

Portadown and the surrounding country areas. I do not remember if the car was marked or unmarked but I do not think we had any marked police cars at that time. Our duties included answering calls as they came to us and providing back up for other police if requested. I was the backseat observer that day and both Constable Cooke and Reserve Constable Warnock were seated at the front. I cannot remember now who was driving and who was the front seat observer.

5. In my notebook entry dated 27 April 1997, which is now produced and shown to me containing the page numbers **9973 to 9976** and my witness statement dated 27 April 1997, which is now produced and shown to me containing the page numbers **9231 to 9232**, I have recorded that we received a radio transmission from a female officer requesting assistance from JD81 in relation to a public disorder in Portadown town centre. The officer making the radio transmission was screaming and it was obvious that a crew was in difficulty and that there was crowd trouble. At the time we received the transmission I had no real cause for concern, however, a call for back-up was not unusual and I had received such calls in the past.

6. When we received the radio transmission we were about two or two and a half miles north of the town centre, in the direction of Killycomaine. We made our way straight to the town centre but because the barriers to the town centre were closed we had to use a roundabout route, coming in via Bridge Street and Edward Street before turning left on to Market Street. It took us about two to three minutes to get to the scene from the time we received the transmission. I believe that we parked behind another unmarked police vehicle on Market Street just before the junction of Thomas Street, near to the central reservation. I have marked our position with an "X" on the map of Portadown [73914]. The Land Rover was positioned across the street near the corner of Woodhouse Street and was facing towards the bottom of the town, i.e. away from the Church. I have marked the position of the Land Rover with an "X" and the letters "LR" and an arrow to denote the way it was facing.

7. There were already at least four officers, possibly six, on the street when we arrived on the scene: the four from the Land Rover crew and then the officers from the other police vehicle. There was a crowd of about forty, possibly fifty people and they were all over the place. The majority of the crowd, I would say in the region of 95 to 99 percent, was Loyalist. The rest were Nationalists. They were all shouting and running about like madmen. It was quite evident that they were high on drink. In my notebook entry [9973] I described the crowd as “rioting”. There were minor fights taking place all around us, across the breadth of Market Street near the Woodhouse Street/ Thomas Street junction. Each of the officers who had been on the scene appeared to be surrounded by a number of persons and a number of persons were fighting with police officers. There were a lot of small particles of broken glass all around the junction of Thomas Street. I presumed it was broken bottles. The officers had their batons drawn and were trying to push the crowd back away from the junction and up the town.
8. Constable Cooke, Reserve Constable Warnock and I got out of our vehicle and went towards the crowd. There was no time to speak to the other officers. Initially I was standing in Market Street, near the central reservation. I recall seeing two men lying motionless on the street not far from where I stood. They appeared to be unconscious. One was at the entrance to Thomas Street and the other was lying in Market Street itself, just a short distance from the junction of Thomas and Market Streets. I have denoted their respective positions with a small circle on the map of Portadown. There were at least two females, possibly three, around them. One or two of the females was going back and forth from one man to the next. I presume those women were with the men on the ground. As the men appeared to be receiving comfort from these women I did not go to assist the men nor did I see any other officers provide any assistance. As I said, our main focus was trying to keep the crowd back from the junction.
9. Indeed, our efforts to control the crowd were quite unsuccessful initially. There were a number of scuffles taking place all over the junction. I am not sure who was

involved, whether the fights were between Nationalists and Loyalists or were between Loyalist factions. Although we were trying to push the crowd back up the town they kept running down towards the junction. I don't know whether they were trying to get at the officers who were at the junction or whether they were trying to get to the two guys. There were also a number of guys coming up out of Woodhouse Street, which is the Nationalist end of the junction. We kept pushing them back down Woodhouse Street.

10. There had been numerous incidents at the Woodhouse Street/Thomas Street junction in the past, for example when the bars would empty and there might be half a dozen people on each side squaring up with each other. The junction had always been known to be a flashpoint for sectarian violence during my time in Portadown and that is why there would be a police Land Rover positioned at that junction. However, those incidents had never involved the numbers that there were that night. The numbers that night were just impossible to handle. The crowd had no fear of the police. We were totally outnumbered. There were just too few police officers to deal with the disturbance. I felt scared as well as threatened by the crowd although I was not actually assaulted. I would not say that we dealt with the incident as a unit though. We were all separate for most of the time, scattered all over the place and trying to watch our own backs. I was even separated from Constable Cooke and Reserve Constable Warnock.
11. It is fair to say that there was no clear strategy although it was fairly obvious what we needed to do. In my view, our priority was to control the crowd. It was a matter of everyone mucking in to try and push the crowd back. We all had our batons drawn to try to put some fear into the crowd but I did not strike anyone. It did not make any sense to use the baton on one or two people given the size of the crowd. I believe that there may have been one or two Federal Riot Guns available but I do not believe they were fired. Given the size of the crowd I am not sure that it would have made a difference anyway if they had been fired.

12. An ambulance must have been called to the town centre to deal with the two injured men on the ground. I do not know when it would have been called but the time between when we arrived on the scene and when the ambulance arrived seemed an awful lot of time, although of course it is hard to judge exactly how long it took to arrive. When it did arrive the crowd was still milling about. We had not got them completely under control and they were still fairly aggressive. Once the ambulance was on the scene the ambulance crew appeared to be working on the two guys on the ground for a long time before putting them in the back of the ambulance. I believe that both of them were taken into the ambulance by stretcher. I assume that the females also went into the ambulance with them but I can't say for certain.

13. While we were trying to control the crowd I believe that other police vehicles arrived with more officers as well as other officers on foot, possibly from the police station on Edward Street. As far as I recall it was a number of minutes before these other officers arrived but it was hard to judge. There were probably between ten to twelve officers in total, but no more. I believe those were all the back-up resources available at that time. A call must have been made for the Mobile Support Unit to provide additional back-up but that would have been handled above my level. The Mobile Support Unit arrived only after we had managed to control the crowd and pushed them up the town. I believe they had been delayed in Banbridge dealing with another incident.

14. When I was trying to control the crowd I would have been right up in their faces, I was that close to them. However, I was not able to recognise anyone. They were all just faces in the crowd. However, as I said in my 27 April 1997 statement [page 9231] I did observe Constable A take a youth I now know to be Wayne Lunt from the crowd to the Land Rover. I note from the transcript of my interview with Chief Inspector Jackson and Sergeant [REDACTED] on 24 September 2001, a copy of which is now produced and shown to me containing pages number 10488 to 10496, I had been involved in patrols in the past that had dealt with Mr Lunt but I had not dealt with him personally.

15. I did not see when Constable A actually apprehended Mr Lunt nor am I able to say why he was apprehended. There was no time for me to ask Constable A why he had been apprehended. As I said in my witness statement of 27 April 1997 [page 9232], he was wearing a red, white and blue scarf but I cannot remember what else he was wearing nor whether he was wearing the scarf in a particular way. I have been asked whether he had a bottle in his hand when he was brought to the Land Rover. I did not notice that he had a bottle. As I was adjacent to the back of the Land Rover at the time pushing people down Woodhouse Street, Constable A asked me to stay with him in the back of the Land Rover. Mr Lunt was placed into the back of the Land Rover but I do not believe that he was handcuffed. He just sat there and did not say anything. He wasn't aggressive; he didn't care.

16. While I was with Mr Lunt in the Land Rover, Constable A went back up the street about fifty or sixty yards up towards the Church. She spoke to the other police. I don't know what about. I did not hear or see her communicate to any one else by radio and I cannot say whether she radioed to get Mr Lunt's details. I have been asked whether any members of the crowd were trying to pull Mr Lunt out of the Land Rover and back into the crowd. I did not see that happening. I have also been asked whether I saw anyone punch Mr Lunt while he was in the Land Rover.

17. Again, I did not see that. While he was in the Land Rover I had one eye on Mr Lunt and one eye off him because there were still one or two persons from the Nationalist side coming up from Woodhouse Street near the back of the Land Rover towards the town centre so I was pushing them back as well as looking after him. Mr Lunt was actually allowed to leave the Land Rover after about five minutes, maybe ten, when Constable A returned to the Land Rover. She spoke to him and released him. I did not ask her why she was releasing him because I did not have time. The crowd was not totally under control but I presumed she had her reasons as she was the one dealing with him. I have been asked whether I witnessed

anyone come up to speak to Constable A after she released Mr Lunt. I did not see anyone speak to her or shout at her.

18. As I said in my witness statement of 27 April 1997 [page 9232], I also recognised Donald Blevins in the Loyalist crowd. I have been asked whether I am certain that it was Mr Blevins that I saw. I am sure because I had had dealings with Mr Blevins a number of years previously in relation to public order incidents so he was known to myself and other officers. He was not an active part of the crowd that was causing any trouble but he was trying to calm the situation and get Loyalists to leave the area by speaking to them and physically pushing them back up the town. However, like the police, he was having no success.
19. Eventually the ten or twelve officers on the scene were able to get the crowd under control and pushed them up to the top of West Street, beyond the barriers at the junction of Mandeville Street. I have marked on the map of Portadown “crowd pushed back” to denote the position of the crowd at this stage. It took us a long time to get the crowd under control, maybe an hour. The crowd was still quite large at that stage, maybe forty or fifty people. They hung around by the barriers although by that stage they were not really aggressive. Initially they gave verbal abuse to us but then eventually became quiet. We did not make any arrests at that stage because we were still outnumbered and as a matter of common sense the focus was on keeping the crowd out of the town centre. We just stood on the other side of the barriers facing the crowd until the Mobile Support Unit arrived and took over. I am unable to say exactly when the town centre did return to normal. I know that we were facing the Loyalist crowd at the barriers at West Street for a long time before the Mobile Support Unit arrived. We were stood down after about ten minutes. I believe it was a verbal stand down. I did not have any sort of debriefing when I was stood down.
20. Neither I nor any of the officers who were stood down made any effort to preserve the scene before leaving the town centre. As a full time Reserve officer I did not

have any training in scene preservation. I certainly was not given any orders to preserve the scene. The barriers were still up so there was no vehicular traffic. Therefore the scene most certainly would not have been driven over.

21. After being stood down I returned to the police station. I probably returned to the station with the Late Crew that I was supposed to have been with in the Land Rover that night as we would have been stood down at the same time. As I said in my interview with Chief Inspector Jackson [page 10495] I terminated duty at about 03.45. That would have included the time to return to the station and changing time as well. I reckon that I would have left the scene maybe around 03.30 or 03.35 on 27 April 1997.
22. I was not given any instructions when I returned to the police station. I don't believe that I would have completed my notebook entry or made my statement at that stage. The standard procedure is for officers to complete their notebook entries as soon as practicably possible. I had been on duty from 15.45pm on 26 April to 03.45 on 27 April. It is possible I would have made the notebook entry when I returned home or when I returned to duty later that afternoon at 15.45. When I did return to duty at 15.45 I did not have any debriefing about the previous night but the Sergeant briefing us or the officer in charge would have told me to go up to CID and write out our statements about the incident. I wrote my statement in the main CID office and handed it to Detective Sergeant Bradley. I did not discuss my statement in detail with anyone. I did not see any of the other officers who had been at the scene the previous night. I was not given any instructions or guidance as to what the statement should contain. In fact, at no stage did I have a debriefing about the incident. At that time we would very, very rarely have been debriefed.
23. I had no further involvement in the investigation of the incident after I provided that statement of 27 April 1997 [page 9231] until my second statement of 2 January 2001 [page 34807]. Subsequently I was served with a 17/3 Notice of Report dated 27 June 2001 by Superintendent Kennedy, a copy of which is now produced and

shown to me containing pages number **10715 to 10716** and I was interviewed by Chief Inspector Jackson on 24 September 2001. The document headed Response to Form 17/3, a copy of which is now produced and shown to me containing pages number **67923 to 67924** appears to be a summary of the transcript of that interview [pages **10488 to 10496**] but for the avoidance of doubt it is not a document produced either by me or on my behalf.

24. I have been asked about various other people who are connected with this and I can say that I knew Allister Hanvey because I had dealt with him a few months before in connection with a road traffic collision. However, he was not as well known to me as Donald Blevins was, for example. I saw Allister Hanvey in the crowd of Loyalists that night but I cannot remember exactly when I saw him, what he was wearing nor what he was doing when I did see him. I have looked at my notebook entry [pages **9973 to 9976**] and my statement of 27 April 1997 [pages **9231 to 9232**] and there is nothing recorded there about Allister Hanvey. I made a further statement dated 2 January 2001, a copy of which is now produced and shown to me containing the page numbers **34807 to 34808**. In that statement I recorded that I saw Allister Hanvey on the night in question. As I said in that statement [page **34807**] I could have seen him either at the junction in the town centre during the disturbance or later when we pushed the crowd back to the top of West Street. I don't know why I did not record this fact in my earlier statement of 27 April 1997. However, if he had been doing anything worthy of note I definitely would have recorded it in my notebook entry and in my original statement.

SIGNED:

JAMES MURPHY

DATED: