moving then to the identification of suspects, the 17 first issue which appears to arise under this is the use 18 of identification evidence. Again, it can be broken 19 down, bearing in mind, as I say, there were a lot of 20 police in the end on the scene. There were a number of 21 civilians on the scene. 22 The primary question must really be: which officers 23 saw who do what, and what did they do about it? So the 24 first question may be: what potential suspects and 25 witnesses were actually recognised at the scene by 89 1 officers? 2 The second question is whether any of those suspects 3 should have been arrested on the night before officers 4 were allowed to leave the scene. One, of course, 5 appreciates the difficulties if this was anything like 6 a riot, but you may be particularly interested in the 7 position of Wayne Lunt, who, while being let out of the 8 Land Rover, allegedly is the subject of two Catholics 9 coming up to the officer and saying, "Why are you 10 letting him go? He is one of those who done it". 11 There may be others, when the evidence comes out, 12 who officers should perhaps have taken some other steps 13 in relation to. It is a matter for you. 14 The third question in relation to the identification 15 of suspects is whether any debriefing took place. If 16 so, by whom, of whom, when and to what effect, because 17 it is remarkably unclear who took any command of getting 18 the information of the uniformed officers on the ground 19 about what they had seen in order to get the 20 investigation started. 21 The fourth question under this heading is whether 22 any such debriefing was adequate and, if not, why not? 23 There are a number of materials in relation to this, 24 including the public order manual, which sets, as it 25 were, the parameters for debriefing. There are a good 90 1 deal of conflicting statements made by officers about 2 what was done and by whom in the immediate aftermath in 3 relation to debriefing. 4 The next question may be: to what extent did 5 officers fail to tell detectives about suspects or 6 witnesses which might have led to the identification of 7 suspects? 8 It is a slightly distinct question from whether 9 there was a debriefing. Rather, it is whether of their 10 own volition officers could and should have come up with 11 names. It will entail an assessment of the adequacy of 12 the statements they made, the notebook entries they made 13 and what the uniformed officers thought fit to tell the 14 detectives when they were questioned. 15 Then, if there is any failure on the part of 16 uniformed officers to tell detectives what they saw, you 17 may wish to know whether any such failure resulted from 18 inadequate debriefing, whether it was from incompetence 19 or deliberate omission on the part of uniformed 20 officers. 21 That, of course, particularly raises the question 22 whether Reserve Constable Atkinson suppressed the 23 information he had, whatever it was, about 24 Allister Hanvey. Did he see him? What did he see him 25 doing? The resolution of that touches on the question 91 1 whether he made the telephone call on 27th April. In 2 turn, this gives rise to a number of subsidiary 3 questions, which most conveniently fall to be considered 4 in relation to the later stages of the investigation. 5 It will also be necessary perhaps to decide why 6 other officers, including Sergeant P89, did not tell 7 detectives about their sightings of Mr Hanvey on the 8 night. For example, as I say, Mr P89 appears to 9 have been warned by Mr Atkinson that Mr Hanvey, who was 10 being aggressive to the sergeant, was a martial arts 11 expert, and it took until about 2000 or 2001 for the 12 sergeant to tell anybody about that. 13 Seventhly then, you may wish to consider whether 14 press releases issued by the RUC in the aftermath of the 15 assault demonstrated a conscious or unconscious desire 16 to put out a version of events which portrayed the 17 police or Protestants in a false light and have deterred 18 Catholics from coming forward with evidence. 19 There has been a fair amount of controversy about 20 the press releases, their accuracy or inaccuracy and the 21 motivation behind any inaccuracy there was, and we will 22 look at those. 23 Then, in the investigative stages still, one might 24 move on to the use of contemporaneous materials. The 25 first question that appears to present itself is whether 92 1 there was an adequate forensic strategy. If not, 2 whether that was deliberate or otherwise. This is 3 a question that covers a range of potential 4 opportunities from taping off the crime screen, taking 5 DNA samples through to all sorts of other potential 6 methods of garnering forensic evidence. 7 The second question perhaps is whether the RUC 8 obtained, viewed and then made proper use of the video 9 recordings, if any, that were available. There were 10 a number of business premises in the vicinity of the 11 town centre. Some had CCTV. Some of those had tapes. 12 Some tapes were seized and were viewed, but they were 13 then returned. No copies were kept. You may need to 14 form the view about the adequacy of the exercise and 15 explore the reason for any inadequacy. It is only fair 16 to say there is controversy about whether the police 17 have accepted at some stage that there was something on 18 some CCTV tapes. 19 Next, I turn to the use of witness evidence. The 20 first question perhaps is whether the RUC took adequate 21 steps to obtain information which may have led to the 22 identification of suspects from those who were with 23 Robert Hamill at the time of the attack. If they didn't 24 do that, why didn't they do that? 25 The second question is whether the RUC took adequate 93 1 steps to obtain that sort of investigation from others 2 who were in the centre of Portadown at the time of the 3 attack. Again, if not, why not? 4 It may be helpful to consider separately, in respect 5 of Tracey Clarke and Timothy Jameson, whether their 6 evidence was properly used and, if not, why not. 7 For example, having got the witness statements, 8 could they have been used at a trial by being read on 9 the basis that the witnesses were not prepared to give 10 evidence because of fear? Were perhaps witnesses primed 11 to say things to leading counsel which meant that those 12 provisions for reading evidence couldn't be used? 13 Separately, in respect of Timothy Jameson, the 14 question may arise whether the detectives were actually 15 told he should be treated as a suspect or whether, as 16 they say, they were simply informed that he might be 17 a material witness, and, if they were told that he 18 should be treated as a suspect, why didn't they do it? 19 I move on to making a case against suspects. I am 20 dealing here only with those suspects who were actually 21 arrested. If I deal firstly with the general approach 22 to this and then move on to the development of cases 23 against individual suspects, in general the first 24 question may be whether an adequate investigative 25 structure was put in place for the assault and 94 1 subsequently for the murder investigation. 2 There are a number of steps which one would perhaps 3 expect to see in that, and no doubt you will wish to 4 consider the degree to which they should have been put 5 in place and whether they were: the appointment of 6 a senior investigating officer; the implementation of 7 a HOLMES system; the use of a policy book; a witness 8 strategy; an arrest strategy. 9 If there was a failure to put in place any part of 10 those processes, why was that and with what result? 11 These are matters that have been considered by 12 internal investigations previously? They will be the 13 subject of evidence from at least Mr Murray and that 14 will be critical evidence. 15 The second question under this heading was whether 16 the murder investigation was hampered by the interplay 17 between it and the neglect investigation. As I have 18 said, Detective Chief Superintendent McBurney headed 19 both. Was the fact that he headed both to hamper one or 20 other of them and, if so, was that deliberate? 21 The third question under this general approach to 22 witnesses -- and suspects, rather, is what roles the 23 various detectives had in the investigation. In 24 particular, it may be important to determine whether 25 Detective Inspector Irwin had any substantial 95 1 responsibility or whether, as he asserts, it was merely 2 a support role as office manager. 3 If I look then briefly to the individual suspects, 4 there were a number of people identified, and, indeed, 5 arrested and detained: Mr Hanvey, Mr Lunt, Mr Forbes, 6 Mr Bridgett, Mr Allen, Mr Robinson, Mr Hobson and 7 Mr Woods. Of course, as emerged from my brief run 8 through the facts this morning, they were treated 9 separately by the DPP and by leading counsel, quite 10 properly, and obviously one looks to see how they were 11 treated individually by the RUC. 12 The first question under this is likely to be: when 13 they were arrested, was an adequate search strategy 14 adopted? If not, why not, and with what consequences? 15 The second question is whether any potential 16 witnesses were properly identified, interviewed and made 17 available. Was information from them properly followed 18 up? If not, why not, and, again, with what result? 19 The third question is whether forensic evidence was 20 sought and deployed adequately. Again, if not, why not, 21 and with what consequence? 22 Finally, in respect of all of these, the fourth 23 question is whether a recommendation for prosecution was 24 properly formulated. If not, why not, and with what 25 consequence? 96 1 Of course, in respect of Mr Hanvey -- that is 2 Allister Hanvey -- additional issues arise. These go, 3 of course, directly to the heart of an express part of 4 the terms of reference. Was he tipped off by 5 Mr Atkinson to get rid of his clothing and did he do 6 that? This is a question that gives rise to a whole 7 line of enquiries, in particular two distinct strands of 8 them. 9 The first was whether Tracey Clarke was telling the 10 truth about the matter in her witness statement dated 11 10th May and whether further enquiries should have been 12 made of her and her family. 13 As we know from the much later re-investigation in 14 2000/2001, the result of further enquiries in 1997 could 15 well have been to identify a jacket other than the 16 jacket Mr Hanvey claimed to be the only one and evidence 17 that it was destroyed. 18 The second strand of investigation about this is 19 whether Andrea McKee was telling the truth about 20 conspiring with the Atkinsons to cover up the telephone 21 call, because you may think it is quite likely, if there 22 was a conspiracy to cover up the telephone call, then 23 there was something in that telephone call that people 24 wanted covering up. That is likely to lead to some sort 25 of conclusion that Mr Atkinson saw something he did not 97 1 want to be made public. 2 Secondly, on this why did the RUC not act sooner and 3 more successfully to prosecute Mr Atkinson over tipping 4 off Mr Hanvey? Again, I have set out the bald dates. 5 By 16th May 1997, they had substantial information. 6 Again, what effect on the murder investigation did the 7 failure to do that have? At any stage from 8 16th May 1997 right down to the point where the 9 potential prosecution against Mr Atkinson was dropped, 10 could they and should they have got Mr Atkinson to give 11 evidence about what he saw Mr Hanvey do, if anything? 12 You may think that the link between Mr Hanvey and 13 Mr Atkinson is a very important one in all sorts of 14 ways. 15 Then, finally, I turn to the question of other 16 agencies and the question of due diligence on their 17 part. There are four potential lines of enquiry here 18 which we would suggest respectfully. 19 The first is in respect of the pathologist, that is 20 Dr Professor Crane, and the neuropathologist, Dr Herron, 21 relating to the time it took to produce the reports 22 which emerged in 1997 as to the cause of death. 23 Next, there is the forensic science report. 24 Mr Marshall, whose name I have mentioned before, was the 25 forensic scientist who dealt with the samples that were 98 1 taken at the scene and matching. Again, his report took 2 months to produce, and, again, it may be a matter of 3 interest to the Inquiry to test why that is and whether 4 that was due diligence in relation to the investigation. 5 Thirdly, in relation to the ICPC, I have said that 6 the ICPC had no power to arrogate to itself oversight of 7 the investigation into the allegation against 8 Mr Atkinson. Nonetheless, it took, as it were, some 9 part by being at an interview and by considering the 10 question whether anything more should be done in 11 relation to Mr Atkinson when it signed off the neglect 12 complaint investigation. The person who was charged 13 with writing the report which led to the signing off is 14 a Mr Mullan. We are going to call him and ask him about 15 that. 16 Finally, the office of the DPP for its involvement 17 in the murder investigation generally, and, in 18 particular, the want of convictions of those who 19 murdered Mr Hamill. 20 Those are the matters which, as I say, with as much 21 diffidence as I can muster, appear to us, having read 22 all the documents, may be valuable ways of looking at 23 the evidence when it comes out. 24 That's all I am proposing to say in respect of the 25 general opening and, of course, at your invitation, sir, 99 1 I will be making very short serial openings before each 2 group of evidence as it comes out, but I do know that 3 some others of my learned friends wish to make some 4 remarks at this stage. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr McGrory? 6 Opening speech by MR MCGRORY 7 MR McGRORY: Mr Chairman, members of the Panel, I am 8 grateful to Mr Underwood for his very both succinct yet 9 comprehensive opening of the chronology and the factual 10 background to this Inquiry. 11 As the Panel know, I appear with Mr McKenna for the 12 Hamill family; that's his immediate family, his mother 13 and his brothers and sisters, his father regrettably not 14 having lived to see the commencement of oral hearings of 15 this Inquiry. 16 It is the unshakeable belief of the Hamill family, 17 sir, that Robert was murdered because of his religion, 18 because he was a Catholic, and for no other reason, by 19 those from that section of the Protestant or Unionist 20 community so imbued with hatred of those of the Catholic 21 faith that, to be involved in the attack of a young man 22 because of his religion, the knocking of him to the 23 ground, the kicking of him in the head and the jumping 24 on him to the extent that it caused his death was 25 a badge of honour, and not something of which they 100 1 should have been deeply ashamed. 2 It is also, sir, of very serious concern to the 3 Hamill family that this terrible incident occurred 4 within feet of a police patrol that was sent to the 5 centre of Portadown where the incident occurred for the 6 very purpose of ensuring that there was no sectarian 7 incident of this or any other nature, and that, in being 8 sent to that particular point, those who were charged 9 with that duty were very much aware that this particular 10 part of Portadown was known as a flashpoint for 11 sectarian conflict between the two very polarised 12 communities in that town. 13 Now, the Panel has already heard something of the 14 demography and make-up of Portadown, which was a deeply 15 divided town with a significant majority of its 16 inhabitants from the Protestant part of the community 17 with those from the Catholic or Nationalist part of the 18 community living in an area around Obins Street and 19 Garvaghy Road to which those who were leaving the Hall 20 on the night of this incident were heading through the 21 centre of the town. 22 That's not the only unusual feature of the town, of 23 course. The town is situated in the County of Armagh, 24 which has, perhaps, a unique and terrible history of 25 sectarian conflict throughout the history of the 101 1 divisions on this island and, of course, the police 2 force, of which it has been said by many since this 3 incident that they were at least neglectful, if not 4 deliberately guilty of misfeasance of their office in 5 the handling of this incident, was no ordinary police 6 force either, but it was a police force which has 7 perhaps uniquely in these islands found itself to the 8 forefront of decades of bitter conflict. 9 Of course, the Panel is aware of the fact that there 10 are numerous allegations of neglect on the part of those 11 police, of the ignoring of warnings, indeed of the 12 direct intervention by one of the officers on duty that 13 night to ensure that possibly one of the alleged 14 perpetrators would never be apprehended. There have 15 been allegations of a failure of senior police officers 16 to investigate the murder, and, indeed, to investigate 17 the allegations of misconduct within their own force. 18 There have been allegations, perhaps, about the 19 reasons for the failed prosecutions, both into the 20 actual murder and into the subsequent allegations of 21 police misconduct, and of the manufacturing of the alibi 22 about which the Panel has heard in some brief detail 23 this morning. 24 The family of Robert Hamill is left, amidst all of 25 those allegations, with a deeply held suspicion that 102 1 those failures, if they are upheld, those alleged 2 failures, were also directly connected to the fact that 3 Robert Hamill was a Catholic, and that they, as his 4 family, were afforded a second-class investigation in 5 every respect. 6 It is in that context that this Panel, sir, and 7 members of the Panel, are charged with the most delicate 8 and most difficult duty of determining whether or not 9 all of those allegations are indeed sustained, and, if 10 they are sustained, why that should be the case. 11 Now, in my respectful submission, it is perhaps 12 difficult to progress much further without asking the 13 Panel to indulge me with some little time to go into the 14 political and religious history of the area of Armagh 15 and Portadown and indeed of this part of the island of 16 Ireland. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: If you say its purpose is to help us to 18 understand the surroundings to this, by all means. 19 MR McGRORY: Indeed, sir. It is for no other reason that 20 I would ask your indulgence in order to do that. I am 21 grateful for that indication. 22 Before I do so, I would like to, first of all, talk 23 for a little while about Robert Hamill, because first 24 and foremost we must never lose sight, as you yourself, 25 sir, have said in your opening remarks this morning, 103 1 that a family has lost a brother and a son. We must, of 2 course, have respect for that. It is with the family's 3 instruction and their wishes that I would inform the 4 Panel of something about the man who was murdered on 5 that fateful morning. 6 The Hamill family, sir, came from the Obins Avenue 7 area of Portadown. It was a Nationalist area which had 8 been targeted on many occasions by Loyalists throughout 9 the 1970s and 1980s. He was one of ten children, and 10 life for the family was a financial struggle. They were 11 a deeply religious family. All were brought up in the 12 Catholic faith, and it was a household in which the 13 Rosary was said every night, and for which many people 14 were prayed for every night and in which the children 15 were taught to respect, not just themselves, but others 16 of all religions. It was a household in which members 17 of both communities were openly welcomed. There were 18 cups of tea and plates of biscuits produced for 19 visitors. 20 Mr Hamill senior, Robert's father, had an interest 21 in greyhounds and Robert helped his father with the 22 walking and training of the dogs. Robert himself was, 23 if somewhat shy, a popular young man. His sisters say 24 he was good looking and attracted the attention of their 25 friends. He was known as a generous young man. He 104 1 always paid his housekeeping to his mother on time when 2 he lived at home. 3 One of the last things he did before he died was to 4 buy his mother a suite of furniture. He liked to laugh 5 and he liked to tell jokes. Shortly after his first 6 child was born, the family have talked about how he 7 conducted a bedside vigil with his eldest son who 8 contracted meningitis. In the belief of the family, he, 9 in fact, alerted the hospital staff to a deterioration 10 in the child's condition and perhaps saved his life. He 11 adored his children. He had two boys. He had 12 a daughter who was born 12 weeks after he was murdered. 13 He was an utterly non-political person. 14 The family regarded themselves in the broadest sense 15 as Nationalists, but politics was never discussed in the 16 household. All the family knew was that their father 17 was an admirer of John Hume, but the father kept a tight 18 rein on his children and nobody was ever brought into 19 the conflict that was raging around them in the estates 20 of Portadown, in the County of Armagh and in the 21 jurisdiction of Northern Ireland throughout their youth. 22 Although throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the family 23 heard stories and personally knew a number of people who 24 had been killed in the conflict, quite a number of 25 Catholics who were killed in the area, 105 1 a Martin McConville, Felix Joe Hughes, Anthony Duffy, 2 and a Jimmy McCann and others were all men from 3 Portadown who were killed because of their religion and 4 who were personally known to the family. Yet, at no 5 time did the family become politically active or feel 6 politically motivated in any way. 7 There was a household which was only yards from 8 a barrier dividing the two sections of the community in 9 Obins Street, in Obins Avenue. They experienced stoning 10 of the house and sectarian abuse having been shouted at 11 them over the barrier. They could see from their house 12 the Loyalist bonfires on 12th July. 13 His sister, Fiona, was particularly close to him, as 14 she was only 11 months older than Robert. They were 15 often regarded as twins. She recalls particularly how 16 on their wedding day, which was only a few months before 17 this incident, she was able to dance with him on the 18 floor and he told her how much he had loved her as 19 a sister on that occasion. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me, Mr McGrory, for interrupting you. 21 The Panel can base its report on the evidence which we 22 hear. I suspect that you are going well outside any 23 evidence we are expected to hear. It is one thing to 24 speak in general of the violence in the area, which is 25 no doubt common knowledge. I think you are descending 106 1 to the particular in a way which is perhaps not 2 permissible. 3 MR McGRORY: As you please, sir. Of course, nothing that 4 I have said is based on material which will not be 5 before the Panel by way of evidence from the family, if 6 it, of course, is permitted, but I am ready to move on 7 in any event. 8 If I may move, sir, to the historical and political 9 context in which these events occurred, in particular 10 the historical place that Armagh has in the history of 11 this island. 12 Armagh is the smallest of the six counties in the 13 jurisdiction of Northern Ireland, although I understand 14 the most populated. It is also a place of very ancient 15 lineage, it having originally been the district of Uladh, 16 which gave its name to the nine-county province of 17 Ulster subsequently. It is also the area from which the 18 mythological stories of the Ulster Cycle emerged and the 19 home of the Red Branch Knights, whose symbol of the 20 Red Hand, of course, has later become synonymous with 21 the province of Ulster. 22 Portadown lies within that county. It, itself, did 23 not come to prominence until perhaps the 19th century, 24 whenever the railways arrived in the Northern part of 25 the island. It became known as the hub of Armagh. 107 1 Armagh itself has a peculiar position within the 2 political and religious history of this island, which 3 has brought about a situation where the religion and 4 national identity have become intertwined. 5 I need not go into great detail about how that 6 happened. Suffice to say it has its origins in the 7 plantations of Ulster which occurred following the 8 flight of the earls in 1607 when the English Crown 9 regained control of the island of Ireland after many 10 years of conflict and of having been reduced to 11 occupation only of the area of the Pale, which was 12 a narrow area from Dublin to Drogheda in County Down. 13 It began in earnest, during the period of the 1640s, 14 to ensure, ironically, that the Province of Ulster, 15 which was the province that had given it most difficulty 16 under the O'Neills in terms of subjugating the island of 17 Ireland would never give it such trouble again by 18 systematically bringing to that area many, many 19 thousands of settlers from the area of Scotland, Wales 20 and principally the north of England. 21 Now, it also planted to some extent the Province of 22 Munster, but, for various historical reasons, it was the 23 Province of Ulster which was most densely populated with 24 people of the Protestant faith, fundamental Protestant 25 faith. That, of course, has had its political 108 1 implications right to this day. 2 It wasn't a smooth transition by any means. The 3 Protestant people who were brought to this island, and 4 their successors, were not necessarily always as 5 faithful and obedient to the Crown as those who brought 6 them here perhaps might have wished. 7 There were rebellions in or about the 1640s and in 8 the 17th and 18th centuries in which many people of the 9 Protestant faith took part, rebellions against the 10 Crown. Albeit there were laws brought in throughout the 11 1700s which sought to discriminate against, not just 12 Catholics, but against those of the more fundamentalist 13 Protestant faith, who were lumped together as those who 14 were the objects of those penal laws, but there emerged 15 throughout the 17th and 18th centuries quite a number of 16 rural groups which agitated with each other. 17 They have names which resonate to this day: Peep 18 O'Day Boys and the Defenders, who were Catholics, Peep 19 O'Day Boys being Protestants. These were agrarian farm 20 workers who formed these groups in order to defend their 21 territory as they saw it. 22 Indeed, out of one of those groups, the Peep O'Day 23 Boys, was formed subsequently the Orange Order in 24 Loughgall in the County of Armagh. 25 In terms of the political development of the island, 109 1 there was an agitation towards the later part of the 2 18th century for some form of home rule and 3 self-Government. In 1782, a Parliament was formed and 4 it was called Grattan's Parliament. 5 Now, in the subsequent years of Grattan's 6 Parliament, of course, there occurred in other countries 7 significant events which had influence on the thinking 8 of the island of Ireland. Then most significantly, of 9 course, was the French revolution of 1789, which 10 inspired a group of Protestant gentlemen, largely based 11 in the City of Belfast and led by Theobald Wolfe Tone to 12 form an organisation called the United Irishmen's 13 Society in 1791. 14 The United Irishmen were imbued with a sense of 15 liberty and of an emerging national identity which 16 associated itself with the island of Ireland against the 17 interests of England, and, to its eternal credit, it was 18 an organisation which sought to include Catholic, 19 Protestant and dissenter within its movement, but it did 20 so alongside the existing and now deeply embedded 21 sectarian tensions in rural areas, particularly the area 22 of County Armagh. 23 The 1798 rebellion which followed was, of course, 24 an unmitigated disaster, with several French fleets 25 either failing to land on the island of Ireland due to 110 1 inclement weather or having landed several weeks after 2 the supposed rebellion had already started and had been 3 suppressed. Thereafter, the English Parliament decided 4 that it would be better to bring the island of Ireland 5 in its entirety into the political supervision of the 6 Crown and brought about the Act of Union of 1800. 7 Perhaps I should mention, first of all, the 8 Orange Order, which is an important organisation, not 9 just in terms of how the deep sectarian divisions 10 developed in the area of Portadown, but in terms of how 11 the police force that was in existence at the time 12 Robert Hamill was killed related to it. 13 The Orange Order -- and I quote from a historian 14 called Jim Smith, and his publication "The Men of No 15 Property: The Origins of the Orange Order", which says 16 as follows: 17 "The Orange Order was forged in the crucible of 18 sectarian conflict in County Armagh, the most densely 19 populated county in the country. Armagh was a microcosm 20 of the late 18th century Ireland. Each of the three 21 major religions/denominations was represented roughly in 22 equal proportions, with a Catholic majority in the poor 23 south, an Episcopalian majority in the north and 24 Presbyterians most numerous across the centre. Each 25 confessional group had a corresponding ethnic identity: 111 1 Irish Catholic, Scots Presbyterian and English 2 Episcopalian, and each was present to some degree in all 3 areas of the county. That finely balanced religious 4 demography itself helps to account for the persistence 5 of sectarian tensions." 6 If I may say so, that about sums up the political 7 and sectarian situation in County Armagh. 8 I don't propose to go into too much detail about the 9 subsequent events throughout the rest of the 18th and 10 19th centuries, but I would like, with the Panel's 11 permission, to perhaps focus on events around the turn 12 of the 19th and 20th century, because they are important 13 to the creation of this state which is known as Northern 14 Ireland and to the development of the RUC as a police 15 force from the original police force which was called 16 the Royal Irish Constabulary and which was founded by 17 Sir Robert Peel in 1836. 18 As the 20th century dawned and preparations were 19 being made, well, perhaps prior to the First World War, 20 a significant political event came about in England by 21 the election of the Liberal Government, which was 22 converted to the home rule cause which was gaining 23 significant ground on the island of Ireland. 24 The concentration of Unionists in the north spurred 25 a significant movement of protest against any possible 112 1 home rule for the island of Ireland. That did not take 2 into account the fact that there was a significant 3 number of people concentrated in the Northern part of 4 the island who were opposed to such a development. That 5 group in particular was closely linked to the English 6 Conservative party, which will become relevant, but they 7 formed a group called the Ulster Volunteer Force, which 8 was a mass movement. Sir Edward Carson, who was 9 a member of the Conservative party, led the movement 10 against home rule, and initiated the signing of 11 a covenant by 45,000 people at Belfast City Hall, but 12 also side by side with that there was formed an armed 13 movement called the Ulster Volunteer Force. 14 As the Home Rule bill, despite the protests of the 15 Northern Unionists, was passed but was shelved because 16 of the onset of World War I. Tensions were relieved by 17 the onset of war in the sense that the UVF, as it had 18 been formed, became the Ulster division of the British 19 army during the course of the war, which, of course, 20 suffered very heavy casualties during World War I. Of 21 course, many Nationalists from the north and south parts 22 of the island of Ireland also joined the British army at 23 that time. 24 After World War I, those of the UVF that returned 25 were, of course, by this time highly trained soldiers. 113 1 The issue of home rule for the island of Ireland had not 2 gone away. By 1918, the British Government felt it was 3 obliged to hold a general election, and in the 1918 4 election Sinn Fein won 73 of the 104 Irish seats 5 Westminster Parliament. 6 Some months later, in January 1919, two RIC men were 7 murdered in Soloheadbeg in County Tipperary and that 8 started the Irish War of Independence which raged until 9 a truce in June of 1921. There were a significant 10 number of casualties in 1919, but in 1920 it is 11 interesting to note that that 53 RIC men were killed 12 during the course of that war of independence. So the 13 front line of that war of independence, from its 14 inception in Soloheadbeg, in the frontline, was the RIC, 15 the Royal Irish Constabulary, which was an armed police 16 force. 17 Throughout this time, matters developed in the 18 north, in that there was serious concern that under this 19 pressure during the course of this war of independence 20 that the RIC could not hold the line in the north. 21 There was some considerable mistrust amongst the 22 Unionist population of the RIC, 80% of which was 23 Catholic and many of whom hailed from the southern part 24 of the country and were considered perhaps to have 25 sympathies with the Irish Republican Army which was at 114 1 war basically with the RIC itself. 2 The British Government introduced auxiliaries to the 3 RIC and boosted its numbers because of the numerous 4 resignations of RIC members, who felt they could not 5 sustain this conflict, by people called the Black and 6 Tans. There were many notorious incidents which, of 7 course, blackened the names of those two organisations, 8 most notably the killing of quite a number of people in 9 Croke Park in 1920. 10 In the north, the UVF was revived in this political 11 context. It was led by a Brigadier FB Crozier, who was 12 an organiser in the original UVF prior to the First 13 World War. The British Government was very concerned 14 that there was in existence a paramilitary organisation 15 over which it had no control. 16 By this time, Carson had retired and 17 Sir James Craig, who was both a Minister in the 18 Conservative Government and the leader of the Ulster 19 Unionists, who had now formed themselves under the 20 umbrella of the Ulster Unionist Council, was asked to 21 legitimise the UVF by forming an auxiliary Constabulary 22 to come to the assistance of the Royal Irish 23 Constabulary. He did so in the form of the Ulster 24 Special Constabulary, which took three forms: the 25 A Specials, the B Specials and the C Specials. 115 1 This was a very considerable addition in resources 2 to the RIC. The number of the B Specials reached in the 3 region of 20,000 within a fairly short space of time. 4 Now, by 1921, the British Government felt that 5 something had to be done about the island of Ireland and 6 it initiated talks between the IRA leaders in Dublin and 7 the Northern Unionists. It promised the Northern 8 Unionists and delivered on the promise of the creation 9 of a political entity which would reflect the dominant 10 position that they held in this particular part of the 11 island, and they introduced the Government of Ireland 12 Act, which effectively partitioned the country. 13 The original Government of Ireland Act catered for 14 a boundary commission which was to examine the extent of 15 the Northern political entity which at first was 16 restricted to six counties and which it was hoped and 17 thought by many Nationalists would be extended to cover 18 the nine countries of Ulster, but that, of course, never 19 happened. But no power was devolved to the Northern 20 administration or would be devolved to it until the 21 conflict with the IRA and the war of independence was 22 resolved. 23 Lloyd George introduced peace talks following the 24 ceasefire which didn't occur for some months. When he 25 did, agreement was reached concerning the creation of 116 1 a free state in the southern part of the Ireland, but 2 the issue of policing, of course, which I hope I have 3 displayed, was a very difficult issue for the 4 Government, and had to be resolved. 5 The RUC came into existence in June of 1922, 6 following the disbandment of the RIC, but an agreement 7 was reached between the British Government and 8 Michael Collins and James Craig concerning the make-up 9 of the RUC, which, in fact, led to a significant change 10 in the religious make-up of that particular police 11 force. So it went from being 80% Catholic, as the RIC 12 in 1922, to being about initially 40% Catholic when the 13 RUC was set up. 14 The reason for that was that there was an agreement 15 that a certain number of the new RUC had to be Catholic. 16 That would reflect the religious demographic of the 17 Northern counties which it was tasked with policing, 18 but, of course, that was a significant reduction in 19 terms of the number of Catholics that had been in the 20 police up until that point, and the numbers were made up 21 from within the ranks of the Specials. 22 Indeed, the texts and authorities on this matter 23 would suggest that significant numbers of the RIC were 24 brought into the RUC at a high-ranking level and fairly 25 close to retirement and that they were not replaced, and 117 1 that, indeed, by 1927, the overall proportion of 2 Catholics had reduced to 17.3%. 3 Now, there also, of course, remained in existence 4 the three special units, which were reduced to the 5 B Specials shortly after partition. The B Specials, in 6 fact, remained in existence throughout the 1920s, 1930s, 7 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, not being disbanded until 1970. 8 Indeed, they were replaced by two separate units, the 9 Ulster Defence Regiment and the RUC Reserve, about some 10 of whose members the Panel, sir, will hear a great deal 11 during the course of these proceedings. 12 The purpose of these remarks concerning the history 13 and development of the RUC is to perhaps, in as neutral 14 a way as possible, give the Panel some flavour of the 15 fact that this was no ordinary police force. This was 16 a police force which had an historical development in 17 the context of conflict. 18 In saying so, that is not necessarily in any way to 19 blame the members of that police force, but that police 20 force and the members of it inescapably saw themselves 21 as performing a political role as defenders of 22 a political idea and a political entity. That is not 23 least because those very same policemen and women were 24 the subject of a campaign of attack and murder by the 25 modern manifestation of the Irish Republican Army and 118 1 other Republican paramilitary groups throughout the 2 1970s and 1980s and 1990s. 3 So, when I make these remarks, it is not in any way 4 to cast any aspersions on the honesty or integrity or 5 good faith, in policing terms, of the vast majority of 6 policemen and women within the RUC, but it is perhaps 7 some attempt to explain that, if there were 8 a significant number of people within that particular 9 police force who perhaps viewed their priorities 10 differently than they ought to have done, that there is 11 an historical background to that. 12 In terms of the modern make-up of the RUC, the 13 Labour MP, Mr McNamara, asked a question in 1997 of the 14 Speaker of the House about the make-up of the RUC. It 15 was asked in September of 1997. So the date of these 16 figures has a certain significance. The full-time RUC 17 numbered 8,500 in September 1997. Of those, only 701 18 were from the Catholic faith. The RUC Reserve numbered 19 3,000 and, of those, only 200 were of the Catholic 20 faith. 21 Now, once again, I must stress that that is not in 22 itself in any way intended to be an indictment of the 23 RUC. There are many reasons why Catholics refused to 24 join the RUC throughout the period of the modern 25 troubles from 1970 to the modern day, not least the fact 119 1 that to do so was to put their own lives very seriously 2 at risk, but the submission is made simply to provide 3 a basis for the deeply held concerns on the part of the 4 Hamill family that those who were charged with the 5 responsibility of ensuring that there was no sectarian 6 conflict in the centre of Portadown on the night of 7 26th/27th April 1997 -- how they perhaps manifestly 8 failed in that responsibility. 9 Also germane to this issue is perhaps the more 10 immediate political issues that were developing in terms 11 of marching which exacerbated the sectarian tensions in 12 Portadown throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. The 13 Anglo-Irish agreement which was signed in 1985 to the 14 great discomfort of many Unionists, it allowed the Irish 15 Government to have a consultative role in the affairs of 16 Northern Ireland. 17 In 1985, there was a row erupted in the Portadown 18 area concerning the banning of a Nationalist accordion 19 parade in 1985 in the area of Obins Street. It was felt 20 that pressure had been brought to bear on the British 21 authorities the following year when a Protestant march 22 was banned on the Easter Monday, and that in itself 23 sparked a great deal of sectarian conflict throughout 24 the whole jurisdiction. That was known as the -- 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Your reading of developments since then 120 1 shows, doesn't it, that things simply went from bad to 2 worse? 3 MR McGRORY: Yes. I need not trouble the Panel with any -- 4 THE CHAIRMAN: That's perhaps an adequate summary of the 5 position that was reached when the troubles were at 6 their highest. 7 MR McGRORY: Yes, indeed. Indeed, this incident happened in 8 1997, which was the year perhaps of the -- I think the 9 third year of a series of years when there was conflict 10 with the Drumcree march. I need not trouble the Panel 11 any further about the detail of that. 12 I am grateful, sir, to Mr Underwood for his 13 comprehensive outlining of the issues, the detailed 14 issues, on which the Panel must make findings of fact, 15 issues concerning whether or not there was any wrongful 16 act or omission by or within the RUC, which facilitated 17 Robert's death or obstructed the investigation, or, 18 indeed, whether attempts were made to do so, and whether 19 any such act or omission was intentional or negligent, 20 and whether the investigation of his death was carried 21 out with due diligence and to make recommendations. 22 In my respectful submission, the Panel is obliged to 23 consider, not just factually, whether or not any of 24 those admissions or acts of neglect or obstruction that 25 are alleged did occur, and, if they did occur, why they 121 1 occurred, and if in considering why they occurred, 2 whether or not the fact that Robert Hamill was 3 a Catholic might have influenced those agencies in their 4 conduct of the various investigation and enquiries into 5 the death of Robert Hamill. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. 7 Yes, Mr Wolfe? 8 Opening speech by MR WOLFE 9 MR WOLFE: Sir, and members of the Panel, I am grateful for 10 this opportunity to make a brief opening on behalf of 11 the Police Service of Northern Ireland. 12 The events of the early morning of 27th April 1997 13 in Portadown and the untimely death of Robert Hamill 14 11 days later was one of a large number of sectarian 15 incidents which sadly punctuated the 30 years of 16 conflict in Northern Ireland. 17 The killing of Mr Hamill has been condemned by all 18 right-thinking people. The killing represented a tragic 19 waste of a young life, and in that sense was reflective 20 of much of what occurred during the conflict here. It 21 is a matter of record that, during the troubles, the 22 Royal Ulster Constabulary, the predecessor of today's 23 police service, was often called upon to take action to 24 protect those whose lives were placed in danger, and to 25 stand firmly against those who would threaten, maim or 122 1 kill. 2 It is acknowledged that for various reasons this 3 description of the role of the police is not shared by 4 everyone in this society and, indeed, my learned friend 5 Mr McGrory has reflected upon some of the historical 6 reasons for that. The debate around policing in 7 Northern Ireland has in the past often been polarised 8 and controversial, and it is a matter of record that 9 until very recently there hadn't been widespread 10 agreement about the principles which ought to underpin 11 policing in this jurisdiction. 12 In his opening remarks, my learned friend, Leading 13 Counsel for the Inquiry, has reflected a view that 14 Mr Hamill's tragic death occurred at a time when there 15 was a great mistrust of policing and the criminal 16 justice system on the part of sections of the Catholic 17 community in Northern Ireland. 18 It is, of course, accepted by the PSNI that, in 19 1997, some, and perhaps many, Catholics in Northern 20 Ireland mistrusted the policing and criminal justice 21 systems. However, it would be quite wrong, in my 22 respectful submission, to assume that the whole of 23 a diverse Catholic community were of that view. 24 For that matter, it might equally be said that 25 a section of the Protestant and Unionist community 123 1 mistrusted the police and were antagonistic towards the 2 police. Moreover, the extent of any mistrust, the 3 reasons for it and the consequences of it do not admit 4 of easy or straightforward answers. The task of 5 policing in a divided society presented the RUC with 6 many challenges, as it still does the PSNI. 7 It will be important for this Inquiry, in my 8 respectful submission, to develop a sophisticated 9 understanding of the context in which the police were 10 working in 1997, and, in doing so, it will wish to avoid 11 any over-simplification which places the police and the 12 entire Catholic community in a "them" and "us" 13 straitjacket. 14 Of course, members of the Inquiry, it would be naive 15 to think that any policing service or organisation can 16 always carry out its work without making mistakes. It 17 has been reported that the police officers who dealt 18 with the assault on Mr Hamill or who investigated its 19 consequences made many mistakes or, worse, deliberately 20 obstructed the pursuit of justice. 21 The purpose of this Inquiry is at least in part to 22 uncover the truth regarding police action or inaction in 23 the events surrounding Mr Hamill's death. It may be 24 that some of what has been said and written about the 25 matter has been inaccurate and exaggerated. Allegations 124 1 have been made which, on one view, have been selective 2 or lacking in evidence. There has been much, it might 3 be said, in the way of unhelpful speculation. 4 The PSNI has no doubt that the Inquiry provides 5 an important opportunity to examine the veracity of 6 allegations that have been made against police and 7 others and to subject them to a forensic scrutiny. This 8 will be in everyone's interests. 9 Therefore, members of the Inquiry, today the Police 10 Service of Northern Ireland welcomes the opportunity to 11 actively participate in a process which has been 12 designed, in the words of leading counsel, to shine 13 a powerful and unbiased spotlight on the public concerns 14 that give rise to the Inquiry being established so that 15 the truth can be revealed. 16 The success of this exercise, I venture to suggest, 17 will, of course, depend on all of the participants 18 committing themselves to revealing the truth as it is 19 known to them without fear or favour. The PSNI has no 20 hesitation in giving its full commitment to assisting 21 the Inquiry with its work so that the truth can be 22 demonstrated for all to see. The PSNI has already given 23 itself to energetically cooperating with the Inquiry in 24 its preparatory work and this has already been the 25 subject of positive comment. The PSNI will continue to 125 1 work in a spirit of openness and transparency as the 2 Inquiry commences the crucial task of hearing the 3 evidence. 4 The success of the Inquiry will also require 5 a thoroughgoing commitment to avoiding any assumptions 6 of fact. The PSNI welcomes the commitment to that 7 objective given by yourself, sir, in your opening 8 remarks and indeed by leading counsel. 9 However, the PSNI is concerned if any credence has 10 been attached to what leading counsel described this 11 morning as perceptions that the RUC was unwilling to 12 assist Catholics generally, that the RUC and the 13 criminal justice system were reckless about the 14 investigation and prosecution of those who attacked 15 Catholics and that the system protected RUC officers. 16 The grave allegations of wrongdoing which appear to 17 frame these perceptions are firmly denied by the PSNI. 18 In due course, we will require further particulars of 19 the evidence, if any, which is relied on to ground those 20 perceptions. 21 It is difficult for any organisation or individual 22 to defend itself, or him or herself, against 23 a perception which may or may not have substance in 24 fact. The PSNI will rely on the Inquiry to separate 25 fact from baseless perception or rumour and to form its 126 1 conclusions around that which is established by the 2 evidence as having occurred. 3 We must also express some concern that, having set 4 himself the goal of making his overview as 5 uncontroversial as he could, leading counsel has also 6 been prepared to put forward certain conclusions, 7 however tentatively. 8 For example, he has said that it is arguable that 9 arising out of the investigation of the neglect of duty 10 complaint there is evidence of absence of due diligence. 11 All of the participants in this process may have 12 formed their own views of particular issues or incidents 13 from the documents they will have considered in 14 preparation for the Inquiry. However, I respectfully 15 suggest that it is unhelpful to the process and risks 16 unfairness to participants if conclusions are 17 articulated prematurely in public and if the content of 18 the evidence which the Inquiry is to hear is in any 19 sense pre-judged. 20 Rather, it is better to restrain any temptation to 21 advance such propositions, however definitively, until 22 after the evidence has unfolded. 23 The PSNI will not seek to defend or exculpate before 24 this Inquiry any officer whose acts or omissions are 25 properly and fairly deserving of censure, nor, for that 127 1 matter, will it seek to excuse organisational or systems 2 failures where they have demonstratively occurred. 3 At the same time, the Inquiry will be invited to 4 give due consideration to all those aspects of the 5 police response, of which there may be many which are 6 worthy of approval or credit. 7 For example, the Inquiry will no doubt wish to 8 consider how officers reacted to the aggression and 9 violence in Portadown on the morning of 27th April, and 10 whether they put themselves at great risk of physical 11 harm. The Inquiry may also wish to give consideration 12 to the rate at which evidence was gathered, arrests made 13 and charges led, and the industries and energy which was 14 brought to the investigations. Those are obviously 15 matters to come out in evidence and the Inquiry will 16 wish to form its own view. 17 It is expected, however, that any criticism of 18 police action will be balanced by consideration of what 19 is praiseworthy about their conduct. 20 The Inquiry may also wish to consider whether 21 obstacles were placed in the path of the RUC's various 22 investigations. It may also wish to consider whether 23 those obstacles were circumstantial, so that nothing 24 could be done about them, or whether they were 25 deliberately placed. 128 1 It may also need to consider the extent to which any 2 obstacles hampered police and whether they could have 3 been overcome. An assessment will have to be made about 4 whether any such obstacles contributed to the 5 difficulties faced by police in bringing to justice 6 those responsible for the killing of Mr Hamill. 7 Furthermore, the Inquiry and observers may wish to 8 acknowledge that much has changed in the world of 9 Northern Ireland policing since 1997. The Patten 10 reforms which gave rise to a new policing organisation 11 from November 2001 are chief amongst those developments. 12 The PSNI is an organisation which is not subjected 13 to the same terrorist threat which faced the RUC. 14 Moreover, its membership is now more representative of 15 the community it seeks to serve. Its resources can be 16 more readily focused on civil policing, and its systems 17 and procedures are altogether more sophisticated. 18 Furthermore, the principles of the Human Rights Act 19 1998 underpin the ethos and outlook of the PSNI. 20 Finally, members of the Inquiry, the PSNI embarks on 21 this process with a determination to ensure that the 22 full truth emerges at the end of it. It is concerned to 23 ensure through its legal team that a thorough and 24 detailed consideration of all of the relevant issues 25 takes place. It gives to the Inquiry a commitment to 129 1 full cooperation throughout proceedings and it stands 2 ready to accept any recommendations for future conduct 3 which may emerge from the Inquiry's considerations. 4 Thank you. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Wolfe, would you accept this: that in 6 a society in which, over many generations, there has 7 been a sad sectarian divide, there are bound to be among 8 sections of both communities suspicions about the good 9 motives of people on the other side? 10 MR WOLFE: Having lived in Northern Ireland for 40 years, 11 I am fully aware of that, sir, yes. 12 Sorry,I didn't mean that to sound flippant. I hear 13 people laughing. It was intended to be a serious answer 14 to your question. 15 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Sometimes, if an allegation is made, 16 one would say, "Oh, that's unthinkable". Where, whether 17 from one side or another, in the type of situation you 18 have had in Northern Ireland there are criticisms made 19 of the good faith of the other side, one does not so 20 readily start off on the basis it is unthinkable and so 21 it must be dismissed, but that is a very far cry from 22 saying it has been shown, and one cannot make the 23 criticism unless it is shown. 24 Would you accept all of that? 25 MR WOLFE: I would accept all of that without hesitation. 130 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Wolfe. 2 Miss Dinsmore, would you wish to address us at this 3 stage? 4 MS DINSMORE: I would appreciate a brief opportunity, 5 Mr Chairman and members of the Inquiry. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: It helps to speak into the microphones. 7 MS DINSMORE: Is that better? 8 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 9 Opening speech by MS DINSMORE 10 MS DINSMORE: As you are aware, I represent Eleanor and 11 Robert Atkinson and, as was opened by leading counsel on 12 behalf of the Inquiry, Mr Atkinson was a full-time 13 Reserve Constable in the RUC and one of the officers on 14 duty on the Land Rover crew at the centre of Portadown 15 when the disturbances arose; those disturbances which 16 resulted in the serious injury to the late 17 Robert Hamill, and to the untimely death of 18 Robert Hamill. 19 Leading Inquiry Counsel has outlined to you, 20 Mr Chairman, the serious allegations which have been 21 made against my clients and each of them. My clients 22 have consistently and do deny any wrongdoing arising out 23 of the events which occurred on the early morning of 24 27th April 1997 and thereafter. 25 Specifically, Mr Atkinson has maintained, and 131 1 continues to maintain, that he discharged his duty as 2 a serving officer to the best of his capacity in helping 3 to quell the said disturbance on that sad evening. 4 Additionally, his wife and himself have and do 5 continue to deny being involved in any conspiracy in any 6 way to interfere with or compromise the criminal 7 investigations which sought to bring persons to justice 8 in relation to those that were involved in that fatal 9 assault on the late Robert Hamill. 10 Accordingly, Mr Chairman, members of the Inquiry, 11 I and my clients, welcome the opportunity to participate 12 within this Inquiry and to seek to exonerate in relation 13 to the allegations that have been made. 14 Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. 15 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Adair? 16 Opening speech by MR ADAIR 17 MR ADAIR: Yes. Thank you, sir. 18 Members of the Panel, as you know, I represent, 19 amongst others, a number of the police officers who were 20 present at the scene of the assault upon Robert Hamill 21 together with a number of officers who were tasked with 22 or involved in the investigation into the death of 23 Robert Hamill. 24 Insofar as this Inquiry will hopefully hear all the 25 facts of this tragic incident as opposed to what has on 132 1 occasions been speculation, rumour or unsubstantiated 2 and inaccurate assertions by some, we entirely welcome 3 this Inquiry. 4 Those officers involved whom I represent also 5 welcome the fact that the Inquiry will hear all the 6 parties and have the opportunity of assessing the 7 credibility and accuracy of those assertions in the 8 light of the overall evidence. The Hamill family have 9 suffered a terrible loss in the death of Robert, and it 10 is just as much in their interests as those for whom 11 I appear that the truth emerges. 12 Sir, there may well -- and at the end of this 13 Inquiry, this Inquiry may find that there may have been 14 things done or not done which, in hindsight, and with 15 the benefit of a microscope, should have been done or it 16 certainly would have been preferable had been done, but 17 we hope that this Inquiry will dispel once and for all 18 what I accept is a genuinely held belief by the Hamill 19 family, that any act or omission on the part of any of 20 those for whom I represent was due to the fact that 21 Robert Hamill was a Catholic. If this Inquiry does 22 nothing else but to dispel that, and, as I repeat, 23 I accept entirely genuinely held belief, then it will 24 have fulfilled its function. 25 That's all I wish to say at this stage. 133 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Is there anyone else who wishes to address me 2 at this stage? Mr Emmerson? 3 MR EMMERSON: On behalf of the Public Prosecution Service 4 may we reserve the opportunity to address some opening 5 submissions when the appropriate stage arises -- 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, of course. 7 MR EMMERSON: -- and simply at this stage assure you, sir, 8 and the members of the Panel of the director and the 9 service's full cooperation consistent with the Inquiry's 10 terms of reference? 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Does anyone else wish to address 12 us at this stage? Yes, Mr Underwood? 13 Opening speech re medical evidence by MR UNDERWOOD 14 MR UNDERWOOD: May I just say that those submissions we have 15 just heard are typical of the constructive, cogent and 16 helpful response we have had, not only from the people 17 from whom we have just heard, but also many others 18 involved in this Inquiry and I pay tribute to them. 19 Sir, we are at a point where I am ready to open the 20 medical evidence. The position is that thanks to the 21 economies of all my learned friends we are about a day 22 ahead of time already. Long may it continue! 23 I propose to spend the remainder of the day, with 24 your leave then, dealing with the medical position. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 134 1 MR UNDERWOOD: This will, I think, cause embarrassment to 2 all those experts to my far left who had no notice 3 whatever as to my intention to lead this material. 4 I hope they and you will forgive me if we deal with this 5 in a slightly uneven way. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: I don't hear any protests. Yes. 7 MR UNDERWOOD: As I said, there are broadly two questions 8 you may want to consider about the medical evidence: 9 namely, whether the assault was the cause of Mr Hamill's 10 death, and whether the medical findings reveal something 11 about the intensity and duration of the assault. 12 In respect of the first of those issues, you will 13 recall that Mr Hamill was assaulted on 27th April 1997 14 and died on 8th May without regaining consciousness. It 15 is fair to say that doctors at the Royal Victoria 16 Hospital where he died were not at all clear what was 17 the reason for the death. Two documents were produced 18 by the hospital contemporaneously. This is where 19 I think it will be helpful to look at some of those. 20 The first of those is at our page number [26166]. 21 This is a discharge summary. If we can highlight the 22 middle paragraph, you will see that the position taken 23 was that this was a: 24 "Relatively minor head injury. Probably hypoxic at 25 the scene." 135 1 That means, of course, lack of oxygen: 2 "Sudden collapse, ? Septicaemia. Ultimate death." 3 So you can see, as of 8th May, there was the 4 possibility already being broadcast that there may have 5 been a contributory factor of the lack of oxygen and 6 conceivably, therefore, a question arising about lack of 7 first aid. The fact that the collapse had been sudden, 8 notwithstanding there had been a general comatose state, 9 and perhaps blood poisoning. 10 Then if we go to page [26101] the other document 11 that emerged is something called a final report. If we 12 go to the next page, [26102], the final comment -- can 13 I take the final paragraph of this, please? This is 14 from the consultant: 15 "This was an extremely unexpected outcome and it was 16 thought that he may have been suffering from a septicaemia 17 or perhaps a pulmonary embolus. The coroner has been 18 informed and a coroner's autopsy carried out, the result 19 of which is awaited. It is felt that this man sustained 20 a relatively minor head injury but was in all likelihood 21 hypoxic at the scene of the assault, resulting in his 22 extreme cerebral irritation and evidence of 23 a decerebrate-type brain stem injury." 24 As I say, it probably would be unfair to call it 25 speculative but a number of options were kept open at 136 1 that point. 2 The state pathologist, who, as I say, was 3 Professor Crane, consulted a neuropathologist, 4 a Dr Herron. They concluded that the cause of death was 5 severe axonal injury, which can only be detected after 6 death and which would have resulted directly from the 7 assault. 8 Professor Crane ruled out all of the causes that 9 were canvassed in the final report and in the discharge 10 summary that we have just looked at. My team felt this 11 issue was so important as to justify a further opinion, 12 so we commissioned a report from an independent expert, 13 Dr Lawler. He has reached a somewhat different 14 conclusion, as I suggested this morning, to that of 15 Professor Crane. 16 That is that Mr Hamill died from a rare complication 17 of a drug that was given to treat him because of his 18 head injury. That complication is, as I said this 19 morning, called neuroleptic malignant syndrome. 20 However, he also concludes that the death was the 21 result of the head injury. He, too, rules out all the 22 possible causes of death mentioned in the final report 23 and in the discharge summary we have just looked at. 24 Other experts have prepared reports relevant to this 25 issue, but which we have considered it unnecessary to 137 1 call. I should explain here what happens where my team 2 has taken the view that a witness statement or a report 3 which has been commissioned should not lead to somebody 4 being called. 5 What we have done is serve those reports on the 6 interested parties and relevant witnesses and told them 7 we are not proposing to call them and either that we are 8 proposing to read the statement or the report or that we 9 are not proposing to do anything with it and to invite 10 any representations. 11 We have had no representations in respect of what 12 follows. So what I am proposing to do, if I may, is to 13 take you to highlights of some of the reports which have 14 been commissioned on this subject and which we 15 respectfully suggest simply reinforce the conclusions 16 you get from Professor Crane and Dr Lawler. You will 17 hear from Professor Crane and Dr Lawler, but I hope this 18 will set some scene for you. 19 I start with a Mr Todd. We find his first report at 20 page [72617]. Going over to page [72618], if we could 21 highlight paragraphs 4 through to 8, please. Mr Todd is 22 a consultant neurosurgeon and spinal surgeon. He was 23 asked to consider the pathology outcome. We see at 24 paragraph 4: 25 "4. Histological examination of the brain showed no 138 1 evidence of hypoxic ischaemic damage in neuronal 2 structures that would be subject to such damage." 3 So he is ruling out hypoxia and ischaemic changes 4 which are essentially the same thing resulting from lack 5 of oxygen supply to the brain: 6 "5. Histological examination of the brain 7 demonstrated a diffuse axonal injury (a shearing injury 8 to white matter tracts) widely distributed throughout 9 the brain; in some areas that damage was thought by 10 Professor Crane to be extensive. 11 "6. Such a diffuse axonal injury, widespread and in 12 parts extensive, would typically be associated with high 13 velocity road traffic accidents where there are severe 14 and abrupt acceleration/deceleration forces. 15 "7. Such a pattern of injury does not usually 16 follow a simple assault where a punch leads to the 17 patient being knocked out briefly. 18 "8. In my opinion, Mr Hamill's head/brain was 19 subjected to such significant forces that it caused the 20 sort of severe axonal injury that is normally associated 21 with high velocity road traffic accidents." 22 Now I, of course, said there is disagreement between 23 these very eminent experts about whether the actual 24 cause of death was axonal injury or neuroleptic 25 malignant syndrome. I think it is fair to say everybody 139 1 accepts there was some axonal injury. The question is 2 whether it was concentrated in such a place as to cause 3 the death. So I hope the disagreement between the 4 experts does not take away from the conclusion that 5 Mr Todd reaches there. 6 If we go to page -- 7 THE CHAIRMAN: I suppose there could have been two causes of 8 death; the axonal injury and the other injury? 9 MR UNDERWOOD: Quite so, yes. 10 Can I next go to another report from Mr Todd at 11 page [72643], dated 8th March 2006? If we go over the 12 page, please, to page [72644], the third paragraph which 13 starts: 14 "In 1992 ..." 15 What Mr Todd is doing is explaining some of the 16 scientific papers about axonal injury. He is 17 explaining: 18 "In 1992, Graham et al published 15 cases of fatal 19 head injury caused by an assault where there was 20 neuropathological evidence of diffuse axonal injury. In 21 10 of the 15 patients the diffuse axonal injury was 22 severe (Grade 3). In some cases, the assault was 23 a punch or punches, in other cases, there were further 24 injuries to the head, either an assault with a heavy 25 object or kicking, in some cases, the victim fell 140 1 striking his head on the ground. Graham et al make the 2 point that in most of their cases full details of the 3 nature of the assault were not available." 4 That is something that one sees running throughout 5 these reports; that both the malignant syndrome and the 6 axonal injury were relatively unreported in the 7 scientific papers and I think it will become clear, 8 particularly when we see Dr Lawler and Professor Crane, 9 that these are matters upon which the scientific 10 community has yet to form crystallised opinions. 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Would it be right to read the paragraph you 12 have highlighted for us, that where the nature of the 13 attack or the nature of the violence was known, it was 14 severe? 15 MR UNDERWOOD: Yes. 16 Can I go back to the page and pick out 17 a paragraph two paragraphs further on, which starts: 18 "There are a number of reports ..." 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 20 MR UNDERWOOD: Thank you very much: 21 "There are a number of reports of axonal injury 22 following assault. We have already considered the 15 23 patients reviewed by Graham et al. Grade 2 diffuse 24 axonal injury has been identified in a man who died thirteen 25 days after an assault. The paper contains the witness 141 1 evidence that 'the victim was attacked while lying on 2 the ground. The perpetrator stomped and kicked the 3 victim and also struck the victim's head with a piece of 4 cement'. This suggests that severe injury is required 5 to cause a grade 2 diffuse axonal injury following 6 assault." 7 THE CHAIRMAN: This was a grade 2 injury, was it? 8 MR UNDERWOOD: There is some debate about that I'm afraid, 9 not helped by the fact that the differentiation between 10 the grades has changed over the years from 1997 to date. 11 What I am doing is giving you a run of reports here. 12 Dr Todd produced those two. That was then followed by 13 a further report which is from a neuropathologist 14 commissioned by the Inquiry from Dr Reid, which I'm 15 about to come to. Then I will take you to a further 16 comment from Dr Todd resulting from all that, if I may. 17 Going to Dr Reid, her report starts at page [72526], 18 but if I can take you through to [72532], please, and 19 I should say that Dr Reid obtained the brain sections 20 that were taken at the autopsy and which were examined 21 by Professor Crane's team with one conclusion, and the 22 purpose of commissioning this report was to have 23 an independent analysis of the subject. 24 If I can pick it up in the third paragraph, please: 25 "In this case there is no description of 142 1 a macroscopic infarct of any type and no infarcts are 2 present in the sections. There is some 3 hypoxaemic/ischaemic neuronal damage, that is pink 4 neurones are seen and if this is graded as in the 5 reference from Graham et al it is diffuse and mild. 6 This change can occur within an hour of 7 hypoxic/ischaemic damage. It can also be due to other 8 insults than the original episode when he was assaulted. 9 Hypothermia itself can also cause hypoxic/ischaemic 10 neuronal damage." 11 There what Dr Reid is doing is independently from 12 the source material saying this is not oxygen 13 starvation. 14 Then, if we can go over the page, please, to 15 page [72533] the paragraph that starts: 16 "From the information and slides available", and 17 goes down to the bottom of (d), please: her conclusions 18 are these: 19 " From the information and slides available: 20 "(a). I do not agree that there is severe traumatic 21 diffuse axonal injury in this case. The grade of DAI", 22 that's diffuse axonal injury, "is II with scattered white 23 matter damage. 24 "(b). The lesions seen histologically showing 25 a macrophage response with little in the way of ongoing 143 1 damage are not, in my opinion, enough to cause his sudden 2 death. The probability of his death through Neuroleptic 3 Malignant Syndrome is one which I would agree with. 4 ."(c). The white matter damage may have been made 5 worse by hypoxaemia/ischaemia, but these lesions in the 6 white matter are not enlarging with more recent changes 7 in the surrounding white matter. 8 "(d). There is hypoxaemic/ischaemic neuronal change, 9 which is diffuse but mild as it involves several gyri 10 in several slides, but there are no cerebral infarcts 11 nor evidence of laminar necrosis in the cortex." 12 Again, we will have the advantage of two very 13 eminent pathologists who can explain that, but, from my 14 understanding of it, you would get laminar necrosis if 15 there is hypoxic damage: 16 "I therefore consider the hypoxaemic/ischaemic 17 changes not to have been a significant effect in this 18 case, but they did have an effect in worsening his 19 initial brain insult in the order of less of than one 20 third." 21 So that's then the position of Dr Reid in respect of 22 both the questions of the hypoxia and also whether the 23 severity of the axonal injury was sufficient in itself 24 to be the cause of death. 25 Then, finally in this run of evidence, if I can go 144 1 to what Mr Todd has said in a third opinion, we find 2 that at page [72811]. The report of 18th July 2006, in 3 which he has had a look at a medical report of 4 Dr Lawler, which we will see, and that report of Dr Reid 5 we have just looked at. 6 If I can go over the page to [72812], can 7 I highlight the top of the page down to "Review of 8 medical report". Thank you very much: 9 "I do not consider myself an expert in the diagnosis 10 of the neuroleptic malignant syndrome. My general 11 understanding is that Dr Lawler's list of major findings 12 in the neuroleptic malignant syndrome are correct. 13 "Dr Lawler also comments that he would be unable to 14 distinguish the neurological features that were 15 a consequence of neuroleptic malignant syndrome and 16 those that were attributable to the primary brain 17 injury. I agree with that. We know that Mr Hamill had 18 a grade 3 diffuse axonal injury which involved the brain 19 stem. Such brain stem damage could be associated with 20 marked fever (probable hypothalamic damage) with 21 autonomic problems (brain stem injury) and rigidity (for 22 example, the arching of the back noted on 01.05.97)." 23 Jumping a paragraph: 24 "However, what I can say with complete confidence is 25 that the use of chlorpromazine in a head-injured patient 145 1 who is agitated and restless is entirely reasonable. 2 The neurosurgeons cannot be faulted for using 3 chlorpromazine under these circumstances, and of course 4 it will be recognized that the development of the 5 neuroleptic malignant syndrome is rare." 6 Going over the page, we get a final conclusion on 7 this, [72813]. Can we highlight the entire paragraph, 8 please? Thank you: 9 "In my report I accepted Professor Crane's view that 10 Mr Hamill suffered a severe grade 3 diffuse axonal 11 injury. Dr Reid believes that the diffuse axonal injury 12 was less severe, grade 2. This weakens my suggestion 13 that Mr Hamill suffered a prolonged and violent assault 14 rather than a single blow to the head and it supports my 15 view that it is not beyond reasonable doubt that he 16 suffered a less severe primary injury causing grade 2 17 axonal injury. 18 "I remain of the view that Mr Hamill's head injury 19 was at a level of violence considerably greater than the 20 average 'Saturday night punch-up'. As you will have 21 noted from my supplementary report, it is simply not 22 possible to be certain as to what level of head injury 23 Mr Hamill suffered even if there was a grade 3 diffuse 24 axonal injury, and still less when the diffuse axonal 25 injury is not considered to be grade 2." 146 1 What I apprehend you can take from that is that the 2 original assumption in the first report of Dr Todd 3 simply assumed the axonal injury was as severe as set 4 out in the original reports, but that, whether it is 5 grade 2 or grade 3, this was a severe assault, and that 6 the distinction between grade 2 and grade 3 is not going 7 to help in determining the severity of the assault, 8 because too little is known. 9 The other question then is whether the medical 10 evidence can throw any light on the nature and period of 11 the assault. I have largely covered that ground with 12 the reports we have just looked at, but I am going to 13 call two nurses, Maureen Hagan and Maureen Millar and 14 a doctor, Dr Low, all of whom worked at the 15 Craigavon Area Hospital. 16 They saw Mr Hamill when he was admitted and they 17 made notes. They are likely to be in the best position 18 to give you evidence of the injuries that Mr Hamill 19 presented with immediately on admission to hospital. 20 There are a number of statements that I want to draw 21 your attention to from other doctors before I call any 22 of those witnesses, whose evidence I hope is 23 uncontroversial, and, therefore, I'm able to read. 24 The first of those is Dr Lavery. We find his 25 statement at page [80633]. (Pause). 147 1 I have just been told there is a medical problem on 2 the part of somebody in the Inquiry and some timetabling 3 discussion may be valuable. I am being invited by some 4 of my team to ask you to rise so that can be sorted out. 5 May I just take a moment to take some instructions 6 to see whether it is worth rising and then coming back? 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, of course. 8 MR UNDERWOOD: From what I am hearing, I think I will invite 9 you to rise for the day. There needs to be some 10 discussion about what time we can sit in the morning 11 because of medical difficulty. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: I see. 13 MR UNDERWOOD: As I have said, sir, we are way ahead of 14 time. I am hoping there will be no loss at all from 15 this. Perhaps I can invite everybody to stay behind, as 16 it were, for another ten minutes or so and we can report 17 to everybody the outcome of the discussions? 18 THE CHAIRMAN: The hope is we shall hear the two consultants 19 tomorrow, is it? 20 MR UNDERWOOD: It would be good if we can get them. To be 21 perfectly frank -- and this is entirely my fault -- 22 I scheduled the consultants for Thursday in the 23 expectation that the openings would take longer, and in 24 the desire not to have consultants kicking their heels 25 in this elegant building when they could be doing 148 1 something far less important. So what I have done is 2 make some enquiries to see whether we can get some of 3 the nurses here tomorrow, if possible, but in any event, 4 sir, we will do what we can. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: We will await events. 6 Tomorrow at 10.30, unless what you tell us conflicts 7 with that. 8 MR UNDERWOOD: Quite so. 9 (3.55 pm) 10 (The hearing adjourned until 10.30 tomorrow morning) 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 149 1 I N D E X 2 3 Opening speech by MR UNDERWOOD ................... 19 4 Opening speech by MR MCGRORY ..................... 100 5 Opening speech by MR WOLFE ....................... 122 6 Opening speech by MS DINSMORE .................... 131 7 Opening speech by MR ADAIR ....................... 132 8 Opening speech re medical evidence ............... 134 9 by MR UNDERWOOD 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 150